Pinard,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
plaintiff
of
reassessments
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
in
respect
of
its
1984,
1985
and
1986
taxation
years.
At
issue
in
this
matter
is
whether
the
sums
of
$187,500
and
$93,791
received
by
the
plaintiff
as
out-of-court
settlements
of
two
actions
in
which
the
plaintiff
claimed
damages
from
its
former
solicitors
for
breach
of
contract
and
negligence
in
the
provision
of
legal
services,
should
be
characterized
as
income
payments,
as
the
defendant
claims,
or
as
capital
payments,
as
urged
by
the
plaintiff.
The
following
facts
are
clearly
established
by
the
evidence:
—
the
plaintiff
is
a
company
incorporated
under
the
laws
of
the
province
of
British
Columbia,
having
a
year
end
for
taxation
purposes
of
August
31;
—
at
all
material
times
the
plaintiff
was
a
member
of
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
joint
venture
and
the
Mountainside
Lodge
joint
venture
which
had
been
formed
to
develop
and
operate
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
and
the
Mountainside
Lodge
at
Whistler,
British
Columbia;
—
the
fiscal
year
end
of
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
joint
venture
is
July
31,
and
the
fiscal
year
end
of
the
Mountainside
Lodge
joint
venture
is
December
31;
—
at
all
material
times,
the
plaintiff
was
also
one
of
four
general
partners
of
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
Ltd.
partnership
which
was
created
to
carry
on
the
business
of
operating
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
as
a
hotel
on
behalf
of
the
limited
partners;
—
at
all
material
times
the
plaintiff
was
also
one
of
six
general
partners
of
the
Mountainside
Lodge
Ltd.
partnership
which
was
created
to
carry
on
the
business
of
operating
the
Mountainside
Lodge
as
a
hotel
on
behalf
of
the
limited
partners;
—
it
was
agreed
by
the
partners
that
the
general
partners
would
receive
management
fees
allocated
to
them
from
the
income
of
the
limited
partnerships
in
consideration
for
their
management
services
in
respect
of
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
and
the
Mountainside
Lodge,
which
fees,
when
earned,
were
reported
by
the
joint
ventures
as
income;
—
the
plaintiff,
as
a
general
partner
in
both
limited
partnerships,
was
allocated
a
30
per
cent
share
of
the
management
fees
allocated
in
respect
of
the
Blackcomb
Lodge,
and
a
15
per
cent
share
of
the
management
fees
allocated
in
respect
of
the
Mountainside
Lodge;
—
the
plaintiff,
together
with
the
other
general
partners
of
each
limited
partnership,
retained
solicitors
to
prepare
the
limited
partnership
agreements,
and
instructed
their
solicitors
to
do
the
legal
work
necessary
to
form
each
limited
partnership;
—
due
to
a
solicitors’
error,
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
Ltd.
partnership
agreement
executed
by
all
the
limited
partners
provided
for
management
fees
calculated
on
the
basis
of
25
per
cent
of
"partnership
operating
income”;
—
due
to
a
solicitors'
error,
the
Mountainside
Lodge
Ltd.
partnership
agreement
executed
by
some
50
of
the
limited
partners
contained
a
similar
error
with
respect
to
the
calculation
of
the
management
fees
payable
to
the
general
partners,
while
the
agreement
executed
by
others
of
the
limited
partners
correctly
set
out
the
basis
of
the
calculation;
—
the
general
partners
of
both
limited
partnerships
commenced
actions
against
the
solicitors
who
had
made
the
errors
referred
to
above,
and
sought
compensation
for
the
additional
costs
incurred
by
them
and
for
the
value
of
management
fee
income
lost
to
them
due
to
the
errors
in
the
limited
partnership
agreements;
—
to
substantiate
their
claim
for
lost
management
fee
revenue,
the
general
partners
retained
an
accounting
firm
which
prepared
a
report
for
the
purpose
of
calculating
the
cumulative
present
values
of
the
income
lost
as
a
result
of
the
errors
in
the
limited
partnership
agreements;
—
the
said
accounting
firm
reported
that
the
cumulative
present
values
of
the
income
lost
as
a
result
of
the
solicitors’
errors
was
$993,903
in
the
case
of
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
Ltd.
partnership,
and
$849,004
in
the
case
of
the
Mountainside
Lodge
Ltd.
