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Citation: 2012 TCC 290
Date: 20120809
Docket: 2010-2155(CPP)
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BETWEEN:
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VICTOR HAUSAUER O/A THE MARKET CENTRE,
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Appellant,
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and
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THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
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Respondent.
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Docket: 2010-2156(EI)
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AND BETWEEN:
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VICTOR HAUSAUER O/A THE MARKET CENTRE,
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Appellant,
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and
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THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL REVENUE,
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Respondent.
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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Edited from the transcript of
Reasons for Judgment delivered orally from the Bench on March 20, 2012 at Lethbridge, Alberta)
Campbell J.
[1]
First before I start with the
appeals which are scheduled for this morning, I'm going to read my reasons into
the record with respect to the CPP and EI appeals of Victor Hausauer which I
heard yesterday. And, I believe, Mr. Hausauer is not in the courtroom so I’ll
read the reasons in his absence.
[2]
These are appeals heard together
on common evidence from a ruling by the Minister of National Revenue (the “Minister”)
that the worker, Christopher Nicholson, was engaged in pensionable and
insurable employment with the Appellant for the period May 25th, 2008, through
to March 4th, 2009. For the purposes of these reasons, I will refer mainly to
the employment insurance appeal.
[3]
The Appellant operates a market
store, known as The Market Centre, which sells, among other things, fresh
produce and bedding plants. The business operated year round, but was busier in
the spring and summer seasons. The worker was engaged to pick up plants and
vegetables, set-up produce stands, water plants, provide customer service and
sell Christmas trees. The majority of those duties were performed at the Appellant’s
premises.
[4]
The worker earned $10 per hour
during the period. Prior to this period under appeal, the worker earned $9 per
hour while engaged by the Appellant to perform similar work.
[5]
The Appellant agreed that he
determined the worker’s hourly rate of pay. The worker did not invoice the Appellant,
but according to the worker’s evidence he kept track of the hours he worked and
submitted them to the Appellant. He assumed the Appellant also tracked his
hours, but the Appellant testified that he never kept a record of the worker’s
time. The worker was engaged during the hours of operation of The Market
Centre.
[6]
The Appellant also stated that the
worker was experienced in this type of work and therefore required little
direction in his work activities. The Appellant provided all tools and
equipment and owned the truck that was used to pick up product.
[7]
The Appellant’s position is that
the worker was engaged as an independent contractor and that this was evidenced
by the numerous cheques issued to the worker on which the Appellant wrote,
“Contract,” at the lower left-hand side of the cheque, and a short, one-page,
undated, handwritten agreement signed by the worker in which he acknowledged
that his work was contract work for which he was responsible for his own
deductions.
[8]
The worker testified that he
always considered himself to be an employee and that he felt forced to sign the
aforesaid agreement.
[9]
There is abundant case law in this
area. Clearly, there was no meeting of minds between the parties with respect
to their intention. When this occurs the terms and conditions of their legal
work relationship becomes even more important and this is where the Wiebe Door Services Ltd. v. Minister of
National Revenue (1986), 87 D.T.C. 5025 (“Wiebe Door”) factors are vital to an
analysis of the issue. Parties may attach any term they wish to their
relationship, but the terms and conditions of that relationship must support
and reflect the label which they so attach.
[10]
In the circumstances of these
appeals, the Wiebe Door factors support the Minister’s position that the
worker is an employee and this is so, despite the fact that the worker was less
than impressive as a witness. The test was clearly stated in 671122 Ontario Ltd. v. Sagaz Industries
Canada Inc., 2001 S.C.C. 59 at paragraphs 47 and 48, and I quote:
47 … The central question is whether the person who has been engaged to
perform the services is performing them as a person in business on his own
account. In making this determination, the level of control the employer has
over the worker’s activities will always be a factor. However, other factors
to consider include whether the worker provides his or her own equipment,
whether the worker hires his or her own helpers, the degree of financial risk
taken by the worker, the degree of responsibility for the investment and
management held by the worker, and the worker’s opportunity for profit in the
performance of his or her tasks.
48 It bears repeating that the above factors
constitute a non-exhaustive list, and there is no set formula as to their
application….
[11]
The Appellant clearly exercised
control over the worker and the performance of his work activities. The Appellant
set the hourly wage and the hours worked. He guaranteed the worker’s work. If
the worker was unavailable, the Appellant completed his duties. Since the
worker was experienced in performing these types of activities, he required
little supervision. However, the Appellant testified that in some cases the
worker required the Appellant’s approval for certain tasks. In any event, it is
the right to control and not the actual control that may have been exercised
and the facts here support my conclusion that the Appellant retained the
ultimate right to control the worker in his activities if he thought it
necessary.
[12]
The factor of tools and equipment
also supports the conclusion that the worker was an employee simply because
everything necessary for the worker’s activities was supplied by the Appellant
at his business premises. This included a vehicle, which was owned by the Appellant
and used in the business and for which the Appellant paid gas, maintenance and
insurance.
[13]
The worker had no opportunity for
financial profit or risk of loss. He received a set hourly wage according to
his hours worked which were established by the Appellant. He was not
financially invested in the business or its management and he bore no
responsibility for any of the expenses of the business. These factors again
support the worker being an employee.
[14]
In addition to these factors,
there was no evidence that the worker worked for anyone else during this
period, that he advertised to obtain work, that he had a business name or a
business or a GST number. The Appellant’s evidence was also that the worker
could not hire replacements.
[15]
The worker is not operating a
business on his own account in these circumstances. The facts do
not support the Appellant’s position that the worker was an independent
contractor despite the stated intention on the cheques, the agreement and the
oral evidence of the Appellant. For these reasons, I am dismissing the appeal
because the evidence supports my conclusion that the worker was engaged in
pensionable and insurable employment during the period under appeal.
[16]
And that concludes my reasons in
the two appeals from yesterday.
Signed at Summerside, Prince Edward Island, this 9th day
of August 2012.
Campbell J.