Docket: IMM-5301-25
Citation: 2026 FC 774
Toronto, Ontario, June 10, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Justice Thorne
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BETWEEN:
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HUDA MOHAMED ABDI
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Applicant
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and
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
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Respondent
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REASONS AND JUDGMENT
I. Overview
[1] The Applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of an Immigration Officer of the High Commission of Canada in Tanzania [Officer] dated November 14, 2024, [Decision] refusing their application for permanent residence [Application]. The Decision had determined that the Applicant had not met the requirements under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [Act] and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [Regulations] as a member of either the Convention Refugee Abroad Class or the Humanitarian-Protected Persons Abroad designated class.
[2] The Applicant alleges that the Decision was unreasonable because the Officer erred in their assessment of credibility for a variety of reasons, including a failure to identify material inconsistencies in her claims, ignoring relevant country condition reports and engaging in inappropriate speculation and plausibility findings. They also allege the Decision was procedurally unfair as the Applicant was not given an adequate opportunity to address extrinsic evidence relied upon by the Officer in their Decision.
[3] For the following reasons, I grant the application and return the Decision to Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada [IRCC] for redetermination. The decision lacks procedural fairness due to an overlooked Schedule 2 narrative document causing confusion between the Applicant and the Officer in their respective understandings of the record.
II. Background
[4] The Applicant is a citizen of Somalia, who currently lives in Uganda and holds a Republic of Uganda Refugee Identity Card. She was sponsored for permanent residence in Canada under the Convention refugee abroad class and the Humanitarian-Protected Persons Abroad designated class, through a Private Sponsorship of Refugees application submitted in 2022.
[5] The Applicant alleges that she fled Somalia in 2019 after being targeted by Al-Shabaab militants, who killed her sister in an altercation. She states that in early July 2019, two men claiming to be Al-Shabaab visited her sister’s shop in Qoryoley, telling her and her sister that as women they were not allowed to work in public and should stay indoors. The men threatened that if the sisters did not cooperate, they would be punished severely. The Applicant stated that she and her sister had received several such warnings and threats from the group previously. She states that on August 27, 2019, while they were closing the shop, armed men came and when one tried to pull her away, the Applicant’s sister intervened but was stabbed and killed. The Applicant fled, first hiding at a relative’s house and then leaving the country where, with the help of smugglers, she reached Uganda in September 2019.
[6] On October 8, 2024, she was interviewed in Kampala by an Officer of the Tanzanian High Commission of Canada with the assistance of an interpreter.
[7] In the refusal letter following the interview, the Immigration Officer flagged credibility concerns in denying her Application, with the determinative issue being what the Officer found to be the Applicant’s inconsistent recounting of the incident with the Al-Shabaab members at her sister’s shop.
[8] The Officer’s interview notes recorded in the Global Case Management System [GCMS] form part of the reasons (Kazadi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 524 at para 27; Gebrewldi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 621 at para 29, citing Pushparasa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 828 at para 15; Khowaja v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 823 at para 3; Kotanyan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 507 at para 26). These notes summarize the Officers concerns, which are expressed in the following four procedural fairness questions posed to the Applicant at the end of the interview, along with her response:
PFL CONCERNS BROUGHT TO THE PA:
-THERE ARE MANY DOCUMENTED INSTANCES OF FIGHTING BETWEEN AL-SHABAAB AND AMISOM AND GOVERNMENT TROOPS IN YOUR AREA, THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE AN AREA WHERE AL-SHABAAB WALKS AROUND FREELY CARRYING OUT KNIFE ATTACKS.
-WOMEN CAN WORK IN JILIB AND OTHER AL-SHABAAB CONTROLLED [sic] AREAS. WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THIS, THE PA SWITCHED TO SAY THAT SHE WAS HARASSED BECAUSE SHE WOULD SOCIALIZE WITH PATRONS AT THE TEA SHOP ACROSS HER SHOP.
-SCHEDULE 2 IS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT WITH THE DECLARATIONS OF THE PA, FURTHER UNDERMINNG [sic] HER CREDIBILITY
-APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT AL-SHABAAB WALKS AROUND FREELY WITH COVERED FACES IN AN AREA WITH HEAVY GOVERNMENT PRESENCE. WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THIS, THE PA SWITCHED TO SAY THAT THEY WERE “TRYING” TO COVER THEIR FACES.
RESPONSE OF PA:
-Our shop was located in the village and it was heavily populated. Many men were taking kat and I would talk to the men in the tea salon. Al-Shabaab told me to dress better and said that I should stop doing what I was doing. They kept saying that women could not get involved with the business and could not talk loudly.
