Date: 20260309

Docket: IMM-16210-24

Citation: 2026 FC 316

[ENGLISH TRANSLATION]

Ottawa, Ontario, March 9, 2026

PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Ngo

BETWEEN:

ZUHURA NDIKUMANA JEAN LUC ISHIMWE SANDRINE NZEYIMANA ISMAIL HABONIMANA (by their litigation guardian Assiya Kwizera)

Applicants

and

THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

I. Background

[1] The applicants, Zuhura Ndikumana, Sandrine Nzeyimana, Ismail Habonimana and Jean‑Luc Ishimwe [collectively, the Applicants], are seeking judicial review of a July 8, 2024 decision by an officer of the High Commission of Canada in Nairobi, Kenya [High Commission] refusing their application for permanent residence as members of a protected person’s family. In the decision under review, the officer found that the Applicants were excluded from the definition of “dependent child” under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR] because they failed to demonstrate that there was a genuine parent–child relationship between the Applicants and their adoptive mother, Assiya Kwizera [Ms. Kwizera] [Decision].

[2] For the following reasons, the application for judicial review must be dismissed. The Applicants failed to show that the Decision was unreasonable or that there had been a breach of procedural fairness. The criteria in the IRPR are clear. The failure to establish the existence of a genuine parent–child relationship under paragraph 4(2)(b) was sufficient to refuse the application for permanent residence even though the legality of the adoptions had been demonstrated under paragraph 4(2)(a) of the IRPR.

II. Relevant facts and Decision under review

[3] The Applicants are citizens of Burundi living in the Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC]. Sandrine Nzeyimana and Jean-Luc Ishimwe are over 22 years of age, Ismail Habonimana is 20, and Zuhura Ndikumana is a minor. In 2014 and 2015, Ms. Kwizera and her spouse adopted the Applicants, who are the children of Ms. Kwizera’s deceased uncles and aunts.

[4] Ms. Kwizera arrived in Canada with her spouse in June 2019. She was granted protected person status in June 2022. On July 28, 2022, the Applicants made an application for permanent residence as Ms. Kwizera’s adopted children under subsection 176(1) of the IRPR. In January 2024, Ms. Kwizera and her spouse got divorced. The Applicants’ application for permanent residence was therefore solely based on their alleged parent–child relationship with Ms. Kwizera.

[5] Each applicant made a separate application. However, their circumstances are similar and their files (as well as the evidence adduced to support their application for permanent residence) are related and were processed at the same time by the same officer. In support of their application, the Applicants initially submitted their respective birth certificates and proof of single status, the transcript of the disposition of the judgment relating to the full adoption of Sandrine Nzeyimana, Jean-Luc Ishimwe and Ismail Habonimana, two money transfers to Jean‑Luc Ishimwe and two to a friend with whom, according to Ms. Kwizera, the children live, totalling approximately US$2,100.

[6] On April 15, 2024, the High Commission sent each applicant a procedural fairness letter [PFL] stating that the officer was not satisfied that the Applicants were admissible under subsection 176(3) of the IRPR in light of subsection 4(2) of the IRPR. The officer was of the opinion that the Applicants did not meet the definition of “dependent child”. The officer raised concerns regarding the legality of the adoption and the existence of a genuine parent–child relationship between the Applicants and Ms. Kwizera, as their records contained little information explaining or showing that a genuine parent–child relationship had been created or establishing that Ms. Kwizera had been providing ongoing financial and emotional support, both before and after she arrived in Canada.

[7] The letter described the officer’s concerns, particularly the insufficiency of the evidence in the record. The PFL notified the Applicants that they had 60 days to submit additional information or documents to respond to the officer’s concerns.

[8] On May 8, 2024, Ms. Kwizera filed, in response to the PFL and on the Applicants’ behalf, documents testifying to the legality of the adoption: a letter from a lawyer in Burundi, the death certificates of the Applicants’ biological parents, a judgment of a DRC peace court granting her full guardianship of the children, Ms. Kwizera and her ex-spouse’s divorce certificate, and an affidavit explaining that the Applicants are her deceased uncles’ biological children. To establish their relationship, she also shared several pages of WhatsApp conversations between herself and Jean-Luc Ishimwe, as well as receipts for money transfers to him.

