CARTWRIGHT,
J.
(concurred
in
by
Martland
and
Ritchie,
JJ.)
:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
judgment
of
Thurlow,
J.
pronounced
on
August
17,
1964,
allowing
the
appeal
of
the
‘re-
spondent
from
a
re-assessment
of
income
tax
for
the
year
1958
in
respect
of
a
sum
of
$38,218,
representing
the
balance
of
amounts
known
in
the
respondent’s
business
as
‘core
deposits’’,
which
the
appellant
in
making
the
re-assessments
included
in
the
computation
of
the
respondent’s
income.
The
relevant
facts
are
fully
set
out
in
the
reasons
of
Thurlow,
J.
and
are
sufficiently
summarized
in
those
of
my
brother
Judson
;
it
is
unnecessary
to
repeat
them.
I
have
reached
the
conclusion
that
the
appeal
fails.
Section
4
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
provides
that,
subject
to
the
other
provisions
of
Part
I
of
the
Act,
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
a
business
is
the
profit
therefrom
for
the
year.
In
Sun
Insurance
Office
v.
Clark,
[1912]
A.C.
443,
a
case
in
which
the
question
for
decision
was
the
amount
of
the
profits
arising
from
the
appellant’s
business,
Earl
Loreburn,
L.C.
spoke
at
page
454
of
‘‘the
only
rule
of
law
that
I
know
of,
namely,
that
the
true
gains
are
to
be
ascertained
as
nearly
as
it
can
be
done’’.
In
Dominion
Taxicab
Association
v.
M.N.R.,
[1954]
8.C.R.
82
at
85;
[1954]
C.T.C.
34
at
37,
it
was
said
in
the
judgment
of
the
majority
of
the
Court:
It
is
well
settled
that
in
considering
whether
a
particular
transaction
brings
a
party
within
the
terms
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
its
substance
rather
than
its
form
is
to
be
regarded.
The
question
of
substance
in
this
case
appears
to
me
to
be
whether
in
stating
what
its
profit
was
for
the
year
the
respondent
could
truthfully
have
included
the
sum
in
question.
To
me
there
seems
to
be
only
one
answer,
that
it
could
not.
It
knew
that
it
might
not
be
able
to
retain
any
part
of
that
sum
and
that
the
probabilities
were
that
96%
of
it
must
be
returned
to
the
depositors
in
the
near
future.
The
circumstance
that
the
respondent
became
the
legal
owner
of
the
moneys
deposited
with
it
and
that
they
did
not
constitute
a
trust
fund
in
its
hands
appears
to
me
to
be
irrelevant;
the
same
may
be
said
of
moneys
deposited
by
a
customer
in
a
bank
which
form
part
of
the
bank’s
assets
but
not
of
its
profits.
To
treat
these
deposits
as
if
they
were
ordinary
trading
receipts
of
the
respondent
would
be
to
disregard
all
the
realities
of
the
situation.
The
grounds
upon
which
Thurlow,
J.
based
his
decision
appear
to
me
to
be
supported
by
the
reasoning
of
the
majority
in
this
Court
in
Dominion
Taxicab
Association
v.
M.N.R.,
supra,
at
p.
85
[p.
38],
where
it
is
stated
that
as
each
deposit
was
received
by
the
Association
and
became
a
part
of
its
assets
there
arose
a
corresponding
contingent
liability
equal
in
amount.
This
was
one
of
the
grounds
on
which
it
was
held
that
the
deposits
formed
no
part
of
the
profits
of
the
Association.
Since
that
decision
there
has
been
no
substantial
change
in
the
wording
of
the
sections
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
on
which
the
appellant
relies.
What
appears
to
me
to
be
decisive
is
the
fact
that
there
is
no
basis,
having
regard
to
the
realities
of
the
situation,
on
which
these
deposits
can
properly
be
treated
as
ordinary
trading
receipts
of
the
respondent
which
it
was
entitled
to
include
in
calculating
its
profits
for
the
year.
Of
course
it
would
be
within
the
power
of
Parliament
to
enact
that
a
receipt
which
could
not
on
any
principle
of
sound
accounting
be
regarded
as
forming
part
of
a
company’s
profit
should
none
the
less
be
treated
as
profit
for
the
purposes
of
taxation
;
but
to
bring
about
such
a
result
clear
and
intractable
words
would
be
necessary.
In
my
opinion,
nothing
in
the
Income
Tax
Act
requires
these
deposits
to
be
treated
as
profits
of
the
respondent.
