Docket: IMM-6626-25
Citation: 2026 FC 1133
St. Catharines, Ontario, September 9, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Duchesne
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BETWEEN:
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SAMAN KAVARIZADEH
SAHAR AZADINASRABADI
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Applicants
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS AND JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1] The Applicants are spouses and are citizens and residents of Iran who applied in June 2022 to become permanent residents in Canada. Their applications have yet to be determined by the IRCC despite the passage of time. They seek a mandamus order compelling the Minister to make a decision with respect to their application, as well as damages in the amount of $ 10,000 and costs.
[2] The Applicants’ application is granted in part for the reasons that follow.
II. Background
[3] The Applicants filed an application for permanent residence under the Provincial Nominee class from outside of Canada on June 22, 2022. Mr. Kavarizadeh, the principal Applicant is a civil engineer while Ms. Azadinasrabadi, the dependant Applicant, is a business manager. Both hold Master’s degrees. The Applicants’ application was made for the most part online, with some scanned documentation being provided after their application and in response to requests to additional information by IRCC.
[4] The record shows the following salient events with respect to the processing of the Applicants’ application after its initial filing in June 2022. None of these facts are contested.
[5] The Applicants were screened through the IRCC Central Intake Office on January 25, 2023.
[6] By February 27, 2023, it had been determined by IRCC that the Applicants had filed duplicate applications that had been received on December 7 and 23, 2022, respectively. The duplicate applications were cancelled and the June 2022 application continued to be processed.
[7] A status update was requested from IRCC by a Member of Parliament on April 14, 2023. The inquiring Member of Parliament was informed on April 17, 2023, that the Applicants’ application was in the queue for processing.
[8] On June 5, 2023, IRCC received a request for the urgent processing of the application due to the evolving situation in Iran.
[9] A status update was again requested from IRCC by a Member of Parliament on November 9, 2023, as the anticipated processing time for the Applicants’ application had been exceeded without a response from IRCC. The inquiring Member of Parliament was informed by IRCC that the Applicants’ application was in progress.
[10] On November 17, 2023, IRCC noted that it had no concerns to that point in time regarding the Applicants’ intention to settle in Manitoba, their relationship as spouses, and that no adverse information that would affect their admissibility or eligibility under the Provincial Nominee class had been found.
[11] On November 20, 2023, IRCC issued a letter to the Applicants and requested that they provide proof of the settlement funds available to them at the time, as well as other documentation to complete their application. The Applicants responded promptly and, by the end of November 2023, the IRCC had assessed the Applicants’ reported medical situations favourably.
[12] IRCC sent a request for security clearance and stage 2 processing on December 6, 2023. The application was sent to security screening on December 13, 2023.
[13] Mr. Kavarizadeh contacted IRCC via email on March 18, 2024. He informed IRCC that the situation in Iran was deteriorating, that he had participated in protests advocating for human rights, had received threatening messages, had a break-in at his home, and was assaulted in front of his family. He urged IRCC to advance the application urgently. The Applicants’ request was forwarded to a supervisor on April 4, 2024.
[14] IRCC noted on December 23, 2024, that the security screening for Mr. Kavarizadeh was ongoing.
[15] Mr. Kavarizadeh sent a demand letter to IRCC on February 17, 2025. The Applicants demanded that IRCC proceed to the immediate processing and determination of their application for permanent residence. The demand letter followed several earlier email requests for a status update on the progress of their application’s process.
III. Evidence since the commencement of this proceeding
[16] The Applicants commenced this proceeding on July 25, 2025.
[17] The Respondent has filed affidavit evidence dated September 3, 2025, that establishes that the security screening for Mr. Kavarizadeh remained ongoing in September 2025, whereas Ms. Azadinasrabadi’s security screening has been completed favourably.
