Citation: 2012 TCC 84
Date: 20120316
Docket: 2010-2091(IT)G
BETWEEN:
SAMIPAL DHALIWAL,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Boyle J.
[1]
The only issue that
remained to be decided at the hearing of this appeal was whether the taxpayer
had elected in his electronically‑filed 2007 tax return to have the
deemed disposition rule in subsection 50(1) of the Income Tax Act (the
“Act”) apply to a bad debt owed to him.
I. Facts
[2]
Over a period of
several months in 2005, Mr. Dhaliwal loaned $156,000 to his employer, Mainland
Sound and Communication Inc. (“Mainland”). Most of the funds were advanced by
cheque to Mainland. A portion was advanced by cheque made out to one of the
individual principals of the business at his request. Mr. Dhaliwal
understood the loan was nonetheless to Mainland and at the trial the Respondent
did not dispute this.
[3]
The principals of
Mainland, Mr. Dhaliwal’s bosses, told him the business was experiencing
short‑term cash flow problems because suppliers to specific jobs needed
to be paid before its customers’ progress payments under the contracts were
due. His loans were to be repaid promptly when customers paid Mainland. This
was a handshake deal at that stage. After a series of advances over a period of
months, none of which had yet been repaid, Mr. Dhaliwal became very
concerned in July 2005 when a supplier refused to deliver on a job because
he was unpaid. Mr. Dhaliwal had already advanced Mainland money to pay
this particular supplier.
[4]
Mr. Dhaliwal
retained a lawyer to advise him. Following his lawyer’s advice,
Mr. Dhaliwal had Mainland and its two principals sign an interest‑bearing
promissory note on August 18, 2005 which was prepared by his lawyer.
The promissory note provided that the loan was to be fully repaid in three
weekly instalments beginning the following week. Under the promissory note, the
two principals were made jointly and severally liable with Mainland for
the debt. Unfortunately for Mr. Dhaliwal, he was never repaid this loan by
Mainland and, as described below, was only ever able to recover a very modest
amount from the bankruptcy of one of the principals with the result that he has
lost more than $154,000.
[5]
A receiver‑manager
of Mainland was appointed by Vancity Credit Union on September 2, 2005.
A Receiving Order was granted by the Supreme Court of British Columbia on
September 14, 2005. A bankruptcy of Mainland ensued. Mr. Dhaliwal
promptly filed a Proof of Claim dated September 30, 2005 as a
preferred creditor in respect of his unpaid wages as employee. He also filed
proof of his claim for the $156,000 debt plus accrued interest in the
bankruptcy as an unsecured creditor. In December 2005, the Trustee’s Statement
of Receipts and Disbursements was signed indicating that Mainland had no
unencumbered assets and that no amount would be available for distribution. In
April 2006, the Trustee filed a Notice of Final Dividend, indicating none would
be paid, and a Discharge of Trustee was issued.
[6]
In 2006, Mr. Dhaliwal
retained another lawyer to pursue collection of the promissory note against the
two individual principals of Mainland as they had agreed in the promissory note
to be jointly and severally liable with Mainland for the amount owing.
Proceedings were commenced in the Supreme Court of British Columbia in
January 2006. Summary judgment was applied for against both principals.
That application was adjourned at the defendants’ request when it came on for
hearing in March 2006. Shortly thereafter he received notice of a filing
for bankruptcy by one of the principals, David Blom.
[7]
Somewhat later in 2006,
in further consultation with his lawyer and upon his lawyer’s advice to stop throwing
good money after bad, it was decided not to pursue the other principal, Oscar Correa.
It had been determined that Mr. Correa had significant outstanding
creditors ahead of Mr. Dhaliwal including financial institutions and the Canada
Revenue Agency (“CRA”).
[8]
It was decided to
pursue his claim in the bankruptcy of Mr. Blom. Mr. Dhaliwal filed a
Proof of Claim for the $156,000 debt and ultimately received a total dividend
of $1,670.85 in respect of the claim. The Certificate of Discharge (Conditions
Met) for Mr. Blom’s bankruptcy was dated February 5, 2007.
[9]
Mr. Dhaliwal e‑filed
his 2007 tax return in timely fashion in late April 2008. In the
electronic tax return, he completed an Allowable Business Investment Loss (“ABIL”)
schedule specifying he had realized a loss of $154,329.15 (i.e. the $156,000
advanced to Mainland less the $1,670.85 dividend from Mr. Blom’s estate in
bankruptcy) in 2007 on the loan made in 2005. His ABIL was computed as 50% of
that loss and he claimed that amount as an ABIL in the main part of his
electronic tax return. The ABIL schedule to his tax return indicates the loan was
disposed of in 2007 upon the date of Mr. Blom’s discharge from bankruptcy.
