Date: 19980816
Docket: 98-52-IT-I
BETWEEN:
ESTATE OF ROLAND AUBÉ,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
Reasons for Judgment
Tardif, J.T.C.C.
[1] This is an appeal in which the issue concerns the
appellant’s deduction under subsection 104(6) of the
Income Tax Act (“the Act”), which was
disallowed, as well as interest on arrears for the additional tax
charged to the appellant, interest on an excess refund and the
late filing penalty imposed on the appellant.
[2] This case relates to the succession of Roland Aubé,
who died on October 7, 1991.
[3] The deceased’s last will was signed on April 21,
1988, and bore number 6608 of the minutes of notary Richard
Déry. The will named Germaine Aubé as testamentary
executor, as stated in articles 11 and 12 thereof, which read as
follows:
[TRANSLATION]
Article 11. To execute my will, I appoint my cousin
GERMAINE AUBÉ, the wife of Jean-Paul Linteau,
on whom I confer seizin of all my movable and immovable property.
I extend her powers beyond the year and a day provided for by law
until my last wishes have been completely fulfilled. I free her
from the obligation of making an inventory and from giving
security.
If she declines to act as executor, dies or cannot act as
executor for any reason whatsoever, whether before or during her
administration, I appoint my grandniece LISE LINTEAU to
replace her, with the same powers.
Article 12. In addition to the powers conferred on her
by law, my testamentary executor shall be entitled:
(a) to sell, exchange or otherwise alienate all of the movable
and immovable property included in my estate on the terms and for
a price in money or any other consideration she considers
appropriate, and to receive such price or consideration and give
a receipt therefor;
(b) to borrow any sum of money and, for that purpose, to
pledge or hypothecate my movable or immovable property, as
appropriate;
(c) to agree to a transaction, compromise or settlement, or to
arbitration, in respect of any claim by or against my estate,
inter alia by giving or receiving any immovable in payment
of any debt owed by or to my estate, and to grant discharges or
releases;
(d) to make any investments she considers appropriate, without
being subject to articles 981o et seq. of the Civil
Code;
(e) to effect any partition of my property herself and, for
this purpose, to appraise the property, form shares thereof and
allocate them to the persons concerned using whatever methods she
considers appropriate, without any authorization or judicial
formalities, even if one of my legatees is a minor, an incapable
person or an absentee, in which case such legatee shall be
represented by my testamentary executor;
(f) to permanently decide any question that may arise during
her administration, realization of property, liquidation,
partition, etc., her decisions to be final and binding on all of
my legatees, with no possible appeal;
(g) to draw from the capital of my estate any sum of money of
which any of my legatees may be in urgent need and, inter
alia, to use any sum of money required for the upbringing,
education, board or clothing of my minor legatees, if any.
[4] To fulfil her mandate as testamentary executor, Germaine
Aubé retained Paul-Henri Gamache, an accountant, who
was the only witness heard in support of the appeal.
[5] Referring to a report made up of 50 documents, Mr. Gamache
told the Court how matters progressed between the time he was
retained and the time a transaction was entered into on August
26, 1993.
[6] His testimony made it clear that the opening of the
succession had caused some tension between the residuary legatee
and the particular legatees.
[7] Following the settlement of the succession, the respondent
issued an assessment, the basis for which was stated as
follows:
[TRANSLATION]
(a) Roland Aubé died on October 7, 1991;
(b) the last will that was neither changed nor revoked by
Roland Aubé is the will dated April 21, 1988, which
is included in number 6608 of the minutes of notary Richard
Déry;
(c) the fiscal year of the “Estate of Roland
Aubé” trust started on October 8, 1991, and ended on
October 7, 1992, for the 1992 taxation year;
(d) for the 1992 taxation year, the “Estate of Roland
Aubé” received, inter alia, the following
income:
Net interest income $17,823
Net rental income $342
Annuity - Industrial Alliance
Payment of face amount $6,267
Interest on claim $100
Total $24,532
(e) a dispute arose in settling the “Estate of Roland
Aubé”;
(f) the dispute referred to in the preceding paragraph was
settled during the 1993 taxation year, as can be seen from the
agreement signed by the parties to the “Estate of Roland
Aubé” on August 26, 1993;
(g) the income tax return of the “Estate of Roland
Aubé” trust was filed on September 9, 1993;
(h) the “Estate of Roland Aubé” trust filed
a supplementary T3 form for $24,532 on behalf of
Marie-Paule Giroux Aubé in 1993;
(i) as a result, the $24,532 was payable in 1993 and not
1992;
(j) in addition, the “Estate of Roland
Aubé” trust should have filed its income tax return
for the 1992 fiscal year 90 days after the end of its fiscal year
ending on October 7, 1992;
(k) the income tax return for the “Estate of Roland
Aubé” trust was filed late, on September 9,
1993;
(l) the Minister determined that the balance due from the
appellant for the taxation year at issue was $3,669.99;
(m) because of the balance due, the Minister charged the
appellant interest on arrears for the 1992 taxation year;
(n) because of the appellant’s lateness in filing its
income tax return for the 1992 taxation year, the Minister also
imposed a late filing penalty on it;
(o) on December 23, 1993, the appellant was refunded $633.97
for the 1992 taxation year, but it was not entitled to a
refund;
(p) it accordingly received an overpayment of $7.25 as
interest on the refund.
