Mahoney,
J:—The
defendant
was
a
Canadian
resident,
employed
by
a
Canadian
corporation
Tranter
Canada
Ltd,
a
wholly
owned
subsidiary
of
Tranter,
inc
[sic],
hereafter
“Tranter”,
a
Michigan
corporation.
On
January
28,
1976,
Tranter
granted
the
defendant
an
option
to
purchase
1,000
of
its
shares
at
a
price
of
$12.50.
All
amounts
of
money
mentioned
herein
are
United
States
dollars.
The
option
was
to
be
exercised
within
five
years
of,
and
not
more
than
25%
of
the
shares
optioned
could
be
taken
up
for
each
year
of
continuous
employment
after,
January
28,
1976.
The
defendant
had
no
rights
as
a
stockholder
in
respect
of
optioned
shares
until
exercise
of
the
option
thereon.
The
agreement
imposed
no
obligation
on
him
to
continue
in
his
employment
but
did
terminate,
subject
to
specific
conditions,
immaterial
to
this
action,
immediately
his
employment
ceased.
The
option
provided
for
adjustments
in
the
event
of
capital
reorganization
or
stock
dividends
and
went
on:
6.
.
.
.
Subject
to
any
required
action
by
the
stockholders,
if
the
Company
shall
be
the
surviving
corporation
in
any
merger
or
consolidation,
any
option
granted
hereunder
shall
pertain
to
and
apply
to
the
securities
to
which
a
holder
of
the
number
of
shares
of
common
stock
subject
to
the
option
would
have
been
entitled;
but
a
dissolution
or
liquidation
of
the
Company
or
a
merger
or
consolidation
in
which
the
Company
is
not
the
surviving
corporation,
shall
cause
every
unexercised
option
outstanding
hereunder
to
terminate.
The
agreed
statement
of
facts
stipulates
that,
by
the
law
of
Michigan,
an
amalgamation
may
involve
one
corporation
absorbing
another
with
the
result
that
the
absorbing
corporation
survives
and
the
absorbed
does
not,
a
concept
different
from
that
embodied
in
Canadian
company
law.
The
amalgamation
hereafter
referred
to
was
carried
out
under
the
law
of
Michigan.
On
December
14,
1977,
Tranter
entered
into
an
agreement
whereby,
effective
January
5,
1978,
a
subsidiary
of
another
company
merged
into
it,
with
Tranter
the
surviving
corporation.
The
effect
of
the
amalgamation
was
to
make
Tranter
a
wholly
owned
subsidiary
of
the
other
company
while
Tranter’s
previous
shareholders
received
$38
per
share
and
retained
no
equity
in
Tranter.
The
defendant
was,
at
the
time,
entitled
to
exercise
his
option
in
respect
of
250
shares
but
had
not
done
so.
It
was
a
term
of
the
merger
agreement
that:
10.
The
Corporation
agrees
that
any
option
to
purchase
Corporation
shares
under
the
Corporation’s
Qualified
Stock
Option
Plan
outstanding
at
the
Effective
Date
of
Merger
shall
be
cancelled
and
that
the
Corporation
will
be
released
of
all
further
obligations
to
any
holder
of
any
option
under
the
Plan.
22.
The
Corporation
will
take
such
action
as
may
be
necessary
to
terminate
and
cancel
as
of
the
closing
all
stock
options
that
may
then
be
outstanding
under
its
Qualified
Stock
Option
Plan,
whether
or
not
such
options
are
then
exercisable
and
to
terminate
such
Plan
effective
as
of
the
closing.
At
any
time
prior
to
such
cancellation,
any
holder
of
a
Corporation
Stock
Option,
whether
or
not
it
is
exercisable
may
enter
into
an
agreement
to
sell
his
option
to
the
Corporation
for
such
shares
covered
by
the
option
at
a
price
equal
to
the
differences
between
$38
times
the
number
of
shares
covered
and
the
aggregate
option
price
for
the
shares.
The
agreement
may
be
subject
to
a
condition
that
if
the
Merger
is
not
consummated
the
sale
will
not
be
carried
out.