partnership,
and
determined
that
the
errors
had
resulted
in
an
estimated
loss
of
management
fee
revenue
to
December
31,
1984
of
$234,291
in
the
case
of
the
Blackcomb
Lodge,
and
$138,625
in
the
case
of
the
Mountainside
Lodge;
—
an
out-of-court
settlement
was
reached
whereby
the
solicitors
agreed
to
compensate
the
general
partners
of
both
limited
partnerships
in
accordance
with
a
settlement
agreement
which
provided
for
payment
on
or
before
February
25,
1985,
of
an
amount
of
$1,250,000
by
the
solicitors
to
the
general
partners;
—
of
the
$1,250,000
settlement
amount,
$625,000
was
referable
to
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
Ltd.
partnership,
and
the
plaintiff
was
allotted
$187,500
as
its
share
in
its
1985
taxation
year
from
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
joint
venture's
year
end
of
July
31
ending
in
the
plaintiff's
1985
taxation
year;
—
the
remaining
$625,274
of
the
settlement
amount
was
referable
to
the
Mountainside
Lodge
Ltd.
partnership
and
the
plaintiff
was
allotted
$93,791
as
its
share
in
its
1986
taxation
year
from
the
Mountainside
joint
venture's
year
end
of
December
31
ending
in
the
plaintiff's
1986
taxation
year;
—
the
plaintiff,
in
filing
its
returns
of
income
for
its
1985
and
1986
taxation
years,
did
not
include
in
income
any
amounts
with
respect
to
the
$187,500
and
$93,791
amounts
allotted
to
the
plaintiff
as
a
result
of
the
settlement
of
the
actions
of
the
general
partners
against
their
solicitors;
—
by
reassessments
made
August
30,
1988
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
included
the
sums
of
$187,500
and
$93,791
in
the
plaintiff's
income
for
its
taxation
years
ending
August
31,
1985
and
1986,
respectively;
—
the
plaintiff
calculated
that
it
had
realized
non-capital
losses
in
its
1985
and
1986
taxation
years
of
$139,456
and
$23,497
respectively
which
it
deducted
in
computing
its
taxable
income
for
its
1984
taxation
year.
As
a
consequence
of
the
reassessments
for
the
1985
and
1986
taxation
years,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
reassessed
the
plaintiff
by
notice
of
reassessment
dated
August
30,
1988
in
respect
of
its
1984
taxation
year
to
disallow
the
deduction
of
non-capital
losses
from
the
plaintiff's
1985
and
1986
taxation
years
in
computing
the
plaintiff's
taxable
income
for
its
1984
taxation
year;
—
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
Ltd.
partnership
agreement
and
the
Mountainside
Lodge
Ltd.
partnership
agreement
were
not
amended
as
a
consequence
of
the
settlement
of
the
actions
and
still
apply
as
they
existed
before
the
actions
were
commenced
to
generally
the
same
general
partners,
including
the
plaintiff,
who,
at
the
present
time
continue
to
operate
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
and
the
Mountainside
Lodge
on
behalf
of
the
limited
partners.
In
addition
to
these
facts,
the
defendant
admits
for
the
purpose
of
this
appeal
that
the
general
partnership
interest
owned
by
the
plaintiff
in
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
Ltd.
partnership
and
in
the
Mountainside
Lodge
Ltd.
partnership
constitutes
capital
property
within
the
meaning
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act").
The
plaintiff
contends
as
a
result
of
the
negligence
of
the
solicitors
retained
by
the
general
partners
to
prepare
the
partnership
agreements,
the
value
of
the
general
partnership
interest
was
"permanently
impaired”.
The
plaintiff
further
argues
the
amount
received
as
damages
for
the
harm
done
to
such
capital
property
is
a
capital
receipt
and
not
a
part
of
business
profit.
The
plaintiff
submits,
therefore,
it
correctly
computed
its
income
or
loss
and
taxable
income
for
the
1984,
1985
and
1986
taxation
years,
because
the
damages
not
being
part
of
profit
within
the
meaning
of
section
9
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
they
are
not
income
within
the
meaning
of
section
3
and
constitute
therefore
a
non-taxable
capital
receipt
in
the
1985
and
1986
taxation
years.
By
contrast,
the
defendant
says
that
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
properly
reassessed
the
plaintiff
for
its
1985
and
1986
taxation
years.