[18] The Respondent filed additional affidavit evidence dated June 11, 2026, that establishes that:
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a)by March 1, 2026, IRCC continued to wait for information from its partners;
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b)on June 9, 2026, IRCC flagged an action item to request that Mr. Kavarizadeh provide a completed military service table, or a military exemption card or other form of proof of military exemption; and,
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c)IRCC made the request to Mr. Kavarizadeh for him to provide a completed military service table, or a military exemption card or other form of proof of military exemption by June 18, 2026, in order for IRCC to continue processing his application on June 11, 2026.
[19] It appears from the information and application filed by the Applicants that Mr. Kavarizadeh had not included any description of any military service in his application. There is no information in the record to show whether Mr. Kavarizadeh had provided the requested information as at the date of hearing.
IV. The Legal Framework and the applicable Legal Test
[20] The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA], establishes several objectives. These include permitting Canada to pursue the social, cultural, and economic benefits of immigration while protecting the health and safety of Canadians and maintaining the security of Canadian society (IRPA, s 3(1)).
[21] Pursuant to subsection 21(1) of the IRPA, a foreign national becomes a permanent resident only if an officer is satisfied that the applicant has applied for that status, has met the applicable obligations, and is not inadmissible. Section 70 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR], similarly requires an officer to issue a permanent resident visa only after an examination establishes that the regulatory requirements for its issue are met.
[22] It is clear from the IRPA and the IRPR that granting an applicant permanent resident status is not discretionary act, but is rather an officer’s duty once they determine, after examination of an application, that an applicant has established that they satisfy all of the applicable requirements to be granted the status sought.
[23] Applicants for permanent resident status may seek relief from the Court when their application for permanent resident status has not been determined in a timely manner. They can do so through an application for a mandamus order pursuant to section 18 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7.
[24] The Court has the discretion to grant a mandamus order to compel the performance of a public legal duty when all of the requirements set out by the jurisprudence for its granting are met. The requirements to be met for the issue of a mandamus order are described in Apotex Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 1993 CanLII 3004 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 742 (CA) [Apotex] and further considered in Conille v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 9097 (FCTD) [Conille], as follows:
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1)there must be a public legal duty to act;
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2)the duty must be owed to the applicant;
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3)there must be a clear right to performance of that duty, determined by considering whether:
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a prior demand for performance of the duty;
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reasonable time to comply with the demand was provided unless it was refused outright; and,
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a subsequent refusal to act which can be either expressed or implied, e.g. unreasonable delay, occurred;
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a)in exercising a discretion, the decision-maker must not act in a manner which can be characterized as “unfair”
, “oppressive”
or demonstrate “flagrant impropriety”
or “bad faith”
;
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b)mandamus is unavailable if the decision-maker’s discretion is characterized as being “unqualified”
, “absolute”
, “permissive”
or “unfettered”
;
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c)in the exercise of a “fettered”
discretion, the decision-maker must act upon “relevant”
, as opposed to “irrelevant”
, considerations;
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d)mandamus is unavailable to compel the exercise of a “fettered discretion”
in a particular way; and
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e)mandamus is only available when the decision-maker’s discretion is “spent”
, i.e., the applicant has a vested right to the performance of the duty.
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5)no other adequate remedy is available to the applicant;
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6)the order sought will have some practical value or effect;
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7)there is no equitable bar to the relief sought; and
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8)on a balance of convenience an order of mandamus should be issued.
[25] These requirements are conjunctive: the remedy sought will be denied if the Court finds that any of the eight Apotex criteria are not favourable to the applicant (Benison v Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police External Review Committee), 2026 FCA 53 at para 45 [Benison]).
[26] As was pointed out recently by the Federal Court of Appeal in Benison, at paragraphs 45 to 51:
[45] The Apotex test is conjunctive. If, in the view of the reviewing court, any of the eight criteria are not favourable to the applicant, mandamus will be denied. However, and significantly, the eight Apotex criteria do not serve the same purpose. The first four criteria are considered by the reviewing court to determine whether the applicant has shown that they would be entitled to an order of mandamus. The final four criteria relate to reasons for which the reviewing court should exercise its discretion to deny the remedy to which the applicant would otherwise be entitled.
