Date: 20260909

Docket: IMM-8873-25

Citation: 2026 FC 1134

Ottawa, Ontario, September 9, 2026

PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Ngo

BETWEEN:

VALENTIN ANTONIO GUEVARA ROBLES

Applicant

and

MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

REASONS AND JUDGMENT

I. Overview

[1] The Applicant, Valentin Antonio Guevara Robles [Applicant], is seeking judicial review of a decision by the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada [IAD] dated March 7, 2025, finding the Applicant inadmissible under paragraph 35(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], with respect to complicity in crimes against humanity and among its findings, that his contribution was voluntary.

[2] The issue on judicial review is whether res judicata applied in the Applicant’s case, given a previous finding by the Refugee Appeal Division [RAD] that the Applicant was not excluded from refugee protection under Article 1F(a) of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees [Convention]. In a decision dated November 9, 2023, the RAD concluded that while the Applicant made significant and knowing contributions to military crimes, his contribution was not voluntary and therefore he was not complicit in the crimes.

[3] For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review is granted. The IAD did not sufficiently assess the application of section 15 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR] and the Applicant’s central arguments that res judicata or issue estoppel applied to the RAD’s findings of fact. The Decision is therefore unreasonable.

II. Background and Decision Under Review

[4] The factual context relating to the Applicant and his background are largely not contested by the parties.

[5] The Applicant is a citizen of El Salvador. When he was 12 years old, the Applicant began working for an individual named “William” in his welding shop, who paid him for welding work. William gave the Applicant more responsibilities, and when the Applicant was 15 years old, he began working for a mobile discotheque named Project 2. The discotheque travelled to various locations on weekends, and the Applicant would help put together and take down equipment.

[6] At some point, William offered the Applicant more money and taught him how to “keep an eye on people”. In this role, the Applicant provided information about the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front guerillas. He later learned that the real reason for the discotheque was for the military to obtain information about suspected guerillas. He then became aware of the true purpose of Project 2, was aware of the crimes against guerillas, and was aware that a family Project 2 informed on was killed.

[7] In December 1991, when he was 17 years old, the Applicant was captured and tortured by guerrillas for 15 days. After he was released, his uncle and mother decided that he should leave El Salvador. He left El Salvador in 1992 and crossed into the US where he lived and worked without status for over 30 years. While in the US, he was arrested in California and went to jail. He claims that while in jail, he was forced to pass messages for inmates. He believes that these inmates were gang members with connections to El Salvador. The Applicant states that because of what the inmates believe he learned from passing these messages, he fears returning to El Salvador. He arrived in Canada in 2022 and sought protection here.

[8] From January 2023, the Applicant’s immigration history included hearings before the Refugee Protection Division [RPD], and an appeal to the RAD of this decision, as well as proceedings before the Immigration Division [ID] and IAD.

[9] On July 24, 2023, the IRCC issued a section 44 report against the Applicant, alleging that he is complicit in crimes against humanity because he voluntarily and knowingly made a significant contribution to the commission of acts that constitute an offence referred to in sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, SC 2000, c 24.

[10] On August 9, 2023, the ID held a hearing with respect to the Applicant’s admissibility. On October 31, 2023, the ID found that the Applicant was not inadmissible under section 45 of the IRPA for committing an act outside Canada that constitutes an offence pursuant to paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA.

[11] The Minister appealed the ID’s decision to the IAD.

[12] The Applicant submitted a copy of the ID’s decision to the RAD. The Minister also objected to this, and the parties presented submissions to the RAD on this issue.

[13] On November 9, 2023, the RAD overturned the RPD’s decision and granted the Applicant’s refugee claim. The RAD concluded that the ID’s decision and findings of fact were not binding on it. Specifically, the RAD noted that “[t]his is different than determining whether a person is inadmissible, where findings of fact by the Board about Article IF exclusion are considered conclusive findings of fact, pursuant to section 15(b) of the IRPR.”

