CAMERON,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
decision
of
the
Income
Tax
Appeal
Board
dated
April
28,
1953
(8
Tax
A.B.C.
247),
dismissing
the
appellant’s
appeal
from
an
assessment
to
income
tax
in
respect
of
the
appellant’s
taxation
year
ending
February
28,
1948.
The
assessment
was
dated
May
7,
1951,
and
therein
the
respondent
deducted
from
the
declared
net
income
of
the
appellant
the
sum
of
$255,103.84
as
“1949
loss
applied”.
The
appellant
submits
that
this
deduction
should
be
increased
by
$22,780.07,
that
amount
being
made
up
of
certain
disbursements
made
by
the
appellant
in
its
taxation
year
ending
February
28,
1949,
which
were
not
allowed
by
the
respondent
as
proper
deductions
in
that
year.
There
is
no
dispute
whatever
as
to
the
facts.
The
appellant
company
is
a
shipping
company
operating
a
number
of
freight
vessels,
some
of
which
it
owns
and
others
of
which
it
operates
under
charter.
In
1946
it
purchased
from
War
Assets
Corpora-
tion
two
vessels
of
the
Canadian
Victory
type
(10,000
ton
dry
cargo
class)
namely,
the
“Mont
Clair’’
and
the
‘‘Mont
Sorrel’’.
Thereafter,
the
vessels
were
used
mainly
in
freight
service
from
Eastern
Canada
to
North
European
and
Mediterranean
ports.
By
agreement
in
writing
dated
April
28,
1948
(Ex.
5),
the
appellant
agreed
to
sell
the
“Mont
Clair’’
to
Muhammadi
Steamship
Co.
Ltd.,
of
Pakistan,
for
$740,000.00.
Clause
5
of
that
Agreement
was
as
follows:
“5.
The
vessel
shall
be
delivered
safely
afloat
in
a
seaworthy
condition,
tight,
staunch
and
strong,
and
in
Lloyd’s
100A-1
class,
without
reservation,
and
in
every
way
satisfactory
for
normal
service
of
a
vessel
of
her
type,
size
and
description,
and,
to
ascertain
the
fulfillment
of
these
requirements,
the
Seller
agrees
to
have
the
vessel
inspected
and
examined
in
a
drydock
in
Canada,
without
the
tailshaft
being
drawn
and
without
opening
up
the
main
engines,
boilers
and
auxiliaries,
by
a
Surveyor
of
Lloyds,
and
to
give
notice
of
such
inspection
to
the
Purchaser
by
letter,
telegram
or
cable,
at
his
address
at
least
three
(3)
days
before
such
inspection
takes
place.
The
Seller
hereby
undertakes
to
promptly
carry
out
at
his
expense
any
repairs
ordered
to
be
carried
out
by
Lloyd’s
Surveyor
to
enable
him
to
issue
a
Certificate
maintaining
the
classification
of
the
vessel
100A-1
without
reservation;
dry-docking
and
other
expenses
incidental
to
the
inspections
to
be
paid
by
the
Purchaser
if
the
Vessel
does
not
require
any
repairs,
the
cost
of
which
shall
be
less
than
FIVE
HUNDRED
DOLLARS
($500.00),
but
said
expenses
to
be
paid
by
the
Seller
if
the
vessel
requires
repairs
other
than
painting,
the
cost
of
which
will
be
in
excess
of
the
sum
of
FIVE
HUNDRED
DOLLARS
($500.00)
;
the
cost
of
painting
to
be
borne
by
the
Purchaser
except
for
the
painting
of
those
parts
which
needed
repairs.
Vessel
to
be
delivered
with
all
holds
cleanswept.”
On
the
date
of
the
Agreement,
the
‘‘Mont
Clair’’
was
loading
a
cargo
at
Port
Sulphur,
Louisiana,
its
voyage
thereto
from
Montreal
having
commenced
on
April
18.
That
cargo
was
delivered
to
ports
in
Eastern
Canada,
the
voyage
having
earned
a
substantial
amount
of
revenue
for
the
appellant.
Inmmediately
on
completing
the
delivery
of
the
cargo,
it
went
into
dry-dock
in
Canada
on
May
25
and
there
certain
repairs
were
made
at
a
cost
of
$17,934.44
(certain
other
^expenses
were
incurred
but
were
not
claimed
as
deductions).
Ex.
1
is
a
list
of
the
repairs
and
the
cost
thereof.
Ex.
2
is
a
summary
thereof
divided
into:
voyage
repairs—$1,057.20;
annual
repairs—$14,970.02;
and
deferable
or
quadrennial
repairs—$1,907.22.