[46] The first four Apotex criteria largely coincide with the traditional requirements for the issuance of a writ of mandamus: the applicant must have a clear legal right to the performance of a public duty; this duty must be owed to the applicant; the public official must have no discretion to act or not; the conditions precedent to the performance of the duty must be satisfied; and the applicant must have demanded performance of the duty and been refused in words or conduct (Donald J.M. Brown & John Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2025) at § 1:21-1:25 (Brown & Evans)).
[47] The final four criteria of Apotex are different. They reflect the fact that, even though a consideration of the first four criteria may establish that the preconditions for the issuance of a writ of mandamus are met, a reviewing court retains a discretion to refuse to issue any prerogative remedy, including mandamus (Brown & Evans at § 1:21). In other words, “even where a litigant has established a ground on which the courts may intervene in the administrative process… the court may decline to provide a remedy for reasons other than the merits of the application for judicial review” (Brown & Evans at § 3:1). This view finds support in this Court’s decision to expressly define the seventh criterion as involving the exercise of its remedial discretion (Apotex at p. 769) and to treat the balance of convenience as a discretionary ground upon which mandamus may be refused, to be considered only once the applicant has established it is prima facie entitled to that remedy (Apotex at pp. 786-791).
[50] […] An applicant who establishes that the first four Apotex criteria are favourable has shown that it is prima facie entitled to a writ of mandamus. However, the four final criteria may be raised by the respondent or by the reviewing court, on its own motion, as discretionary bars to mandamus. Even though the applicant might be entitled to mandamus, relief should be denied in the court’s discretion because, on the evidence before it, an adequate alternative remedy was available, an order of mandamus would have no practical value or effect, there is an equitable bar to relief, or relief should not, on the balance of convenience, be granted.
[51] Where such bars to relief are raised by the respondent or the reviewing court, or where their existence is apparent from the record before the court, the applicant bears a tactical burden to disprove their existence, lest its application for mandamus be dismissed. Otherwise, an applicant is not required to proactively disprove the existence of discretionary bars to judicial review; absent a finding by the reviewing court that such bars exist, the applicant is entitled to the relief it has sought.
[27] An applicant seeking a mandamus order is not required to establish that they have suffered significant prejudice to establish that an unreasonable delay has been incurred. Whether prejudice has been suffered as a result of the delay, significant or not, may become relevant in the consideration of whether an equitable bar to relief arises at the balance of convenience stage of the analysis (Benison, at paras 126 -128).
[28] While the Court has the discretion and power to decline the issue of a mandamus order, that discretion should be exercised with prudence, given its serious impact on an applicant. Declining to issue a mandamus order when an applicant has established their prima facie entitlement to one should be supported by evidence and cogent reasons as to whether issuing the mandamus order would cause obvious or unacceptable cost or chaos or have a disproportionate impact on the Respondent’s interest or on other applicants (Benison, at paras 151-156, 161; Abdelrahman v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 1076 at paras 30-31 [Abdelrahman]).
[29] With these principles and the applicable legal test for the issue of a mandamus order in mind, I turn to the issues raised by the parties.
V. Issues
[30] This application raises two issues:
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1)are the Applicants entitled to mandamus order considering the first four Apotex criteria; and,
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2)has the delay in completing the assessment of the Applicants’ applications breached procedural fairness, legitimate expectations, or the duty to act in good faith?
VI. Arguments
(1) Prima facie entitlement to a mandamus order
[31] The Applicants argue that they have met all of the requirement for mandamus order to be issued to compel IRCC to make a determination on their permanent residency applications and that the IRCC’s delay in processing their applications is unreasonable.
[32] They argue that the Respondent has a public legal duty to act upon their applications and to process their applications for permanent residence within a reasonable period of time (Jia v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 596 at para 78 [Jia]). The Respondent’s duty is therefore owed to them.
[33] The Applicants argue that they have satisfied the Conille factors by establishing through admissible evidence that they have demanded that IRCC make a decision on their applications on February 17, 2025, that a reasonable period of time has elapsed for IRCC to comply with the demand to make a decision, and that IRCC has not since made a decision on their applications despite the passage of an unreasonable delay.