The
“Corporation”
was
Tranter.
By
clause
15,
Tranter
covenanted,
inter
alia,
that
503,288
shares
of
its
capital
stock
were
outstanding
and
would
be
outstanding
at
the
date
of
merger.
The
defendant
was
approached
and
agreed
to
surrender
his
option
for
$38
per
share
less
the
$12.50
option
price.
The
operative
document,
signed
by
him,
read:
In
consideration
of
the
sum
of
twenty-five
thousand
five
hundred
and
00/100
dollars
($25,500.00)
receipt
of
which
is
hereby
acknowledged,
I
surrender
to
Tranter,
inc
all
of
my
options
to
purchase
stock
of
Tranter,
inc.
Prior
to
December
31,
1977,
he
was
paid
$25,500.
The
Income
Tax
Act
provides:
7.
(1)
Where
a
corporation
has
agreed
to
sell
or
issue
shares
of
the
capital
stock
of
the
corporation
or
of
a
corporation
with
which
it
does
not
deal
at
arm’s
length
to
an
employee
of
the
corporation
or
of
a
corporation
with
which
it
does
not
deal
at
arm’s
length,
(b)
if
the
employee
has
transferred
or
otherwise
disposed
of
rights
under
the
agreement
in
respect
of
some
or
all
of
the
shares
to
a
person
with
whom
he
was
dealing
at
arm’s
length,
a
benefit
equal
to
the
value
of
the
consideration
for
the
disposition
shall
be
deemed
to
have
been
received
by
the
employee
by
virtue
of
his
employment
in
the
taxation
year
in
which
he
made
the
disposition.
The
receipt
clearly
lies
to
be
taxed
under
that
provision.
The
learned
assistant
chairman
of
the
Tax
Review
Board,
[1980]
CTC
2826;
80
DIC
1701,
held
that
this
case
was
not
to
be
distinguished
from
Reynolds
et
al
v
The
Queen,
[1976]
CTC
792;
77
DTC
5044,
in
which
it
was
found
that
a
company,
by
resolving
to
wind
itself
up
under
the
British
Columbia
Companies
Act
had
breached
options
to
purchase
its
shares
given
the
taxpayers
there
and
it
was
held
that
the
consideration
accepted
by
them
was
received
in
satisfaction
of
their
rights
of
action
flowing
from
that
breach.
With
respect,
I
disagree.
Here,
there
was
no
breach.
When
the
defendant
agreed
to
surrender
his
option,
Tranter
was,
as
it
remained
after
the
merger,
in
a
legal
position
to
fulfil
its
obligations
to
him
under
it.
Tranter
never
breached
the
option
by
putting
itself
in
a
position
where
it
could
not
fulfil
its
Obligations
under
it;
Tranter
simply
agreed
to
procure
his
surrender.
It
in
fact
procured
the
surrender.
It
is
idle
to
speculate
on
the
consequences
to
him
or
the
merger
had
he
refused
it.
The
defendant’s
argument
that
the
surrender
did
not
fall
within
paragraph
7(1
)(b)
because
no
right
survived
the
surrender
is
specious.
He
disposed
of
his
rights
under
the
agreement;
the
effect
of
that
disposition
on
those
rights
is
immaterial.
This
case
is
on
all
fours
with
Greiner
et
al
v
The
Queen,
[1981]
CTC
477;
81
DTC
5271,
as
that
case
dealt
with
the
taxpayers’
stock
options.
I
understand
an
appeal
is
pending
there.
The
defendant’s
efforts
to
distinguish
the
case
on
the
basis
of
Greiner’s
senior
managerial
position
is
entirely
without
merit.
Mr
Justice
Addy
had
already
concluded
the
stock
option
issue
against
Greiner
when
he
referred
to
Greiner’s
position
in
connection
with
another
issue
which
need
not
be
considered
here.
It
was
no
part
of
the
ratio
for
his
disposition
of
the
stock
option
issue.
Judgment
The
assessment
of
the
defendant’s
1977
income
tax
return
is
restored.
The
plantiff
will
recover
her
taxed
costs.