[8] The main issue is whether the Minister of National Revenue
(“the Minister”) is justified in disallowing the
$24,532 deducted by the appellant under subsection 104(6) of the
Act for the 1992 taxation year.
[9] The accountant, Paul-Henri Gamache, said that in
January 1992 he had already identified and completed the
inventory of the assets of the succession. He said that he helped
make the formal inventory, which was officially completed on
October 12, 1992 (see Exhibit A-5).
[10] The accountant also said that the value of the residuary
legacy was known on October 7, 1992.
[11] The appellant argued that the residuary legatee knew very
early on that she was entitled to a share in the assets of the
succession. Micheline Goulet, who holds a power of attorney from
the residuary heir, also testified that she knew in the days
following the death that Marie-Paule
Giroux-Aubé was fully entitled to a share in the
assets of the succession.
[12] The appellant’s arguments on this key issue are
worded specifically as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
. . .
3.(d) Marie-Paule Giroux-Aubé was entitled to demand
the residue of the succession in 1992, which she did.
(e) Marie-Paule Giroux-Aubé, as the residuary heir,
even accepted the taxation consequences of the succession, if
taxation were to occur, pursuant to an agreement reached in
1993.
. . .
(g) Marie-Paule Giroux was entitled to enforce payment of the
residue in 1992, in accordance with subsection 104(24).
. . .
(i) In 1992, and more specifically during the spring of 1992,
Ms. Giroux’s representative, Marc Renaud, was authorized to
take possession of a gun collection.
(j) Ms. Giroux’s lawyers also enforced payment of the
residue of the succession in the year following the death, and it
was even confirmed by the said lawyers in September 1992 that
they were willing to accept $200,000 as a settlement.
5.(a) The residuary legatee, Marie-Paule Giroux, entered into
an agreement accepting the report of October 7, 1992, by the
testamentary executor, the appellant in this case. In that
report, Marie-Paule Giroux-Aubé was assigned
the interest income and rental income, as can be seen from the
said report prepared by the chartered accountants Houle et
associés.
(b) In that agreement, Marie-Paule Giroux Linteau, the
residuary legatee, also accepted payment of the residue of the
succession in capital and interest and, as beneficiary of the
said sums of money, should have been taxed on the said interest,
as can be seen from a transaction between Marie-Paule Giroux
Linteau and Germaine Aubé Linteau that was agreed to and
signed by the parties on August 26, 1993.
[13] Counsel for the estate argued that only the quantum of
the residuary mass was problematic or uncertain. The appellant
argued that the accountant retained by the testamentary executor
had completed his administration and the work he had been
instructed to do by February 1992.
[14] As of that date, the inventory had been completed and the
assets of the succession clearly identified; they basically
consisted of a deposit certificate and two immovables, namely the
residence and a lodge.
[15] According to the appellant, this was enough to identify
the parameters and content of the share due to the residuary
legatee. The appellant also argued that once the residuary
legatee’s assets were identified, she had or ought to have
had seizin of them and therefore responsibility for the assets
that were ultimately to be transferred to her.
[16] The Department argued that the date on which the
succession was liquidated corresponded to the date of the
agreement entered into on August 26, 1993. It was a
settlement that had been difficult and had taken a long time to
negotiate. The transaction dated August 26, 1993, was worded as
follows:
[TRANSLATION]
TRANSACTION ENTERED INTO
_______________________________________________________
BETWEEN
MARIE-PAULE GIROUX, widow of Roland Aubé and
residuary universal legatee,
AND
GERMAINE AUBE LINTEAU, testamentary executor.