[14] The RAD also cited Massroua v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1542 at paragraphs 39-41 [Massroua], whereby findings of fact made by the RPD in an exclusion proceeding are to be considered as conclusive findings of fact in an admissibility determination under section 35 of the IRPA (Massroua at para 40, citing Johnson v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 868 at para 24).

[15] The RAD considered the factors in Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 [Ezokola] in its analysis: the size and nature of the organization; the part of the organization with which the refugee claimant was most directly concerned; his position or rank in the organization and his duties and activities; and the length of time the refugee claimant was in the organization, particularly after acquiring knowledge of the group’s crime or criminal purpose; the method by which the refugee claimant was recruited and the refugee claimant’s opportunity to leave the organization.

[16] The RAD concluded that the Applicant was not complicit in the war crimes of the El Salvador military and death squads. Although there are serious reasons for considering that he made a significant and knowing contribution to El Salvador military and death squads’ crimes, the RAD found that the Applicant’s contribution was not made voluntarily.

[17] On March 7, 2025, the IAD released its decision with respect to the Applicant’s admissibility [Decision]. The IAD noted the RAD’s decision and that there had been parallel processes occurring at both the RAD and the ID.

[18] The IAD found paragraph 15(b) of the IRPR does not require it to treat the RAD’s determination of exclusion as conclusive, and that the IAD is not precluded from conducting a de novo hearing and coming to different conclusions than those of the RAD.

[19] The IAD conducted their own analysis of the Ezokola factors and placed considerable weight on the Applicant’s duties and actions within the organization, among other things. The IAD disagreed with the ID’s conclusion that there was no voluntary contribution because of the Applicant’s young age and his role compared to the size and nature of the organization. The IAD found that despite the Respondent’s young age at the material times, this did not indemnify his contributions or render them insignificant.

[20] The Minister also sought judicial review of the RAD’s decision.

[21] In a decision dated April 28, 2025, the Court dismissed the Minister’s judicial review, concluding that the RAD reasonably applied the factors from Ezokola (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Guevara Robles, 2025 FC 761).

[22] The IAD’s Decision is the subject of this judicial review.

III. Issues and Standard of Review

[23] The issue on judicial review is whether the IAD’s Decision was unreasonable.

[24] The parties submit that the standard of review with respect to the merits of the Decision is reasonableness (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paras 10, 25 [Vavilov]). The Respondent also submits that the standard of reasonableness applies to questions of statutory interpretation of a tribunal’s enabling statute, including the application of paragraph 15(b) of the IRPR (citing Vavilov at paras 7, 116).

[25] I agree that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review, in particular with respect to an administrative decision-maker’s interpretation of its home statute (Vavilov at para 115-116; see also Pepa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 SCC 21 at paras 38-39 [Pepa]).

[26] On judicial review, the Court must consider whether a decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness – justification, transparency and intelligibility (Vavilov at para 99). A reasonable decision will always depend on the constraints imposed by the legal and factual context of the particular decision under review (Vavilov at para 90). A decision may be unreasonable if the decision-maker misapprehended the evidence before it (Vavilov at para 126).

[27] The party challenging the decision bears the onus of demonstrating that the decision is unreasonable (Vavilov at para 100).

IV. Analysis

[28] At the hearing, I asked the parties to discuss the issue of the IAD’s interpretation of the IRPR on the reasonableness standard of review.

[29] The Applicant submits that the question of res judicata needed to be considered in tandem with the IRPR. Before the IAD, the Applicant relied on paragraph 15(b) to argue that the RAD’s factual findings concerning Article 1F(a) exclusion should be treated as conclusive for the purpose of determining admissibility under section 35(1)(a) of the IRPA. He also cited British Columbia (Attorney General) v Malik, 2011 SCC 18 to support the proposition that the RAD’s decision ought to be given considerable weight.

[30] Furthermore, the Applicant submitted to the IAD that the principle of res judicata, and more specifically issue estoppel, applied to his case (citing Danyluk v Ainsworth Technologies Inc, 2001 SCC 44 [Danyluk]; Toronto (City of) v Canadian Union of Public Employees, 2001 CanLII 24114 (ONCA)).