The
result
brought
about
by
the
judgment
of
Thurlow,
J.
is
that
in
the
year
in
question
the
respondent
will
be
taxed
on
its
true
profit
for
that
year.
If
in
the
following
year,
as
seems
probable,
as
to
a
small
portion
of
the
said
sum
of
$38,213,
the
respondent
ceases
to
be
under
liability
to
return
it
to
the
depositor
or
depositors,
such
portion
will
form
part
of
the
profit
in
that
year
and
once
again
the
respondent
will
be
taxed
on
its
true
profit.
I
do
not
think
that
such
a
result
should
be
disturbed.
I
would
dismiss
the
appeal
with
costs.
JUDSON,
J.
(concurred
in
by
Abbott,
J.)
:—The
Minister,
in
assessing
the
respondent’s
income
for
its
1958
taxation
year,
included
in
income
the
sum
of
$38,213
shown
on
its
balance
sheet
as
a
current
liability
entitled
"‘Customers'
Deposits’’.
The
Exchequer
Court
allowed
an
appeal
from
this
assessment
and
the
Minister
appeals
now
to
this
Court.
The
company
was
in
the
business
of
rebuilding
Ford
engines.
It
sold
these
to
Ford
dealers,
but
in
order
to
stay
in
business,
it
needed
a
regular
supply
of
rebuildable
engines.
Therefore,
when
it
sold
an
engine
to
a
dealer,
it
required
that
dealer
to
supply
it
with
another
rebuildable
engine
of
the
same
model.
If
the
dealer
did
not
supply
the
rebuildable
engine,
he
had
to
pay
a
deposit
to
be
held
by
the
company
until
he
did
supply
such
an
engine.
When
he
did,
he
got
his
deposit
back.
It
is
these
unredeemed
deposits
held
by
the
company
to
the
amount
of
$38,213
which
the
Minister
has
assessed
for
income.
The
amount
of
the
deposit
was
usually
about
three
times
the
market
value
of
the
old
used
engine.
It
was
deliberately
set
at
this
high
figure
in
order
to
ensure
that
an
old
engine
would
be
delivered
as
soon
as
possible.
Other
details
of
the
arrangement
between
the
company
and
its
customers
were
that
the
engine
on
a
visual
inspection
had
to
be
rebuildable.
If
parts
of
the
engine
were
missing
or
if
there
were
defects
which
were
visible
or
apparent
on
inspection,
the
deposit
was
not
refunded
in
full
but
was
reduced.
If
the
engine
on
a
visual
inspection
was
not
rebuildable,
the
dealer
only
got
the
scrap
value
of
the
engine
as
a
credit.
The
company
did
not
keep
these
deposits
separate
from
other
monies
received
by
it
from
its
sale
of
rebuilt
engines.
There
is
no
question
here
of
any
trust
attaching
to
the
deposit
monies.
It
was
argued
before
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
in
another
case
that
there
was
such
a
trust.
This
was
rejected
and
no
appeal
was
ever
taken
from
this
decision
(Western
Engine
Works
Limited
V.
M.N.R.
(1959),
22
Tax
A.B.C.
399).
In
my
opinion,
this
case
was
correctly
decided.
The
learned
trial
judge
in
setting
aside
the
assessment
held
that
the
company
was
entitled
to
a
deduction
in
respect
of
its
liability
to
refund
the
deposits,
that
this
liability
was
not
a
contingent
liability,
and
that
the
amount
necessary
to
provide
for
their
retirement
was
not
a
reserve,
contingent
amount,
or
sinking
fund
within
the
prohibition
of
Section
12(1)
(e)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
liability,
he
said,
was
not
one
that
arose
on
delivery
of
the
engine
but
existed
from
the
time
of
receipt
of
the
deposit.
It
became
due
and
payable
when
the
engine
was
actually
delivered.
The
evidence
seems
to
show
that
in
most
cases
only
a
short
time
elapsed
between
the
payment
of
the
deposit
and
its
redemption
by
the
delivery
of
a
rebuildable
engine.
It
also
shows
that
about
96
per
cent
of
the
deposits
were
redeemed.
The
judgment
of
the
Exchequer
Court
is
obviously
founded
upon
the
finding
that
the
deposits
were
of
an
income
nature
arising
in
the
ordinary
course
of
the
company’s
trading
transactions.
With
this,
I
agree.