[9] On July 8, 2024, the High Commission refused the Applicants’ application for permanent residence. Each applicant received the same refusal letter justifying the refusal of the application. The Global Case Management System [GCMS] notes, which are part of the reasons for the Decision, relate the officer’s analysis of the two adoption criteria: its legality and the existence of a relationship.

[10] Regarding the legality of the adoption, the officer’s notes describe a lawyer’s explanation of the legal process for adoptions in Burundi, detailing the consent process undergone by Ms. Kwizera. However, the officer expressed concerns with respect to the irregularities in the other documents that Ms. Kwizera provided to substantiate the adoption process. The officer gave them little weight.

[11] On the subject of the relationship, the officer pointed out that Ms. Kwizera submitted a 24‑page transcript of WhatsApp messages between herself and Jean-Luc Ishimwe covering the March to July 2022 period. The officer emphasized that these messages were not translated and consisted mainly of missed calls and omitted media. The officer also mentioned the money transfers by Ms. Kwizera. The officer concluded that the information on record and the response to the PFL did not allay the concerns noted in the PFL.

[12] The officer also analyzed humanitarian and compassionate considerations and the best interests of the children, but reiterated that there was little information on record to support the existence of a parent–child relationship between each applicant and Ms. Kwizera and therefore justify an exemption under subsection 25(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].

[13] That Decision is the subject of this judicial review.

III. Issue

[14] The issues are whether the Decision is reasonable and procedurally fair.

[15] The Court must review the merits of the Decision on the reasonableness standard (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 at paras 10, 16–17, 25 [Vavilov]). I agree with the parties that the reasonableness standard applies to the reasons for the Decision.

[16] On judicial review, the Court must perform an analysis and determine whether a decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness—justification, transparency and intelligibility (Vavilov at para 99). A reasonable decision in a given situation will always depend on the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision under review (Vavilov at para 90). A decision may be found unreasonable if the administrative decision-maker misapprehended the evidence in the record (Vavilov at paras 125–126). The burden is on the party challenging the decision to show that it is unreasonable (Vavilov at para 100).

[17] Procedural fairness allegations are assessed on a basis that resembles the standard of correctness. The question for the Court is whether the procedure was fair having regard to all the circumstances (Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at paras 54–56; Lipskaia v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 267 at para 14). The ultimate question remains whether the applicant knew the case to meet and had a full and fair chance to meet it. The duty to act fairly has two components: (1) the right to a fair and impartial hearing before an independent panel; and (2) the right to be heard (Fortier v Canada (Attorney General), 2022 FC 374 at para 14; Therrien (Re), 2001 SCC 35 at para 82). Everyone has the right to a full and fair opportunity to present their case (Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at para 28).

[18] The nature and extent of this duty are eminently variable. As a result, whether a decision is procedurally fair must be determined on a case-by-case basis (Baron v Canada (Attorney General), 2023 FC 1177 at paras 22–24).

IV. Analysis

A. Relevant statutory framework

[19] Section 2 of the IRPR lists the individuals who are considered family members for the purposes of family reunification:

[20] Section 2 must be read together with subsection 4(2) of the IRPR, which limits who can be considered an adopted child:

[Emphasis added.]

[21] Subsection 4(2) of the IRPR provides for two specific elements for a foreign national to be considered an adopted child. In the French version, the elements are preceded by “selon le cas”. This means that to exclude an applicant, it is sufficient for a decision-maker to conclude that one or the other of these elements is present. Since the English version includes the term “or” [“selon le cas” in the French version of the provision], the word “disjunctive” is used in the case law to describe this principle.

[22] The effect of subsection 4(2) is clear. Because an officer can justify a refusal on the basis of either of these two elements, namely, paragraph 4(2)(a) or paragraph 4(2)(b), to avoid exclusion under subsection 4(2) of the IRPR, an applicant must therefore demonstrate both that the adoption was not entered into primarily for immigration purposes and that the adoption created a genuine parent–child relationship between the adoptee and the adopter.

[23] The practical consequence is that it is not enough to establish only the existence or legality of the adoption. An applicant must also demonstrate the quality of the relationship that followed the adoption. The IRPR requires confirmation not only that the adoption occurred (that is, that it was legal), but also that it created a genuine parent–child relationship between the adoptee and the adopter.

