Date: 19980618
Docket: 95-652-IT-G
BETWEEN:
GAZ MÉTROPOLITAIN INC.,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
PIERRE ARCHAMBAULT, J.T.C.C.
[1] Gaz Métropolitain Inc. ("GMI") is
challenging assessments made by the Minister of National Revenue
("the Minister") for the 1987 and 1988 taxation years.
The Minister included $2,803,650 received as a government grant
for the purchase of servitudes in its income for 1987 pursuant to
s. 12(1)(x) of the Income Tax Act ("the
Act"). The parties filed a consent to judgment in respect of
this first appeal. For 1988, the Minister, in calculating
GMI's taxable income, disallowed the deduction of $2,836,655
as non-capital losses from a subsidiary, GNC Québec
Ltée ("GNC"). These losses were sustained before
control of GNC was acquired by GMI.
[2] In disallowing this deduction the Minister relied on
s. 88(1.1)(e) of the Act. He maintained that GMI was
not carrying on the same business as GNC. In the Minister's
submission, GMI's principal activity was the sale of natural
gas and that of GNC was the conversion of vehicles to natural
gas.
[3] GMI argued that GNC's principal activity was the sale
of natural gas as a fuel for vehicles and that the conversion of
vehicles to natural gas was merely a secondary activity of its
business of selling natural gas. This activity was one aspect of
the creation of the infrastructure necessary for selling natural
gas as a fuel.
Facts
[4] GMI carries on a business selling natural gas to
residential, commercial and industrial customers. Distribution is
primarily by pipeline, which is why the business is regulated by
Quebec's Régie du gaz naturel ("the
Régie"). GMI has about 1,500 employees.
[5] To promote wider consumption of natural gas in Quebec GMI
has adopted various strategies. It has negotiated with the
Régie for permission to offer grants to potential
customers to help them convert to natural gas. To help them
purchase the equipment necessary for this conversion, GMI offers
its customers either financing or the option of renting the
equipment. To carry out the conversion work GMI may offer its own
services or put its potential customers in touch with independent
technicians. Finally, GMI is involved in certain scientific
research and experimental development work to develop new
technologies favouring the adoption of natural gas as an energy
source.
[6] Robert Normand, who was GMI's vice-president of
finance from 1976 to 1997, estimated that 90 to 95 percent
of GMI's gross receipts come from the sale of natural gas and
that the remainder come from incidental activities, such as
installation and conversion services.
[7] In the early 1980s Canadian government policies were
designed to ensure greater security of supply and wider
diversification of energy sources for Canada. Some programs
encouraged Canadians to change their fuel oil heating equipment
for natural gas equipment.
[8] Oil supply problems and the sharp rise in oil prices
combined with rising estimates of world gas reserves encouraged
several countries to develop policies favouring the use of
natural gas as a fuel for vehicles. Italy and New Zealand played
an important part in this movement. At the time in question,
Italy had half a million vehicles running on natural gas. To be
used as a fuel for vehicles, natural gas must be compressed and
stored in one or two gas cylinders.
[9] GMI wanted to start selling natural gas as a fuel. It
undertook a research and development program. It learned from its
research that Italy manufactured the best equipment in the
industry. The first stage of GMI's strategy was to convert
its own truck fleet to natural gas and so acquire some
experience.
[10] The second stage was to create the infrastructure for a
distribution network so as to reach consumers. This
infrastructure involved a network of vehicle conversion centres
and a network of public filling stations. These filling stations
had to be equipped with compressors to fill consumers' gas
cylinders. The creation of this infrastructure raised technical
problems and required considerable resources. To solve these
problems GMI decided to take on partners. As indicated in the
notes to its 1981 to 1986 financial statements, GNC was
incorporated on September 1, 1981 to develop the market for
natural gas as a fuel, set up conversion centres, develop a
filling station network and even open a training school.[1] Fifty percent of
this company's shares were purchased by CNG Fuel System Ltd.
("CNG Fuel"), a subsidiary of the Nova group,
25 percent by the Société
québécoise d'initiative
pétrolière and the remaining 25 percent by
GMI. GNC began operating in mid-1982 and its fiscal year
ended on December 31.
