Docket: T-2207-26
Citation: 2026 FC 1152
Toronto, Ontario, September 14, 2026
PRESENT: Madam Justice Whyte Nowak
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BETWEEN:
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CAROLINE O’DRISCOLL
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Applicant
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and
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MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
THE HONOURABLE GARY ANANDASANGAREE
AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
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Respondents
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REASONS AND JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1] The Applicant, Caroline O’Driscoll [Applicant], brings this motion pursuant to Rule 51 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 [Federal Courts Rules] appealing the Judgment of Associate Judge Coughlan [Motion Judge] dated July 13, 2026 [Judgment], dismissing her application for judicial review and denying her request for mandamus.
[2] For the following reasons, this motion is dismissed as the Applicant has failed to identify a reviewable error in the Judgment warranting this Court’s intervention. Rather, the Applicant’s appeal amounts to a disagreement with the result of the Judgment and the binding authority of the Federal Court of Appeal in O’Driscoll v Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2025 FCA 206 [O’Driscoll FCA].
II. Facts
A. Background to the Applicant’s appeal
[3] The Applicant is a lawyer by profession and represents herself in this and other related proceedings that she commenced in 2023. The proceedings stem from her sister’s divorce and child custody proceedings in the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta in 2019.
[4] The Applicant alleged that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police [RCMP] failed to properly investigate her sister’s complaints to the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP [CRCC] in which she alleged abuse and fraud by the former spouse [Spouse]. The Applicant emailed the RCMP Commissioner [Commissioner] requesting that the RCMP’s conduct be reviewed and investigated. When the Applicant failed to receive a response, she commenced an application for judicial review.
[5] The application was dismissed in a decision of Justice Lafrenière reported as O’Driscoll v Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2024 FC 1660 [O’Driscoll FC]. Justice Lafrenière found that there was no basis for judicial review as no decision had been made and the Commissioner had not engaged in any administrative action that affected the Applicant’s rights or carried legal consequences (O’Driscoll FC at para 28). The Applicant’s request for mandamus to compel an investigation was also rejected as Justice Lafrenière found that the Commissioner’s conduct was not a refusal to act (O’Driscoll FC at para 34). The Applicant was found not to have established either that the Commissioner owed her a public legal duty to act, or that she had a clear right to compel the Commissioner’s performance of that duty (O’Driscoll FC at para 35).
[6] The Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision in O’Driscoll FC. Writing for the Court, Justice Rennie held that the CRCC process allowed the Applicant to file a complaint, have it investigated, receive a response and no more; the process did not impose a legal obligation on the Commissioner to respond to her demands (O’Driscoll FCA at paras 15-16). The Federal Court of Appeal also agreed that the Applicant had not met the test for mandamus as the Applicant had not identified a legally cognizable right or interest upon which the RCMP Commissioner was bound to act whether pursuant to subsection 5(1) of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, RSC 1985, c R-10 [RCMP Act] or by virtue of the common law duties of police (O’Driscoll FCA at paras 20-21). The Applicant has sought leave to appeal this decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.
B. The Applicant’s email to the Minister of Public Safety
[7] The present motion relates to an email the Applicant sent to the Minister of Public Safety, the Honourable Gary Anandasangaree [Minister] on March 10, 2026. In that email, the Applicant reported, “[…] systemic incompetence, arbitrary enforcement of the law, submission of inaccurate evidence and withholding of relevant evidence in Court proceedings, various potential conflicts of interest […] and the non-response and inaction of RCMP leadership to the RCMP’s own findings and records of same […]”
dating back to 2019. The Applicant attached a chronology and documentation related to alleged criminal acts on the part of the Spouse, including his alleged abduction of her nieces and their relocation to another province which the Applicant says the RCMP had knowledge of. The Applicant refers to this documentation as the “RCMP Information.”
[8] When the Applicant did not receive a response, she sent the Minister a further email on March 29, 2026, which concluded, “since you have authority and Ministerial oversight of the RCMP Commissioner and now have knowledge of this situation, please advise as to what steps you are taking to address the lack of accountability of the Force under the RCMP Commissioner in this matter.”