ANYTHING ELSE YOU WANT TO TELL ME? No, that’s what happened to me.
END OF INTERVIEW
[…]
[9] Dissatisfied with the Applicant’s response to these issues, the Decision held credibility to be the determinative factor for the Officer in finding that the Applicant did not meet the definition of either “a Convention refugee or Country of Asylum class”
member:
Due to the inconsistencies in the statements versus file documentation, and the credibility gaps of the applicant during the interview, I’m not satisfied the PA meets the definition of a Convention refugee or Country of Asylum class.
[10] The Applicant now judicially reviews this Decision.
III. Issue and Standard of Review
[11] As the reasons that follow make clear, the determinative issue at play in this matter is whether the Decision was procedurally fair.
[12] On judicial review, procedural fairness is reviewed on a correctness-like standard. This requires the Court to analyze whether the procedure followed was fair, having regard to all the circumstances (Kawasaki v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FC 936 at para 13, citing Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 [CPR] at para 54). The reviewing court determines whether the applicant “knew the case to meet and had a full and fair chance to respond”
(Elykova v Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 97 at para 5, citing CPR at para 56; see also Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at para 53; Canadian Association of Refugee Lawyers v Canada (Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship), 2020 FCA 196 at para 35, leave to appeal to SCC dismissed, 2021 CanLII 69969 (SCC)).
IV. Legal Framework
[13] Under subsection 11(1) of the Act, before entering Canada a foreign national must apply to an officer for a visa or any other document required by the Regulations, which may be issued if after an examination, “the officer is satisfied that the foreign national is not inadmissible and meets the requirements of this Act”
. These requirements include the regulations made under it (subsection 2(2) of the Act). Subsection 16(1) of the Act imposes an obligation that “a person who makes an application must answer truthfully all questions put to them for the purpose of the examination and must produce a visa and all relevant evidence and documents that the officer reasonably requires.”
[14] Section 139 of the Regulations sets out the requirements to issue a permanent residence visa to a foreign national and their accompanying family members, including if they have membership in the source country, Convention refugee abroad and/or country of asylum class.
[15] The definition of Convention refugee is set out, in section 96 of the Act, as a person outside of their countries of nationality who has a subjective fear of persecution on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership in a social group or political opinion, and that objectively this fear of persecution is well-founded. A person claiming refugee status under section 96 must meet the applicable legal test to establish there is a “serious possibility”
or “reasonable chance”
of persecution in the event of a return to the country they have fled.
[16] For persons abroad, refugee protection is “wider”
than that set out in section 96 of the Act. Members of the Country of Asylum class do not need to meet the definition of Convention refugee (Saifee v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 589 [Saifee] at para 39; Saeed v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 129 at para 48). This distinction is discussed in Saifee at paras 39-40:
[39] Members of the country of asylum class need not meet the definition of Convention refugee, and consequently need not demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. Rather, they must demonstrate that they are displaced outside of their country of nationality and habitual residence, and have been and continue to be seriously affected by civil war, armed conflict or massive violations of civil rights, and that there is no reasonable prospect within a reasonable period of a durable solution elsewhere for them.
[40] Indeed, a foreign national may well never have been persecuted for one of the reasons set out in the definition of Convention refugee and still be eligible for protection as a member of the country of asylum class. It is consequently crucial not to confuse the cases of foreign nationals meeting the definition of Convention refugee with those meeting the criteria of the country of asylum class.
[17] The relevant provisions of the Act with respect to the two classes are as follows:
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Convention Refugees Abroad
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Réfugiés au sens de la Convention outre-frontières
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Convention refugees abroad class
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Catégorie
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144 The Convention refugees abroad class is prescribed as a class of persons who may be issued a permanent resident visa on the basis of the requirements of this Division.
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144 La catégorie des réfugiés au sens de la Convention outre-frontières est une catégorie réglementaire de personnes qui peuvent obtenir un visa de résident permanent sur le fondement des exigences prévues à la présente section.
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Member of Convention refugees abroad class
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Qualité
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145 A foreign national is a Convention refugee abroad and a member of the Convention refugees abroad class if the foreign national has been determined, outside Canada, by an officer to be a Convention refugee.
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145 Est un réfugié au sens de la Convention outre-frontières et appartient à la catégorie des réfugiés au sens de cette convention l’étranger à qui un agent a reconnu la qualité de réfugié alors qu’il se trouvait hors du Canada.