After that date no further collections could have been reasonably expected to
be received in respect of his loan to Mainland.
[10]
In early May 2008,
the CRA wrote requesting additional information in respect of his ABIL before
it could assess his tax return. The CRA pre‑printed questionnaire does
not even contemplate a loan being actually disposed of by a sale to a third
party.
[11]
In September 2008,
the CRA wrote to Mr. Dhaliwal saying it was denying the ABIL completely
for the sole reason that Mainland had not filed its tax returns and hence the CRA
could not determine if it was a qualifying small business corporation (“SBC”) for
purposes of the ABIL provisions of the Act. It can be noted that a
debtor’s ABIL is not dependant upon the corporate borrower filing its tax returns
under the Act. It can also be noted that Mr. Dhaliwal did answer
the questions in his CRA questionnaire describing Mainland’s business and the
number of its employees, information necessary to determine whether a
corporation is a qualifying SBC.
[12]
Following this,
Mr. Dhaliwal went to meet with the CRA in September 2008 to try to resolve
this denial of his ABIL. At the meeting with the CRA, he completed a T1
Adjustment Request asking the CRA to reassess 2007 to allow the ABIL. He did
this at the meeting at the CRA’s suggestion. In January 2009, the CRA
wrote to Mr. Dhaliwal that it was unable to make the adjustment request
for the sole reason Mainland had not filed its tax returns so they could not
determine if it was a qualifying SBC. The letter advised him to file an Objection
if he disagreed.
[13]
Mr. Dhaliwal filed
an Objection. The Objection was denied and the assessment was confirmed.
According to a detailed letter accompanying the Notice of Confirmation, the CRA
concluded that the loan became bad in 2005 upon Mainland’s bankruptcy. It also
reiterated that there was insufficient evidence that Mainland was a qualifying
SBC. The CRA also concluded that the loan was not made to Mainland but to
Mr. Blom because a Proof of Claim for the full debt had been filed in
Mr. Blom’s bankruptcy proceeding. The CRA also concluded that the loan appeared
to be non‑arm’s length given that Mr. Dhaliwal was an employee of
Mainland, did not receive security for the loan, and interest only began accruing
upon the signing of the promissory note. The concluding portion of the
confirmation letter says that since the loan went bad in 2005, subsection 50(1)
of the Act required that the election for a deemed disposition of the
debt be made in 2005 and that his 2007 T1 Adjustment Request could not satisfy
the requirement. The letter usefully points out that upon payment of a late‑filing
penalty, the taxpayer could still late‑file an election for 2005.
[14]
The penalty would have
been approximately $5,000 but given that Mr. Dhaliwal believes the debt
went bad in 2007 and not in 2005, and given that the CRA had made three other
very adverse conclusions that the loan could not satisfy the ABIL requirements,
Mr. Dhaliwal did not make a late‑filed election for 2005 and pay the
necessary late‑filing penalty. He no doubt wisely concluded that (i) he
believed it was unnecessary, and (ii) it would still not cause the CRA to
allow him the ABIL. He proceeded to appeal the CRA confirmation of his 2007 Objection
in this proceeding.
[15]
In its Reply, the Respondent
pleaded that the loan was not made by Mr. Dhaliwal for value to an arm’s‑length
corporation for the purpose of earning income. The Respondent also pleaded that
Mainland was not a SBC. The Respondent further pleaded that the loss, if there
was one, did not occur in 2007. Finally, and for the very first time in this
dispute, the Respondent submitted that even if the loss was realized in 2007,
the taxpayer did not elect as required by subsection 50(1) of the Act
in his 2007 taxation year’s return. It can be noted that this was not supported
by an assumption by the Minister.
[16]
At the opening of
trial, the Respondent conceded that Mr. Dhaliwal’s loan was in fact made
for value, on an arm’s‑length basis, to an SBC for the purpose of
producing income. The Respondent did not dispute at trial that the loss was
realized in 2007. Thus, the only question remaining was whether either the ABIL
schedule and ABIL deduction in Mr. Dhaliwal’s e‑filed 2007 tax return,
or his 2007 T1 Adjustment Request, satisfied the requirements of subsection 50(1)
that the taxpayer elect to choose to realize the loss in his 2007 tax return.
