Citation: 2012 TCC 293
Date: 20120814
Docket: 2007-662(IT)I
BETWEEN:
ARLETTE VERREAULT,
Appellant,
and
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN,
Respondent.
[OFFICIAL ENGLISH
TRANSLATION]
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Boyle J.
[1]
Arlette Verreault is an
Aboriginal person who, in 1998 and 1999, worked as the coordinator and director
of the Centre de formation autochtone en milieu urbain (the training centre) of
the Centre d'amitié autochtone de La Tuque Inc. (the friendship centre), as an
employee of Native Leasing Services (NLS). The issue to be decided in this informal
procedure case is whether the income earned by her for this work was exempt
from tax by virtue of section 87 of the Indian Act and
subsection 81(1) of the Income Tax Act (ITA). Specifically, the
only issue to be decided is whether the income is "personal property situated
on a reserve" for purposes of section 87 of the Indian Act. To
decide on this issue, we must look at the factors connecting this income to a
reserve.
[2]
Ms. Verreault is an
Innu from the Mashteuiatsh Reserve or community, at least 200 km north of La
Tuque, Quebec. During the years at issue, she resided solely in La Tuque, where
she worked as the director and coordinator of the training centre.
[3]
The training centre was
a pilot project of the Regroupement des centres d'amitié autochtones du Québec
(the federation) and of the La Tuque friendship centre, in which the government
participated and to which it provided assistance.
[4]
In their testimony, Ms.
Verreault and the Crown witness, the director general of the La Tuque
friendship centre, who also sat on the board of the federation, described the relationship
between the training centre, the federation and the friendship centre. Ms.
Verreault had also been a member of the board of the La Tuque friendship centre
before being appointed director and coordinator of the training centre.
[5]
I accept as correct and
accurate the testimony of the director general of the La Tuque friendship centre,
who also sat on the board of the federation and was familiar with Ms. Verreault's
mandate at the training centre with regard to the relationship between the
training centre, the friendship centre and the federation. The director general
of the friendship centre during the years at issue worked for the organization
for 20 years. The mandate is described in general terms in the first draft of
the management policies manual of the Aboriginal training centres in urban
communities project
(the manual) filed in evidence. The management policies manual was drafted
following a meeting of the coordinators of the three training centre pilot
projects along with the members of the board of the federation: Ms. Verreault
participated in this meeting as coordinator. At the same time, I accept Ms. Verreault's
testimony that, in practice, she had considerable freedom and that, in her
opinion, things did not always work as the federation or the friendship centre
expected.
[6]
The main goal of the
training centre project was to assist Aboriginal people in obtaining secondary
5 equivalency certification within a period of six months. The project of which
Ms. Verreault was the director and coordinator involved setting up and
operating a computer laboratory for training purposes. In the management policy
manual, the federation is described as the project sponsor responsible for the
overall project including the verification of the evolution of budgets. The
friendship centre is described as the sponsor of the training centre responsible
for the measures it took to provide services as well as for managing the
training centre's facilities and staff. The training centre was not a separate
legal entity and, in the documents filed by the La Tuque friendship centre with
the government of Quebec, it identifies the training centre as another name
used by the friendship centre during the years at issue.
[7]
The head office and
premises of the friendship centre were located in La Tuque, which was not a
reserve. The training centre was located on the premises of the friendship
centre in La Tuque.
[8]
Ms. Verreault testified
that, with a few exceptions, the training centre's clients were Aboriginal
people. None of Mr. Verreault's clients was Innu like her or was from her band's
reserve or community.
[9]
As its name suggested,
the training centre's main clients were Aboriginal people living off the
reserve. However, some of the clients were not from La Tuque but from more
remote locations. No specific information was provided, but some clients came from
the Attikamek band's Obedjiwan, Wemotaci and Manawan reserves or communities,
four or more hours' drive from La Tuque. Some may have returned to their
reserves or communities once they had completed their training.
[10]
According to the
management policies manual, the training centre's clientele had to be, in order
of priority, Aboriginal people living in urban areas, Aboriginal organizations
and communities and all clients and businesses in the community.
[11]
This was consistent
with the objectives of the La Tuque friendship centre, set out in its letters
patent and consisting, among other things, in the following: maintain a permanent
policy in which or of which transitional services and programs will be offered
to persons of Indian descent to assist them in establishing themselves in the
urban community and promoting social, sports or cultural activities for the
benefit of Aboriginal people with the participation of non-Aboriginal people in
order to foster social relationships between all of these individuals and raise
the general public's awareness of the special needs of Aboriginal people who
immigrate into our society and facilitate their acceptance in the community.
[12]
The management policies
manual specifies that the friendship centre was responsible for hiring or
ratifying the hiring of the coordinator of the training centre as well as for
supervising the training centre's staff. I accept the disinterested testimony
of the director general of the friendship centre, according to which, the
centre had appointed Ms. Verreault to the position of coordinator and director
after consulting with the federation without NLS's involvement. The written
evidence mentioned confirms this version of events. Ms. Verreault first became
aware of the opening for the position at the training centre as a member of the
board of the friendship centre. Following her appointment as coordinator and
director of the training centre, Ms. Verreault stopped being a board member. It
is not disputed that she fulfilled her functions for the training centre of the
friendship centre as an employee of NLS. However, it was not NLS that appointed
her to the coordinator and director position.
