Mogan,
T.C.C.J.:—The
principal
business
of
the
appellant
is
to
provide
a
hot
oil
service
for
producing
wells
of
major
oil
companies.
The
service
is
provided
by
transporting
a
hot
oil
unit
to
a
particular
well;
operating
the
unit
at
the
well
for
a
number
of
hours;
and
then
moving
on
to
another
well.The
hot
oil
unit
is
mounted
on
the
back
of
a
substantial
ten-wheel
truck.
For
the
purpose
of
deducting
an
investment
tax
credit
for
1984
and
1985
under
subsec-
tion
127(5)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act"),
the
appellant
classified
the
hot
oil
unit
and
the
truck
as
"gas
or
oil
well
equipment"
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
(j)
of
class
10
of
Schedule
II
to
the
Income
Tax
Regulations.
The
respondent
accepted
that
classification
for
the
hot
oil
unit
alone
but
rejected
that
classification
for
the
truck
on
which
the
unit
was
mounted.
The
issues
in
this
appeal
are
whether
the
truck
(cab
and
chassis)
should
be
regarded
as"gas
or
oil
well
equipment"
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
(j)
of
class
10;
whether
the
truck
was
"designed
for
use
on
highways
or
streets”
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
4600(2)(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations;
and
whether
the
truck
was
equipment
used
primarily
"for
the
purpose
of
operating
an
oil
or
gas
well”
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
127(10)(c)(ii)
of
the
Act.
Evidence
concerning
the
appellants
oilfield
services
was
given
by
Terrence
O'Connor,
the
shareholder
and
general
manager
of
the
appellant.
The
hot
oil
unit
is
used
primarily
to
enhance
the
recovery
of
oil
from
existing
wells
(approximately
85
per
cent
of
its
working
time).
Although
the
appellant's
work
involves
both
oil
and
gas
wells,
Mr.
O'Connor
described
the
operation
only
at
oil
wells.
The
bottom-hole
temperature
of
an
oil
well
when
first
drilled
is
very
high
(perhaps
400°
F.)
but,
as
the
well
gets
older,
the
well
bore
cools
and
any
paraffin
wax
in
the
oil
will
start
to
build
up
in
the
tubing
and
cause
a
restricted
flow.
Hot
oil
can
reheat
the
well
bore
and
production
tubing
and
thereby
melt
the
paraffin
wax
causing
an
enhanced
recovery
of
oil
from
the
older
well.
The
appellant's
function
is
to
get
the
hot
oil
down
to
the
bottom
of
the
well
where
it
can
melt
the
wax.
The
production
tubing
which
brings
the
oil
from
the
bottom
of
the
well
to
the
surface
is
a
pipe
running
up
the
centre
of
the
outside
casing
of
the
well
bore.
The
space
between
the
production
tubing
and
the
outside
casing
is
called
the
annulus.
The
appellant
forces
hot
oil,
under
great
pressure,
down
the
annulus
to
the
perforations
in
the
casing
at
the
base
of
the
well
and
then
circulates
it
back
up
the
production
tubing
to
the
surface.
By
applying
this
hot
oil
treatment
over
a
number
of
hours,
the
well
bore
and
production
tubing
are
reheated;
the
accumulated
paraffin
wax
is
melted
and
brought
to
the
surface
with
the
hot
oil;
and
the
production
from
the
well
is
enhanced.
An
existing
oil
well
in
production
would
not
have
any
equipment
capable
of
heating
oil
or
forcing
it
under
pressure
to
the
base
of
the
well.
Therefore,
when
paraffin
wax
begins
to
accumulate
at
the
base
of
the
well
over
a
period
of
time,
the
well
would
need
the
hot
oil
services
of
some
person
like
the
appellant.
The
hot
oil
unit
comprises
five
basic
components:
a
storage
tank,
a
feed
pump,
a
burner,
a
pressure
pump
and
some
pipe
lengths.
The
first
four
components
are
mounted
on
the
back
of
the
truck
and
the
pipe
lengths
(the
fifth
component)
are
stored
and
carried
along
the
side
of
the
chassis.