[31] At the hearing, the Applicant emphasized that even if the jurisprudence is silent on the reverse (i.e. has not committed), it is not necessarily an implied exclusion without more analysis by the IAD in the Decision. This is especially so given that section 15 of the IRPR deals specifically with an evidentiary rule (or a “deeming provision” in the Applicant’s words).

[32] The Respondent submits that the Applicant’s position over-simplifies the issue of res judicata or issue estoppel. Relying on paragraph 15(b) of the IRPR, the IAD found that this section applied only if the IRB made a positive finding that a foreign national has committed a war crime or crime against humanity. Since no such finding was made, the IAD reasonably found that it was not required to treat the RAD’s determination of exclusion as conclusive. The Respondent repeated the IAD’s conclusion that had Parliament intended for paragraph 15(b) of the IRPR to apply broadly to situations where the IRB had made a finding that a war crime or crime against humanity was not committed, then the legislation would have reflected this.

[33] The Respondent further submits that the IAD has exclusive jurisdiction over inadmissibility determinations pursuant to paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA, and the RAD has exclusive jurisdiction over exclusion proceedings under section 98 of the IRPA and Article 1F(a) of the Convention. As such, even if the evidence before the IAD and RAD was the same, and the legal issues were also the same, there could still be different outcomes. In addition, while both the RAD and IAD considered the Ezokola factors, they did so for different legislative purposes. As such, the purposes of both divisions differ greatly, and a mechanical examination of the IRPR would undermine the administrative scheme. The IAD’s process is also de novo. To the extent there is a “deemed finding” of fact under the IRPR for section 35 inadmissibility hearings, this is only limited to finding of fact and not findings of mixed fact and law.

[34] I cannot agree with the Respondent’s submissions. The Respondent’s argument does not address the Applicant’s submissions that the IAD erred by not grappling with the Applicant’s central argument of res judicata or issue estoppel in the Decision within the context of its analysis of the IRPR or more broadly.

[35] Furthermore, the analysis that does appear in the Decision with respect to the IRPR is also not sufficiently justified to meet the requirements under the reasonableness standard of review. Finally, many of the arguments that the Respondent raised at the hearing in support of the reasonableness of the Decision were not articulated by the decision-maker.

A. The IAD’s statutory interpretation of paragraph 15(b) of the IRPR is not complete

(1) Judicial review of the IAD’s statutory interpretation

[36] As the Supreme Court instructs, assessing the reasonableness of a decision begins with a “reasons first” approach and seeks to understand the reasoning that led to the decision, and whether it was “based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” (Vavilov at paras 84-85).

[37] There are legal constraints on the IAD’s interpretation of legislation and regulations. The decision-maker is constrained by the specifically worded statutory scheme from which it draws its authority (Vavilov at paras 99, 108-110). The facts before the decision-maker, the common law, and the decision-maker’s past practices are also constraints which must be accounted for in the decision.

[38] The applicable legislative framework that bears upon the IAD is found in paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA:

[39] The Applicant also referred the IAD to paragraph 15(b) of the IRPR that provides guidance in the application of paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA:

[40] It is well established in the case law that the starting point in any statutory interpretation exercise in Canada is based on the modern approach, under which the words of a provision must be interpreted “in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament” (Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC) at para 21).

[41] To be reasonable, an administrative decision on a question of statutory interpretation must be consistent with the “modern principle” of statutory interpretation (Vavilov at para 118). The decision-maker does not have to engage in a formalistic statutory interpretation exercise every time, but the decision must always be consistent with the text, context and purpose of the provision (Vavilov at paras 119–120). However, whatever form the interpretive exercise takes, the merits of an administrative decision-maker’s interpretation of a statutory provision must be consistent with the text, context and purpose of the provision (Pepa at para 63, citing Vavilov at para 120).

[42] These are the relevant legal constraints that bear upon the decision-maker in this case.

(2) Application to the Decision under review

[43] With the foregoing legal framework in mind, I turn towards the reasons in the Decision.