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Humanitarian-protected Persons Abroad
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Personnes protégées à titre humanitaire outre-frontières
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Person in similar circumstances to those of a Convention refugee
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Personne dans une situation semblable à celle d’un réfugié au sens de la Convention
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146 (1) For the purposes of subsection 12(3) of the Act, a person in similar circumstances to those of a Convention refugee is a member of the country of asylum class.
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146 (1) Pour l’application du paragraphe 12(3) de la Loi, la personne dans une situation semblable à celle d’un réfugié au sens de la Convention appartient à la catégorie de personnes de pays d’accueil.
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Humanitarian-protected persons abroad
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Personnes protégées à titre humanitaire outre-frontières
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(2) The country of asylum class is prescribed as a humanitarian-protected persons abroad class of persons who may be issued permanent resident visas on the basis of the requirements of this Division.
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(2) La catégorie de personnes de pays d’accueil est une catégorie réglementaire de personnes protégées à titre humanitaire outre-frontières qui peuvent obtenir un visa de résident permanent sur le fondement des exigences prévues à la présente section.
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Member of country of asylum class
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Catégorie de personnes de pays d’accueil
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147 A foreign national is a member of the country of asylum class if they have been determined by an officer to be in need of resettlement because
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147 Appartient à la catégorie de personnes de pays d’accueil l’étranger considéré par un agent comme ayant besoin de se réinstaller en raison des circonstances suivantes :
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(a) they are outside all of their countries of nationality and habitual residence; and
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a) il se trouve hors de tout pays dont il a la nationalité ou dans lequel il avait sa résidence habituelle;
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(b) they have been, and continue to be, seriously and personally affected by civil war, armed conflict or massive violation of human rights in each of those countries.
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b) une guerre civile, un conflit armé ou une violation massive des droits de la personne dans chacun des pays en cause ont eu et continuent d’avoir des conséquences graves et personnelles pour lui.
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[18] The relevant provisions are reproduced in the Appendix to these reasons.
V. Analysis
A. The Decision was procedurally unfair
[19] The Applicant submits their procedural fairness rights were breached, contending that though the Officer identified various concerns that were put to the Applicant in the interview, the Applicant was not, in reality, provided with an adequate opportunity to understand and respond to those issues. Applicant’s counsel also submits that the Officer relied on extrinsic country condition evidence that was not provided to the Applicant in the interview. I find these arguments to largely be without merit.
[20] However, I note that during the hearing of this matter, it emerged that prior to her interview with the Officer, as part of her Application the Applicant’s representatives had provided two versions of the Schedule 2: Refugees Outside of Canada form [Schedule 2]: an initial one dated October 21, 2021, and an updated version dated September 11, 2024. Both versions are included in the CTR provided to the Court and to the Applicant, as well as in the Applicant’s Record, but the issue of whether there was confusion in the Decision related to the multiple Schedule 2 forms was not raised by counsel for the Applicant and did not factor into their written submissions. Rather, it was counsel for the Respondent who realized that this had occurred, and who alerted the Court and the Applicant to this development during the hearing. This is to the credit of Respondent’s counsel, whom I commend for both comporting herself professionally and for acting in the finest tradition of an Officer of the Court.
[21] It is evident from a review of the record that the Officer was apparently unaware that an updated Schedule 2 had been submitted, and that during the Applicant’s interview their questioning of the Applicant was predicated on the information in the initial Schedule 2 form and the narrative that it contained, as opposed to the more detailed narrative in the updated September 11, 2024 Schedule 2 form that superseded it. This explains certain of the Officer’s otherwise puzzling and unreasonable findings, such as their assertion that the Applicant’s Schedule 2 form “is completely inconsistent with the declarations of the PA, further undermining her credibility”
– when the Applicant’s oral submissions were, in fact, consistent with the updated Schedule 2 narrative. As the Officer was likely not aware of this updated document, it seems that during the interview the Officer and the Applicant were often speaking at cross purposes, with neither realizing their factual disconnect.
[22] As the contents of the CTR are presumed to have been before the Officer (Togtokh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 581 at para 16; Ogbuchi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 764 at para 18), this circumstance presents a clear procedural fairness violation, and error on the part of the Officer, whose questioning of the Applicant was predicated on the earlier, much less detailed version of the Schedule 2 narrative. From this, it is clear that the Applicant was not made aware of the case against her, occasioning a breach of procedural fairness. Indeed, upon reviewing both Schedule 2 documents, it becomes evident that both she and the Officer were confused and obviously speaking at cross purposes, with neither realizing the other was proceeding with a factual understanding reflecting a different narrative. This Court has found that a tribunal’s own confusion with relation to evidence raises issues of both procedural fairness and reasonableness (Ratnasingam v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 274 at paras 42-44). In the words of Justice Pamel (as he then was) in that matter:
[43] It is on account of what can best be described as a misunderstanding between the Principal Applicant and the member that the RPD made a negative credibility finding. That credibility finding permeated the entire decision and thus was clearly determinative of the RPD’s decision.