The
storage
tank
has
two
compartments:
one
stores
the
fuel
oil
to
fire
the
burner
and
the
second
stores
approximately
50
barrels
of
crude
oil
to
be
heated
and
pumped
down
the
well.
The
feed
pump
moves
the
crude
oil
from
the
storage
tank
to
the
burner
(where
it
is
heated
to
a
temperature
of
250°F
to
300°F)
and
then
to
the
high
pressure
pump.
This
pump
receives
the
hot
oil
and
subjects
it
to
pressures
ranging
from
3,000
pounds
per
square
inch
to
5,000
pounds
per
square
inch.
It
takes
that
much
pressure
to
circulate
the
hot
oil
down
the
annulus
and
up
the
production
tube.
The
pipe
lengths
are
used
to
transport
the
hot
oil
from
the
pressure
pump
to
the
well
head
where
it
is
forced
under
pressure
down
the
annulus.
There
are,
of
course,
many
gauges,
valves,
gears,
levers,
etc.
connected
with
the
five
basic
components
and
used
in
the
operation
of
the
hot
oil
unit.
The
hot
oil
unit
is
accompanied
by
a
tanker
truck
to
provide
the
oil
which
will
be
heated
before
being
pumped
down
the
well
of
the
appellant's
eus-
tomer.
For
an
existing
well,
that
oil
is
usually
obtained
from
the"
battery”
which
is
a
storage
site
within
a
few
miles
of
the
well
where
the
customer
collects
all
of
the
oil
produced
by
its
wells
in
that
particular
field.
The
battery
has
a
separator
and
treater
to
separate
gases
and
water
from
the
oil
as
it
arrives
from
the
various
wells.
For
the
completion
of
a
new
well
not
yet
in
production,
the
oil
in
the
tanker
truck
probably
will
have
been
purchasea
I
from
some
third
party
and
will
have
been
treated
to
remove
some
or
all
of
the
wax
and
other
impurities.
The
oil
brought
to
the
well
head
in
the
appellant's
tanker
truck
cannot
be
recovered
by
the
appellant
after
being
pumped
under
pressure
down
the
well.
If
the
appellant
has
been
required
to
purchase
that
oil
from
a
third
party,
the
customer
will
be
charged
for
the
oil
contributed
by
the
appellant
to
the
customer's
well.
The
50
barrels
of
crude
oil
in
the
storage
tank
(the
first
component
of
the
hot
oil
unit)
would
not
be
sufficient
for
a
complete
hot
oil
treatment
but
they
are
adequate
to
put
the
hot
oil
unit
in
operation
while
the
tanker
truck
goes
to
the
battery
or
to
some
third
party
to
obtain
more
oil.
In
the
years
under
appeal,
the
appellant
purchased
trucks
from
Kenworth
Canada
manufactured
to
the
appellant's
specifications.
The
appellant
would
inform
Kenworth
of
the
weight
to
be
hauled
and
the
power
required
for
the
equipment
comprising
the
hot
oil
unit.
When
the
truck
is
driven
to
a
well,
the
power
from
its
engine
is
going
to
the
rear
wheels.
But
when
the
truck
is
stopped
and
the
hot
oil
unit
is
operating,
the
pumps
in
the
unit
are
powered
by
the
truck
engine.
The
appellant
orders
a
particular
transmission
on
which
two
power
take-offs
can
be
mounted.
Different
belts
from
the
power
take-offs
operate
the
feed
pump
and
the
pressure
pump.
The
pressure
pump
alone
will
use
300
to
500
horsepower
depending
upon
the
pressure
and
volume
of
hot
oil
needed.
The
drive
shaft
to
the
rear
axles
has
a
split
box
so
that
power
can
be
diverted
up
to
the
pressure
pump.
The
truck
engine
is
used
only
10
per
cent
of
its
operating
time
to
move
the
unit
from
well
to
well;
the
remaining
90
per
cent
of
its
operating
time
occurs
when
the
truck
is
stationary
and
the
hot
oil
unit
is
working.
Mr.
O'Connor
emphasized
this
point
by
stating
that
over
a
ten-year
period
the
truck
engine
may
have
only
50,000
miles
of
travel
from
place
to
place
but
1,000,000
miles
of
operating
the
hot
oil
unit
while
stationary.