[34] The Applicants argue that the average processing time for their application, as reflected on the IRCC’s website at the time of their application, was 12 months. The average processing time would have suggested that their application would have been processed approximately by the end of June 2023. They argue that it has taken IRCC well over 38 months since they filed their application. They argue that the delay is longer than the nature of the process required in relation to similar applications.
[35] The Applicants argue that they submitted a complete application such that they are not responsible for the delay incurred in processing their application. They also argue that IRCC’s silence up to the date of the commencement of this proceeding indicates that the Respondent has no reasonable or satisfactory justification for the delay incurred.
[36] The Applicants urge the Court to reject any explanation from the Respondent that turns on the matter of security screening. They urge the Court to do so because they believe that they have submitted every necessary information required by the IRCC which may aid the security screening exercise to be carried out.
[37] The Applicants submit that they have done everything possible by submitting a complete application and by sending a demand letter to get the Respondent to process the application. They submit that there is no other adequate remedy available to them other than a writ of mandamus.
[38] The Respondent does not dispute that he has a public duty to process the application. He argues nevertheless that the Applicants have failed to demonstrate that they meet all the requirements for a mandamus order to be granted. More specifically, the Respondent argues that the Applicants have failed to establish that there has been an unreasonable delay in processing their application. The balance of convenience also does not favour issuing a mandamus order.
[39] The Respondent argues that the Applicants have not led evidence that the Respondent has refused to perform her duty. The evidence, argues the Respondent, is that the Applicants’ application continues to be processed.
[40] The Respondent also argues that an applicant cannot rely on average processing times as a reliable benchmark as to the timeliness of their application’s processing unless they establish that their application is average (Jiao v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1664 at paras 38-41).
[41] The Respondent argues that the application remains in process and that she is currently awaiting security screening to determine Mr. Kavarizadeh’s admissibility. As required by section 22(1) of IRPA, an officer must be satisfied that an applicant is not inadmissible to Canada. Screening regarding security and inadmissibility is a necessary and important requirement under sections 3(1)(h) and (i) of the IRPA.
[42] The Respondent has led evidence that the security screening of foreign nationals is carried out jointly by IRCC, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), and Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Following a referral by IRCC, CBSA screens applicants for a range of concerns, including national security, espionage, and crimes against humanity, and CBSA provides a recommendation to IRCC regarding inadmissibility. The Respondent argues that security screening and background checks must be comprehensive to fulfill the Minister’s obligations under the IRPA, and that this process takes time (Cheloei v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 820 at para 24 [Cheloei]).
[43] That said, the Respondent has not led evidence to show that the Applicants’ application is in any manner non-routine or otherwise complicated by any particular fact or series of facts.
(2) Other arguments: delay in breach of the delay of the duty of legitimate expectations, or breach of duty to act in good faith, and damages
[44] The Applicants argue that the representation set out on IRCC’s website with respect to average or estimated processing times amounts to a representation to applicants that their applications will be processed in a timely manner. The failure to process applications in a timely manner therefore amounts to a violation of the representation and breaches the duty of legitimate expectation owed to them.
[45] The Applicants also argue that IRCC has acted in bad faith by failing to pursue the determination of the Applicants’ application within its suggested processing times. IRCC’s failure is argued as constituting “conduct designed to mislead”
(Canada (Attorney General) v Galipeau, 2012 FC 1399 at para 42).
[46] The Applicants also seek $ 10,000 in damages for delay.
VII. Analysis
(1) The Applicants are prima facie entitled to a mandamus order
[47] The Court is required to first determine whether the Applicants have satisfied the first four criteria of the Apotex test. If they have, then they are prima facie entitled to a mandamus order. The final four criteria applicable as discretionary bars against the granting of a mandamus order would then be considered.
[48] After considering the evidence in the record, I find that the Applicants have established that they are prima facie entitled to a mandamus order because they have satisfied the first four criteria of the Apotex text.
[49] It is not contested by the Respondent that he owes the Applicants a legal duty to act and to process their application within a reasonable time. The Applicants have therefore established the first two requirements of the Apotex test.