[13]
Ms. Verreault fulfilled
her duties as coordinator and director of the training centre at its computer
laboratory in La Tuque. In addition, every month, Ms. Verreault had
meetings in Québec with representatives of the federation and the coordinators
of the two other training centre pilot projects in Val-d'Or and Montréal. A
special committee of the federation decided on the activities of the three
training centres. In addition, Ms. Verreault travelled to visit Aboriginal
communities one or two days per month to promote the training centre and try to
increase its clientele.
[14]
It had not been decided
from the outset that the training centre would be located in the friendship
centre's offices in La Tuque. It was open to Ms. Verreault to choose other
premises in La Tuque or in another town. Although the two witnesses' testimony
diverged somewhat, it seems unlikely that the training centre would have been
established not in an urban centre, but on a reserve or in a community given
the urban integration aims of both the friendship centre and the training
centre. In any event, the training centre is located in the friendship centre
in La Tuque. As a practical matter, the training centre could not have been
located on a reserve or in a community as high-speed Internet access was
required and was not available outside urban centres at the time.
[15]
As coordinator and
director of the training centre, Ms. Verreault did not report to the director
general of the friendship centre but essentially reported to the board of the
federation. The coordinator and director of the training centre also reported
to the board of the friendship centre in La Tuque.
[16]
To enrol in the
training centre's program, its clients needed to obtain approvals and funding
from government employment centres.
[17]
The friendship centre
carried out its mission in urban and in Aboriginal communities. Similarly, both
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people participated in its activities.
I. Applicable Law
[18]
Subsections 87(1) and
(2) of the Indian Act provide as follows:
TAXATION
87(1) Property exempt from taxation — Notwithstanding any other
Act of Parliament or any Act of the legislature of a province, but subject to
section 83 and section 5 of the First Nations Fiscal and
Statistical Management Act, the following property is exempt from
taxation:
(a) the interest of an Indian or a band in reserve lands or
surrendered lands; and
(b) the personal property of an Indian or a band situated
on a reserve.
(2) No
Indian or band is subject to taxation in respect of the ownership,
occupation, possession or use of any property mentioned in
paragraph (1)(a) or (b) or is otherwise subject to
taxation in respect of any such property.
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TAXATION
87(1) Biens exempts de taxation —
Nonobstant toute autre loi fédérale ou provinciale, mais sous réserve de l'article 83
et de l'article 5 de la Loi sur la gestion financière et statistique
des premières nations, les biens suivants sont exemptés de taxation :
a) le droit d'un Indien ou d'une bande
sur une réserve ou des terres cédées;
b) les biens meubles d'un Indien ou d'une
bande situés sur une réserve.
(2) Nul
Indien ou bande n'est assujetti à une taxation concernant la propriété, l'occupation,
la possession ou l'usage d'un bien mentionné aux alinéas (1)a)
ou b) ni autrement soumis à une taxation quant à l'un de ces
biens.
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[19]
Paragraph 81(1)(a)
of the Income Tax Act provides as follows:
81(1)
Amounts not included in income — There shall not
be included in computing the income of a taxpayer for a taxation year,
(a) Statutory exemptions [including Indians] — an
amount that is declared to be exempt from income tax by any other enactment of
Parliament, other than an amount received or receivable by an individual that
is exempt by virtue of a provision contained in a tax convention or agreement
with another country that has the force of law in Canada;
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81(1)
Sommes à exclure du revenu — Ne sont pas inclus
dans le calcul du revenu d'un contribuable pour une année d'imposition :
a) Exemptions prévues par une autre
loi [incluant celles prévues dans un accord avec les Indiens] — une somme
exonérée de l'impôt sur le revenu par toute autre loi fédérale, autre qu'un
montant reçu ou à recevoir par un particulier qui est exonéré en vertu d'une
disposition d'une convention ou d'un accord fiscal conclu avec un autre pays
et qui a force de loi au Canada;
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[20]
The nature and purpose
of the exemption in section 87 was addressed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Williams
in which it wrote the following:
A -- The Nature
and Purpose of the Exemption from Taxation
The question of the purpose of ss. 87, 89 and 90 has been
thoroughly addressed by La Forest J. in the case of Mitchell v.
Peguis Indian Band, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 85. La Forest J.
expressed the view that the purpose of these sections was to preserve the
entitlements of Indians to their reserve lands and to ensure that the use of
their property on their reserve lands was not eroded by the ability of
governments to tax, or creditors to seize. The corollary of this conclusion
was that the purpose of the sections was not to confer a general economic
benefit upon the Indians (at pp. 130-31):
The exemptions from taxation
and distraint have historically protected the ability of Indians to benefit
from this property in two ways. First, they guard against the possibility
that one branch of government, through the imposition of taxes, could erode
the full measure of the benefits given by that branch of government entrusted
with the supervision of Indian affairs. Secondly, the protection against
attachment ensures that the enforcement of civil judgments by non‑natives
will not be allowed to hinder Indians in the untrammelled enjoyment of such
advantages as they had retained or might acquire pursuant to the fulfillment
by the Crown of its treaty obligations. In effect, these sections shield
Indians from the imposition of the civil liabilities that could lead, albeit
through an indirect route, to the alienation of the Indian land base through
the medium of foreclosure sales and the like; see Brennan J.'s
discussion of the purpose served by Indian tax immunities in the American
context in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), at p. 391.