The
extraordinary
uses
for
the
truck
engine
to
operate
the
hot
oil
unit
were
part
of
the
appellant's
specifications
when
it
ordered
a
new
truck.
Each
truck
required
heavier
springs
for
its
use
off
highways
and
roads.
This
kind
of
truck
could
be
built
heavier
Because
it
did
not
nave
to
transport
cargo
like
a
common
carrier.
Upon
delivery,
the
appellant
received
only
the
cab
and
chassis.
The
appellant
has
its
own
shop
in
which
the
hot
oil
components
were
assembled
and
then
mounted
on
the
chassis.
The
cost
of
the
cab
and
chassis
alone
was
$85,000;
the
cost
of
the
hot
oil
components
was
approximately
$140,000;
the
cost
of
labour
to
mount
the
hot
oil
components
and
integrate
them
with
the
truck
was
approximately
$40,000.
Therefore,
the
appellant
incurred
a
total
cost
of
about
$265,000
to
put
a
hot
oil
unit
out
in
the
field
ready
to
operate.
Having
regard
to
the
operation
of
a
hot
oil
unit
as
described
above,
I
turn
to
the
labyrinth
of
statutory
provisions
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
Regulations
upon
which
this
appeal
will
be
decided.
Subsection
127(5)
permits
the
deduction
of
an
investment
tax
credit
from
the
tax
otherwise
payable.
Subsection
127(9)
defines
investment
tax
credit
in
relation
to”
qualified
property".
Subsection
127(10)
contains
a
long
definition
of
qualified
property
from
which
I
will
extract
only
the
relevant
parts:
127(10)
For
the
purposes
of
subsection
(9),
a
"qualified
property"
of
a
taxpayer
means
a
property
(other
than
a
certified
property)
that
is
(b)
prescribed
machinery
and
equipment
acquired
by
the
taxpayer
after
June
23,1975,
that
has
not
been
used,
or
acquired
for
use
or
lease,
for
any
purpose
whatever
before
it
was
acquired
by
the
taxpayer
and
that
is
(c)
to
be
used
by
him
in
Canada
primarily
for
the
purpose
of
(ii)
operating
an
oil
or
gas
well
or
processing
heavy
crude
oil
recovered
from
a
natural
reservoir
in
Canada
to
a
stage
that
is
not
beyond
the
crude
oil
stage
or
its
equivalent.
.
.
.
The
prescribed
machinery
and
equipment
referred
to
in
paragraph
127(10)(b)
is
defined
in
section
4600
of
the
Income
Tax
Regulations:
4600(2)
Property
is
prescribed
machinery
and
equipment
for
the
purposes
of
paragraph
127(10)(b)
of
the
Act
if
it
is
depreciable
property
of
the
taxpayer
(other
than
property
referred
to
in
subsection
(1))
that
is
(e)
a
property
included
in
paragraph
(a)
of
Class
10,
or
Class
22,
in
Schedule
II
(other
than
a
car
or
truck
designed
for
use
on
highways
or
streets);
(g)
a
property
included
in
any
of
paragraphs
(b)
to
(f),
(h),
(j),
(k),
(o),
(r),
(t),
or
(u)
of
Class
10
in
Schedule
II;
The
relevant
portions
of
Class
10
(30
per
cent)
in
Schedule
II
are:
Property
not
included
in
any
other
class
that
is
(a)
automotive
equipment,
including
a
trolley
bus,
but
not
including
(i)
an
automotive
railway
car
acquired
after
May
25,
1976,
(ii)
a
railway
locomotive,
or
(iii)
a
tramcar,
and
property
that
would
otherwise
be
included
in
another
class
in
this
Schedule
that
is
(j)
gas
or
oil
well
equipment;
The
appellant
and
respondent
use
the
statutory
provisions
set
out
above
to
support
their
respective
arguments.
The
appellant
argues
that
the
truck
and
chassis
and
the
hot
oil
unit
are
an
integrated
parcel
of
machinery
and
equipment
which
is
"gas
or
oil
well
equipment"
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
(j)
of
Class
10
in
Schedule
II;
that
such
equipment
is
prescribed
machinery
and
equipment
within
Regulation
4600(2)(g);
that
such
equipment
is
used
in
Canada
primarily
for
the
purpose
of
operating
an
oil
or
gas
well
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
127(10)(c)(ii);
and
that
such
equipment
is
therefore
"qualified
property".