[44] In the Decision under the section entitled “Are the factual findings of the RAD res judicata”, the IAD acknowledged the Applicant’s submission with respect to reliance on the RAD’s findings of fact, and the Applicant’s jurisprudence and citations to paragraph 15(b) of the IRPR.

[45] The IAD acknowledged that the purpose of section 15 of the IRPR is to avoid re-litigation. The IAD then concluded that paragraph 15(b) states “based on findings that the foreign national or permanent resident has committed a war crime or a crime against humanity” (emphasis added) but does not contain the term “has not committed” (emphasis added). The IAD underlined that the RAD did not make a positive finding that the Applicant had committed a war crime or crime against humanity.

[46] The IAD also noted that the jurisprudence is silent concerning whether paragraph 15(b) can be interpreted more broadly and applied to situations where the IRB had made a negative finding, such that a war crime or crime against humanity was not committed. The IAD stated that it was persuaded by the Minister’s submissions that if the IRPR contemplated application in circumstances where an applicable crime had not been committed, the wording in the regulation would have reflected this.

[47] With respect, considering the reasons provided by the IAD, I conclude that the IAD’s Decision is not reflective of the modern approach to statutory interpretation.

[48] In particular, and of relevance to the Applicant’s case, where the meaning of a statutory provision is disputed in administrative proceedings, the decision-maker must demonstrate in its reasons that it was alive to these essential elements (Vavilov at para 120). This is what a reviewing Court looks for in undertaking a reasonableness review.

[49] The Federal Court of Appeal recently considered the issue where a statutory provision has not been previously interpreted and explained by a decision-maker or a court. In those instances, the decision-maker must turn its own mind to the principles of statutory interpretation (Canadian Nuclear Laboratories Ltd v Canada (Attorney General), 2026 FCA 106 at para 38, citing Pepa at para 64).

[50] The Supreme Court in Piekut v Canada (National Revenue), 2025 SCC 13 [Piekut] also reiterated that “[t]he modern principle requires a court to interpret statutory language ‘according to a textual, contextual and purposive analysis to find a meaning that is harmonious with the Act as a whole’” (Piekut at para 43). As a result, “plain meaning alone is not determinative and a statutory interpretation analysis is incomplete without considering the context, purpose and relevant legal norms” (Piekut at paras 43-45; see also Vavilov at para 118).

[51] I appreciate that a statute’s purpose and context cannot overwhelm the text and that the focus must remain on the text of the statute, which acts as the anchor in the interpretive exercise (Pepa at para 186). However, it is evident from reading the Decision that the decision-maker assessed the plain language in section 15 but did not engage with the purpose or context of the text.

[52] In this case, the IAD had agreed with the Applicant that the purpose of paragraph 15(b) of the IRPR is to preclude re-litigation in certain circumstances. The IAD had also recognized that there was no jurisprudence interpreting section 15 of the IRPR where a negative finding had occurred. The Applicant had proposed an interpretation in favour of capturing both positive and negative findings and disputed the Respondent’s narrow interpretation of the statutory provision.

[53] As such, to be reasonable, the reasons in the Decision needed to justify why the IAD would depart from the purpose of section 15 of the IRPR to avoid re-litigation in favour of a more restrictive interpretation and explain why that more restrictive interpretation better reflects the intent of Parliament. The reasons also needed to engage in considering the “opposite” statutory interpretation proposed by the Applicant and reflect that the IAD was alert to its role in interpreting its home statute in light of these two competing interpretations.

[54] The omission of any other analysis by the IAD beyond the plain reading of the section is sufficient to cause the Court to lose confidence in the outcome reached by the decision-maker (Vavilov at para 122). There are insufficient reasons in the Decision to allow the Court to conclude that the IAD’s statutory interpretation was complete. This is a determinative reviewable error.

[55] I underline that I make no determination on whether section 15 of the IRPR applies to the circumstances that were before the IAD, or whether the section applies to either positive and negative findings, or only to a positive finding by the IRB.