[9] The Minister responded to the Applicant by letter dated April 1, 2026 [the Minister’s Letter]. The Minister’s Letter states:
Dear Caroline O’Driscoll:
Thank you for your correspondence of March 10, 2026, regarding the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
While I am the Minister responsible for the RCMP, my role does not permit me to involve myself in operational police matters or intervene in police investigations. In addition, as the case to which you refer is currently before the courts, it would be inappropriate for me to comment on the specifics of the case or related matters.
Thank you again for taking the time to write.
Yours sincerely,
The Honourable Gary Anandasangaree, P.C., K.C., M.P.
Minister of Public Safety
[10] After further unanswered communications to the Minister, the Applicant filed an application seeking judicial review of the Minister’s non-response.
[11] The Respondents, the Minister and the Attorney General of Canada [collectively, the Respondents], filed a motion seeking an order striking the application on the basis that it fails to raise a reviewable decision and the legal test for mandamus has not been met.
C. The Decision under appeal
[12] The Motion Judge granted the Respondents’ motion and struck the Applicant’s application on the basis that the application is fatally flawed and doomed to fail for the reasons given in O’Driscoll FCA and O’Driscoll FC. The Motion Judge found that the Applicant’s rights are circumscribed by the formal complaints process provided by statute and that it is futile to pursue judicial review where no legal rights have been affected, no legal obligations have been imposed and where there are no prejudicial effects.
[13] Additionally, the Motion Judge found that the Applicant failed to meet the requirements of the test for mandamus established in Apotex Inc v Canada (Attorney General) (C.A.) [1994] 1 FC 742 [Apotex], as she had not shown that the Minister owed her a public legal duty to act, and that she has a clear right to the Minister’s performance of that duty (citing O’Driscoll FCA at para 22, O’Driscoll FC at paras 34-35).
III. Preliminary Issue
[14] The Respondents object to the inclusion in the motion record of the affidavits that were before the Motion Judge. These affidavits include those sworn by the Applicant on May 31, 2026, and June 21, 2026, as well as the Respondents’ supporting affidavit which was directed at the Respondents’ alternative relief requesting security for costs.
[15] The Motion Judge refused the Applicant’s affidavits with the exception of the following exhibits attached to the May 31, 2026, affidavit:
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The Applicant’s email to the Respondents dated March 10, 2026, with attachments (Exhibit 1);
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The Applicant’s email to the Respondents dated March 29, 2026, with attachments (Exhibit 4); and
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An email the Applicant received from the Minister’s Ministerial Correspondence Unit attaching the Minister’s Letter (Exhibit 9) [collectively, the Exhibits].
[16] The Motion Judge considered the Exhibits to be admissible as they are referred to in the notice of application and are therefore incorporated by reference (Judgment at para 23 citing JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc v Canada (National Revenue), 2013 FCA 250 at para 54 [JP Morgan]).
[17] At the hearing, counsel for the Respondents and the Applicant agreed to the inclusion of the Exhibits. The remainder of the Applicant’s affidavit evidence shall be excluded by reason that the Applicant did not challenge the Motion Judge’s rejection of this evidence and the Respondents’ affidavit is not relevant to this appeal.
IV. Issues and Standard of Review
[18] The standard of review to be applied on a Rule 51 motion is that described by the Supreme Court of Canada in Housen v Nikolaisen, 2002 SCC 33, at paragraphs 26-36 and Hospira Healthcare Corporation v Kennedy Institute of Rheumatology, 2016 FCA 215 [Hospira]. Questions of law are reviewable on the standard of correctness whereas questions of fact or questions of mixed fact and law are reviewable on the standard of palpable and overriding error (Hospira at paras 63-65, 79, 83). The latter standard of review is highly deferential and permits a court’s intervention only where there is an obvious error in the trial decision that is determinative of the outcome of the case (Salomon v Matte‑Thompson, 2019 SCC 14 at para 33).
V. Analysis
A. Did the Motion Judge err in finding that the application is doomed to fail?
[19] The Applicant alleges that the Motion Judge misinterpreted and misapplied the authority of JP Morgan in multiple ways, each of which I address in turn.
(1) Error in identifying the subject of judicial review
[20] First, the Applicant submits that the Motion Judge erred in framing the Minister’s Letter as the decision under review. According to the Applicant, the Minister’s Letter is evidence of the Minister’s decision not to address ongoing systemic incompetence, misconduct, and mismanagement of the RCMP over which the Minister has oversight. The Applicant submits that it is this improper identification of the decision at issue that led the Motion Judge to dismiss the Minister’s Letter as a mere courtesy letter.
