HALL,
J.
(Martland,
Ritchie
and
Spence,
J
J.
concurring)
:—
The
appellant
and
his
brothers
William
and
John
for
many
years
prior
to
1957
were
engaged
in
the
business
of
managing
horse
racing
activities
at
a
number
of
race
tracks
in
British
Columbia
at
which
pari-mutuel
wagering
was
authorized.
They
conducted
the
business
as
managers
of
horse
racing
operations
through
the
medium
of
a
company
incorporated
in
British
Columbia
is
a
private
company
named
‘‘
Ascot
Jockey
Club
Ltd.”.
The
appellant
and
his
brothers,
while
using
the
Ascot
Company
as
their
parent
instrument,
controlled
a
number
of
other
companies
which
leased
different
race
tracks
in
British
Columbia.
This
procedure
was
followed
to
meet
the
requirements
of
British
Columbia
legislation
limiting
the
racing
each
season
to
14
days
per
track.
In
1958
which
is
the
year
in
question
in
this
appeal,
the
racing
season
at
the
several
tracks
in
which
he
was
interested
was
56
days
in
the
Vancouver
area
and
14
days
at
Sandown
on
Vancouver
Island.
The
functions
of
the
appellant
and
his
brothers
included
control
of
finances,
selection
of
horses
and
personnel,
arrangements
for
current
and
capital
expenditure
on
plant
and
negotiations
with
horse
owners.
The
appellant
and
his
brothers
were
in
full
control
at
that
level
of
management
and
they
each
received
a
salary
of
$12,000
for
the
year
1958.
The
appellant
and
his
two
brothers
were
also
engaged
along
with
two
others
called
Geoghegan
in
the
management
of
a
catering
business,
the
partnership
being
responsible
for
all
the
catering
at
both
Exhibition
Park,
Vancouver
and
Sandown
on
Vancouver
Island,
From
this
partnership
the
appellant
earned
the
sum
of
$7,904.58
in
1958
and
included
this
income
in
his
1958
return.
In
1957
the
appellant
and
his
brother
John
entered
into
an
agreement
with
the
Portland
Turf
Association,
an
incorporated
company
in
the
State
of
Oregon
to
manage
the
business
affairs
and
transactions
of
the
association
arising
out
of
the
horse
race
meetings
at
Portland,
Oregon,
for
a
share
of
the
profits
and
reasonable
expenses.
The
agreement
contained
the
following
provisions
:
1.
The
Randalls
covenant
and
agree
that
they
will
faithfully,
honestly
and
diligently
manage
the
business
affairs
and
transactions
of
the
Association
arising
out
of
the
conducting
and
holding
of
horse
race
meetings
for
a
term
of
ten
(10)
years
from
this
date
and
will
devote
such
time,
labour,
skill
and
attention
to
such
employment
as
may
be
necessary.
2.
All
horse
race
meetings
shall
be
conducted
and
held
in
the
name
of
the
Association.
8.
All
the
business
affairs
and
transactions
arising
out
of
the
conducting
and
holding
of
the
said
horse
race
meetings
shall
be
managed
and
taken
care
of
by
the
Randalls,
subject
always
to
the
control
and
direction
of
the
Association
so
far
as
financial
matters
are
concerned.
4.
The
Association
shall
pay
and
bear
all
expenses
arising
out
of
the
conducting
and
holding
of
the
said
horse
race
meetings
and
the
Randalls
shall
not
be
required
to
assist
in
any
way
in
the
financing
of
the
race
meetings.
Arrangements
shall
be
made
so
that
all
cheques
shall
be
signed
by
one
of
the
Randalls
and
a
person
appointed
by
the
Association.
5.
Each
year,
ninety
(90)
days
prior
to
the
opening
of
the
racing
season
of
the
Association,
the
Randalls
shall
submit
a
budget
to
the
Association
and
on
approval
thereof
adequate
funds
shall
be
supplied
by
the
Association.
6.
The
Association
covenants
and
agrees
with
the
Randalls
to
conduct
races
on
as
many
days
as
it
is
reasonably
possible
to
do
so
and
not
in
any
event
on
less
than
forty
(40)
days
each
year.
7.
It
is
the
intention
of
both
the
Association
and
the
Randalls
that
the
said
race
meetings
shall
be
conducted
in
a
similar
manner
to
race
meetings
conducted:
by
the
companies
in
which
the
Randalls
are
associated
at
Hastings
Park,
in
the
City
of
Vancouver,
in
the
Province
of
British
Columbia,
and
the
Randalls
shall
be
allowed
by
the
Association
to
manage
the
said
race
meetings
in
such
a
manner.