[24] For the purposes of subsection 4(2) of the IRPR, the decision‑maker must conduct a qualitative assessment of the relationship the adoption created by taking into account the relevant factors.

B. Factors to consider in assessing the creation of a genuine relationship

[25] The parties invited me to consider Ekhator v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1303 [Ekhator] as a useful guide for decision-makers in carrying out their analysis of the creation of a genuine parent–child relationship, namely, the factors to consider under paragraph 4(2)(b) of the IRPR.

[26] However, this Court has rarely had to assess the quality of a parent–child relationship for the purposes of paragraph 4(2)(b) of the IRPR. Furthermore, in Ekhator, the Court had to review the creation of a genuine parent–child relationship within the meaning of paragraph 5.1(2)(a) of the Citizenship Act, RSC 1985, c C‑29 [Citizenship Act].

[27] Before the hearing, I sent a Direction to the parties to elaborate on the factors in Ekhator within the context of the IRPR.

[28] The Applicants argue that the principles from Ekhator can be transposed to adoptions under the scheme of the IRPR on the basis of the “in pari materia” rule of interpretation, which holds that statutes on the same subject must be construed together as one (relying on R v Myette (BJ), 1993 CanLII 8842 (SK KB) at para 7; Soper v Canada (CA), 1997 CanLII 6352 (FCA) at 148–149; Ali v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 182 at paras 43–44, other citations omitted). The Applicants contend that paragraph 5.1(2)(a) of the Citizenship Act and paragraph 4(2)(b) of the IRPR are clearly in pari materia because they deal with the [translation] “same thing” (the assessment of the genuineness of an adoption) and concern the [translation] “same type of thing” (the creation of a genuine parent–child relationship for the purposes of immigration or citizenship).

[29] The respondent is not challenging the Applicants’ position. He also submits that the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada’s Immigration Appeal Division [IAD] has applied the Ekhator factors to appeals from sponsorship applications regarding adopted children within the context of the IRPR because these factors are “helpful in assessing whether a genuine parent–child relationship was created by an adoption” (relying on Ladeji v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 CanLII 54103 (CA IRB) at paras 1, 7, 32–33, 49–50 [Ladeji]; Fernando v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 CanLII 138602 (CA IRB) at paras 7–10, 51 [Fernando]).

[30] In Ekhator, Justice Go ruled on whether an adoption created a genuine parent–child relationship within the meaning of paragraph 5.1(2)(a) of the Citizenship Act. She confirmed that there is little case law addressing this definition and then summarized the case law (Ekhator at paras 19–25, citing Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Young, 2016 FCA 183 [Young]; Alvarado Dubkov v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 679 [Dubkov]; Rai v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 77 at para 21 [Rai]; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Dufour, 2014 FCA 81). She found that most of the case law described what is not a genuine parent–child relationship. Justice Go also noted that in most of these cases, the analysis appeared to be focused on whether the adoption was “‘not entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring a status or privilege in relation to immigration or citizenship’”, rather than on whether there was a genuine relationship (Ekhator at paras 17–18).

[31] After summarizing the case law and the various factors listed therein for assessing the creation of a genuine parent–child relationship, Justice Go concluded that an assessment of the nature of the adoption in the context of the Citizenship Act should explore the following questions:

a. whether there is a commitment on the adoptive parent to raise the child as their own and to meet the child’s material and emotional needs as they arise;

b. whether an adoptive parent not only legally, but practically, has taken on the role of parents in the applicant’s life; and

c. whether the assertion of an adoptive relationship is reflected in the reality.

[Ekhator at para 26.]

C. Case law on the analysis of parent–child relationships under the IRPR

[32] There is a similar legal void in this case and in the context of the IRPR. The recent case law on subsection 4(2) of the IRPR relates to whether the decision-maker was satisfied that the adoption was not entered into for the purposes of immigrating or acquiring a status or privilege under the IRPA, in application of paragraph 4(2)(a) of the IRPR (see, for example, Habte v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 8). This factor concerns the legality of an adoption. Recent decisions mentioning paragraph 4(2)(b) do not address the specific issue before the Court in the present matter.