[11] GMI's overall strategy in acquiring an interest in
GNC was to increase its volume of natural gas sales by about 20
to 25 percent. GNC's purpose in creating vehicle
conversion centres was to encourage increased sales of natural
gas for use as a fuel. The operation of conversion centres was
not a separate business for GNC but an incidental activity which
was essential to the sale of natural gas.
[12] The conversion centres were set up gradually. Initially
the conversions were carried out in centres owned by GNC.
Franchised businesses later played an increasing part in this
activity. In 1985, 48 percent of conversions were carried
out by GNC centres and 52 percent by franchisees. In the
first quarter of 1986, 77 percent of conversions were
carried out by franchisees.
[13] To set up the filling station network GNC entered into
joint ventures with three oil companies: Ultramar, Gulf and
Shell. GNC held 50 percent of the joint ventures. In 1985
gross receipts amounted to $878,145 and costs to $986,154. Assets
stood at $1,865,177 and liabilities at $2,084,152. These figures
represented GNC's share. In 1986, 19 public filling
stations were operated by three oil companies, two by independent
distributors and one by GNC, making a total of 22 public
filling stations. GNC also sold natural gas directly to private
filling stations, such as those for taxi fleets.
[14] In mid-1984 GNC prepared a submission for the
government of Quebec to persuade it to convert its vehicle fleet
to natural gas and to promote projects to convert school and
urban transportation vehicle fleets. This submission also sought
to induce the government not to tax natural gas sold as a fuel at
a level that would have the effect of reducing the difference
between natural gas and gasoline prices to less than
50 percent. Unfortunately for GNC, it was unable to achieve
its first objective.
[15] To encourage consumers to convert to natural gas GMI paid
$900 for each conversion while the federal government paid an
additional $500 up to March 1987. Mr. Normand stated that in
order to be able to offer this $900 subsidy, GMI had to obtain
permission from the Régie and that the Régie would
not have given it permission to do so if there were not a
reasonable expectation of profit from the sale of natural gas as
a fuel. The Régie would not have permitted a situation in
which all the consumers indirectly subsidized the market for
natural gas for use as a fuel.[2]
[16] In its tax returns for 1982, 1983 and 1984 GNC described
the type of business it was in as follows: [TRANSLATION]
"vehicle retrofitting". In its 1985 and 1986 returns it
described its activities as follows: [TRANSLATION] "selling
natural gas for vehicles and vehicle retrofitting". For
1985, 80 percent of its income came from conversion and
20 percent from natural gas sales. For 1986 income from
conversion dropped to 71 percent and that from the sale of
natural gas rose to 29 percent. According to
Mr. Normand, GNC made a profit on the resale of its natural
gas. However, he could not give a figure for this profit because
there was only one accounting system for both sales of natural
gas as a fuel and conversion activities. It is impossible to
break down the fixed costs between these two activities.
[17] From 1982 to 1985 GNC had only losses. The amounts of
these non-capital losses were as follows:
1982 $ 286,999
1983 $ 891,572
1984 $ 936,550
1985 $ 720,534
Total $2,835,655
[18] In 1986 GMI and its partners reviewed GNC's
operations. They found that a new strategy had to be adopted to
make the distribution of natural gas for use as a fuel
profitable. The income statement for 1985 shows that natural gas
sales and receipts from conversion services had produced a gross
profit of $884,333 on sales of $3,387,379. However, fixed costs
totalling $1,468,044 and GNC's share —
$108,009 — in the losses of the joint ventures
resulted in a loss of $691,720. According to Mr. Normand,
losses were to be expected in the first few years of operation
because of the start-up costs associated with this new
activity, especially those incurred to create the network for
distributing natural gas for use as a fuel.
[19] Despite these disappointing results GMI still saw
potential in the market for natural gas for use as a fuel. In
view of the price differential favouring natural gas over
gasoline and propane, Quebec was an attractive market for GMI.