The
respondent
has
two
principal
arguments.
First,
he
argues
that
the
truck
should
be
regarded
as
separate
and
apart
from
the
hot
oil
unit;
that
the
truck
is
automotive
equipment
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
(a)
of
Class
10
in
Schedule
II;
that
the
truck
is
designed
for
use
on
highways
or
streets
within
Regulation
4600(2)(e);
and,
therefore,
the
truck
falls
outside
the
definition
of
prescribed
machinery
and
equipment.
And
secondly,
the
respondent
argues
that
the
truck
is
not
used
in
Canada
primarily
for
the
purpose
of
operating
an
oil
or
gas
well
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
127(10)(c)(ii);
and,
therefore,
the
truck
is
not
“
qualified
property”.
I
propose
to
consider
first
whether
the
truck
(cab
and
chassis)
should
be
regarded
as
separate
and
apart
from
the
hot
oil
unit.
There
are
a
number
of
recent
decisions
in
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
which
are
helpful
on
this
question.
In
The
Queen
v.
Nowsco
Well
Service
Ltd.,
[1990]
1
C.T.C.
416,
90
D.T.C.
6312,
the
taxpayer
corporation
provided
services
to
those
who
operated
oil
and
gas
wells.
Nowsco
deducted
an
investment
tax
credit
on
machinery
and
equipment
which
it
claimed
was
prescribed
and
used
for
the
purpose
of
manufacturing
or
processing
goods
for
sale
or
lease
within
subparagraph
127(10)(c)(i).
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
argued
that
Nowsco's
equipment
was
"designed
for
use
on
highways
or
streets"
within
the
meaning
of
Regulation
4600(2)(e).
Urie,
J.A.
delivered
the
unanimous
judgment
of
the
Court
and
stated,
at
page
426
(D.T.C.
6319):
While
perhaps
initially
the
vehicles
used
by
the
respondent
were
“
designed
for
use
on
highways
or
streets"
their
design
was
so
modified
for
purposes
of
their
utilization,
that
the
limited
design
purpose
was
of
minimal
importance.
Their
primary
purpose
was
to
become
parts
of
an
integrated
process
for
the
cementing
and/or
stimulation
of
oil
or
gas
wells.
In
The
Queen
v.
Halliburton
Services
Ltd.,
[1990]
1
C.T.C.
427,
90
D.T.C.
6320,
Halliburton
carried
on
the
same
kind
of
business
as
Nowsco;
and
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
held
in
favour
of
Halliburton
for
the
same
reasons
as
were
given
in
Nowsco.
The
decisions
in
Nowsco
and
Halliburton
were
delivered
on
the
same
day.
The
trial
judge
in
the
Halliburton
case
had
held
that
the
cab
and
chassis
should
be
separated
from
the
equipment
mounted
thereon
([1985]
2
C.T.C.
52,
85
D.T.C.
5336
at
page
59
(D.T.C.
5341))
but
that
part
of
her
judgment
was
not
appealed.
Referring
to
the
statement
of
Urie,
J.A.
quoted
above,
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
was
prepared
to
set
aside
the
original
design
of
the
vehicles
in
Nowsco
because
that
design
was
so
modified
for
purposes
of
the
commercial
use
of
the
vehicles.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
argued
that
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
was
able
to
set
aside
the
original
design
of
the
trucks
in
Nowsco
because
the
trial
judge
in
that
case
had
found
as
a
fact
that
Nowsco
operated
a
mobile
factory
[see
[1988]
2
C.T.C.
24,
88
D.T.C.
6300].
Cullen,
J.
stated
at
page
39
(D.T.C.
6311);
To
me,
the
activities
at
the
well
head
are
conducted
by
a
"mobile
factory”,
and
this
mobility
should
not
disentitle
the
plaintiff
to
the
tax
benefits
enjoyed
by
a
processing
plant
which
is
always
situated
at
one
location.
This
was
also
the
position
adopted
by
Bonner,
J.
of
this
Court
in
Laidlaw
Waste
Systems
Ltd.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1989]
1
C.T.C.