[33] For example, in Nyembo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1336, the officer justified the refusal by writing that “[n]othing in the documents submitted demonstrated an emotional or financial interdependence”. However, in the decision under review, the officer had not mentioned or considered the evidence on record that bore out emotional and financial interdependence. Consequently, the Court found that the decision was not reasonable, as the evidence on record contradicted the decision-maker’s finding.

[34] Although the decision under review in Tiben v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 965, mentioned the financial support between a parent and their adopted child, the main issue was whether the adoption had been entered into to acquire a status or privilege under the IRPA, in application of paragraph 4(2)(a) of the IRPR. Bizimana v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 288, was determined on the issue of procedural fairness. Although the initial refusal in Yebyo v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1212 [Yebyo] was justified by the insufficiency of evidence in relation to the genuineness of the adoption and the existence of a parent–child relationship, the Court did not discuss these topics. Rather, Justice Manson focused on the fact that the decision‑maker’s reasons lacked intelligibility (Yebyo at para 35, citing Lee v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 814 at paras 13–15).

[35] Although the Court has previously reviewed the existence of parent–child relationships under the regulation applicable to the sponsorship of adopted children, case law on this issue is extremely rare. Indeed, the latest decision specifically ruling on a decision‑maker’s analysis in this regard is Singh Rangi v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 548, rendered by Justice Mactavish in 2013. However, that decision addressed the factual analysis carried out by the decision-maker, who had raised serious concerns regarding the existence of a genuine relationship.

[36] I also note that this Court has, in the past, considered the case law in this respect centering on the IRPR and on the IRPA and the Citizenship Act, and vice versa, to inform its analysis of the definition of “genuine parent–child relationship”.

[37] For example, in Dubkov, Justice St-Louis, as she then was, analyzed whether there was a genuine parent–child relationship under the Citizenship Act. In doing so, she relied on Buenavista v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC 609 [Buenavista], which applied the IRPR, to examine the factors included therein. She noted that these factors do not constitute a checklist to work through (Dubkov at paras 9, 26).

[38] Similarly, in Martinez Garcia Rubio v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 272, which involved a decision on a sponsorship for the purposes of citizenship, Justice Simpson also cited Buenavista. In finding that the decision under review was unreasonable, she ordered that the new decision-maker consider the factors described at paragraph 8 of Buenavista.

[39] Hurd v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCT 719 [Hurd] is a judicial review of the refusal of a sponsorship application regarding the applicant’s adopted daughters. Justice Lemieux took into account the IAD’s reasons in Guzman v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1995 CanLII 19408 (CA IRB), 33 Imm LR (2d) 28 [Guzman]. He also considered decisions ruling on the issue of relationships within the context of the Citizenship Act. Justice Lemieux then listed the following non‑exhaustive factors for assessing whether there is a parent–child relationship under the Immigration Regulations, 1978 – Amendment, SOR/93-44 (which was replaced by the IRPR in 2002):

(a) motivation of the adopting parents;

(b) to a lesser extent the motivation and conditions of the natural parents;

(c) authority and suasion of the adopting parent(s) over the adopted child;

(d) supplanting the authority of the natural parent(s) after adoption;

(e) relationship of the adopted child with the natural parent(s) after adoption;

(f) treatment of the adopted child versus the natural children by the adopting parent(s);

(g) relationship between the adopted child with the natural parent(s) before the adoption;

(h) changes flowing from the new status of the adopted child such as records, entitlements, etc. and including documentary acknowledgment that the child is the son or daughter of the adoptive parent(s); and

(i) arrangements and actions taken by the adoptive parent(s) as they relate to caring, providing and planning for the adopted child.

[Hurd at para 5.]

[40] Summarizing the applicable case law and the repeated application of these factors, Justice Lemieux stated that “I agree with other judges of this Court these factors may, depending upon the facts of a particular case, be relevant in making the assessment, recognizing that other factors, not on the list, may also be relevant depending upon the situation at hand” (Hurd at para 41).

[41] Although Hurd and Guzman deal with relationships in the context of sponsorship for the purposes of permanent residence rather than citizenship, the Court relied on these decisions in Dufour v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 340 at paragraph 43 (affirmed on appeal, 2014 FCA 81) as analogies with respect to the applicable and relevant factors for determining whether an adoption was primarily entered into for the purposes of acquiring a citizenship‑related status or privilege. Moreover, the IAD decisions the respondent identified (Ladeji at para 33; Fernando at paras 9-10) cite Dubkov and Rai as well as the Federal Court of Appeal in Young, decisions which were rendered in the context of the Citizenship Act.