In summary, the historical
record makes it clear that ss. 87 and 89 of the Indian Act, the
sections to which the deeming provision of s. 90 applies, constitute
part of a legislative "package" which bears the impress of an
obligation to native peoples which the Crown has recognized at least since
the signing of the Royal Proclamation of 1763. From that time on, the Crown
has always acknowledged that it is honour-bound to shield Indians from any
efforts by non-natives to dispossess Indians of the property which they hold
qua Indians, i.e., their land base and the chattels on that land base.
It is also important to
underscore the corollary to the conclusion I have just drawn. The fact
that the modern-day legislation, like its historical counterparts, is so
careful to underline that exemptions from taxation and distraint apply only
in respect of personal property situated on reserves demonstrates that the
purpose of the legislation is not to remedy the economically disadvantaged
position of Indians by ensuring that Indians may acquire, hold, and deal with
property in the commercial mainstream on different terms than their fellow
citizens. An examination of the decisions bearing on these sections
confirms that Indians who acquire and deal in property outside lands reserved
for their use, deal with it on the same basis as all other Canadians.
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A -- La nature et l'objet de l'exemption fiscale
Le juge La Forest a analysé en profondeur la question de l'objet
des art. 87, 89 et 90 dans l'arrêt Mitchell c. Bande indienne Peguis,
[1990] 2 R.C.S. 85. Il a conclu que ces articles visent à préserver
les droits des Indiens sur leurs terres réservées et à assurer que la
capacité des gouvernements d'imposer des taxes, ou celle des créanciers de
saisir, ne porte pas atteinte à l'utilisation de leurs biens situés sur leurs
terres réservées. La conséquence de cette conclusion était que les articles
en question ne visent pas à conférer un avantage économique général aux
Indiens (aux pp. 130 et 131) :
Historiquement, les
exemptions de taxe et de saisie ont protégé de deux façons la capacité des
Indiens de profiter de cette propriété. Premièrement, elles empêchent qu'un
palier de gouvernement, par l'imposition de taxes, puisse porter atteinte à l'intégrité
des bénéfices accordés par le palier de gouvernement responsable du contrôle
des affaires indiennes. Deuxièmement, la protection contre les saisies assure
que l'exécution de jugements obtenus par des non‑Indiens en matière
civile ne pourra entraver les Indiens dans la libre jouissance des avantages
qu'ils ont acquis ou pourront acquérir conformément à l'exécution par la
Couronne de ses obligations prévues par traité. Dans les faits, ces articles
ont protégé les Indiens contre l'imposition d'obligations de nature civile
qui pouvaient conduire, quoique indirectement, à l'aliénation de leurs terres
à la suite de ventes forcées et par d'autres moyens semblables; voir l'examen
par le juge Brennan du but des exemptions de taxe accordées aux Indiens en
contexte américain dans l'arrêt Bryan v. Itasca County,
426 U.S. 373 (1976), à la p. 391.
En résumé, le dossier
historique indique clairement que les art. 87 et 89 de la Loi sur les
Indiens, auxquels s'applique la présomption de l'art. 90, font
partie d'un ensemble législatif qui fait état d'une obligation envers les
peuples autochtones, dont la Couronne a reconnu l'existence tout au moins
depuis la signature de la Proclamation royale de 1763. Depuis ce temps, la
Couronne a toujours reconnu qu'elle est tenue par l'honneur de protéger les
Indiens de tous les efforts entrepris par des non‑Indiens pour les
déposséder des biens qu'ils possèdent en tant qu'Indiens, c'est‑à‑dire
leur territoire et les chatels qui y sont situés.
Il est également important
de souligner la conséquence de la conclusion que je viens de tirer. Le
fait que la loi contemporaine, comme sa contrepartie historique, prenne tant
de soin pour souligner que les exemptions de taxe et de saisie ne s'appliquent
que dans le cas des biens personnels situés sur des réserves démontre que l'objet
de la Loi n'est pas de remédier à la situation économiquement défavorable des
Indiens en leur assurant le pouvoir d'acquérir, de posséder et d'aliéner des
biens sur le marché à des conditions différentes de celles applicables à leurs
concitoyens. Un examen des décisions portant sur ces articles confirme
que les Indiens qui acquièrent et aliènent des biens situés à l'extérieur des
terres réservées à leur usage le font aux mêmes conditions que tous les
autres Canadiens.
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[Emphasis added.]
[21]
The decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada in Williams v. Canada requires that deciding whether an Aboriginal
person's employment income is personal property situated on a reserve involves
considering the relevant connecting factors and weighing them:
The approach which best reflects these concerns is
one which analyzes the matter in terms of categories of property and types of
taxation. For instance, connecting factors may have different relevance with
regard to unemployment insurance benefits than in respect of employment
income, or pension benefits. The first step is to identify the various
connecting factors which are potentially relevant. These factors should then
be analyzed to determine what weight they should be given in identifying the
location of the property, in light of three considerations: (1) the
purpose of the exemption under the Indian Act; (2) the type of
property in question; and (3) the nature of the taxation of that
property. The question with regard to each connecting factor is therefore
what weight should be given that factor in answering the question whether to
tax that form of property in that manner would amount to the erosion of the
entitlement of the Indian qua Indian on a reserve.