2375,
89
D.T.C.
259
at
page
2381
(D.T.C.
263).
What
are
the
consequences
of
the
trial
judge's
finding
that
Nowsco
was
operating
a“
"mobile
factory"?
I
infer
that
the
vehicles
in
Nowsco,
after
modification,
were
not
used
to
transport
different
loads
of
cargo
from
place
to
place.
Any
heavy
equipment
(e.g.,
a
hot
oil
unit)
can
be
made
mobile
by
mounting
it
on
wheels.
If
it
is
towed
around
on
a
trailer,
there
is
no
risk
that
it
will
be
mistaken
for
a
truck.
But
if,
for
efficiency,
safety
and
convenience,
it
is
mounted
on
the
chassis
of
a
truck
and
the
truck's
engine
is
used
to
power
it,
is
the
resulting
equipment
primarily
a
truck
used
to
transport
only
a
hot
oil
unit
or
is
it
primarily
a
self-propelled
hot
oil
unit
which
has
assimilated
what
was
Originally
designed
as
a
truck?
If
the
hot
oil
unit
and
the
truck
are
brought
together
for
the
sole
purpose
of
making
the
unit
mobile,
it
does
not
seem
reasonable
to
regard
the
truck
component
of
the
resulting
equipment
as
if
its
chassis
and
engine
had
not
been
absorbed
into
the
overall
system
of
the
hot
oil
unit
to
provide
it
with
power
and
a
platform.
To
me,
the
resulting
equipment
has
become
more
of
a
hot
oil
unit
and
less
of
a
truck
because
the
truck
component,
in
its
basic
concept,
was
designed
to
transport
different
cargo
from
place
to
place.
It
is
the
specifications
imposed
by
the
appellant
which
change
the
basic
concept
of
the
truck
into
a
power
plant
which
can
operate
equipment
at
a
fixed
location
and
then
move
it
to
another
location.
The
average
citizen
does
not
see
a
hot
oil
unit
because
it
operates
only
in
oil
or
gas
fields
but
the
average
citizen
is
familiar
with
other
mobile
equipment
like
a
concrete
mixer
which
can
be
seen
on
many
urban
streets.
The
rotating
hopper
can
mix
a
large
quantity
of
concrete
while
stationary
or
moving
along
a
street
or
highway,
and
it
can
discharge
small
manageable
batches
while
at
a
construction
site.
If
the
rotating
hopper
is
powered
by
the
truck
engine,
is
the
mobile
unit
primarily
a
concrete
plant
or
primarily
a
truck?
Similarly,
a
mobile
crane
has
the
capacity
to
raise,
shift
and
lower
heavy
weights
at
different
locations.
If
the
lifting
device
is
powered
by
the
truck
engine,
is
the
mobile
unit
primarily
a
hoist
or
primarily
a
truck?
In
this
case,
the
appellant's
hot
oil
equipment
needed
low
end
gears
and
the
truck's
speed
even
on
a
good
highway
was
therefore
limited
to
55
m.p.h.
Mr.
O'Connor
stated
that
if
the
hot
oil
unit
were
mounted
on
a
skid
or
platform
(e.g.,
as
in
the
far
north)
it
would
still
need
an
engine,
transmission
and
main
drive
like
that
provided
by
the
truck
engine
on
any
one
of
the
appellant's
mobile
units.
The
unit
is
necessarily
mobile
because
its
services
at
any
particular
well
are
required
for
only
a
few
hours
or
a
couple
of
days;
and
it
must
be
able
to
move
from
well
to
well
either
along
highways
and
roads
or
across
open
country.
On
this
question
of
whether
the
truck
(cab
and
chassis)
should
be
integrated
with
the
hot
oil
unit,
the
most
persuasive
evidence
is
the
fact
that
about
90
per
cent
of
the
truck
engine's
operating
time
is
in
a
stationary
position
providing
power
for
the
hot
oil
unit,
and
about
10
per
cent
of
its
operating
time
is
spent
moving
from
well
to
well
or
from
the
appellant's
service
depot
to
a
well.
I
cannot
dissociate
the
operation
of
the
hot
oil
unit
from
the
operation
of
the
truck
engine
on
which
the
unit
is
totally
dependent.
