Docket: IMM-21410-24
Citation: 2026 FC 1139
Toronto, Ontario, September 10, 2026
PRESENT: Mr. Justice Southcott
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BETWEEN:
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BEKIR SAMI YILBAS
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS AND JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision made by an immigration officer [the Officer] on April 29, 2024 [the Decision], to destroy the Applicant’s permanent resident card [PR Card].
[2] This application for judicial review is allowed because, as explained in these Reasons, the Officer did not provide an intelligible analysis of the application of s 58(3) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR], upon which the Officer appears to have relied as authority to destroy the Applicant’s PR Card.
[3] My Judgment will grant relief materially in the form sought in the Applicant’s Memorandum of Argument [the AMOA], setting aside the Decision and ordering that the matter be redetermined by a different immigration officer. However, that relief does not include direction, as requested by the Applicant, that such redetermination take place based on the circumstances that existed at the time of the Decision, including the Applicant’s permanent resident [PR] status or eligibility therefor.
II. Background
[4] The Applicant is a citizen of Turkey. On April 4, 2023, he submitted an application to renew his PR Card [the Application]. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada [IRCC] authorized the Application on July 24, 2023, and subsequently mailed his PR Card to the Applicant at the Ottawa mailing address that the Applicant included in the Application [the Address]. On August 17, 2023, the PR Card was returned as undeliverable at the Address. On April 29, 2024, IRCC destroyed the PR Card.
III. Decision under Review
[5] The Decision that is the subject of this application for judicial review is reflected in the Officer’s notes contained in IRCC’s Global Case Management System [GCMS], the operative entry in which is dated April 29, 2024, and reads as follows:
PRC CARD RETURNED TO SYDNEY PRC AS UNDELIVERABLE, client did not provide new or alternative canadian address in over 180 days. Card Destroyed.
IV. Issues and Standard of Review
[6] In his Application for Leave and for Judicial Review, the Applicant sought judicial review of the Decision based both on alleged breaches of procedural fairness and on the Decision being unreasonable. In the AMOA subsequently included in the Applicant’s Application Record, he advanced only procedural fairness arguments. The Applicant did not file a further memorandum of argument in this application. Both the Respondent’s Memorandum of Argument [the RMOA] and Respondent’s Further Memorandum of Argument responded to the procedural fairness arguments in part by relying on s 58(3) of the IRPR, which affords as follows authority for destruction of a PR Card:
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(3) A permanent resident who applies for a permanent resident card under section 56 must, in order to be provided with the card, attend at the time and place specified in a notice mailed by the Department. If the permanent resident fails to attend within 180 days after the Department first mails a notice, the card shall be destroyed and the applicant must make a new application in order to be issued a permanent resident card.
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(3) Le résident permanent qui fait une demande aux termes de l’article 56 doit, afin de se voir remettre la carte de résident permanent, se présenter aux date, heure et lieu mentionnés dans un avis envoyé par courrier par le ministère. Si le résident permanent ne se présente pas dans les cent quatre-vingts jours suivant la première mise à la poste d’un avis, la carte est détruite et il doit, s’il veut qu’une autre carte lui soit délivrée, faire une nouvelle demande.
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[7] The Applicant filed Reply Argument after receiving the RMOA but did not engage with the Respondent’s submissions on s 58(3). However, at the hearing of this application, in addition to procedural fairness arguments, the Applicant advanced oral submissions to the effect that IRCC’s mailing of the PR Card to the Applicant did not represent notice as contemplated by s 58(3) as a precondition to IRCC’s authority to destroy the card 180 days thereafter. The Respondent advanced oral submissions in response. In my view, these submissions raise arguments surrounding the reasonableness of the Decision.
[8] As such, the issues raised for the Court’s adjudication in this application are as follows:
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whether the Officer breached the rules of procedural fairness by failing to inform the Applicant of IRCC’s difficulty delivering the PR Card before making the Decision to destroy it; and
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whether the Officer unreasonably relied on s 58(3) of the IRPR in making the Decision to destroy the PR Card.
[9] As is implicit in its articulation, the second issue above is governed by the reasonableness standard, as informed by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov].
[10] The procedural fairness issue is reviewable on a standard akin to correctness, requiring the Court to consider whether, taking into account all the circumstances, the procedure followed was fair (Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at paragraph 54).
V. Analysis
[11] My decision to allow this application for judicial review turns on the second issue identified above, i.e., whether the Officer unreasonably relied on s 58(3) of the IRPR in making the Decision to destroy the PR Card.
[12] The parties’ arguments focused significantly on whether the practice followed by IRCC in the case at hand, i.e., mailing the PR Card to the Applicant, as opposed to sending the Applicant correspondence identifying a time and place for the applicant to attend in order to be provided with the card, complies with s 58(3) so as to authorize IRCC to destroy the card 180 days later. More fundamentally, it is the Applicant’s position that the Officer was not authorized to destroy the PR Card, because IRCC’s failed communication with him did not afford him notice as contemplated by s 58(3).