According to studies by a Canadian consulting firm, with
38 percent of the potential market Quebec was the largest
market in Canada for natural gas as a fuel. According to those
studies, there was a potential of some 450,000 vehicles
operating on natural gas after five years. That would
represent annual natural gas consumption of some 26 billion
cubic feet. At the time GMI was selling about 125 billion
cubic feet. In the early 1980s the Canadian Gas Association
projected that about 120 filling stations would be opened in
Quebec. Finally, a survey of users of natural gas as a fuel in
the summer of 1985 indicated a fairly high level of satisfaction
ranging from 84 percent for individuals to 88 percent
for companies.
[20] On September 29, 1986 GNC's partners decided to
transfer all their shares to GMI and when it was wound up GNC
transferred its business to GMI. Of GNC's 29 employees,
only two were re-hired by GMI, which already had all the
administrative staff it needed for the sale of natural gas as a
fuel. GMI's strategy would be to focus its efforts on the
sale of natural gas to businesses with fleets of vehicles.
Finally, the conversion centres would be operated for GMI by CNG
Fuel, which would employ three of GNC's employees. CNG Fuel
was to provide its services for a period of 18 months
following the winding-up of GNC. However, a little over
12 months later, on October 21, 1987, CNG Fuel decided
to pull out and GMI informed all natural gas filling stations
that it would continue to promote the development of the Quebec
market for natural gas for use as a fuel. It also undertook to
continue the compressor maintenance service.
[21] GMI incorporated GNC's operations selling natural gas
as a fuel into its natural gas sales operations. There is no
separate item in GMI's financial statements that would show
to what extent this activity of selling natural gas as a fuel
produced profits or incurred losses. Nor is there any breakdown
of fixed costs — such as administrative
costs — between natural gas sales operations and the
sale of natural gas as a fuel.
[22] The agreement with the oil companies continued until
1993. From then on GMI continued to market natural gas as a fuel
on its own. Its nine largest customers represented a fleet of
some 500 vehicles. Although he could not corroborate this
with an accounting analysis, Mr. Normand is convinced that
the sale of natural gas as a fuel was a profitable activity for
GMI after the winding-up of GNC because of the considerable
reduction in fixed costs that resulted from the decision to focus
of GMI's efforts on businesses with large fleets of vehicles
and because of the increase in the volume of long-term sales.
[23] GMI continued to look for new markets for its natural gas
for use as a fuel, including the lift truck market and the school
and municipal transportation market. It also hoped that natural
gas as a fuel would be more attractive to consumers once gasoline
prices rose again.
[24] The Minister's auditor testified to explain his
assessment. He filed his T20 report, and I quote the relevant
paragraph explaining his position (Exhibit I-9 at
p. 15):
[TRANSLATION]
We are of the view
- that GMI was not carrying on the same business as the
subsidiary, since some of the operations were transferred to
another business, which means that the nature of the business has
changed;
- that GMI's principal business is the selling of natural
gas, not the conversion of cars to gas;
- that this activity is a separate business;
- that the taxpayer's intention was not to make a profit
from this activity, which was the principal source of GNC
Québec's losses; and
- that to give one example, an automobile manufacturing
business (GM) is a separate business from one selling gasoline
(Esso).
Our position is supported by an article from the 1989
Conference Report, 14:22, which clearly indicates that each
activity must be considered as a separate business.
CONCLUSION
GMI did not carry on the same business and the losses cannot
be claimed in 1988.
[25] In his Reply to the Notice of Appeal counsel for the
Minister stated that in arriving at his assessment the Minister
had assumed certain facts, including that the conversion of
vehicles to natural gas was a separate business from the sale of
compressed natural gas for those vehicles. However, the
auditor's report indicates on the contrary that he considered
GNC to be carrying on only a single business, but that there were
two activities. He said the following at p. 14 of his
report:
[TRANSLATION]
. . . according to the 1985 T-2 return, the
business from the subsidiary was divided into two activities: the
conversion of vehicles to natural gas —
70 percent — and the distribution of natural gas
to vehicles — 30 percent.
[26] Counsel for the Minister added that the Minister had
assumed that GMI had not carried on the business transferred by
GNC for profit or with a reasonable expectation of profit
throughout 1988. In his report, however, the auditor stated that
it was impossible to determine whether there had been a
reasonable expectation of profit because [TRANSLATION]
"[GNC’s money-losing] business was
merged into the parent company's operations"
(p. 14 of the report).