[17]
Mr. Dhaliwal was
entirely credible in his testimony and reasonable in his approach throughout
this matter. He kept good records and documents to support all of the above. He
appears to have been as determined and diligent in pursuing collection of the
debt owed to him as would be expected of a reasonable Canadian business person
or investor. He was equally diligent, clear and consistent in claiming and
pursuing the ABIL he reported in his 2007 tax return in respect of the bad debt.
I can also add that he represented himself in this matter very ably.
II. Law and Analysis
[18]
The relevant portions
of the applicable provisions of the Act are as follows:
39. (1) Meaning
of capital gain and capital loss [and business investment loss] — For the purpose of this Act,
. . .
(c) a taxpayer’s business investment loss for a taxation
year from the disposition of any property is the amount, if any, by which the
taxpayer’s capital loss for the year from a disposition after 1977
(i) to which subsection 50(1) applies, or
(ii) to a person with whom the taxpayer was dealing at arm’s
length
|
39. (1)
Sens de gain en capital et de perte en capital [et des pertes au titre d’un
placement d’entreprise] — Pour l’application de
la présente loi :
[…]
c) une perte au titre d’un placement
d’entreprise subie par un contribuable, pour une année d’imposition,
résultant de la disposition d’un bien quelconque s’entend de l’excédent
éventuel de la perte en capital que le contribuable a subie pour l’année
résultant d’une disposition, après 1977:
(i) soit à laquelle le paragraphe 50(1) s’applique,
(ii) soit en faveur d’une personne avec laquelle il n’avait aucun
lien de dépendance,
|
. . .
|
[…]
|
50. (1) Debts
established to be bad debts and shares of bankrupt corporation — For the purposes of this subdivision, where
(a) a debt owing to a taxpayer at the end of a taxation
year (other than a debt owing to the taxpayer in respect of the disposition
of personal-use property) is established by the taxpayer to have become a bad
debt in the year, or
(b) a share (other than a share received by a taxpayer as
consideration in respect of the disposition of personal-use property) of the
capital stock of a corporation is owned by the taxpayer at the end of a
taxation year and
(i) the corporation has during the year become a bankrupt (within
the meaning of subsection 128(3)),
(ii) the corporation is a corporation referred to in section 6 of
the Winding-up Act that is insolvent (within the meaning of that Act)
and in respect of which a winding-up order under that Act has been made in
the year, or
(iii) at the end of the year,
(A) the corporation is insolvent,
(B) neither the corporation nor a corporation controlled by it
carries on business,
(C) the fair market value of the share is nil, and
(D) it is reasonable to expect that the corporation will be
dissolved or wound up and will not commence to carry on business
and the taxpayer elects in the taxpayer’s return of income for the
year to have this subsection apply in respect of the debt or the share, as
the case may be, the taxpayer shall be deemed to have disposed of the debt or
the share, as the case may be, at the end of the year for proceeds equal to
nil and to have reacquired it immediately after the end of the year at a cost
equal to nil.
|
50. (1) Créances reconnues comme irrécouvrables et actions d’une
société en faillite — Pour l’application de la
présente sous-section, lorsque, selon le cas :
a) un contribuable établit qu’une
créance qui lui est due à la fin d’une année d’imposition (autre qu’une
créance qui lui serait due du fait de la disposition d’un bien à usage
personnel) s’est révélée être au cours de l’année une créance irrécouvrable;
b) une action du capital-actions d’une
société (autre qu’une action reçue par un contribuable en contrepartie de la
disposition d’un bien à usage personnel) appartient au contribuable à la fin
d’une année d’imposition et :
(i) soit la société est devenue au cours de l’année un failli au
sens du paragraphe 128(3),
(ii) soit elle est une personne morale visée à l’article 6 de la Loi
sur les liquidations, insolvable au sens de cette loi et au sujet de
laquelle une ordonnance de mise en liquidation en vertu de cette loi a été
rendue au cours de l’année,
(iii) soit les conditions suivantes sont réunies à la fin de
l’année :
(A) la société est insolvable,
(B) ni la société ni une société qu’elle contrôle n’exploite
d’entreprise,
(C) la juste valeur marchande de l’action est nulle,
(D) il est raisonnable de s’attendre à ce que la société soit dissoute
ou liquidée et ne commence pas à exploiter une entreprise,
le contribuable est réputé avoir disposé de la créance ou de
l’action à la fin de l’année pour un produit nul et l’avoir acquise de
nouveau immédiatement après la fin de l’année à un coût nul, à condition
qu’il fasse un choix, dans sa déclaration de revenu pour l’année, pour que le
présent paragraphe s’applique à la créance ou à l’action.
|
[19]
A taxpayer’s ABIL is
50% of his or her business investment loss (“BIL”). BIL is defined in
paragraph 39(1)(c) of the Act. In order for a taxpayer to
have a BIL, subparagraphs 39(1)(c)(i) and (ii) require that the
loss on the qualifying debt or shares be realized either from an actual
disposition to an arm’s‑length person or from a deemed disposition to
which subsection 50(1) applies.