The
uncontradicted
evidence
establishes
that
all
these
repairs
so
claimed
as
deductions
by
the
appellant
in
his
1949
income
tax
return
were
maintenance
repairs,
occasioned
by
ordinary
wear
and
tear
and
that
none
of
the
expenses
were
incurred
for
improvements
or
alterations.
Delivery
of
the
‘‘Mont
Clair’’
was
made
to
the
purchaser
immediately
upon
leaving
dry-dock,
namely,
on
May
31,
1948.
Similarly,
the
appellant
on
April
30,
1948,
entered
into
an
agreement
to
sell
the
‘‘Mont
Sorrel’’
to
the
Kingdom
of
the
Netherlands
for
$743,250.00
(Ex.
6).
Clause
5
of
that
Agreement
for
Sale
was
practically
identical
with
Clause
5
of
the
Agreement
of
Sale
of
the
‘‘Mont
Clair”
(supra).
On
the
date
of
that
agreement,
the
vessel
was
on
a
voyage
which
had
commenced
on
April
27
and
which
was
completed
on
June
11.
Then
followed
two
other
voyages
made
on
behalf
of
the
appellant
company.
About
July
23,
1948,
and
upon
completion
of
the
last
of
these
voyages,
the
‘‘
Mont
Sorrel’’
went
into
dry-dock
and
underwent
a
survey.
Certain
repairs
aggregating
$4,854.63
were
made.
the
details
of
which
are
shown
in
Ex.
3
and
summarized
in
Ex.
4.
These
repairs
fell
within
the
same
categories
as
those
made
to
the
“Mont
Clair”,
all
being
in
the
nature
of
maintenance
repairs
occasioned
by
ordinary
wear
and
tear.
The
‘‘Mont
Sorrel’’
was
delivered
to
the
purchasers
immediately
after
leaving
dry-dock,
namely
on
July
26.
It
is
the
aggregate
of
these
two
amounts,
namely
$22,780.07,
which
the
respondent
disallowed
as
deductions
for
the
taxation
year
1949
and
which,
as
I
have
pointed
out,
were
not
added
to
the
amount
of
the
1949
losses
of
the
appellant
which
were
allowed
as
a
deduction
for
its
1948
taxation
year.
It
is
not
necessary
to
go
into
the
details
of
these
amounts
in
view
of
the
admissions
made
by
counsel
for
the
respondent
at
the
hearing.
He
conceded
that
they
fell
within
the
category
of
maintenance
repairs
and
that
had
the
vessels
not
been
sold
and
had
the
appellant
continued
thereafter
to
operate
them
in
its
business,
all
of
the
expenses
so
incurred
would
have
been
treated
as
deductible
expenses
in
the
taxation
year
ending
February
28,
1949.
Briefly,
the
contention
of
the
appellant
is
that
these
expenses
were
ordinary
expenses
incurred
in
the
course
of
the
appellant’s
business;
that
the
repairs
were
made
necessary
by
the
continuous
operation
of
the
vessels
while
earning
income
for
the
appellant;
that
they
were
incurred
for
the
purpose
of
earning
the
income
of
the
appellant
and
were
therefore
deductible.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
submits,
on
the
other
hand,
that
the
repairs
were
made
pursuant
to
the
terms
of
Clause
5
of
the
two
Agreements
of
Sale
(supra)
and
in
order
that
the
appellant
might
deliver
the
vessels
in
Lloyd’s
100A-1
Class
and
not
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business
of
the
appellant
;
that
they
are
therefore
barred
by
the
provisions
of
Section
12(1)
(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
He
submits,
also,
that
they
were
outlays
on
account
of
capital
and
are
therefore
barred
by
Section
12(1)
(b)
of
the
said
Act.
These
subsections
are
as
follows
:
“12.
(1)
In
computing
income,
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(a)
an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
property
or
a
business
of
the
taxpayer,
(b)
an
outlay,
loss
or
replacement
of
capital,
a
payment
on
account
of
capital
or
an
allowance
in
respect
of
depreciation,
obsolescence
or
depletion
except
as
expressly
permitted
by
this
Part.
’
’
It
is
of
particular
importance
to
note
that
neither
of
the
vessels,
following
completion
of
the
repairs,
was
used
in
the
business
of
the
appellant,
and
that
at
the
time
the
expenses
were
incurred
the
appellant
had
entered
into
agreements
to
dispose
of
the
vessels
and
knew
that
thereafter
they
would
not
be
used
to
earn
income
for
the
appellant.