The
defendant
says
the
Minister
correctly
included
the
compensation
paid
to
the
plaintiff
in
those
years
as
its
share
of
the
proceeds
of
the
settlement
of
the
actions
between
the
general
partners
of
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
and
Mountainside
Lodge
Ltd.
partnerships
against
their
solicitors
as
income.
The
defendant
says
the
compensation
was
so
paid
in
respect
of
management
fee
income
lost
to
the
general
partners,
including
the
plaintiff,
and
represented
income
of
the
plaintiff
from
business
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
9(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
in
the
amounts
of
$187,500
in
the
1985
taxation
year,
and
$93,791
in
the
1986
taxation
year.
The
defendant
says
consequently,
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
properly
reassessed
the
plaintiff
for
its
1984
taxation
year,
and
correctly
determined
the
plaintiff's
taxable
income,
as
the
latter
had
no
non-capital
losses
from
its
1985
and
1986
taxation
years
to
be
applied
in
computing
its
taxable
income
for
the
1984
taxation
year.
At
trial,
counsel
for
both
parties
recognized
the
amounts
of
$187,500
and
$93,791
were
not
received
by
the
plaintiff
as
proceeds
of
disposition
of
capital
property.
Counsel
for
the
plaintiff
further
agreed
the
appeal
should
be
dismissed
with
respect
to
the
allegations
contained
in
paragraph
12
of
the
statement
of
claim
concerning
the
capital
cost
allowance
allowed
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
in
the
plaintiff's
1985
and
1986
taxation
years.
As
to
whether
the
damages
paid
to
the
plaintiff
are
properly
to
be
regarded
as
profit
from
business
for
purposes
of
section
3
and
subsection
9(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
I
am
of
the
view
that
the
rule
stated
by
Diplock,
L.J.,
in
London
&
Thames
Haven
Oil
Wharves
Ltd.
v.
Attwooll,
[1967]
2
All.
E.R.
124
at
134,
is
applicable:
Where,
pursuant
to
a
legal
right,
a
trader
receives
from
another
person
compensation
for
the
trader’s
failure
to
receive
a
sum
of
money
which,
if
it
had
been
received,
would
have
been
credited
to
the
amount
of
profits
(if
any)
arising
in
any
year
from
the
trade
carried
on
by
him
at
the
time
when
the
compensation
is
so
received,
the
compensation
is
to
be
treated
for
income
tax
purposes
in
the
same
way
as
that
sum
of
money
would
have
been
treated
if
it
had
been
received
instead
of
the
compensation.
And
further
on,
Lord
Diplock
stated
at
pages
134-35:
If
the
solution
to
the
first
problem
is
that
the
compensation
was
paid
for
the
failure
of
the
trader
to
receive
a
sum
of
money,
the
second
problem
involved
is
to
decide
whether,
if
that
sum
of
money
had
been
received
by
the
trader,
it
would
have
been
credited
to
the
amount
of
profits
(if
any)
arising
in
any
year
from
the
trade
carried
on
by
him
at
the
date
of
receipt,
that
is,
would
have
been
what
I
shall
call
for
brevity
an
income
receipt
of
that
trade.
Attwooll
was
followed
by
the
Appeal
Division
of
this
Court
in
The
Queen
v.
Manley,
[1985]
1
C.T.C.
186,
85
D.T.C.
5150,
at
page
190
(D.T.C.
5151).
In
Manley
the
taxpayer
received
in
damages,
precisely
what
he
would
have
realized
in
profit
from
his
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade.
Applying
the
rule
stated
by
Diplock,
L.J.
in
Attwooll,
supra,
Mahoney,
J.A.
concluded,
at
page
191
(D.T.C.
In
the
present
case,
the
respondent
was
a
trader,
he
had
engaged
in
an
adventure
in
the
nature
of
trade.
The
damages
for
breach
of
warranty
of
authority,
which
he
received
from
Benjamin
Levy
pursuant
to
a
legal
right,
were
compensation
for
his
failure
to
receive
the
finder's
fee
from
the
Levy
family
shareholders.
Had
the
respondent
received
that
finder’s
fee
it
would
have
been
profit
from
a
business
required
by
the
Income
Tax
Act,
to
be
included
in
his
income
in
the
year
of
its
receipt.