[42] In considering the mutual influence and sharing of standards and case law as regards the analysis of parent–child relationships in decisions dealing with the Citizenship Act and the IRPR (or sponsorship applications), it can be observed that the factors to consider have been very consistent, regardless of the applicable statutory scheme.

[43] The case law has consistently held that the goal of the analysis is for the officer to examine the relationships created following an adoption. This is a mandatory step for determining whether there is a genuine parent–child relationship for the purposes of the IRPR. Although the factors or questions discussed in the case law are worded differently, they result in an assessable standard for determining whether the facts laid out in a sponsorship application support the existence of such a relationship. There is no stringent rule or a set of criteria to work through, such as a checklist.

[44] The case law reveals that this analysis is a factual exercise that must be conducted on a case‑by-case basis, and that the burden of establishing the quality of this relationship is on the applicant. The decision-maker can take several factors into account, such as those described above, but the factors set out in the case law are not exhaustive. A decision‑maker must apply, depending on the facts of each case, the factors that he or she considers relevant to assess the relationship holistically and determine whether an applicant has met the requirements of paragraph 4(2)(b) of the IRPR. The case law also teaches that the present as much as the future state of a relationship created by the adoption can serve as a reference (Hurd at paras 31–32, citing Kwan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 971; Perera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 1047).

[45] Considering the parties’ statements and the case law cited, I agree that the questions set out in Ekhator can apply to an analysis of the nature of a parent–child relationship following an adoption for the purposes of the IRPR, namely, in determining whether an adoption created a genuine parent–child relationship between the adoptee and the adopter within the meaning of paragraph 4(2)(b) of the IRPR. In Ekhator, these questions provide a general and sufficiently broad summary of the factors a decision-maker can examine in carrying out the complex but necessary analysis of the nature of a parent–child relationship.

[46] Nevertheless, the decision-maker must still follow the teachings of Vavilov and Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21, and the decision must bear the hallmarks of reasonableness. Most importantly, the decision-maker must identify the factors considered and address the evidence on record and the submissions received.

(1) Analysis

[47] The Applicants claim that the Decision breached procedural fairness because the notes clearly illustrate that the officer had doubts as to the authenticity of the documents adduced attesting to the adoption. In spite of this, the officer did not give them the opportunity to respond to these concerns.

[48] Second, the Applicants explain that the evidence submitted was sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine relationship between Ms. Kwizera and the Applicants. According to the Applicants, the money transfers and the copy of the WhatsApp conversation are a testament to both financial and emotional support. The officer should have taken into account the circumstances of Ms. Kwizera, who had been trying to meet her children’s needs from far away despite her precarious situation.

[49] In contrast, the respondent submits that the Decision was reasonable and procedurally fair. The respondent explains that the comments of the officer, questioning the authenticity of the documents presented in support of the adoption, are not determinative. The refusal of the application was not based on the adoption’s legality. Therefore, these remarks had no impact on the Decision. Even if the Applicants had had the opportunity to respond to them, the outcome of the matter would not have been affected.

[50] As for the merits of the Decision, the respondent argues that the Applicants raised no reviewable error. Rather, their arguments sought to rework the evidence. The decision-maker reasonably found that the evidence on record was scant and did not support the existence of a relationship. Ms. Kwizera’s money transfers were not sufficiently substantial or consistent to constitute financial support, and the WhatsApp messages do not substantiate the alleged emotional support.

[51] Moreover, the respondent submits that the IRPR criteria require an applicant to show both that the adoption was legal and that a parent–child relationship was created between the adoptee and adopter. The Applicants’ argument disregards the requirement and importance of satisfying the two criteria at subsection 4(2) of the IRPR. A person may have been a party to a legal adoption but be unable to establish the existence of a genuine parent–child relationship. The Applicants’ failure to meet the second criterion in this case is fatal.

[52] I agree with the respondent’s arguments.