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La méthode qui tient le mieux compte de ces préoccupations est celle
qui analyse la situation sous le rapport des catégories de biens et des types
d'imposition. Par exemple, la pertinence des facteurs de rattachement peut
varier selon qu'il s'agit de prestations d'assurance‑chômage, de revenu
d'emploi ou de prestations de pension. Il faut d'abord identifier les divers
facteurs de rattachement qui peuvent être pertinents. On doit ensuite
analyser ces facteurs pour déterminer le poids à leur accorder afin d'identifier
l'emplacement du bien, en tenant compte de trois choses: (1) l'objet de
l'exemption prévue dans la Loi sur les Indiens, (2) le genre de
bien en cause et (3) la nature de l'imposition de ce bien. Il s'agit
donc de déterminer, relativement à chaque facteur de rattachement, le poids qui
devrait lui être accordé pour décider si l'imposition en cause de ce type de
bien représenterait une atteinte aux droits de l'Indien à titre d'Indien sur
une réserve.
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[22]
With respect to
employment income, the relevant connecting factors are accepted to be (i) location
of the employer; (ii) residence of the employee; (iii) location of
the work; and (iv) nature of the work. See Her Majesty the Queen v.
Shilling, 2001 FCA 178:
[29] As we have already
noted, the Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to apply to employment
income the connecting factors test formulated in Williams, supra.
Williams itself concerned the location of unemployment insurance
benefits.
[30]
However, in several cases this Court has been called upon to apply the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence in order to determine whether an Indian's
employment income was situated on a reserve and thus exempt from income tax
by virtue of paragraph 87(1)(b) of the Indian Act.
[31]
Thus, in Canada v. Folster, [1997] 3 F.C. 269 (C.A.); and Bell v.
Canada, [2000] 3 C.N.L.R. 32 (F.C.A.), the following factors were said to
be potentially relevant in determining whether an Indian's employment income
is situated on a reserve: the location or residence of the employer; the
nature, location and surrounding circumstances of the work performed by the
employee, including the nature of any benefit that accrued to the reserve
from it; and the residence of the employee.
[32]
The place where the employee was paid has also been considered a potentially
relevant connecting factor, although not one that has been given much weight:
Bell v. Canada (1998), 98 DTC 1857 (T.C.C.), at paragraphs 45-47. The
Tax Court Judge's decision was upheld on appeal and his identification of the
connecting factors approved: [2000] 3 C.N.L.R. 32 (F.C.A.), at paragraph 35.
[33]
The weight to be assigned to any of these factors may vary according to the
facts of any given case, even when the category of property in question
(employment income) and the nature of the tax (income tax) are the same. Nonetheless,
the case law suggests that particular attention should be given to the nature
of the work performed by the employee, and the circumstances surrounding it.
As Linden J.A. explained in Folster, supra, at paragraph 27:
In my view, having regard
for the legislative purpose of the tax exemption and the type of personal
property in question, the analysis must focus on the nature of the appellant's
employment and the circumstances surrounding it. The type of personal
property at issue, employment income, is such that its character cannot be
appreciated without reference to the circumstances in which it was earned.
Just as the situs of unemployment insurance benefits must be
determined with reference to its qualifying employment, an inquiry into the
location of employment income is equally dependent upon an examination of all
the circumstances giving rise to that employment.
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[29]
Comme il en a déjà été fait mention, la Cour suprême n'a pas encore eu l'occasion
d'appliquer au revenu d'emploi le critère des facteurs de rattachement qui a
été énoncé dans l'arrêt Williams, précité. L'arrêt Williams
lui-même se rapportait à l'emplacement de prestations d'assurance-chômage.
[30]
Toutefois, dans plusieurs cas, la présente Cour a eu à appliquer la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême afin de déterminer si le revenu d'emploi d'un Indien était
situé dans une réserve et si, par conséquent, il était exempt d'impôt en
vertu de l'alinéa 87(1)b)
de la Loi sur les Indiens.
[31]
Ainsi, dans les arrêts Canada c. Folster, [1997] 3 C.F. 269 (C.A.); et
Bell c. Canada, [2000] 3 C.N.L.R. 32 (C.A.F.), on a dit que les
facteurs suivants étaient peut-être pertinents lorsqu'il s'agissait de
déterminer si le revenu d'emploi d'un Indien est situé dans
une réserve: l'emplacement de l'employeur ou son lieu de résidence; la nature
du travail, le lieu de travail et les circonstances dans lesquelles le
travail est accompli par l'employé, et notamment la nature de tout avantage
qu'en tire la réserve; le lieu de résidence de l'employé.
[32]
Le lieu où l'employé était payé a également été considéré comme un facteur de
rattachement qui pouvait être pertinent, même si l'on n'a pas accordé
beaucoup d'importance à ce facteur : Bell c. Canada (1998),
98 DTC 1857 (C.C.I.), aux paragraphes 45 à 47. La décision du juge
de la Cour de l'impôt a été confirmée en appel et son identification des
facteurs de rattachement a été approuvée :
[2000] 3 C.N.R.L. 32 (C.A.F.), au paragraphe 35.