8,
The
Randalls
shall
be
entitled
to
receive
and
be
paid
for
their
services
as
Managers
one-half:
of
one
per
cent
(%
of
1%)
of
all
horse
racing
pools.
on
races
conducted
at
the
race
track
owned
or
controlled
by
the
Association,
the
said
sum
to
be
payable
at
the
end
of
each
week,
and
in
addition
thereto,
the
Randalls
shall
be
allowed
reasonable
expenses,
not
to
exceed
Five
Thousand
($5,000.00)
Dollars
per
year.
The
$5,000
expense
allowance
provided
for
in
para.
8
above
was
not
dealt
with
as
a
separate
item
in
the
courts
below
nor
was
in
referred
to
in
this
Court.
It
apparently
is
not
relevant
in
these
proceedings.
In
1958
the
appellant
reported
an
income
of
$17,626.71
under
this
agreement
and
he
claimed
to
deduct
the
sum
of
$5,241.53
as
his
expenses
in
travelling
to
and
from
Portland
and
his
living
expenses
at
Portland
while
there
to
manage
the
race
track
meetings
and
the
business
of
the
Portland
Turf
Association
as
called
for
in
the
agreement.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
allowed.
him
$1,200
but
disallowed
the
remainder.
No
details
of
how
the
$5,241.58
were
made
up
were
given
nor
were
any
details
given
showing
how
the
$1,200
so
allowed
was
computed.
The
appellant
filed
his
income
tax
return
for
the
year
1958
and
by
Notice
of
Re-Assessment
dated
August
4,
1964
the
net
amount
of
$4,011.63
of
the
expenses
claimed
by
the
appellant
in
connection
with
the
Portland
racing
operation
was
disallowed.
The
appellant
gave
Notice
of
Object
to
this
reassessment.
The
assessment
was
confirmed
by
the
Minister
and
on
September
15,
1965
his
appeal
was
dismissed.
The
appellant
then
appealed
to
the
Tax
Appeal
Board.
His
appeal
was
heard
by
Cecil
L.
Snyder,
Q.C.,
who
dismissed
the
appeal.
An
appeal
was
then
taken
to
the
Exchequer
Court
and
the
case
was
heard
by
the
Honourable
F.
A.
Sheppard,
Deputy
Judge
of
the
Exchequer
Court
of
Canada
at
Vancouver
who
upheld
the
Tax
Appeal
Board.
As
appears
from
the
judgment
of
the
Tax
Appeal
Board,
the
amount
of
the
expenses
claimed
as
a
deduction
is
not
in
dispute.
The
appeal
involves,
(1)
whether
the
allowance
of
the
expenses
in
question
was
excluded
by
Section
12(1)
(a)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
(2)
if
not
so
excluded,
whether
the
deduction
of
the
expenses
is
allowable
elsewhere.
Mr.
Justice
Sheppard
found
that
the
appellant
was
engaged
in
a
business
within
the
meaning
of
Section
12(1)
(a)
and
(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
That
finding
was
a
correct
one
and
was
not
disputed
by
counsel
for
the
Minister
in
this
Court.
Section
12(1)
(a)
reads
as
follows:
12.
(1)
In
computing
income,
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(a)
an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
property
or
a
business
of
the
taxpayer,
and
Section
12(1)
(h)
reads:
12.
(1)
In
computing
income,
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(h)
personal
or
living
expenses
of
the
taxpayer
except
travelling
expenses
(including
the
entire
amount
expended
for
meals
and
lodging)
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
while
away
from
home
in
the
course
of
carrying
on
his
business,
"Income’’
is
defined
by
Section
4
which
reads:
4.
Subject
to
the
other
provisions
of
this
Part,
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
a
business
or
property
is
the
profit
therefrom
for
the
year.
The
evidence
was
that
the
appellant
made
some
30
trips
from
Vancouver
to
Portland
and
back
in
1958,
and
while
at
Portland
lived
part
of
the
time
at
a
hotel
and
part
of
the
time
in
an
apartment
which
the
brothers
had
rented
and
which
they
occupied
and
used
as
an
office
when
one
or
the
other
was
in
Portland
looking
after
the
operation
there.
The
Portland
race
season
in
1958
was
00
days
and
overlapped
in
part
the
British
Columbia
season.