[21] The Applicant has not shown any palpable and overriding error in this aspect of the Judgment. The Motion Judge fully understood the Applicant’s position that the Minister’s Letter is a decision of the Minister “not to address ongoing systemic incompetence, misconduct, and mismanagement of the … RCMP”
(Judgment at para 14). The basis of the Motion Judge’s determination that the application was doomed to fail was not that the Minister’s Letter was a courtesy letter. Rather, the Motion Judge considered that the Applicant had not identified a decision or “matter”
over which the Court has jurisdiction to conduct judicial review because the Applicant had not shown that the Minister’s failure to act (as reflected in the Minister’s Letter) affected legal rights, imposed legal obligations or caused prejudicial effects to the Applicant or to others (Judgment at paras 25-27 citing Canada (Attorney General) v Democracy Watch, 2020 FCA 69 [Democracy Watch]).
[22] The Applicant now relies on a more recent decision of the Supreme Court in Democracy Watch v Canada (Attorney General), 2026 SCC 28 [Democracy Watch 2026], which had not been issued by the time of the Judgment. The Applicant cites the following paragraph of Democracy Watch 2026:
[…] the legality of every aspect of an administrative decision, and every exercise of public power, is subject to the supervision of the courts. Where a statutory provision, properly construed, purports to limit any aspect of the courts’ constitutionally enshrined supervisory jurisdiction, that provision is ultra vires (Democracy Watch 2026 at para 76).
The decision in Democracy Watch 2026 does not undermine the Judgment. Rather, it affirms that a court need not engage with the merits of an application where there is a basis to decline relief, which in this case includes a lack of jurisdiction under section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7 [Federal Courts Act]. It also affirms that the common law bases to decline to consider the merits of an application for judicial review remain undisturbed (Democracy Watch 2026 at para 75). In this case, this includes the legal test for determining what constitutes a “matter”
under section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act.
(2) Error in finding the Minister’s Letter did not compel action on the part of the Minister
[23] The Applicant submits that the Motion Judge erred in her application of the test in Democracy Watch by finding that the Minister’s inaction fails to affect legal rights, impose legal obligations or cause prejudicial effects, thereby rendering it not reviewable.
[24] First, the Applicant suggests that the Motion Judge failed to acknowledge the effect of the Minister’s failure to act on the legal rights of her and her sister.
[25] The Motion Judge specifically found that the Applicant could not establish any legal right, statutory or otherwise, to compel an answer from the Minister concerning her inquiries (Judgment at paras 26-27). This finding flows from the following holding in O’Driscoll FCA upon which the Motion Judge based her decision (Judgment at para 3):
The Commissioner’s lack of response to the appellant’s June 19th email did not constitute a reviewable decision as it did not affect the appellant’s legal rights, impose legal obligations, or have prejudicial effects. The appellant had no legal right to be provided with answers to her questions, the Commissioner had no legal duty or obligation to respond to the appellant’s questions, and the non-response did not have prejudicial effects (at para 12).
[26] The Applicant suggests that the authority of O’Driscoll FCA is of no relevance because the statutory powers and obligations of the Minister are not the same as those bestowed on the Commissioner. I disagree and concur with the Motion Judge that the decision is a full answer to the motion that was before her. The critical holding in O’Driscoll FCA is that the Applicant cannot rely on a mere grant of statutory authority to a public official to force the exercise of administrative discretion absent a legal right on the part of a citizen to do so (O’Driscoll FCA at para 22).
[27] Which leads to the Applicant’s second submission that her pleading of various statutory references must be taken as true and creates a “rebuttable presumption”
that these provisions not only authorize but obligate the Minister to investigate the RCMP. The Applicant has pleaded the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, SC 2005, c 10 (sections 4, 5 and 6), the RCMP Act (sections 5, 6.1, 20, 24.1 and Parts VI, VII, VII.1, and VIII) and the Code of Conduct attached as a Schedule to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations, 2014 (SOR/2014-281). The Applicant submits that the Minister’s duty under these provisions was “triggered”
by knowledge of the RCMP Information.