[33]
L'importance à accorder à l'un quelconque de ces facteurs peut varier selon
les faits d'une affaire donnée, et ce, même si le bien en question (un revenu
d'emploi) et l'impôt (un impôt sur le revenu) appartiennent à une même
catégorie. Néanmoins, la jurisprudence donne à entendre qu'il faut prêter une
attention particulière à la nature du travail accompli par l'employé et aux
circonstances y afférentes. Comme le juge Linden l'a expliqué dans l'arrêt Folster,
précité, au paragraphe 27 :
À mon avis, étant donné le but poursuivi par le
législateur en créant l'exemption d'impôt et le genre de bien meuble en
cause, l'analyse doit porter sur la nature de l'emploi de l'appelante et les
circonstances qui s'y rapportent. Le genre de bien meuble en cause, c'est‑à‑dire
le revenu d'emploi, est tel qu'on ne peut juger de sa nature sans se référer
aux circonstances dans lesquelles il a été gagné. De même que le situs
des prestations d'assurance-chômage doit être déterminé par rapport à l'emploi
ouvrant droit aux prestations, de même l'analyse de l'emplacement du revenu d'emploi
est subordonnée à un examen de toutes les circonstances qui ont donné lieu à
l'emploi.
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II. Analysis of connecting factors
A. Location of the employer
[23]
Ms. Verreault's
employer, Native Leasing Services, is operated by an Aboriginal person on the
Six Nations Reserve in Ontario. The significance of this connecting factor is
somewhat limited given that NLS had no role in the appointment of Ms. Verreault
to her position at the training centre and no other involvement with the
affairs of the training centre or the friendship centre, and appeared to have
served solely as the vehicle through which payment for her services to the
training centre was made. In Shillin, NLS played a similar role. In that
case, the Federal Court of Appeal wrote the following:
45 One other
issue respecting the location of the employer requires comment. That tax
planning was the motivation for the respondent to enter into an employment
relationship with NLS is not a concern in the absence of an allegation that
either the transaction is a sham, or that the general anti‑avoidance
rule in section 245 of the Income Tax Act is applicable. The
Crown has made no such allegation in this case. As the Trial Judge found,
there should be no discounting of the weight to be accorded the on‑reserve
location of the employer because the employment by that employer was
motivated by tax planning and a desire to avoid the payment of income tax.
See Neuman v. Minister of National Revenue,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 770, at paragraph 39. On the other
hand, in the absence of evidence which would support giving additional weight
to this connecting factor, contracting with an on‑reserve employer,
whether motivated by tax planning or not, will be given only limited weight.
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45 Il importe
de faire une autre remarque au sujet de l'emplacement de l'employeur. Le fait
que l'intimée a été amenée à avoir une relation d'emploi avec NLS pour des
raisons de planification fiscale importe peu s'il n'est pas allégué que l'opération
est factice, ou que la règle générale anti‑évitement énoncée à l'article 245
de la Loi de l'impôt sur le revenu s'applique. Or, Sa Majesté n'a fait
aucune allégation de ce genre dans ce cas‑ci. Comme le juge de première
instance l'a conclu, on ne devrait pas accorder une importance réduite au
fait que l'employeur est situé dans une réserve du simple fait que des
raisons de planification fiscale et le désir d'éviter d'avoir à payer l'impôt
sur le revenu avaient amené l'intimée à exercer l'emploi en question. Voir Neuman
c. Ministre du Revenu national, [1998] 1 R.C.S. 770, au
paragraphe 39. D'autre part, en l'absence d'éléments de preuve
étayant l'importance accrue à accorder à ce facteur de rattachement, le fait
d'avoir passé un contrat avec un employeur situé dans une réserve ne se verra
accorder qu'une importance restreinte, et ce, indépendamment de la question
de savoir si des raisons de planification fiscale étaient à l'origine du
contrat.
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[Emphasis added.]
[24]
NLS fulfilled a similar
role in the matter before the Federal Court in Horn v. Canada. In that
case, Justice M.L. Phelan wrote the following:
97 Therefore,
while NLS's location is on the Six Nations Reserve, these other circumstances
indicate that this factor is not particularly weighty. It is of almost little
weight to Horn as she is not a member of the Six Nations nor does her band at
Kahnawake receive any direct benefits from NLS's location on the Six Nations
Reserve.
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97 Par
conséquent, si NLS est située dans la réserve des Six Nations, ces autres
circonstances indiquent que ce facteur n'est pas particulièrement important.
Il est presque sans importance pour Horn, puisqu'elle n'est pas membre des
Six Nations et que sa bande de Kahnawake ne tire aucun avantage direct du
fait que NLS est située dans la réserve des Six Nations.
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[25]
Similarly, in Canada
v. Folsteri, the Federal Court of Appeal did not think that it should
attach much weight to the location where the cheques were issued to pay the
employee (see paragraph 26).
[26]
The role of NLS and the
relevance of its situs on the Six Nations Reserve were also addressed by
Justice Sheridan of this Court in McIvor v. The Queen in which
she wrote the following:
84 There is no
question that NLS and O.I. Inc. headquarters were located on the Six Nations
Reserve. By purchasing supplies and services from on‑reserve sources,
renting office space from the band and providing jobs and training to the on‑reserve
administrative staff, the business operation of NLS/O.I. Inc. provided some
benefit to the Six Nations Reserve.
85 Against
this finding, however, must be balanced the following facts which reduce the
weight to be given this connecting factor: first, the financial benefit to
the Six Nations Reserve represented but a modest portion of the total
revenues of NLS and O.I. Inc. Further, the source of such revenues were the
service fees deducted from the employment earnings of each of the leased
employees at their respective Placement Organizations, none of which was
located on the Six Nations Reserve or any other reserve. Finally, the
NLS/O.I. Inc. administrative staff on the Six Nations Reserve did little more
than act as a conduit between the off‑reserve Placement Organizations
who maintained and reported records of the leased employees' hours of work,
and the off-reserve payroll services that processed their pay cheques.