AGREEMENTS:
WHEREAS Roland Aubé, by will dated April 21,
1988, named Marie-Paule Giroux, his wife, the residuary universal
legatee;
WHEREAS the said instrument appointed Germaine
Aubé Linteau executor of the said succession;
WHEREAS the said will made certain particular legacies
to Germaine Aubé Linteau, Jean-Paul Linteau,
Pierrette Aubé, Françoise Aubé, Lise
Linteau and Sylvie Giroux;
WHEREAS Roland Aubé died at the age of 78
on or about October 7, 1991, at Québec;
WHEREAS the last will that was neither changed nor
revoked by Roland Aubé is the will dated April 21, 1988,
which is included in number 6608 of the minutes of notary Richard
Déry;
WHEREAS it is in the interests of justice that the
particular legacies be honoured;
WHEREAS the testamentary executor and the residuary
universal legatee wish to settle the partition of the succession
now;
THE PARTIES AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
1. The recitals shall form an integral part of this
agreement;
2. This agreement shall constitute a transaction within the
meaning of articles 1918 et seq. of the Civil Code;
3. The testamentary executor confirms that she has handed over
the particular legacies and arranged for the particular legatees
to receive the property they have inherited;
4. The residuary universal legatee, Marie-Paule Giroux,
acknowledges and accepts the inventory of the succession prepared
on January 27, 1992, by Messrs. Gaudreau & Lessard, notaries
at Sainte-Foy, in accordance with the inventory included in
number 8825 of the minutes of notary Michel Y. Gaudreau;
5. The parties acknowledge that the residuary universal
legatee was able to retake possession of the movable property and
effects in the matrimonial home of which she wished to retain
ownership;
6. The parties hereto also acknowledge and accept the
inventory bearing number 8847 of the minutes of notary
Michel Y. Gaudreau of Sainte-Foy and dated February 12,
1992, and the inventory of a fishing lodge bearing number 8993 of
the minutes of notary Michel Y. Gaudreau and dated June 11,
1992;
7. The residuary universal legatee, Marie-Paule Giroux, is
inheriting $190,000 as residuary heir of the estate of Roland
Aubé;
8. Marie-Paule Giroux renounces her share of the residence
owned by the estate of Roland Aubé that corresponds to the
immovable designated as follows:
An immovable situated at street number 1405 Côte des
Erables, Québec, and known as an immovable designated as
being part of lot 227 and part of lot 228 of the cadastre of
the parish of Charlesbourg, registration division of
Québec;
9. Marie-Paule Giroux also renounces any share she may have
in, or claim or right she may have to ownership of, a fishing
lodge owned by the estate of Roland Aubé that has been
bequeathed to Lise Linteau, the said immovable corresponding to
the following designation:
A site designated as lot 15-4, range 11, township of
Stoneham, corresponding to lot 15-4, range 11 of the official
cadastre of the parish of St-Emond de Stoneham, registration
division of Québec.
The whole with the building constructed thereon and
dependencies.
The whole consisting of a fishing lodge.
10. Marie-Paule Giroux declares that she accepts the
testamentary executor’s report of October 7, 1992;
11. The parties confer on each other a final, mutual,
reciprocal and full discharge in respect of any claims they may
have against each other;
12. Marie-Paule Giroux renounces any other property contained
in the residue of the estate of Roland Aubé as of the date
of payment of the said sum of $190,000 in capital, plus
interest;
13. The parties agree to sign all documents required to
finalize this transaction, including transfers for the immovable
property bequeathed by Roland Aubé to Lise Linteau as a
particular legacy under articles 8 and 9 of the said will;
Signed at Beauport this 26th day of August 1993.
Residuary universal legatee:
___________________________
MARIE-PAULE GIROUX
____________________________________
Pierre-Marcel Normandeau, Advocate
JOLIN, FOURNIER MORISSET
Signed at Sainte-Foy this 26th day of August 1993.
Testamentary executor:
___________________________
GERMAINE AUBE LINTEAU
_____________________
Michel Poulin, Advocate
POULIN & ASSOCIES
Signed at Sainte-Foy this 26th day of August 1993.
Intervener:
_____________________
LISE LINTEAU
[17] To give effect to the transaction, some of the particular
legatees had to co-operate by drawing on their respective
legacies to make up the agreed amount needed for the
transaction.
[18] At what point did the testamentary executor finish or
complete her administration? I consider it important to go back
to the will, which established her rights in terms of the
duration of her administration, to determine whether the testator
set out any qualifications.
[19] Article 11 of the said will clearly states that the
executor could extend her administration beyond the year and a
day provided for by law until the last wishes of the deceased had
been completely fulfilled. This was worded as follows:
[TRANSLATION]
Article 11. To execute my will, I appoint my cousin
GERMAINE AUBÉ, the wife of Jean-Paul Linteau,
on whom I confer seizin of all my movable and immovable property.
I extend her powers beyond the year and a day provided for by law
until my last wishes have been completely fulfilled. I free her
from the obligation of making an inventory and from giving
security.