[20]
Subsection 50(1)
applies to deem a disposition of a debt where a debt is established to have
become a bad debt in the year and the taxpayer elects in his or her return of
income for that year to have the subsection apply. In the French version of the
Act, the phrase “makes a choice” is used for the verb “elects”.
[21]
It is no longer
disputed that the Mainland debt became bad in 2007. The only issue is whether
Mr. Dhaliwal elected in his 2007 tax return to have the deemed disposition
of that debt available to him under subsection 50(1) apply. There is no
prescribed form under the Act for choosing this election. The CRA does
not have a recommended form available for the election. Tax returns developed
by the CRA do not have a space to expressly indicate an election to have
subsection 50(1) apply, not even in the schedules for dispositions of
capital property or for computation of ABILs. While a taxpayer can add pages to
a paper tax return, electronic tax returns are set by the CRA and there is no
chance for a taxpayer to add or append a new form, or letter or document to
them.
[22]
The question thus
becomes: Must a subsection 50(1) election be made with an express
reference to electing to have subsection 50(1) apply, or is it sufficient
that the taxpayer elects to report a loss in his or her tax return on a deemed
disposition that results because he or she has chosen to avail himself or
herself of subsection 50(1)? In an electronic‑filing age, this takes
on considerable importance as, if an election making a specific reference to
subsection 50(1) is required, but no such choice is available in the CRA’s
electronic tax returns, this would mean that subsection 50(1) is only
available to paper‑filers or that the CRA is derelict in its duties in
administering the Income Tax Act.
[23]
The T1 Adjustment
Request clearly does not satisfy the requirement that a taxpayer elect in his
or her tax return. Similarly, an objection filed after the tax return is
assessed cannot be considered to meet the requirement that the taxpayer choose
in his or her tax return. If those were the only evidence of Mr. Dhaliwal
choosing to have section 50 apply in 2007 to his Mainland debt, he could
not succeed and a late‑filed election would indeed be required. See for
example this Court’s decisions in Arnold v. The Queen, 2002 DTC 1395,
at paragraph 18, and in Soja v. The Queen, 2007 TCC 61, 2007 DTC 584,
at paragraph 15.
[24]
Originally a
subsection 50(1) deemed disposition did not require a taxpayer to elect to
realize his or her loss on a debt; it was automatic in the year in which it
went bad. As a consequential amendment to a significant rewriting of the
section 80 debt forgiveness rules in the 1990s, the section 50 deemed
disposition was no longer automatic but applied only if the taxpayer elected to
apply it. It is clear from the Department of Finance’s Technical Notes
accompanying the amended legislation that the election was introduced to allow
taxpayers to avoid adverse debt forgiveness results on inter‑corporate related
party debt under the new rules that would be triggered upon a disposition.
There is no suggestion that the election was added in order to give the CRA
additional notice and details of the fact that the taxpayer has calculated his
or her loss on the basis of the subsection 50(1) deemed disposition rule.
[25]
The first
section 50 election requirement was added even earlier and applied only with
respect to shares. The legislation with respect to shares was retroactive to
1985 and was therefore accompanied by a transitional rule which provided that, for
years prior to the statutory amendment, the taxpayer could elect to have the
amendment apply by notifying the Minister in writing. The election required
under this transitional rule was considered in Anderson v. M.N.R.,
92 DTC 2296. In that case, Justice Beaubier wrote:
This letter does not indicate the specific subsection or amendment
under which he claims the allowable business investment losses. But the letter
indicates that the Appellant wants the Minister to recognize that allowable
business investment losses were incurred and he wants these losses to be
applied against his 1986 and 1987 income. The essence of the communication
was that the Appellant wants to be allowed to claim allowable business
investment losses in respect of his shares in B & D. That is sufficient to
communicate the taxpayer’s election.
[Emphasis added.]