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84 Il est
certain que les bureaux principaux de NLS et d'O.I. Inc. étaient situés dans
la réserve des Six Nations. L'exploitation de NLS et d'O.I. Inc. offrait
certains avantages à la réserve des Six Nations : les fournitures et les
services étaient achetés de sources situées dans la réserve, les locaux à
bureaux étaient loués de la bande et des emplois et de la formation étaient
fournis au personnel administratif dans la réserve.
85 Toutefois,
il faut soupeser cette conclusion en fonction des faits suivants, qui
atténuent le poids à accorder à ce facteur de rattachement : premièrement, l'avantage
financier accordé à la réserve des Six Nations représentait une fraction bien
faible de l'ensemble des revenus de NLS et d'O.I. Inc. En outre, ces revenus
provenaient des frais de service qui étaient déduits de la rémunération de
chacun des employés dont les services étaient loués auprès de leurs
organismes de placement respectifs, dont aucun n'était situé dans la réserve
des Six Nations ou dans une autre réserve. Enfin, le personnel administratif
de NLS et d'O.I. Inc. dans la réserve des Six Nations se contentait d'agir
comme intermédiaire entre les organismes de placement hors réserve, qui
enregistraient et déclaraient les heures de travail des employés dont les
services étaient loués, et les services de paye hors réserve qui traitaient
les chèques de paye.
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[27]
Similarly in a decision
of Associate Chief Justice Rossiter of this Court in Googoo v. The
Queen,
in addressing the weight to be given to the residence of NLS on the Six Nations
Reserve, he wrote the following at paragraph 98:
98 In Canada
v. Monias, supra, it was noted that although the location of the
employer has been regarded as a connecting factor under the analysis mandated
by Williams, there must nonetheless be some evidence of the scope of
the employer's activities on the reserve or of some benefit flowing to the
reserve from the presence of the employer. Otherwise it cannot be a factor
upon which much weight will be assigned.
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98 Dans l'arrêt
Canada v. Monias, précité, la Cour d'appel fédérale a fait observer
que, même si l'emplacement de l'employeur est considéré comme un facteur de
rattachement dans l'analyse prévue par l'arrêt Williams, il faut
néanmoins qu'il y ait des éléments de preuve au sujet de l'importance des
activités de l'employeur dans la réserve ou d'un bénéfice pour la réserve du
fait de la présence de l'employeur, à défaut de quoi il n'y a pas lieu d'accorder
beaucoup de poids à ce facteur.
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[28]
It is clear from the
facts of this case that the location of NLS on the Six Nations Reserve in
Ontario did not in any way factor into the operations of the training centre or
the friendship centre in La Tuque. There was no evidence in this case of the
role that NLS might have fulfilled on the Six Nations Reserve for the benefit
of its residents. In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that little
weight should be given to this limited connecting factor in Ms. Verreault's
case. The only role NLS played in her case was to somewhat increase her
prospects for being successful in her claim for a section 87 exemption by
virtue of an additional connecting factor. As it is clear from the decisions
cited above, that alone is of little relevance or assistance and should be given
little weight.
B. The appellant's residence
[29]
During the years in
question, Ms. Verreault lived in the town of La Tuque. She did not live on
a reserve. It was not clear from the evidence when, if ever, she had lived on a
reserve prior to or since the years in question.
[30]
The absence of such a
connecting factor is by no means fatal to her claim. It is not a requirement of
section 87 of the Indian Act that the owner of the personal
property reside on a reserve. Section 87 requires that the situs of the
property be on a reserve. In Williams the Supreme Court of Canada wrote
the following:
Having regard to the importance of the location of the qualifying
employment income as a factor in identifying the location of the unemployment
insurance benefits, the remaining factor of the residence of the recipient
of the benefits at the time of their receipt is only potentially significant
if it points to a location different from that of the qualifying employment.
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Compte tenu de l'importance de l'emplacement du revenu d'emploi
donnant droit aux prestations en tant que facteur dont il faut tenir compte
pour identifier l'emplacement des prestations d'assurance‑chômage, le facteur
restant, c'est‑à‑dire la résidence de la personne qui reçoit les
prestations au moment de leur réception, ne peut avoir d'importance que s'il
indique un emplacement différent de celui de l'emploi qui a rendu admissible
aux prestations.
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[Emphasis added.]
[31]
In Horn, Justice
M.L. Phelan noted that one of the appellants resided on a reserve and
wrote the following:
104 As regards Williams, she is a resident of the Six Nations
Reserve. She has strong ties to the community, both physical, social and
emotional. However, the benefits to the Reserve of her employment, aside from
those clients of the Shelter who come from the Reserve, is largely that of
her spending income on living expenses. This is not a significant connecting
factor, per se, as held in Bell.
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104 Quant à
Williams, elle réside dans la réserve des Six Nations. Elle entretient des
liens solides avec la collectivité, tant physiques que sociaux et
émotionnels. Toutefois, les avantages que tire la réserve de son emploi, mis
à part les clients du Refuge qui viennent de la réserve, tiennent
principalement au fait qu'elle consacre son revenu à ses frais de
subsistance. Il ne s'agit pas d'un facteur de rattachement important en soi,
ainsi qu'il a été conclu dans l'arrêt Bell.