In
my
opinion,
the
truck
must
be
regarded
as
an
integral
part
of
the
hot
oil
unit.
There
is
no
doubt
that
when
the
truck
is
manufactured
by
Kenworth
and
delivered
to
the
appellant,
it
is
"designed
for
use
on
highways
or
streets"
within
the
meaning
of
Regulation
4600(2)(e).
But
as
a
consequence
of
the
specifications
issued
by
the
appellant
to
Kenworth,
it
is
also
designed
for
three
other
purposes
of
equal
importance:
(i)
to
carry
the
weight
of
and
to
provide
a
permanent
base
for
a
hot
oil
unit;
(ii)
to
provide
power
for
the
pumps
and
other
components
of
the
hot
oil
unit;
and
(iii)
to
transport
the
hot
oil
unit
by
highway,
road
or
across
open
ungraded
country.
When
the
appellant
has
taken
delivery
of
the
truck
(only
the
cab
and
chassis)
from
Kenworth
and
has
completed
the
installation
of
the
hot
oil
unit
using
the
power
take-offs
from
the
transmission
and
the
split
box,
it
is
no
longer
reasonable
to
regard
the
truck
as
simply
designed
for
use
on
highways
or
streets
because
it
now
has
the
capacity
to
store
and
power
the
hot
oil
unit
and
move
that
unit
from
well
to
well
across
open
ungraded
country.
The
fact
that
the
low
end
gears
required
by
the
hot
oil
unit
reduce
the
maximum
highway
speed
of
the
truck
to
55
m.p.h.
is
a
good
indication
that
its
primary
design
was
not
for
use
on
highways
or
streets.
Having
found
that
the
truck
is
an
integral
part
of
the
hot
oil
unit,
I
cannot
reasonably
characterize
it
as
a
"truck
designed
for
use
on
highways
or
streets".
Therefore,
the
truck
is
not
excluded
from
the
definition
of“
prescribed
machinery
and
equipment"
by
reason
of
Regulation
4600(2)(e).
This
disposes
of
the
respondent's
first
argument.
I
will
now
consider
the
respondent's
second
argument
that
the
truck
is
not
used
in
Canada
primarily
for
the
purpose
of
operating
an
oil
or
gas
well.
A
fundamental
question
in
the
respondent's
second
argument
is
whether
the
truck
together
with
the
hot
oil
unit
mounted
thereon
is
“gas
or
oil
well
equipment”
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
(j)
of
Class
10
in
Schedule
II.
Those
words
are
defined
in
subsection
1104(2)
of
the
Regulations:
1104(2)
In
this
Part
and
in
Schedule
II,
"gas
or
oil
well
equipment"
includes
(a)
equipment,
structures
and
pipelines,
other
than
a
well
casing,
acquired
to
be
used
in
a
gas
or
oil
field
in
the
production
therefrom
of
natural
gas
or
crude
oil,
and
(b)
a
pipeline
acquired
to
be
used
solely
for
transmitting
gas
to
a
natural
gas
processing
plant,
but
does
not
include
(c)
equipment
or
structures
acquired
for
the
refining
of
oil
or
the
processing
of
natural
gas
including
the
separation
therefrom
of
liquid
hydrocarbons,
sulphur
or
other
joint
products
or
by-products,
or
(d)
a
pipeline
for
removal
or
for
collection
for
immediate
removal
or
natural
gas
or
crude
oil
from
a
gas
or
oil
field
except
a
pipeline
referred
to
in
paragraph
(b):
The
relevant
words
in
paragraph
(a)
are“
equipment.
.
.
acquired
to
be
used
in
a
gas
or
oil
field
in
the
production
therefrom
of
natural
gas
or
crude
oil”.
Mr.
O'Connor's
unchallenged
evidence
is
that
the
hot
oil
unit
is
used
85
per
cent
of
its
working
time
to
enhance
or
stimulate
the
recovery
of
oil
from
producing
wells
and
15
per
cent
of
its
working
time
to
assist
in
the
completion
of
a
new
well.
Each
producing
well
needs
the
service
of
a
hot
oil
unit
on
a
periodic
basis
but
not
frequently
enough
to
justify
the
purchase
and
maintenance
of
the
required
equipment.