[20] The executor accordingly had full authority to take the
time she needed to perform her duties as executor.
[21] For that purpose, Germaine Aubé retained an
accountant, Paul-Henri Gamache. That was a wise
decision.
[22] The evidence adduced about the mandate given to the
accountant was not very detailed; he simply explained that he had
been retained by Germaine Aubé to make an inventory so
that the property involved could then be distributed to the
legatees named in the will. Mr. Gamache very quickly did
everything he could to fulfil his mandate.
[23] According to the accountant, his work was, for all
practical purposes, finished as of October 1992; he also said
that after the particular legacies were partitioned, the only
remaining assets were two immovables and some deposit
certificates.
[24] Can the accountant and the executor claim that their
administration had been completed at that time? I do not think
so. The parameters, scope and limits of an administration are not
determined on the basis of the importance of what has to be
completed or finalized as part of the administration.
[25] I do not agree with the interpretation suggested by the
accountant, who argued that he had completed his administration
because what remained to be done was basically unimportant and
required mere formalities.
[26] According to the accountant, all he had to do was make
sure that the investments were profitable or yielded a return; he
said that he had to wait for the parties to agree before he could
issue cheques based on the agreement that had been reached.
[27] Going along with the accountant’s interpretation of
the concept of administration would have absurd results, as the
end of an administration would have to be defined based on the
importance of what remains to be done. The duration of an
administration is separate from its content, and it seems to me
that a mandate to administer property basically ends with the
rendering of an account, which is not necessarily subject to
special procedures or specific formalities.
[28] One thing is clear: administration of a mass of property
or the assets of a succession does not end before the complete
and total delivery of the property being administered, unless, of
course, the mandator withdraws the mandate while it is being
carried out, in which case the mandatary’s administration
obviously ends.
[29] In the case at bar, it is my view that the administration
ended when the transaction was signed on August 26, 1993. This
had the effect of liquidating the assets of the succession that
was the subject of the administration entrusted to the
testamentary executor, who, in turn, had retained the
accountant.
[30] Moreover, it was a transaction whose content was clearly
defined and stated as far as the capital and interest were
concerned.
[31] In this regard, the appellant’s interpretation that
the $190,000 in capital included a substantial amount for accrued
interest is supported by neither the facts nor the agreement.
[32] According to the balance of the evidence, relations
between the particular legatees and the residuary legatee were
difficult and strained, and each family was represented by a
lawyer. At first, the parties’ positions on the value of
the residue of the succession were very far apart. The
discussions and negotiations finally led to a settlement, which
was confirmed by the transaction dated August 26, 1993.
[33] The evidence showed that some of the particular legatees
had to make contributions in order to implement the settlement.
In other words, the settlement reached in no way resulted from a
mere adding up of cash amounts to which interest was added; it
was a lump sum that had not been broken down and was somewhat
arbitrary, and it was set for the sole purpose of reaching an
agreement sealed by the transaction of August 26, 1993.
[34] Accordingly, it is not appropriate to try after the fact
to reconstruct the various components that made it possible to
put together the capital that was offered and accepted.
[35] This approach also completely rebuts the
appellant’s argument that the succession had been settled
for a very long time. I found it surprising that the accountant
took such a position, since the reality was quite different. I
understand that he often referred to legal chicanery that he may
have considered bizarre and dilatory; however, his opinion that
his administration was completed after February since the only
remaining assets were deposit certificates and two immovables is
just as bizarre and unfounded.
[36] Page 9 of the unaudited financial statements and review
engagement reports dated October 7, 1991, indicates that fees of
$21,935 were paid to the accountant. I presume that part of that
amount was for work after February 1992. All of the facts brought
out by the testimonial evidence and the will clearly showed that
certain of the assets of the succession were still being
administered until the transaction of August 1993.
[37] Until that time, the estate had custody of and was
responsible for the assets dealt with in the transaction of
August 1993. It therefore had to bear the tax liability arising
from that administration. The agreement, the facts and the
Act support this conclusion.
[38] As regards the late filing penalty, the Court refers to
the admissions made by the accountant, who said that he was aware
of the applicable deadline and acknowledged that the return was
filed several months late.
[39] As regards interest, as I told the parties during the
opening remarks, the case law applied by this Court has clearly
indicated that only the Minister has jurisdiction over
interest.
[40] The Tax Court of Canada therefore has no jurisdiction to
cancel or reduce the interest applicable to amounts due pursuant
to an assessment or overpayment.
[41] For all these reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa, Canada, this 18th day of August 1998.
“Alain Tardif”
J.T.C.C.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION]
Translation certified true on this 16th day of February
1999.
Stephen Balogh, Revisor