[13] As noted above, the Applicant raised these arguments for the first time at the hearing of the application. While the Respondent did not object to those submissions and advanced arguments in response, in these circumstances the Court is reluctant to address interpretation of s 58(3) in any more detail than necessary to dispose of this application. As such, the question whether IRCC’s practice of mailing PR Cards (rather than indicating a time and place for an applicant to attend in order to be provided a PR Card) represents notice as contemplated by s 58(3) should be left for determination in another matter in which it is more comprehensively briefed and argued.
[14] Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the Applicant has identified a reviewable error in the Decision, arising from the absence of any engagement by the Officer with the question of whether the s 58(3) notice requirement was satisfied in circumstances in which IRCC’s communication with the Applicant was returned as undeliverable. It is undisputed between the parties (and indeed expressly reflected in the GCMS notes) that the PR Card was returned to IRCC as undeliverable and that the Officer was aware of this. Therefore, independent of whether transmitting the card to the Applicant by mail at the address he provided in the Application might have otherwise satisfied the s 58(3) notice requirement, it is not clear how the Officer concluded that the requirement was satisfied when it is apparent (and was apparent to the Officer at the time) that the transmission was not received by the Applicant.
[15] The GCMS notes (which inform an understanding of the reasons for the Decision) reflect that the PR Card was destroyed because it was returned to IRCC as undeliverable and more than 180 days had passed without the Applicant providing a new or alternative Canadian address. It is apparent from the 180-day reference that the Officer was relying on the authority afforded by s 58(3) to destroy the PR Card. However, the record before the Court does not reveal any analysis by the Officer in support of a conclusion that the s 58(3) notice requirement had been satisfied on the facts of the matter at hand, in which the Officer was aware that the notice had not been received.
[16] This is not to say that there may not be a reasonable analysis available, either surrounding the interpretation of s 58(3) of the IRPR or in relation more generally to the giving of notice by mail, pursuant to which facts akin to those in the case at hand, or more details surrounding such facts, might satisfy the notice requirement. I also note that the parties confirmed at the hearing of this application that there is no evidence before the Court as to why IRCC’s mail with the PR Card was undeliverable, including whether or not the Applicant had moved from that address. I therefore offer no comment on whether a case involving similar but more detailed facts might support a reasonable analysis surrounding satisfaction of the s 58(3) notice requirement.
[17] Rather, the Decision in the matter at hand does not withstand reasonableness review, because the reasonableness standard as informed by Vavilov is concerned with the intelligibility of administrative decision-making, which is lacking in the record before the Court.
[18] Having arrived at the conclusion that the Decision is unreasonable, this application for judicial review will be allowed, and it is unnecessary for the Court to engage with the issue as to whether the Officer breached procedural fairness in making the Decision.
VI. Remedy
[19] It remains necessary to address the remedy that the Court should grant in this application.
[20] The Applicant submits in the AMOA that the Court should order that the Decision be set aside and the matter be redetermined de novo by another officer. However, at the hearing of this application, the Applicant requested that the Court direct that, in redetermining the matter, the new officer make such redetermination based on the circumstances as they existed at the time of the impugned Decision. More expressly, the Applicant’s counsel submitted that, while the Applicant was clearly eligible for PR status at the time the PR Card was issued, the record before the Court does not demonstrate whether he currently has that status or remains eligible for same. As such, the Applicant wishes for the redetermination to be performed under circumstances in which he clearly has such status or eligibility.
[21] The Respondent’s position is that, if the Court were to allow this application for judicial review, it should set aside the Decision and remit it for redetermination, but such redetermination should be performed under current circumstances. The Respondent notes the distinction between mere possession of a PR Card and the holding of PR status. In particular, as explained in Salewski v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 899, there is a rebuttable presumption that the holder of a PR Card has PR status, but the issuance of a PR card does not, for instance, have the effect of restoring PR status that had been previously lost (at para 20).
[22] I agree with the Respondent’s position. Effectively, the PR Card represents evidence of PR status, and it is not the Court’s role in this application to adjudicate whether the Applicant holds or is entitled to such status or, through the remedy granted, to influence any such determination.
[23] I also note that it is obvious, and with this the parties agree, that the redetermination of this matter by a new officer will not strictly be reconsidering the same determination as was made by the Officer. That is, the Decision that has been set aside in this matter was whether to destroy the Applicant’s PR Card. That destruction has occurred and cannot be undone. Rather, the question for the new officer will be whether to issue a PR Card to the Applicant. My Judgment will provide that level of direction, but not go further, in connection with the required redetermination.
[24] Finally, I note that neither party proposed any question for certification for appeal, and none is stated.
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