The
appellant
therefore
provides
a
necessary
service
which
enhances
the
production
of
oil
from
many
wells
and
permits
the
completion
of
new
wells.
It
could
be
concluded,
on
the
plain
meaning
of
the
above
words
in
subsection
1104(2),
that
the
appellant's
equipment
(truck
plus
hot
oil
unit)
is
used
in
a
gas
or
oil
field
in
the
production
of
natural
gas
or
crude
oil.
I
am
inclined
to
reach
that
conclusion.
In
Bunge
of
Canada
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1984]
C.T.C.
284,
84
D.T.C.
6276,
Bunge
owned
and
operated
grain
elevators
about
200
feet
from
the
wharf
at
Bassin
Louise,
in
the
Port
of
Quebec.
Bunge
purchased
new
equipment
to
increase
its
efficiency
in
discharging
grain
from
its
elevators
into
large
oceangoing
vessels;
and
it
claimed
an
investment
tax
credit
under
subparagraph
127(10)(c)(ix)
on
the
basis
that
the
new
equipment
was
to
be
used
primarily
for
the
purpose
of
"the
storage
of
grain".
Bunge’s
appeal
was
allowed
and
Pratte,
J.A.
delivering
judgment
for
the
Court
stated
at
page
285
(D.T.C.
6277):
The
only
question
on
this
appeal,
therefore,
is
whether
those
new
discharging
facilities
were
used
by
the
appellant“
primarily
for
the
purpose
of
.
.
.
the
storing
of
grain”.
That
question
must,
in
my
view,
be
answered
in
the
affirmative.
The
storage
of
grain
requires
not
only
that
there
be
silos
where
the
grain
can
be
stored
but
also
that
the
silos
be
provided
with
the
equipment
necessary
to
receive
the
grain
for
storage
and
deliver
it
to
its
owner
after
it
has
been
stored.
In
my
opinion,
the
equipment
required
to
discharge
grain
from
the
appellant's
silos
was
equipment
used
for
"the
storing
of
grain”
because
the
discharge
of
grain
from
a
silo
appears
to
me
to
be
a
necessary
and
integral
part
of
the
storing
of
the
grain.
In
Lor-Wes
Contracting
Ltd.
v.
The
Queen,
[1985]
2
C.T.C.
79,
85
D.T.C.
5310,
Lor-Wes
did
not
own
any
timber
limits
or
cutting
rights
but
constructed
logging
roads
and
performed
site
services
for
persons
who
owned
timber
limits
or
cutting
rights.
Lor-Wes
deducted
an
investment
tax
credit
on
the
basis
that
its
equipment
was
used
for
the
purpose
of
"logging"
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
127(10)(c)(vii).
The
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
recognized
that
the
investment
tax
credit
in
subsection
127(10)
was
“incentive”
legislation
and
allowed
the
Lor-Wes
appeal.
MacGuigan,
J.A.
delivering
judgment
for
the
Court
affirmed
the
earlier
decision
in
Bunge
and
stated
at
pages
83-84
(D.T.C.
5313):
Taking
a
broader
look
at
the
provision,
we
have
what
appears
from
the
text
to
be
an
inducement
to
taxpayers
to
undertake
or
augment
specific
activities,
viz.,
those
listed
in
paragraph
(c).
From
that
point
of
view,
it
would
be
a
matter
of
indifference
whether
the
increased
activity
was
that
of
a
logging
company
itself
or
of
a
subcontractor:
in
both
cases
the
increase
in
investment
and
economic
activity
would
be
the
same.
Here,
the
words
"primarily
for
the
purpose
of
logging”
are
not
followed
by
the
words
"by
him”
or
otherwise
qualified
so
as
to
limit
the
benefit
of
the
section
to
cases
wherein
the
corporation
taxpayer
itself
has
the
timber
or
cutting
rights.
Not
only
was
the
appellant's
equipment
used
to
carry
out
an
integral
part
of
logging,
but
owners
of
such
rights
are
required
by
law
in
British
Columbia
to
obtain
approval
from
the
Forest
Service
of
a
five-year
development
plan
and
a
two-year
logging
plan,
including
in
both
cases
proposed
road
designs.