Counsel
for
the
appellant
emphasized
the
fact
that
the
repairs
were
occasioned
by
the
continuous
operation
of
the
vessels
in
the
ordinary
course
of
its
business.
I
accept
the
evidence
that
such
was
the
fact.
Then
he
submits
that
under
the
provisions
of
Section
387
of
the
Canada
Shipping
Act,
Statutes
of
Canada,
1934,
c.
44,
the
hull,
equipment
and
machinery
of
every
steamship
registered
in
Canada
was
required
to
undergo
an
inspection
by
a
steamship
inspector
at
least
once
in
each
year
and
that
a
certificate
under
the
Act
could
not
be
granted
unless
and
until
all
the
repairs.
required
by
the
steamship
inspector
to
be
made
had
actually
been
completed.
He
points
to
the
fact
that
the
last
annual
inspection
of
the
vessels
had
been
made
in
the
summer
of
1947
and
that
the
annual
inspection
for
1948
would
be
required
at
or
about
the
time
when
these
repairs
were
undertaken.
The
fact
is
that
no
such
inspection
was
made
under
the
Act
in
1948
by
a
steamship
inspector,
prior
to
delivery
of
the
vessels
to
the
purchasers.
Under
the
circumstances
here
existing,
it
was
not
necessary
for
the
appellant
to
have
such
an
inspection
as
it
had
no
intention
of
operating
the
vessels
after
they
left
drydock.
Section
387(2)
of
the
Canada
Shipping
Act
provided
that
no
vessel
(which
goes
from
any
place
in
Canada)
shall
be
so
used
unless
such
a
certificate
is
on
board
and
penalties
are
provided
for
cases
in
which
a
voyage
is
made
without
such
a
certificate.
Under
the
circumstances,
it
was
wholly
unnecessary
for
the
appellant
to
comply
with
the
provisions
of
Section
387(1)
inasmuch
as
no
further
voyages
were
to
be
undertaken
by
either
vessel
on
its
behalf.
Section
12(1)
(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
is
a
positive
enactment
and
excludes
deductions
which
were
not
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
his
property
or
business,
subject,
of
course,
to
the
specific
deductions
allowed
under
Section
11.
It
is
not
enough
to
establish
that
the
dilapidations
which
occasioned
the
expenditures
arose
out
of
or
in
the
course
of
the
business.
It
must
be
established
that
the
purpose
of
the
taxpayer
in
making
the
outlays
was
that
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
the
business.
In
the
present
case
I
am
unable
to
find
that
that
was
the
purpose
of
the
officers
of
the
appellant.
The
outlays,
in
the
particular
circumstance,
could
not
in
any
way
affect
the
income
of
the
company
either
in
its
past
or
future
operations.
The
business
of
the
company
was
the
operation
(and
not
the
sale)
of
vessels.
The
outlays
were
incurred
at
the
time
each
vessel
entered
the
drydock,
and
it
was
then
known
that
they
would
no
longer
be
operated
by
the
appellant,
but,
followinz
the
inspection
by
Lloyds’
surveyor
and
the
completion
of
the
repairs
he
might
require
to
be
made
in
order
to
place
the
vessels
within
Lloyds’
100
A-l
Class,
would
be
delivered
immediately
to
the
purchasers.
In
my
view,
the
sole
purpose
of
the
appellant
in
incurring
the
expenses
was
to
comply
with
the
requirements
of
Clause
5
of
the
agreements,
namely,
to
meet
the
terms
of
its
contract
to
have
the
vessels
put
into
Lloyds’
100A-1
Class.
It
is
reasonable
to
assume
that
these
outlays
were
not
lost
to
the
appellant.
I
have
no
doubt
that
in
entering
into
the
contracts
of
sale
and
before
agreeing
to
the
requirement
that
the
vessels
should
be
repaired
as
required
by
a
Lloyds’
surveyor
so
as
to
bring
them
into
Lloyds’
100A-1
Class,
the
appellant
took
into
consideration
the
estimated
cost
of
such
repairs
and
that
the
sale
values
were
based
on
the
values
of
the
ships
after
such
prospective
repairs
were
made.
The
evidence
is
that
a
purchaser
would
offer
more
for
a
vessel
when
the
contract
included
such
a
covenant
by
the
vendor
as
is
found
in
Clause
5,
than
he
would
otherwise
do.
For
these
reasons
the
appeal
will
be
dismissed
and
the
assessment
affirmed.
The
respondent
is
entitled
to
his
costs
after
taxation.
Judgment
accordingly.