The
damages
for
breach
of
warranty
are
to
be
treated
the
same
way
for
income
tax
purposes.
Also,
Strayer,
J.
appeared
to
be
guided
by
the
same
general
principles
in
Canadian
National
Railway
Co.
v.
M.N.R.,
[1988]
2
C.T.C.
111,
88
D.T.C.
6340,
at
pages
114-15
(D.T.C.
6342-43),
wherein
he
provided
the
following
formulation
of
the
legal
principles
applicable
to
cases
of
this
sort:
There
is
much
jurisprudence
on
the
question
of
whether
compensation
paid
on
the
occasion
of
the
termination
of
some
business
arrangement
is
capital
or
income.
To
a
large
extent
each
case
turns
on
its
own
facts.
It
appears
to
me
that
there
are
two
aspects
which
a
court
must
consider
in
examining
such
a
situation
retrospectively:
was
the
purpose
of
the
payment
to
replace
capital
or
income;
and,
whether
or
not
the
purpose
can
be
reliably
determined,
was
the
effect
of
the
payment
to
replace
capital
or
income?
It
appears
to
me
to
be
a
dual
test
because
the
purpose
may
not
be
discernible,
or
it
may
not
be
reliably
discernible
in
the
sense
that
parties
to
settlements
should
not,
by
misstating
the
real
purpose,
determine
the
tax
consequences
of
the
receipt
of
such
compensation.
It
is
therefore
necessary
to
look
at
both
purpose
and
effect.
With
respect
to
purpose,
the
essential
question
is
to
determine
what
the
compensation
—
whether
paid
pursuant
to
a
contract,
a
court
award
of
damages,
or
otherwise
—
is
intended
to
replace.
In
some
cases
the
contract
providing
for
compensation
may
be
clear.
The
measure
employed
for
calculating
compensation
is
not
always
determinative:
potential
lost
income
may
be
taken
into
account
in
calculating
a
capital
sum
to
be
paid.
Nor
on
the
other
hand
does
the
fact
that
an
amount
is
paid
as
damages
for
breach
of
a
contract
necessarily
make
it
a
capital
sum
and
not
income.
On
the
contrary
it
appears
to
me
that
whatever
the
source
of
the
legal
right
to
the
compensation,
be
it
the
contract
or
the
law
of
damages,
the
substantive
issue
is:
what
is
this
amount
intended
to
replace?
In
the
present
case,
the
measure
of
the
damages
paid
to
the
plaintiff
has
been
determined
by
reference
to
the
present
value
of
the
amount
of
the
income
lost
as
a
result
of
the
reduced
management
fee
by
reason
of
the
improperly
drawn
limited
partnership
agreements.
Furthermore,
the
plaintiff,
together
with
the
same
general
partners,
still
continues
to
provide
management
services
in
respect
of
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
and
the
Mountainside
Lodge
under
the
improperly
drawn
limited
partnership
agreements.
Under
such
circumstances,
I
cannot
find
that
the
solicitors’
errors
did
destroy,
sterilize
or
materially
cripple
the
whole
of
the
profit-making
structure
of
the
business
operations
of
the
general
partners
with
respect
to
the
Blackcomb
Lodge
or
the
Mountainside
Lodge
Ltd.
partnerships.
Such
general
partnership
interest
was
simply
impaired,
albeit
permanently.
The
general
partners
did
not
lose
their
capital
asset.
(See
Glenboig
Union
Fireclay
Co.
v.
C.I.R.,
[1922]
S.C.
112,
12
T.C.
427
(Ct.
of
Sess.)
at
463-64
(T.C.),
and
Attwooll,
supra,
at
pages
129-30.)
Therefore,
the
compensation
paid
by
the
solicitors
to
the
general
partners,
including
the
plaintiff,
was
not
on
account
of
capital.
The
amounts
of
$187,500
and
$93,791
allotted
to
the
plaintiff
as
a
result
of
the
settlement
of
the
actions
of
the
general
partners
against
their
solicitors
were
compensation
paid
in
respect
of
management
fee
income
lost
to
the
general
partners
as
a
result
of
the
solicitors'
errors
and
represented
income
to
the
plaintiff
from
business
in
the
1985
and
1986
taxation
years.
Consequently,
the
plaintiff's
appeal
will
be
dismissed
with
costs.
Appeal
dismissed.