Moreover,
since
road
building
is
one
of
the
most
expensive
parts
of
the
total
logging
operation,
owners
subcontract
to
road
building
companies
for
the
sake
of
their
own
cost
efficiency.
It
is
impossible
to
regard
the
work
of
such
road
builders,
whose
total
operation
is
dedicated
to
building
roads
for
logging,
as
isolated
from
the
totality
of
the
logging
industry.
Their
work
is
dedicated,
and
their
equipment
is
used
by
them,
primarily
for
the
purpose
of
logging.
Adopting
the
comment
by
Macguigan,
J.A.,
the
words
“primarily
for
the
purpose
of
operating
an
oil
or
gas
well”
subparagraph
127(10)(c)(ii)
are
not
followed
by
the
words
"by
him".
In
the
Bunge
case,
the
Court
held
that
the
new
equipment
to
discharge
grain
was
used
primarily
“for
the
purpose
of
the
storage
of
grain”
within
subparagraph
127(10)(c)(ix)
because
discharging
grain
from
the
elevator
was
an
integral
part
of
storing
grain
in
the
elevator.
In
the
Lor-Wes
case,
the
Court
held
that
equipment
used
by
one
person
to
build
logging
roads
for
another
person
who
owned
the
timber
limit
or
cutting
rights
was
used
primarily
"for
the
purpose
of
logging”
within
subparagraph
127(10)(c)(vii)
because
the
construction
of
logging
roads
was
an
integral
part
of
logging.
Following
these
two
cases,
I
conclude
that
equipment
to
provide
a
hot
oil
service
is
used
primarily
“for
the
purpose
of
operating
an
oil
or
gas
well”
within
subparagraph
127(10)(c)(ii)
because
enhancing
the
recovery
of
oil
from
a
producing
well
is
an
integral
part
of
operating
the
well.
Accordingly,
the
hot
oil
unit
is
“
qualified
property"
within
subsection
127(10).
This
disposes
of
the
respondent's
second
argument.
Counsel
for
the
respondent
cited
the
decision
of
the
Federal
Court-Trial
Division
in
Texaco
Exploration
Co.
v.
The
Queen,
[1975]
C.T.C.
404,
75
D.T.C.
5288
in
which
Collier,
J.
construed
the
words"
production
of
oil
or
gas"
(at
page
5293).
In
my
view,
that
case
can
be
distinguished.
Subparagraph
127(10)(c)(ii)
uses
the
words
"operating
an
oil
or
gas
well”
and
not
"production".
As
was
pointed
out
in
Lor-Wes
above,
the
"logging"
need
not
be
performed
by
the
subcontractor
claiming
the
tax
credit
who
built
the
roads
for
the
logging
companies.
Although
the
word
"production"
appears
in
paragraph
1104(2)(a),
the
use
of
the
appellant's
equipment
to
enhance
the
recovery
of
oil
from
a
producing
well
is
the
use
of
equipment
for
the
production
of
oil
or
gas.
As
stated
at
the
beginning
of
these
reasons
for
judgment,
the
respondent
has
acknowledged
that
the
equipment
comprising
the
hot
oil
unit
(apart
from
the
cab
and
chassis
of
the
truck)
is
"qualified
property”
within
subsection
127(9).
Having
regard
to
the
evidence
and,
in
particular,
the
degree
to
which
the
truck's
engine,
the
transmission
and
the
drive
shaft
are
integrated
with
the
equipment
comprising
the
hot
oil
unit,
I
can
only
conclude
that
the
cab
and
chassis
of
the
truck
are
also
"qualified
property"
within
subsection
127(10).
I
may
not
have
reached
this
conclusion
if
the
truck's
engine
had
not
powered
the
hot
oil
unit.
The
appeals
are
allowed
and
the
assessments
for
1984
and
1985
are
referred
back
to
the
respondent
for
reconsideration
and
reassessment
on
the
basis
that
a
truck
which
transports
and
powers
a
hot
oil
unit
is
equipment
used
primarily
for
the
purpose
of
operating
an
oil
or
gas
well
within
the
meaning
of
subparagraph
127(10)(e)(ii)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
Appeals
allowed.