The
Minister
contended
that
the
appellant’s
expenses
of
travelling
to
Portland
and
his
expenses
of
living
there
were
not
in
the
performance
of
any
undertaking
in
the
agreement
but,
on
the
contrary,
were
purely
personal
to
him
and
outside
the
agreement.
I
am
unable
to
accept
that
contention.
It
seems
to
me
that
if
the
appellant
was
going
to
fulfil
the
obligations
he
undertook
to
fulfil
under
the
agreement
in
question,
it
was
necessary
for
him
to
travel
to
and
from
Portland
as
the
exigencies
of
the
business
there
required
him
to
do.
The
Minister
relied
on
Bahamas
General
Trust
Company
et
al.
v.
Provincial
Treasurer
of
Alberta,
[1942]
1
W.W.R.
46,
in
which
it
was
held
that
the
expenses
of
a
member
of
the
board
of
directors
of
Canadian
National
Railways
who
being
in
Shanghai,
China,
on
his
own
business
and
for
pleasure
when
a
meeting
of
the
Canadian
National
Railways
board
of
directors
was
called
travelled
from
Shanghai
to
Montreal
and
back
to
Shanghai
and
claimed
those
expenses
as
deductible
from
his
income.
There
is,
in
my
view,
no
similarity
between
the
two
cases.
The
Minister
also
relied
on
Mahaffy
v.
M.N.R.,
[1946]
S.C.R.
450;
[1946]
C.T.C.
135,
in
which
the
question
was
whether
a
member
of
the
Legislative
Assembly
of
Alberta
was
entitled
to
his
travelling
and
living
expenses
in
attending
a
session
of
the
Legislature
under
Section
5(1)
(f)
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
which
was
the
same
section
as
was
dealt
with
in
the
Bahamas
General
Trust
case
(supra).
Again
I
can
see
no
similarity
between
the
Mahaffy
case
and
the
present
one.
Rinfret,
C.J.
in
the
Mahaffy
case
said
in
part:
"The
occupation
of
Members
of
Provincial
Legislative
Councils
and
Assemblies
is
neither
a
trade
nor
a
business.
‘
‘
On
the
hearing
of
this
appeal,
counsel
for
the
Minister
took
a
further
objection
that
neither
the
income
nor
the
expenses
arising
out
of
the
Portland
operation
could
be
considered
in
arriving
at
the
appellant’s
income,
relying
on
the
wording
of
Section
139(1)
(az)
which
reads:
(az)
a
taxpayer’s
income
from
a
business,
employment,
property
or
other
source
of
income
or
from
sources
in
a
particular
place
means
the
taxpayer’s
income
computed
in
accordance
with
this
Act
on
the
assumption
that
he
had
during
the
taxation
year
no
income
except
from
that
source
or
those
sources
of
income
and
was
entitled
to
no
deductions
except
those
related
to
that
source
or
those
sources;
Counsel
argued
that
the
Portland
operation
had
to
be
considered
separate
and
apart
from
the
British
Columbia
operations.
I
do
not
think
that
this
follows
because
on
the
evidence
that
was
before
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
and
before
the
learned
Deputy
Judge
of
the
Exchequer
Court
of
Canada
it
becomes
clear
that
the
whole
operation,
whether
at
Vancouver
or
Sandown
or
at
Portland,
was
in
fact.
one
business
being
conducted
by
the
appellant
and
his
brothers
and
that
the
income
of
that
business
from
the
various
geographic
bases
was
income
from
the
business
as
a
whole
just
as
the
business
of
a
bank
or
any
other
enterprise
which
has
branches
in
many
areas
remains
one
business
and
not
many
separate
businesses,
each
to
be
dealt
with
separately.
Locke,
J.
in
Interprovincial
Pipe
Line
Company
v.
M.N.R.,
[1959]
S.C.R.
763
at
772-3;
[1959]
C.T.C.
339
at
347:
Paragraphs
(av)
of
Section
127(1)
and
(az)
of
Section
139(1)
were
intended,
in
my
opinion,
to
prevent
a
taxpayer
who
might
be
engaged
in
two
separate
businesses
not
related
to
each
other
by
reason
of
their
nature
from
taking
into
account
losses
or
expenses
incurred
in
one
in
computing
the
taxable
income
of
the
other.
By
way
of
illustration,
if
a
person
engages
in
business
as
a
hardware
merchant
in
a
country
town
and,
at
the
same
time,
engages
in
farming
or
ranching,
losses
sustained
or
expenditures
incurred
in
operations
of
the
latter
nature
may
not
be
taken
into
account
in
computing
the
taxable
income
from
the
hardware
business,
and
vice-versa.