[56] On judicial review of a decision interpreting a statute, the Court does not conduct its own statutory interpretation exercise or seek to determine the correct interpretation (Vavilov at paras 83, 116; Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21 at para 62 [Mason]; Pepa at paras 48, 147, 179). A reviewing court cannot impose its statutory interpretation onto the decision-maker as this would be akin to creating a “yardstick” to measure the decision and result in improperly conducting a correctness review (Vavilov at para 83). The interpretation of paragraph 15(b) of the IRPR should be left to the IAD.

B. The Decision did not engage with the Applicant’s arguments on issue estoppel

[57] I also agree with the Applicant that the IAD did not engage with the issue estoppel argument that he presented along with the statutory context that he raised in his submissions.

[58] The Supreme Court established the two-step analysis in consideration of issue estoppel in Danyluk at paragraph 33. The first step is to determine whether the party has established the preconditions to the operation of issue estoppel per Angle v Minister of National Revenue, 1974 CanLII 168 at page 254 namely a) that the same question has been decided; b) that the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and, c) that the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or their privies. If successful, the decision-maker must still determine whether, as a matter of discretion, issue estoppel ought to be applied.

[59] On judicial review, the Respondent made submissions in relation to the two-step analysis in Danyluk to argue that issue estoppel did not apply to the Applicant’s case. However, the Decision itself is silent on this analysis. None of the factors in Danyluk were identified or analyzed. It is not the role of the Court (nor the Respondent) to buttress the reasons in the Decision.

[60] This omission would constitute a failure of “responsive justification” that would warrant the Court’s intervention (Mason at para 10). A decision maker’s failure to meaningfully grapple with key issues or central arguments raised by the parties may call into question whether the decision maker was actually alert and sensitive to the matter before it (Vavilov at para 128).

[61] The principle of responsive justification also means that if a decision has particularly harsh consequences for the affected individual, the decision maker must explain why its decision best reflects the legislature’s intention and is justified in light of the facts and the law (Vavilov at paras 133-135; see also Mason at para 76). Here, the IAD concluded its Decision by making a deportation order against the Applicant. Where the impact of a decision on an individual’s rights and interests is severe, the reasons provided to that individual must reflect the stakes.

[62] The lack of reasons in the Decision on res judicata or issue estoppel also means that the Court cannot conclude that the IAD properly grappled with the Applicant’s main arguments. As such, the Decision is not transparent, justified, or intelligible.

[63] The errors identified in the preceding paragraphs are determinative errors. I will not address the parties’ arguments with respect to the merits of the Decision, namely the IAD’s conclusions that the Applicant’s contributions were voluntary pursuant to the Ezokola factors.

V. Conclusion

[64] The application for judicial review is granted.

[65] The Decision does not meet the hallmarks of reasonableness, as it is not coherent and rational in its analysis of the evidence and arguments provided. The Decision was not responsive to the Applicant’s submissions. The shortcomings in relation to the IAD’s interpretation of paragraph 15(b) and lack of analysis on the issue of issue estoppel are sufficient for the Court to lose confidence in the outcome reached as a whole (Vavilov at paras 122, 128, 194). The Decision is therefore unreasonable.

[66] The parties do not propose any question for certification and I agree that in these circumstances, none arise.

JUDGMENT in IMM-8873-25

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

• 1.The application for judicial review is granted.

• 2.The IAD’s Decision is set aside and the matter is remitted to the IAD for reconsideration in accordance with the reasons in this Judgment.

• 3.There is no question for certification.

“Phuong T.V. Ngo”

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:	IMM-8873-25
STYLE OF CAUSE:	VALENTIN ANTONIO GUEVARA ROBLES v MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING:	VANCOUVER (BRITISH COLUMBIA)
DATE OF HEARING:	JULY 30, 2026
REASONS AND JUDGMENT:	NGO J.
DATED:	SEPTEMBER 9, 2026

APPEARANCES:

Munpreet Sandhu	For The Applicant
Zahida Shawkat	For The RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Titan Law Corporation Barristers and Solicitors Vancouver (British Columbia)	For The Applicant
Attorney General of Canada Vancouver (British Columbia)	For The RESPONDENT