[28] The Motion Judge rejected the Applicant’s reliance on her pleading of various statutory provisions. She held as follows:
Furthermore, I note that the Applicant has failed to show that the Minister has a legal duty to take the action the Applicant demands. Merely pleading statutory provisions that are largely discretionary fails to lay a proper foundation for the existence of the alleged legal duty owed by the Minister to the Applicant (Judgment at para 29).
[29] The Applicant has not shown any error in this aspect of the Judgment, which is reviewable on a standard of correctness.
[30] First, the principle that allegations in a pleading are to be taken as true on a motion to strike does not extend to pleadings of law, a litigant’s interpretation of which cannot bind the Court (Moreau v Ottawa International Airport Authority, 2025 FC 1401 at para 11).
[31] Second, a review of the statutory provisions themselves supports the Motion Judge’s characterization. The provisions are either descriptions of the general grant of authority, a description of conduct or are discretionary – all of which supports the Motions Judge’s finding that the Applicant had not shown the existence of a legal duty owed to her by the Minister.
[32] In her memorandum of argument, the Applicant also cited subsection 45.79(1) of the RCMP Act to suggest that the Minister has the authority to decide if the actions of members of the RCMP while performing their duties under the RCMP Act “may have constituted an offence under federal or provincial law. . . that would be in the public interest to be investigated by an investigative body or by a police force other than the Force.”
Not only is this provision also discretionary, it is also not relevant as the Applicant did not allege that the RCMP committed an offence under federal or provincial law.
B. Did the Motion Judge err in refusing a writ of mandamus?
[33] The Applicant argues that the Motion Judge erred in failing to apply the legal test for mandamus as set out in Apotex, including by failing to recognize that mandamus can be granted for “significant maladministration or administrative misconduct”
on the part of the Respondents.
(1) No error in finding no public legal duty to act
[34] The Applicant submits that the Motion Judge erred in holding that the statutory regime does not trigger any public legal duty for the Minister when the Minister is in receipt of the RCMP Information. This issue is reviewable on the standard of correctness (O’Driscoll FCA at para 10).
[35] The Applicant relies specifically on the Minister’s public legal duty to provide executive oversight of the RCMP.
[36] The Motion Judge cited the following paragraph of the O’Driscoll FCA decision, which fully addresses the Applicant’s argument:
Subsection 5(1) is the source of the Commissioner’s authority for the management and control of the RCMP. Absent an effect on a legally cognizable right or interest, a grant of statutory authority to a public official does not give rise to a legal right on the part of a citizen to require that the associated administrative discretion of management and control be exercised in a certain way, or at all (see, for example, Reisdorf v. Canada, 2023 FCA 188 at para. 8). There is therefore no error in the Federal Court’s finding that ‘the Commissioner had no legal obligation to respond within the unilateral, arbitrary and extremely short deadline’ imposed in the June 19th email (Federal Court Decision, at para. 27) (O’Driscoll FCA at para 22).
[37] I can find no error in the Motion Judge’s finding that mandamus was not warranted as the purported source of the Minister’s public legal duty to act in this case based on the grant of statutory authority as a public official, was squarely rejected by the Federal Court of Appeal.
VI. Costs
[38] The Respondents seek an elevated cost award on the basis of: (i) the Applicant’s persistent pattern of re-litigating issues that have previously been determined; (ii) the sheer volume of the motion record which is over 500 pages in length; (iii) the fact that the Applicant has not paid past cost awards (as noted by the Motion Judge); and (iv) while the Applicant is a self-represented litigant, she is a sophisticated litigant with legal training. The Respondents’ Bill of Costs for this motion comes to $5,400.00 based on a combination of fee items for a motion and an appeal under Tariff B, Tables 2 and 3, Column 2 of the Federal Courts Rules. The Applicant did not challenge the Bill of Costs and made no submissions of her own.
[39] I do not agree that such an elevated cost award is justified. Based on the Respondents’ success, I am awarding the Respondents their costs calculated at the high end of Tarriff B, Column 1 of Table 3 (item 13) and Table 4 (items 8 and 11).
VII. Conclusion
[40] As the Applicant has failed to show any error in the Associate Judge’s Judgment, this motion is dismissed with costs.
[41] I appreciate the Applicant’s frustration and the difficult personal circumstances she is navigating; however, I wish to emphasize that this decision is not a lapse in the rule of law as she warned it would be if the Court were to dismiss her appeal, but one that adheres to the limits of the Federal Court’s jurisdiction, which is equally important to the rule of law.
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