Analysis
[27] Section 111 of the Act authorizes a taxpayer, in
computing his or her taxable income, to deduct non-capital losses
for the seven taxation years immediately preceding and the three
taxation years immediately following the year.
Section 111(8) of the Act defines a non-capital loss
essentially as a taxpayer's loss from a business or property.
The Act also authorizes a parent company to deduct, in addition
to losses which it has sustained itself, those of a subsidiary
which was wound up and merged into the parent company. According
to s. 88(1.1)(c), the subsidiary's non-capital
losses are deemed to be those of the parent company provided
certain conditions are met, one of which is that the loss must
not have been deducted by the subsidiary.
[28] However, when such losses are attributable to a taxation
year ending before the time when the parent company acquired
control, ss. 88(1.1)(e)(i) and (ii) of the Act
provide that they may not be deducted by the parent company
unless other conditions are met, namely that (1) the losses
are from a business carried on by the subsidiary and the business
is carried on by the parent company for profit or with a
reasonable expectation of profit throughout a particular year,
and (2) only to the extent of the total of the parent
company's income from the business for the particular year
and from any other business substantially all of the income of
which was derived from the sale, leasing, rental or development
of similar properties or the rendering of similar services.
[29] The first question to be answered is whether GMI carried
on, throughout 1988, the business previously carried on by GNC.
In order to answer it a clear understanding of the business
carried on by GNC is necessary. The auditor concluded that
GNC's principal business was the conversion of vehicles to
natural gas, since 70 percent of its income came from that
activity. In the auditor's submission, since GMI
subcontracted the vehicle conversion activity to CNG Fuel on
September 29, 1986, it had ceased carrying on GNC's
vehicle conversion business and the first condition accordingly
could not have been met.
[30] I do not feel that this analysis by the auditor is
correct. To begin with, I am not persuaded that had GMI had
ceased operating the conversion centres. Although GMI
subcontracted the operation of the conversion centres to CNG Fuel
the latter was operating them on GMI's behalf. It is clear in
law that a business can be carried on through an agent: see
E.S.G. Holdings Limited v. The Queen, 76 DTC 6158
(F.C.A.).
[31] In any case, even if CNG Fuel had not been operating
these centres on GMI's behalf, GNC's principal business
was not the conversion of vehicles to natural gas. The evidence
indicated rather that GNC's primary purpose was to sell
natural gas, and incidentally to supply services of converting
vehicles to natural gas. While it is true that receipts came
primarily from that activity at first, conversion would become a
much less important activity in the longer term. Initially
natural gas sales represented only a small percentage of
GNC's income. That percentage rose to 20 percent in 1985
and was nearly 30 percent at the time of the
liquidation.
[32] The auditor appears to have been too heavily influenced
by information provided in summary form in GNC's tax returns.
I am persuaded that this information was intended more to
indicate the percentage that the sale of various products or
services might represent than to describe the real nature of its
business. If the auditor had taken his inquiries further, he
would certainly have realized that GNC's primary purpose was
the sale of natural gas. As GNC was just starting up its business
and had to convert vehicles in order to create a market for its
product,[3] it is
not surprising that receipts came first from the conversion of
vehicles to natural gas and that those receipts were higher than
the receipts from the sale of natural gas. In the long term,
however, these proportions would be reversed.
[33] Encouraging the establishment of conversion centres
operated by third parties is perfectly consistent with the
strategy of depending more on the sale of natural gas as a source
of income than on the conversion activities. I therefore conclude
that GNC carried on a business of selling natural gas as a fuel
and that the conversion operations were only an activity
incidental to that business.
[34] Even if it were assumed that GMI had ceased to provide
these conversion services, which is contrary to my interpretation
of the facts, would the result of that cessation be to
substantially alter the business carried on by GNC? I do not
think so. When a company abandons an activity incidental to its
principal business, it continues to operate the principal
business.
[35] Having arrived at this definition of GNC's business,
it must be determined whether GMI carried on that business
throughout 1988 and whether it did so for profit or with a
reasonable expectation of profit. There is not really any doubt
that GMI continued marketing natural gas as a fuel in 1988, but
did it do so for profit or with a reasonable expectation of
profit?