[50] The Applicants have also established that they have sent a demand letter to IRCC and that IRCC has not made a determination on their application despite the passage of more than 17 months by the time of the hearing of his proceeding.
[51] The issue is then to determine whether the delay incurred by the Respondent is unreasonable considering the factors set out in paragraph 23 of Conille. Those factors are whether:
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a)the delay incurred is longer than the nature of the process requires;
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b)the applicant and their counsel are responsible for the delay; and,
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c)the authority responsible for the delay has not provided a satisfactory justification.
[52] The Applicants’ evidence is that the estimated time published by IRCC for the processing of routine permanent residence applications from Iran at the time of their application was 12 months. A number of decisions of this Court stand for the proposition that average processing times posted by the Respondent are not guarantees of processing times and that delay beyond average processing times does not necessarily warrant granting a mandamus order (Jia, at para 92; Yuehong v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1837 at paras 65-69; Cheloei, at paras 19-21; Mohabadi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1377 at paras 15-18).
[53] The Federal Court of Appeal reminds us at paragraph 60 of Benison that a lengthy delay is not inordinate in itself. The time taken to complete a process must be considered in light of the circumstances of the case. This then requires the consideration of three non-exhaustive contextual factors: a) the nature and purpose of the proceedings; b) the length and causes of the delay; and c) the complexity of the facts and issues in the case.
[54] I can do no better than to quote Madam Justice Catherine M. Kane from her very recent reasons in Abdelrahman, at paragraphs 28 to 31, as to the consideration to be given to the Conille factors in light of Benison:
[28] With respect to unreasonable delay, in Benison, the Court of Appeal explained that the first Conille factor addresses the time requirements inherent in the administrative proceedings considering the legal and factual complexities dealt with by the administrative decision-maker. The requirements of a fair process, the purpose of the proceedings and the rights and interests of those affected must be considered (Benison at para 77). The nature and purpose of the proceedings are contextual factors that should be considered in deciding whether the delay has been prima facie longer than the nature of the process requires (Benison at para 81). Service standards set by the administrative decision-maker are relevant to ascertaining the time required by the nature of the process but are not determinative (Benison at para 91).
[29] Where an applicant establishes that the delay in determining their application exceeds the time requirements inherent to the administrative proceedings, the onus then shifts to the respondent to demonstrate with evidence that there is a satisfactory justification (Benison at para 98). This evidence must be linked specifically to the delay faced by the applicant (Benison at paras 118-119, 129).
[30] Evidence of significant prejudice is not required to establish unreasonable delay but may become relevant at the balance of convenience stage (Benison at paras 125-128).
[31] The Court of Appeal also explained that the discretion to deny relief on the ground of balance of convenience should only be exercised in the clearest of circumstances and with great care. The court should only refuse to issue mandamus to an applicant otherwise entitled to mandamus where granting this remedy would cause obvious and unacceptable administrative cost or chaos or where potential health and safety risks to the public would outweigh the applicant’s right to pursue personal or economic interests (Benison at paras 153, 161).
[55] The reasonableness of the Respondent’s delay and whether the delay incurred is justified depend on the facts and the evidence in the record before the Court. As rightly noted in Abdelrahman at paragraph 39, the Court expects explanations from the Respondent, at least in general terms that can be publicly disclosed, for delay. While some security information cannot be made public, mechanisms exist for the Respondent to protect such information from disclosure. Some information for the review and the reasons for its length are required for the Court to assess whether the length of a security review is reasonable (Jahantigh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1253 at para 19, and the jurisprudence cited therein) and whether a matter is complex and non-routine (Mamut v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1593 at para 103).
a) The delay is longer than the nature of the process requires
[56] The evidence in the record is that the estimated time for the processing of a permanent resident application from Iran at the time that the Applicants filed their application is significantly exceeded by the Respondent in this proceeding.