In
this
Court,
the
Crown
has
'two
points
in
its
appeal
based
on
Section
12(1)
(a)
and
(e)
of
the
Act,
(1)
that
the
amounts
necessary
to
provide
for
the
retirement
of
these
liabilities
which
at
the
end
of
the
year
had
"‘not
become
due
or
recoverable
by
the
dealer’’
were
neither
outlays
or
expenses
made
or
incurred
during
the
year
(Section
12(1)
(a)),
and
(2)
that
such
amounts
would
be
in
respect
of
a
reserve
or
contigent
account
and,
as
such,
prohibited
by
Section
12(1)
(e).
Section
12(1)
(a)
and
(e)
reads:
12.
(1)
In
computing
income,
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(a)
an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
property
or
a
business
of
the
taxpayer,
(e)
an
amount
transferred
or
credited
to
a
reserve,
contingent
account
or
sinking
fund
except
as
expressly
permitted
by
this
Part.
The
Minister’s
position
is
that
unless
there
is
an
express
provision
in
the
Act,
the
taxpayer
is
prohibited
by
these
paragraphs
from
making
these
deductions.
He
says
there
are
no
such
other
provisions.
It
is
obvious
that
there
was
no
outlay
or
expense
made
until
the
deposit
was
refunded.
But
the
judgment
under
appeal
holds
that
the
outlay
or
expense
was
incurred
when
the
deposit
was
made
because
the
liability
to
refund
was
immediate
and
not
contingent.
In
this
I
think
there
is
error.
There
was
no
liability
to
refund
until
the
rebuildable
engine
was
actually
delivered.
The
taxpayer
was
not
definitely
committed
in
the
year
of
income
to
make
this
disbursement
or
outlay
or
expense
until
the
rebuildable
engine
was
delivered.
And
even
then,
as
I
have
pointed
out
above,
there
were
several
potential
adjustments
to
be
made
depending
on
the
state
of
the
rebuildable
engine
as
disclosed
by
a
visual
inspection.
The
probability,
in
this
case
96
per
cent,
that
the
taxpayer
would
be
required
to
refund
the
greater
portion
of
the
deposits
does
not
permit
their
deduction.
They
are
deductible
in
the
year
in
which
they
are
made.
I
also
think
that
the
company
fails
under
Section
12(1)
(e).
This
amount,
shown
as
a
liability,
is
an
amount
transferred
or
credited
to
a
reserve.
It
may
be
good
commercial
or
accountancy
practice
to
make
provision
for
these
liabilities
but
this
is
subject
to
the
express
provisions
of
the
Act
and
the
Act
does
not
make
an
express
provision
here.
The
main
argument
of
the
taxpayer
in
this
case
was
directed
to
the
nature
of
the
receipt.
He
argued
that
the
consideration
for
the
sale
of
a
rebuilt
engine
is
the
catalogue
price
plus
the
delivery
of
a
rebuildable
engine
of
the
same
model,
and
that
the
deposit
is
a
refundable
deposit
which
at
the
time
of
its
receipt
is
not
the
absolute
property
of
the
respondent.
I
cannot
accept
this
submission.
No
one
else
had
any
property
interest
in
the
deposit
except
the
taxpayer.
It
became
part
of
his
funds.
It
was
not
a
trust.
Its
receipt
merely
gave
rise
to
an
obligation
to
repay
when
something
further
was
done
by
the
person
who
made
the
deposit.
There
was
no
immediate
liability
to
repay.
These
deposits
are
chargeable
against
income
for
the
year
when
they
are
refunded.
I
do
not
think
that
Section
85B
requires
any
consideration
for
the
determination
of
this
appeal.
Nor
do
I
think
that
Dominion
Taxicab
Association
v.
[1954]
S.C.R.
82;
[1954]
C.T.C.
34,
governs
this
case.
The
word
deposit”
is
one
of
highly
variable
meaning.
Its
mere
use
in
a
contract
determines
nothing
without
an
analysis
of
the
rights
and
obligations
created.
In
the
Taxicab
case
it
was
the
price
of
membership
in
the
Association.
It
was
transferable
and
interest
bearing
under
certain
conditions.
The
conclusion
in
this
Court
was
that
it
did
not
become
the
absolute
property
of
the
Association.
Rand,
J.
held
that
it
was
a
contribution
to
the
capital
of
the
Association
and
not
an
income
receipt.
On
both
grounds
the
present
case
is
distinguishable.
The
appeal
should
be
allowed
with
costs
and
the
assessment
of
the
Minister
for
the
1958
taxation
year
restored.