[44] It is a reviewable error for the RPD to base a negative credibility finding on an inconsistency that did not in fact exist (Adomah v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 328 at para 8; Abed v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1160 at paras 11-12). The RPD’s misunderstanding of the evidence undermines the reasonableness of the RPD decision. The RPD’s confusion on this point also raises issues of procedural fairness (e.g., Yahaya v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1570).
[23] Though, in the hearing, the Respondent conceded the apparent error by the Officer, they nonetheless urged the Court to consider divergences in the narratives for the two Schedule 2 forms and draw a negative inference. They point out that the initial narrative essentially generally states that the Applicant fled Somalia due to civil war and unrest, while the second version is more detailed, outlining a precipitating incident in which Al-Shabab militants had confronted her and her sister because they were women operating a business. In response, Applicant’s counsel notes that there could be a number of reasons for divergences in the two documents, such as the Applicant correcting errors in the initial narrative, or providing more detail as to the events when told that doing so was helpful. However, Applicant’s counsel asserts that as the Officer never confronted the Applicant with the difference in the two narratives, and the Applicant never had the opportunity to provide any such explanation, an adverse inference should not be drawn. I agree. It is not for this Court to speculate or to leap to a negative conclusion in lieu of any explanation from the Applicant that can be assessed. It is unknowable what impact such an explanation might have and, in any event, clearly the Applicant could not even have been provided with the opportunity to make such an explanation, given that neither party had realized the factual understanding of the other rested on a different Schedule 2 narrative.
[24] Secondly, the Respondent suggested that perhaps no procedural fairness violation should be found since at least the Applicant was questioned and had the opportunity to answer the concerns raised by the Officer, even if neither of them realized that the Officer’s questions pertained to an understanding of the facts borne out of the initial Schedule 2 narrative. On this, I cannot agree. This circumstance rather occasioned obvious confusion for both parties, leading to improper findings of contradictions stemming from the Applicant’s testimony and an inability for the Applicant to comprehend, much less properly address some of these concerns. For example, the GCMS notes recording the questioning in the interview includes the following exchange (which has been reformatted to identify that the Officer’s questions are those in all capitals):
OFFICER: DETAILS OF ARRIVAL TO COUNTRY OF ASYLUM?
Applicant: It took 12 days from my home to Uganda.
OFFICER: ON YOUR APPLICATION, IT SAYS IT TOOK YOU 4 MONTHS?
Applicant: This is a mistake on my form.
OFFICER: ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY OTHER MISTAKES ON YOUR FORM?
Applicant: No
[25] Here the Officer is referencing the travel time noted in the initial Schedule 2 form, but the Applicant’s answer is consistent with the timing set out in the second Schedule 2 form. When the Applicant responds that the four-month time was a mistake on the form, she evidently does so believing that the form was corrected, which it was in the updated Schedule 2 form. The Officer then asks if she is aware of any other mistakes in the form, while themselves not knowing about any such corrections or amendments in the updated form. The Officer and the Applicant are speaking at cross purposes, with both unknowingly talking about different forms. This is just one example of the confusion that ensued, in light of which I cannot find that any procedural unfairness should be considered remedied merely because of the questioning – which throughout lacked a common factual understanding – in the interview.
[26] In short, despite the excellent submissions by Respondent’s counsel, it cannot be said that the Applicant knew the case to meet and had a full and fair chance to respond in the face of these circumstances. Nor do I find that the procedure followed leading to the Decision was fair, having regard to all the circumstances. Significantly, this Court has acknowledged that overseas refugee applications warrant “heightened procedural fairness protections compared to other visa applications”
(Ininahazwe v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1732 at para 10 citing Iqbal v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 622 at paras 23–25; Darwisheh v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 98 at para 15, citing Ha v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FCA 49 at para 61).
[27] I find the Decision to be procedurally unfair.
[28] Given this finding, it is unnecessary for me to address the remainder of the Applicant’s arguments as to the issue of the reasonableness of the Decision.
VI. Conclusion
[29] This application for judicial review is granted. The matter is returned for redetermination by a different IRCC Officer.
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