[57] As of the date of the hearing of this application, the Applicant Mr. Kavarizadeh’s application had remained in the security screening process since December 13, 2023, that is, for 952 days (2 years, 7 months and 9 days). Since then, there was a note in the GCMS notes that security screening continued to be in process for Mr. Kavarizadeh in late December 2024. In March 2026, the GCMS notes reflect that the Applicants’ files were pending information from IRCC’s unnamed security partners. The next piece of information on file is the request for Mr. Kavarizadeh’s complete military service table in June 2026.
[58] Considering that there is no evidence led by the Respondent to establish that the Applicants’ application is non-routine or that the nature of the processing to be carried with respect to the Applicants is not ordinary, I find that the delay incurred by the Respondent is longer than the nature of the security process requires in this case.
b) The applicant and their counsel are not responsible for the delay incurred despite having filed an incomplete application
[59] Subsection 139(1)(b) of the IRPR requires an applicant for permanent residence to submit an application that is in accordance with paragraphs 10(1)(a) to (c) and (2) (c.1) to (d) of the IRPA and sections 140.1 to 140.3 of the IRPR. Paragraph 10(1)(a) to (c) of the IRPR requires an applicant’ application to be in writing, signed and include all of the information and documents required by the IRPR and the IRPA.
[60] As noted above, the Applicant Mr. Kavarizadeh failed to include details of his military service or exemption thereof in the application that was filed. The Applicants’ application was therefore incomplete at the time that it was filed. The Respondent sought that missing information from the Applicants in June 2026.
[61] The Applicants’ counsel argued at the hearing of this proceeding in response to questions from the Court that the Applicants ought not to be penalized by the incomplete nature of their application for permanent residence because the Respondent has a statutory duty pursuant to section 12 of the IRPR to return an application to an applicant if the application does not satisfy the requirements of sections 10 or 11 of the IRPR.
[62] The Applicants did not establish how the failure to provide information regarding Mr. Kavarizadeh’s military and paramilitary service as requested by a question in the pre-formatted application form constitutes a failure to satisfy the requirements of sections 10 or 11 of the IRPR. The Court therefore need not make a determination on whether section 12 of the IRPR was triggered on the facts of this case.
[63] The Respondent has argued in additional submissions sought by the Court that, while it is trite law that it is incumbent on an applicant to ensure that their application is complete and that incomplete applications may contribute to the delay in the correct circumstances, there is no evidence to suggest that either the Applicants or their counsel are responsible for the delay incurred despite their incomplete applications in this case. The Respondent confirmed that she does not take the position that the Applicants or their counsel are responsible for the delay because there is no evidence that the incomplete application delayed the processing of the Applicants’ application.
[64] Considering the foregoing and the Respondent’s admission, I find that the Applicants and their counsel are not responsible for the delay incurred in the processing of their application.
c) The Respondent has not provided a satisfactory justification for the delay
[65] As noted above, there is no evidence led by the Respondent to establish that the Applicants application was unusual, non-routine or problematic in any way, or that extensive security screening was required for any reason. There is no evidence that is specific to the Applicants’ application that might suggest a reason for the delay incurred in processing their application.
[66] This Court has consistently required some details with respect to what security concerns or issues are the cause of the delay if lengthy security screening is relied upon as the reason for delay (Abdelrahman, at para 43 and the jurisprudence cited therein). Simply stating that the security screening continues is simply insufficient.
[67] I acknowledge that there has been some limited activity in the Respondent’s screening work, as is reflected in the June 11, 2026, GCMS note for a request for information from Mr. Kavarizadeh regarding his military service and/or exemption therefrom. As noted above, however, the Respondent has admitted that Mr. Kavarizadeh’s failure to provide this information in his application has not caused a delay in processing the application.
[68] While the request for information regarding military service and/or an exemption therefore shows some processing activity, it does not explain the 911-day delay between when the application was referred to security screening and the request for any type of information to assist in screening.
[69] I find on the evidence led that the Respondent has not established that there is a reasonable justification for her delay in proceeding the Applicants’ permanent resident application.
[70] I also find that the Applicants have established the first four Apotex factors and that they are prima facie entitled to the issue of a mandamus order.