[36] Market studies disclosed a long-term potential for the
sale of natural gas as a fuel. The adjustments made by GMI in
carrying out that activity after it purchased GNC's business
eliminated a number of fixed costs and led to economies of scale.
GMI also focused on the sale of natural gas as a fuel to
businesses with large fleets of vehicles. Finally, many of the
start-up costs for marketing the new product had already
been incurred.
[37] Although we cannot say for certain, since these
activities were merged with GMI's other marketing operations,
it is even possible that the marketing of natural gas as a fuel
made a profit in 1988. It is thus reasonable to conclude that the
losses deducted by GMI came from GNC and that GNC's business
was carried on by GMI throughout 1988 with at least a reasonable
expectation of profit.
[38] The second question must now be considered, namely
whether the second condition contained in
s. 88(1.1)(e)(ii) of the Act was met. As GNC's
business was merged with that of GMI it is impossible to
determine what income came from the business transferred to GMI
by GNC. It must therefore be determined whether GMI earned income
from a business substantially all of the income of which was
derived from the sale, leasing, rental or development of property
similar to that sold, leased, rented or developed by GNC or from
the rendering of services similar to those rendered by GNC.
[39] To answer this question, it must be determined first what
products were sold by GNC before the acquisition of control and
second what products were sold by GMI during 1988. As was
mentioned above, GNC was primarily involved in the marketing of
natural gas as a fuel and also provided conversion services.
Ninety or 95 percent of GMI's income came from the sale
of natural gas and the rest from incidental operations. As the
evidence showed that GMI provided conversion services to its
customers, it is reasonable to conclude that substantially all of
its income came from the sale of natural gas and from conversion
services.
[40] Were the natural gas GMI sold and the conversion services
it provided goods and services similar to the goods sold and
services provided by GNC? I do not think there can be the least
doubt that these were not only similar goods or services but in
fact essentially identical goods. In my view, there is no
significant difference between natural gas sold as an energy
source for heating units, hot water heaters or gas ranges or as a
fuel for vehicles. The services of converting vehicles to natural
gas, if not identical, were at the very least similar.
[41] The fact that GNC's activities were incorporated into
GMI's activities and that it was not necessary to create a
separate division to carry on those activities is certainly a
very good sign not only that GNC was carrying on a business
similar to GMI's business but that the products it sold or
the services it rendered were identical or at least similar.
[42] I cannot help noting that, in applying s. 88 of the
Act in the instant case, the Minister's auditor appears to
have lost sight of the raison d'être of the
anti-avoidance provisions contained in s. 88(1.1)(e)
of the Act. Their purpose is to prevent taxpayers from acquiring
control of companies more for the tax losses of those companies
than for the business carried on by them. It seems clear that the
purpose of s. 88 of the Act is to prevent a company whose
principal activity is, for example, the sale of natural gas from
buying a company whose principal activity is the manufacture of
television sets unless the latter business is carried on for
profit or with a reasonable expectation of profit, and the losses
can be deducted only to the extent of the income from the
television manufacturing business. However, can there be a better
example of a business to which the anti-avoidance rule should not
apply than one such as GMI, which acquired a business carried on
by a company it had itself incorporated, though in a minority
position, to promote the sale of its product, namely natural
gas?
[43] The conditions set out in s. 88(1.1)(e) of
the Act have all been met. GMI is entitled to deduct the losses
sustained by GNC before it acquired control; these losses
amounted to $2,835,655.
[44] For these reasons, GMI's appeals from the assessments
for the 1987 and 1988 taxation years are allowed without costs
and the assessments referred back to the Minister of National
Revenue for reconsideration and reassessment in accordance with
the consent to judgment for the 1987 taxation year, on the basis
that GMI's non-capital losses include the non-capital losses
of $2,835,655 from GNC and also on the basis that GMI is entitled
to deduct the said losses in calculating its taxable income for
the 1988 taxation year.
[45] In view of the circumstances of these appeals, it would
have been entirely appropriate to award costs to GMI, but GMI
waived them.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, June 22, 1998.
"Pierre Archambault"
J.T.C.C.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Translation certified true on this 22nd day of October
1998.
Stephen Balogh, revisor