[53] At the hearing, the Applicants focused on the GCMS notes assessing the legality of their adoption. They contend that the officer should have provided reasons for the refusal on the basis of the two criteria in subsection 4(2) of the IRPR and that the officer’s response was therefore insufficient. The Applicants challenge the officer’s notes raising concerns about the authenticity of the documents adduced in support of the Applicants’ adoption. The officer had not disclosed these suspicions or given Ms. Kwizera the opportunity to respond to them, which led to a breach of procedural fairness. In addition, the officer erred in giving little weight to the official documents, which must be presumed authentic unless evidence is produced to prove otherwise (citing Rasheed v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 587 at paras 19‍‍–‍20).

[54] Having reviewed the GCMS notes within the context of the record as a whole, I cannot find that the officer’s analysis respecting the genuineness of the adoptions resulted in a breach of procedural fairness.

[55] From the outset, it should be noted that two concerns were identified in the PFL, one of which was the legality of the adoptions. The GCMS notes therefore answer one of the questions asked in the PFL, which Ms. Kwizera addressed through her second submission. As a result, it is reasonable to expect there to be notes and an analysis in this regard in the record.

[56] I understand the Applicants’ argument with respect to the officer’s findings on the [translation] “minimal weight” of the legal documents. If the officer doubted whether the documents were authentic, it would have been preferable for the officer to be clearer in this respect. However, even if I were to accept that the Applicants were right to challenge the [translation] “minimal weight” assigned to the adoption documents, the analysis of these documents did not result in a rejection of the documents or in a finding that the adoptions were not genuine. There was therefore no breach of procedural fairness in this case.

[57] The officer had to assess the adoptions from a legal standpoint as well as from a practical standpoint in terms of the relationships they created. Beyond the legality of the adoptions, the Applicants had to demonstrate that, from a practical perspective, Ms. Kwizera had acted as a parent (and how she had done so), among other things. On the basis of the refusal letter, it is obvious that the officer relied on paragraph 4(2)(b) to justify the refusal of the application. According to the clear wording of the IRPR, the officer can justify a refusal based on the elements in either paragraph 4(2)(a) or paragraph 4(2)(b) of the IRPR.

[58] Considering the record before the Court, I find that the legality of the adoptions was not at the root of the refusal. Therefore, I reject the Applicants’ argument challenging the analysis of the adoption documents.

[59] As for the analysis of the relationships, the Applicants point to the first element from Ekhator, which concerns the significance of the “commitment on the adoptive parent to raise the child as their own and to meet the child’s material and emotional needs as they arise”. They allege that they were able to satisfy this element.

[60] I cannot agree with the Applicants’ arguments in this case. Their submissions regarding the officer’s analysis boil down to a disagreement with the officer’s findings.

[61] The officer considered the facts after the adoption took place and, in particular, looked at the interactions between the Applicants and Ms. Kwizera both before and after she arrived in Canada. This is a reasonable analytical framework.

[62] At the hearing, the Applicants conceded that Ms. Kwizera [translation] “did not submit many documents”, that the documents provided are not [translation] “consequential enough” and [translation] “are scant”.

[63] I cannot consider the statements the Applicants made at the hearing, namely, that Ms. Kwizera had sent only the few documents she had in her possession and that there were issues surrounding the money transfers. These new statements, and the argument concerning Ms. Kwizera and the Applicants’ separation, were made in neither the sponsorship application nor the response to the PFL. The record contained no evidence providing context for these transfers and messages. The Applicants identified no evidence to the contrary.

[64] On judicial review, it is inappropriate to consider arguments or facts that were not raised before the administrative decision-maker (Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers’ Association, 2011 SCC 61 at paras 22–24; Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada v Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2012 FCA 22 at paras 15, 18–20).

[65] The documents before the officer included money transfer documents and copies of WhatsApp messages. In responding to the PFL, Ms. Kwizera then described in an affidavit their [translation] “emotional bond sustained using my son Jean-Luc Ishimwe’s telephones” and [translation] “the receipts testifying to financial support I send my son Jean-Luc Ishimwe”. She explained that she was first sending the money to a friend because the children were living with him. This information is repeated under the headings [translation] “evidence of financial support” and [translation] “evidence of communication” in a handwritten note dated July 28, 2022.

[66] The officer’s reasons speak to these assertions. The Applicants have not raised any errors that would justify the Court’s intervention.