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[32]
Given these comments from
Williams and Horn, even had Ms. Verreault lived on a reserve, the
significance and weight of that connecting factor would only be strong if her
residence on a reserve played some significant role in her work that gave rise
to the income in question.
[33]
In the circumstances,
therefore, this is at best a neutral consideration in my analysis of the
connecting factors; it does not assist in any way in establishing that Ms. Verreault's
income is property situated on a reserve.
[34]
If Ms. Verreault's
income is to be situated on a reserve, there is no factual basis for it to be
considered to be situated on her Innu reserve, where she did not reside and
with which neither the training centre nor the friendship centre was in any way
connected.
[35]
The three Attikamek
reserves of Obedjiwan, Wemotaci and Manawan, which many of the training centre
and the friendship centre's clients were members of and came from – and may
have remained members of while they were living in La Tuque and attending the training
centre or otherwise – are not sufficiently connected to Ms. Verreault's
work at the training centre to conclude that the situs of her income from that
work was on any of those three reserves. She estimated that her promotional activities
took her out of La Tuque to one of the reserves for a day or two each month on
average. It is noted that the evidence showed that the drive to and from any of
these reserves would have taken a long day in itself.
[36]
Considering these
facts, the only other reserve where Ms. Verreault could argue the income
from her training centre work was situated was the Six Nations Reserve in
Ontario. As stated above, in the first part of my analysis, the Six Nations
Reserve and NLS situated on that reserve had no inherent or significant relationship
with the work of the friendship centre in La Tuque or its training centre, and
its only role was limited to that of being a kind of placement agency for their
employee Arlette Verreault.
[37]
Thus, the conclusion to
be made on the connecting factor analysis of the appellant's residence in this
case is that Ms. Verreault's income was not situated on any of those
reserves.
C. Location of work
[38]
The training centre of
which Ms. Verreault was the director and coordinator and its computer
laboratory were located on the premises of the friendship centre in La Tuque,
not on a reserve. With few very limited exceptions, all of Ms. Verreault's
work was completed in La Tuque. She did go to Québec one day per month for
meetings of the three coordinators with members of the federation's board. In
addition, she spent on average one or two days a month at one of the three
Attikamek reserves promoting the La Tuque training centre project. Her evidence
was that each of these reserves was two to five hours driving distance from La
Tuque each way. There is no reason to believe that any of the training centre
clients resided on the reserves while attending classes. It is clear that the
primary focus of both the friendship centre and the training centre was
providing assistance to Aboriginal people living in urban centers. The promotion
of her project on the reserves was not established to be a principal or
significant part of her duties as director and coordinator of the training centre.
[39]
Cases such as Folster and Amos provide
examples of circumstances where an Aboriginal person's off‑reserve work
may qualify for the section 87 exemption. In each of those cases, the Aboriginal
person's workplace had a historical connection to a reserve and had at times
been at least in part situated on the reserve, even if the employee did not
work on the reserve during the year in question. In each of these two cases,
the appellants lived on the reserve in question. In Ms. Verreault's case,
unlike in Folster and Amos, there were no significant historical
or practical connections of a similar nature between the off‑reserve
location of the training centre at which she worked and any of the reserves in
question.
[40]
In Ms. Verreault's
case, the fact that her place of work was located in La Tuque, not on a
reserve; that little of her time was spent on any reserve; and that there was
no historical connection between her La Tuque computer laboratory and any
reserve results in a very weak connection to a reserve.
D. Nature of the work
[41]
The only connection
between the nature of Ms. Verreault's work and the training and services offered
by the computer laboratory project and any reserve is that the majority of her
clients were Aboriginal people who were believed to have come from the three
Attikamek reserves mentioned and some of whom may have returned there. Given
the driving distances, it is assumed that none of the clients resided on the
reserves during their six months of training in La Tuque.
[42]
This factor was considered
in Shilling at paragraphs 49 et seq.:
49 In this
case, the respondent's place of employment was in Toronto. This is a factor
that would tend to locate her employment income off-reserve. However, under
the connecting factors analysis, location of employment alone will not be
conclusive. Normally, regard must be had to the nature of the employment as a
whole and the surrounding circumstances to determine what connection, if any,
the off-reserve employment has to a reserve.
. . .
51 AHT appears to be a social services
organization involved in preventative health care and other social assistance
for off‑reserve Native people in Toronto. The respondent's work
benefits AHT and its off-reserve clientele. This is in stark contrast to Folster
where the hospital's patients mostly lived on‑reserve. As the Trial
Judge found, merely because the nature of employment is to provide
services to Indians does not connect that employment to an Indian reserve as
a physical place.
52 In
finding that the nature of the respondent's duties are not a connecting
factor to a reserve, we do not overlook the fact that the services provided
are social services to Native people as opposed to employment in a for‑profit
enterprise. However, many not‑for‑profit social service organizations
exist in Canadian cities. Employees of such organizations are not exempt from
income tax. Given the limited purpose of paragraph 87(1)(b) of
the Indian Act, the fact that the employment at issue involves
providing social services to off‑reserve Native people, is no reason
for conferring preferred tax treatment under that provision.