(2) The Respondent has not established that a mandamus order should be denied
[71] The exercise of the Court’s discretion to refuse to issue a mandamus order despite an applicant establishing that they are entitled to such an order should be supported by evidence and cogent reasons as to whether issuing the mandamus order would cause obvious or unacceptable cost or chaos, or have a disproportionate impact on the Respondent’s interest or on other applicants (Benison, at paras 151-156, 161; Abdelrahman, at paras 30-31).
[72] The Respondent has the burden of leading such evidence (Benison, at paras 50-51). The Respondent has not led evidence to establish how the balance of convenience favours her on the facts of this case. There is no evidentiary basis for the Court to exercise its discretion to deny the Applicants the mandamus order they seek on the balance of convenience or on any of the last four Apotex factors.
(3) The determination of the Applicants’ application is to be completed within 90 days
[73] The Applicants invite this Court to make an order compelling the Respondent to make a decision on their permanent resident applications within 5 days of this Judgment. The Respondent makes no suggestion as to the time within which the Applicants’ application is to be determined should the Court find that a mandamus order should issue.
[74] The evidence in the record does not show if Mr. Kavarizadeh has provided the Respondent the information sought with respect to his military service. That information should be provided.
[75] A determination on the Applicants’ application must be made expeditiously, but not so quickly as to unreasonably curtail any remaining security screening steps that should be completed by the Respondent and its security partners. Considering the circumstances of the case and the Respondent’s failure to lead evidence that suggests that significant additional time is required to complete the security screening that is apparently underway, there is no suggestion that a decision cannot be made on the Applicants’ application within the latest of 90 days from the date of this judgment if Mr. Kavarizadeh’s military information has been provided to IRCC prior to this judgment being issued, or 90 days from the Respondent’s receipt of Mr. Kavarizadeh’s military information if that information has not yet been provided.
(4) The Applicants’ other arguments
[76] The Applicants’ argument as to a duty of legitimate expectation and its alleged breach is not persuasive.
[77] The doctrine of legitimate expectations applies where a public authority makes a clear, unambiguous, and unqualified representation about the procedure it will follow (Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36 at paras 94-97). General processing-time information does not constitute a representation that a particular application will be decided by a specific date (Jia at para 92; Pakatchian v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2026 FC 759 at paras 34-35).
[78] The Applicants’ bad-faith allegation is also unpersuasive. Bad faith generally connotes moral blameworthiness, including conduct designed to mislead or pursued for an improper motive, and must be assessed in context having regard to the circumstances and the person’s knowledge (Canada (Attorney General) v Galipeau, 2012 FC 1399 at para 42). The record does not support a finding of bad faith on the part of the Respondent.
[79] Finally, the Applicants’ claim for 10,000 $ in damages for delay is untenable. There is no reasonable cause of action suggested by the Applicants nor any basis in law identified by the Applicants for the Court to order damages on the facts of this case. Further, no evidence of any damages has been provided by the Applicants. The Applicants’ claim for damages is dismissed.
VIII. Conclusion and Costs
[80] The Applicants’ application will be granted in part, and the Respondent shall be required to make a decision on the Applicants’ application within the time frame described above.
[81] The Applicants have sought their costs of this proceeding but have not suggested the amount of costs they seek. The Court strongly encourages the parties to confer and attempt to agree on the costs prior to September 23, 2026. If the parties agree on costs by then, they may deliver a letter on consent to my attention that sets out their agreement as to costs for the Court’s consideration.
[82] In the event that the parties do not agree on costs, then the Applicants shall have until September 25, 2026, to serve and file their costs submissions that do not exceed three pages, double-spaced, exclusive of schedules, appendices, and authorities. The Respondent will then have until October 2, 2026, to serve and file her costs submissions, also limited to three pages, double-spaced, exclusive of schedules, appendices, and authorities.
[83] If no agreement as to costs is filed by September 23, 2026, and no costs submissions are served and filed by September 25, 2026, then no costs will be awarded to any party.
[84] Neither party has proposed a question of general importance for certification, and none arises in this case.
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