[67] The record confirms that the WhatsApp document certainly contains short messages between Ms. Kwizera and Jean-Luc Ishimwe, but the officer rightly noted that the document also contains a history of missed calls and omitted media.

[68] Because the messages were not translated, and in the absence of other evidence, there was nothing to explain the nature of the communications. In particular, there was no evidence of recent contact between Ms. Kwizera and the adopted children. The messages submitted are from a five‑month period in 2022 that occurred two years prior to the response to the PFL.

[69] It was therefore open to the officer to conclude that the copies of the WhatsApp messages did not corroborate the statement that Ms. Kwizera [translation] “communicates regularly” with her children and did not support a [translation] “sustained emotional bond” as she suggested. The officer’s finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that a parent–child relationship developed or to establish ongoing emotional support for each applicant is entirely reasonable in these circumstances.

[70] Furthermore, the copies of receipts of money transfers by Ms. Kwizera cover a period of approximately three years and total about US$2,100 for all four Applicants (or US$175 per year for each child). No information was submitted to contextualize the amounts provided. As the respondent observed, there was no consistent [translation] “schedule” to the support, which contradicts Ms. Kwizera’s statements that she [translation] “sends money regularly”.

[71] As a result, it was open to the officer to conclude that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate ongoing financial support both before and after Ms. Kwizera arrived in Canada. It follows that the officer’s conclusion in this regard was not unreasonable.

[72] The Applicants had to produce sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine family relationship. In this case, they suggested that there had been sustained emotional and financial support. The record did not support this assertion. As the Applicants did not present sufficient evidence, they failed to show that they met the requirements of the IRPR.

[73] Agreeing with the Applicants’ emphasis on paragraph 4(2)(a) of the IRPR, that is, the legality of the adoption, without addressing paragraph 4(2)(b) and their failure to meet this second criterion would strip subsection 4(2) of all meaning and deviate from Parliament’s intention. If I were to accept the Applicants’ argument as regards the first criterion of the legality of the adoptions and recognize that a legal adoption on its own is sufficient, there would be no difference between paragraph 4(2)(a) and paragraph 4(2)(b). However, in interpreting the IRPR, I must be mindful to “avoid adopting an interpretation that would render any portion of a statute meaningless, pointless or redundant” (Heffel Gallery Limited v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FC 605 at para 23, citing Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed (Markham, Ontario: LexisNexis Canada, 2014) at 211).

[74] Although I understand the serious consequence of the refusal of their sponsorship application, the clear wording of subsection 4(2) of the IRPR cannot be ignored. Both criteria therein are important.

[75] In this case, the Applicants have not satisfied the criterion in paragraph 4(2)(b) of the IRPR, which is sufficient to refuse their application for permanent residence. The Decision is reasonable because it is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision-maker (Vavilov at para 85).

[76] Lastly, there was no breach of procedural fairness in the decision‑making process. The shortcomings with respect to the sufficiency of the evidence on record were identified from the outset in the PFL. Ms. Kwizera had the opportunity to respond to the officer’s concerns.

V. Conclusion

[77] The Applicants have raised no error justifying the Court’s intervention, and no breach of procedural fairness has been demonstrated. The application for judicial review must therefore be dismissed.

[78] The parties confirmed that there is no question to certify, and I agree that none arises in this matter.

JUDGMENT in IMM-16210-24

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is as follows:

1. The application for judicial review is dismissed.

2. There is no question for certification.

“Phuong T.V. Ngo”

 

 

Certified true translation

Vera Roy, Senior Jurilinguist

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:		IMM-16210-24
STYLE OF CAUSE:		ZUHURA NDIKUMANA, ET AL v THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING:	OTTAWA, ONTARIO
DATE OF HEARING:	DECEMBER 1, 2025
JUDGMENT AND REASONS:	NGO J
DATED:	MARCH 9, 2026

APPEARANCES:

Me A. Michel M. J. Essou	FOR THE APPLICANTS
Me Alex Dalcourt	FOR THE RESPONDENT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Me A. Michel M. J. Essou Ottawa, Ontario	FOR THE APPLICANTS
Attorney General of Canada Ottawa, Ontario	FOR THE RESPONDENT