[26]
In Roy v. R.,
[2004] 2 C.T.C. 2519, [2002] T.C.J. No. 134,
Justice Tardif relied upon the above passage from Anderson to
conclude that the Respondent’s argument that a subsection 50(1) election
had to formally elect to expressly have subsection 50(1) apply was
unlikely to succeed and was perhaps wisely abandoned in that case. In Roy,
the taxpayer’s appeal was allowed. It was sufficient that the ABILs were
claimed in the tax return for the year relying upon and computed on the basis
of having elected or chosen to apply subsection 50(1).
[27]
The CRA’s
Interpretation Bulletin IT159R3 “Capital Debts Established to be Bad Debts”
discusses the requirements of subsection 50(1) in paragraph 1. It
does not address the election. This is because the CRA has not revised this
bulletin since 1985, prior to the amendment making the subsection elective for
taxpayers.
[28]
In the CRA T4037
Capital Gains guide, it is written under the heading “What is a business
investment loss?”: “To do this [elect a deemed disposition], you have to file
an election with your income tax and benefit return. To make this election,
attach to your return a letter signed by you. State that you want subsection 50(1)
of the Income Tax Act to apply.”
[29]
The CRA has a
publication on electronic filing called EFILE for Individuals. It says: “There
are no paper returns to file and, unless we ask for receipts, none are needed.”
It goes on to say later: “Neither you nor your EFILE service provider should
send us a paper copy of your return or any documents, unless we ask you to do
so.”
[30]
The Respondent asked
that I find that, in order to elect to have subsection 50(1) apply, a
taxpayer must file an election with his or her tax return in some form which
expressly refers to subsection 50(1). I note that the section
requires that the election be in the tax return, not with the tax return.
[31]
Given that an e‑filed
tax return does not lend itself to adding an election form that is not in the
CRA’s electronic package, the Respondent asks me to conclude that e‑filing
taxpayers must be required to mail to the CRA a written election referring to
subsection 50(1), separately from the electronic tax return filed, but
somewhere near in time to it being filed. I note that this seems to be
moving even further from the clear statutory requirement that, whatever the
form of the election, it must be made in the tax return.
[32]
The Respondent asks me
to conclude in the alternative that the Act as written simply does not
permit an e‑filer to make a subsection 50(1) election. I would
be loath to make such a backwards step unless the language of the Act
compels me to. I am frankly surprised that the CRA would be asking for
barriers to electronic filing.
[33]
Finally, the Respondent
asks that I simply find that, on the facts of this case, Mr. Dhaliwal
did not make an election in his 2007 tax return, without addressing how such an
election could possibly have been made in an e‑filed tax return.
I was asked to leave that as an unstated problem for the CRA and/or
Parliament to resolve. I think many Canadians would think I was only
half doing my job if I took such an approach.
[34]
I am not compelled
by the language of subsection 50(1) to reach the conclusion advocated by
the Respondent. The text of subsection 50(1) does not describe a form or
otherwise dictate how the taxpayer makes his or her election and chooses in his
or her tax return to have the subsection 50(1) apply. It is clear from the
legislative history that the purpose of the election was to allow taxpayers choice
in order to avoid the unintended application of the new debt forgiveness rules
in certain circumstances, and not to ensure the Minister was given any needed
additional information or paperwork. I agree with the sensible reasoning
of Beaubier J. in Anderson and Tardif J. in Roy that, upon
a proper interpretation of section 50, it is sufficient to communicate the
taxpayer’s election by clearly communicating in his or her tax return that he
or she wants to be allowed an ABIL in respect of particular debt or shares disposed
of in that year. This same analysis applies equally to electronic and paper format
tax return. In this case, Mr. Dhaliwal’s 2007 electronic tax return clearly
claims an ABIL, using the CRA’s ABIL schedule, in respect of a $156,000 loan
made in 2005 and disposed of in 2007. The matter could hardly be clearer.
[35]
It is frankly
disappointing that the CRA needs the Court to resolve the issue of how
elections should be made in e‑filed tax returns when there is no
prescribed form required. The answer is surely only a matter of common sense
and programming. The Court can only provide a lawful and common‑sense
answer. If the CRA wants more, all it needs to do is program its electronic tax
return differently. That this issue can have gone on for so long and this far
appears to be a questionable use of public resources. It is 2012, four years
later, and the CRA still appears not to have addressed how it would like to
administer the Act in this regard.
[36]
The appeal is allowed
with costs.
Signed at Edmonton,
Alberta, this 16th day of March 2012.
"Patrick Boyle"