The
reason
is
that
these
operations
are
not
related
one
to
the
other
in
the
sense
intended.
The
taxpayer’s
income
from
the
hardware
business
is
to
be
reckoned
as
if
he
had
during
the
taxation
year
no
income
except
from
that
source,
according
to
the
subsection.
If,
on
the
other
hand,
the
merchant’s
business
was
that
of
the
sale
of
produce
and
he
should
operate
a
truck
farm
for
the
purposes
of
obtaining
supplies
for
his
business,
presumably
these
businesses
would
be
considered
to
be
related,
within
the
meaning
of
the
subsection.
I
accept
this
statement
as
the
correct
interpretation
to
be
given
to
the
subsection
in
question.
The
subsection
has
no
application
where
businesses
are
so
related
even
if
carried
on
at
different
locations.
I
would
allow
the
appeal
and
direct
that
the
income
tax
assessment
of
the
appellant
for
the
1958
taxation
year
be
remitted
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
re-assessment
by
allowing
as
a
deduction
from
income
of
the
appellant
the
sum
of
$4,011.63.
The
appellant
is
entitled
to
his
costs
in
this
Court
and
in
the
Exchequer
Court.
JUDSON,
J.
(dissenting)
:—Both
the
Tax
Appeal
Board
and
the
Exchequer
Court
have
held
that
the
appellant,
Robert
M.
Randall,
along
with
his
brother,
was
carrying
on
business
under
the
Portland
agreement.
Both
tribunals,
for
identical
reasons,
have
upheld
the
Minister’s
ruling
that
the
travelling
and
hotel
expenses
were
not
deductible
because
they
came
within
the
prohibitions
in
Section
12(1)
(a)
and
(h)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
This
section
reads
:
12.
(1)
In
computing
income,
no
deduction
shall
be
made
in
respect
of
(a)
an
outlay
or
expense
except
to
the
extent
that
it
was
made
or
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
from
property
or
a
business
of
the
taxpayer,
(h)
personal
or
living
expenses
of
the
taxpayer
except
travelling
expenses
(including
the
entire
amount
expended
for
meals
and
lodging)
incurred
by
the
taxpayer
while
away
from
home
in
the
course
of
carrying
on
his
business.
Section
12(1)
(a)
prohibits
the
deduction
of
these
expenses
because
they
were
not
incurred
in
the
course
of
carrying
on
the
Portland
business.
The
Chairman
of
the
Board
correctly
states
the
principle
in
the
following
conclusion
taken
from
his
reasons
:
There
was
no
evidence
that,
when
in
Vancouver,
the
appellant
did
anything
to
benefit
the
Portland
business
nor
did
he
carry
on
the
business
of
either
company
while
travelling
between
the
two
cities.
It
is
not
enough
that
expenses
were
incurred
while
the
taxpayer
was
away
from
his
home.
They
must
also
have
been
incurred
in
the
course
of
carrying
on
his
business.
If
a
deduction
could
be
granted
the
expense
must
have
been
incurred
in
the
course
of
carrying
on
the
business
of
horse
racing
at
the
Portland
track.
It
cannot
be
found
that,
in
travelling
from
Vancouver
to
Portland
and
return
or
in
eating
and
sleeping
at
a
Portland
hotel
or
in
an
apartment
rented
in
that
city,
the
appellant
was
carrying
on
the
business
from
which
he
seeks
to
deduct
these
expenses.
He
commenced
carrying
on
that
business
when
he
arrived
in
Portland
and
ceased
to
do
so
when
he
left
the
city.
Expenses
of
board
and
lodging
are
common
to
all
taxpayers
and
the
appellant
incurred
expenses
“away
from
home”
for
these
purposes
only
because
he
maintained
his
residence
in
Vancouver
rather
than
in
Portland.
Section
12(1)(h)
prohibits
the
deduction
because
these
are
personal
or
living
expenses
and
do
not
come
within
the
exception
in
Section
12(1)(h)
because,
for
the
reasons
stated
above,
they
were
not
incurred
in
the
course
of
carrying
on
business.
These
expenses
were
obviously
incurred
while
away
from
home.
But
that
is
not
enough.
To
qualify
for
deduction,
they
must
also
have
been
incurred
in
the
course
of
carrying
on
business.
I
would
dismiss
the
appeal
with
costs.