Docket: IMM-21135-24
Citation: 2026 FC 321
Ottawa, Ontario, March 10, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Zinn
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BETWEEN: |
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JUAN LUIS PAIZ PICADO |
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Applicant |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1] The Applicant unsuccessfully sought protection in Canada under section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27) [the Act] due to his fear of the Nicaraguan government because of his anti-government political opinion. The Refugee Protection Division [RPD] rejected the Applicant’s claim, finding that he did not establish that he is perceived as an anti-government dissident and that he was targeted because of that perception [the Decision]:
The panel finds that the claimant does not hold an actual anti-government political opinion and does not face a forward-looking risk of persecution in Nicaragua because of his actual political opinion.
[2] The Applicant submits that the Decision must be set aside because:
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The RPD violated the Applicant’s right to a fair hearing by failing to put the Applicant on notice that “forward-facing risk”
is an issue in the claim; and
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Alternatively, that the RPD’s finding that the Applicant has not established that he would be perceived as someone holding an anti-government political opinion and thus does not face a risk of persecution, is unreasonable.
[3] I am not persuaded of either submission; the application will be dismissed.
[4] I accept the Applicant’s submission that the first issue must be assessed on the standard akin to correctness: Ambroise v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 62. The second on reasonableness.
[5] The Applicant begins his submission on the alleged breach of procedural fairness by pointing to the opening statement of the Member: “My view is that the hearing should focus on the issue of credibility, subjective fear, and failure to claim in a safe country.”
Counsel then, prior to his submissions to the RPD, confirmed that the same issues raised at the beginning of the hearing were still relevant issues in the claim.
[6] Counsel submits that “by stating and then confirming the issues in the claim as he did, the Member indicated to counsel that if the claimant is believed (i.e. is credible), his subjective fear of returning to Nicaragua is established, and there is a reasonable explanation for why he did not claim in the USA that does not undermine his subjective fear, then the Member accepts that the claim has been made out.”
[7] The Applicant relies on my decision in Okwagbe v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 792 [Okwagbe] , at para 7 where I wrote: “[w]hen the applicant has not made submissions on an issue because the tribunal directly indicates that no such submissions are required, or where the tribunal indirectly indicates that no such submissions are required, then the applicant is denied natural justice if the tribunal makes its ruling based on that issue.”
[8] With respect, Okwagbe is distinguishable from the case at bar. In Okwagbe, the Member explicitly stated that the delay in claiming protection is “the only thing I have to get past [emphasis added].”
However, the Member’s decision rested only on the finding that the applicant had an internal flight alternative; an issue never identified to be at issue.
[9] In the case at bar, the Member included as issues to be addressed, the Applicant’s subjective fear.
[10] At least since the decision of the Supreme Court in Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, it has been accepted that the test for establishing a fear of persecution is bi-partite in nature. Refugee claimants must establish both that they have a subjective fear of persecution if they return to their home country and that their fear is well-founded in an objective sense.
[11] The Member, in the Decision under review, found that the Applicant “does not hold an actual anti-government political opinion and does not face a forward-looking risk of persecution in Nicaragua because of his actual political opinion.”
[12] I accept that the Member does not state that the Applicant does not have the alleged subjective fear of returning that he claims, nor does the Member state that he has that subjective fear. However, it is clear from the reasons that the Member did find that the Applicant has failed to establish the subjective fear in addition to failing to establish it is well-founded. The Applicant had no subjective fear because he does not hold any opinions that would attract the possibility of persecution.
[13] The alternative raised is that the finding that the Applicant would not be perceived as someone holding an anti-government political opinion and thus does not face a risk of persecution, is unreasonable.
[14] Again, with respect, the Member addressed and reviewed all of the evidence offered by the Applicant before concluding: “While the panel accepts that the claimant was questioned and intimidated between April and June of 2018, the panel finds that he has failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he was ultimately perceived as an anti-government dissident and that he was targeted between July 2018 and October 2022 because of that perception.”
[15] While one might have concluded otherwise, as the Applicant urges, he has failed to point to any error of the Member that does not ultimately rest on his view that the Member failed to properly weigh the evidence. That is not a matter for this Court.
[16] For these reasons, the application must be dismissed. No question was proposed for certification.
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