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49 En l'espèce,
l'intimée travaille à Toronto. Ce facteur tendrait à montrer que le revenu d'emploi
est situé en dehors d'une réserve. Toutefois, selon l'analyse se rapportant
aux facteurs de rattachement, le lieu du travail à lui seul n'est pas
concluant. Normalement, il faut tenir compte de la nature de l'emploi dans
son ensemble et des circonstances y afférentes en vue de déterminer quel lien
existe, le cas échéant, entre l'emploi exercé en dehors d'une réserve et une
réserve.
[…]
51 AHT semble
être une organisation de services sociaux qui s'occupe de soins de santé
préventifs et fournit de l'aide, à Toronto, aux autochtones qui ne sont pas
dans une réserve. AHT et sa clientèle hors réserve tirent bénéfice du travail
de l'intimée, contrairement à ce qui se produisait dans l'affaire Folster,
où les patients de l'hôpital habitaient presque tous dans la réserve. Comme
le juge de première instance l'a conclu, l'emploi n'est pas rattaché à une
réserve indienne au sens physique du terme du simple fait que la nature de l'emploi
consiste à fournir des services à des Indiens.
52 En
concluant que la nature des tâches de l'intimée ne constitue pas un facteur
de rattachement avec une réserve, nous n'omettons pas de tenir compte du fait
que les services fournis sont des services sociaux à l'intention des
autochtones, par opposition à un emploi exercé dans le cadre de l'exploitation
d'une entreprise à but lucratif. Toutefois, il existe dans les villes
canadiennes un grand nombre d'organisations à but non lucratif offrant des
services sociaux. Les employés de pareilles organisations ne sont pas
exemptés de l'impôt sur le revenu. Compte tenu du but restreint de l'alinéa 87(1)b)
de la Loi sur les Indiens, le fait que l'emploi en question se
rapporte à la prestation de services sociaux à des autochtones en dehors d'une
réserve ne confère pas pour autant un traitement fiscal privilégié en vertu
de cette disposition.
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[Emphasis added.]
[43]
On the same subject,
Justice Evans of the Federal Court of Appeal wrote the following in Monias:
66 That the
work from which employment income is earned benefits Indians on reserves, and
indeed may be integral to maintaining the reserves as viable social units, is
not in itself sufficient to situate the employment income there. It is not
the policy of paragraph 87(1)(b) to provide a tax subsidy for
services provided to and for the benefit of reserves. Rather, it is to
protect from erosion by taxation the property of individual Indians that they
acquire, hold and use on a reserve, although in the case of an intangible,
such as employment income, it is the situs of its acquisition
that is particularly important.
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66 Le fait que
le travail qui donne lieu au revenu d'emploi soit au bénéfice des Indiens
dans les réserves et qu'il puisse être essentiel au maintien des réserves
comme groupes sociaux viables, n'est pas en soi suffisant pour situer le
revenu d'emploi dans les réserves. La politique qui sous-tend l'alinéa 87(1)b)
n'a pas pour but d'offrir une subvention fiscale aux services fournis aux
réserves. Il s'agit plutôt de protéger la propriété que les Indiens peuvent
acquérir, conserver et utiliser dans une réserve, de toute atteinte par le
biais de l'impôt, bien que dans le cas d'un bien incorporel, comme le revenu
d'emploi, c'est le situs de son acquisition qui est
particulièrement important.
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[44]
It is clear from these
comments of the Federal Court of Appeal that the status Indian make-up of the
clientele of Ms. Verreault's workplace is not a strong connecting factor.
[45]
Nothing else in the
nature of her work that would connect it to any reserve.
III. Conclusion
[46]
The Court is
sympathetic to the financial consequences for Ms. Verreault of her income
not qualifying for the exemption since NLS did not withhold income tax from her
salary payments. However, this Court is bound to apply the law as set out in
subsection 81(1)(a) of the ITA and in section 87 of the Indian
Act and to follow the analysis mandated by the Supreme Court of Canada and
the Federal Court of Appeal in applying the section 87 exemption.
Unfortunately for Ms. Verreault, that requires me to dismiss her appeal.
In her testimony, she did complain that she was very annoyed with NLS for not
having withheld tax and having put her in this position. This Court is without
jurisdiction to deal with that complaint. If Ms. Verreault wishes to pursue a
claim against NLS, such a claim must be brought in a court other than the Tax
Court of Canada.
[47]
In her testimony, Ms. Verreault
complained as well that she did not understand why her section 87
exemption had been allowed in respect of her previous work in prior years at
several Aboriginal‑related organizations in La Tuque by the Canada
Revenue Agency (CRA) without challenge, yet her similar work in the years at
issue at the training centre, while an employee of NLS, has been challenged.
She noted that the only significant difference apparent to her was the
involvement of NLS. The Tax Court of Canada has no other knowledge of the
thoughts or workings of the CRA with respect to Ms. Verreault in other years,
but it may well be the case that the involvement of NLS in her work at the training
centre in the years in question did trigger an audit review and verification by
the CRA of that work whereas her prior years' work at other organizations was
never audited or verified by the CRA. In any event, these considerations do not
allow me to depart from a proper application of the law to the appeal in
question before me which relates solely to her claim for a section 87
exemption for 1998 and 1999 in respect of her income from working at the training
centre.
[48]
For the above reasons,
the appeal is dismissed.
Signed at Ottawa,
Canada, this 14th day of August 2012.
"Patrick Boyle"
Translation certified true
on this 1st day of October 2012
Margarita Gorbounova, Translator