Date: 20260204

Docket: IMM-23095-24

Citation: 2026 FC 157

Ottawa, Ontario, February 4, 2026

PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Blackhawk

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

I. Overview

[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision of a senior officer of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration (“Officer”) dated September 6, 2024, who conducted a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (“PRRA”) wherein it was determined that the Applicant was not a person in need of protection, pursuant to Sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act SC 2001, c 27 (“IRPA”) (“the Decision”).

[2] The Applicant argues that the Officer failure to consider new evidence filed in support of his PRRA is a breach of procedural fairness and/or natural justice and was unreasonable. I will note that Counsel for the Applicant did not appear at the hearing of this matter; accordingly, I have relied on previously filed argument set out in the Applicant’s record.

[3] The Respondent argues that the Decision was not made in breach of the duty of procedural fairness and was reasonable. The Respondent argues that the Officer considered the totality of the evidence and reasonably concluded that the Applicant was not a person in need of protection pursuant to Sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA.

[4] For the reasons that follow, this application is dismissed.

II. Background

[5] The Applicant is a citizen of Ghana.

[6] The Applicant submits that some “Kinsmen (the Applicant’s paternal uncles) and Chiefs” are “after him” because of a land dispute. The land in question was inherited by the Applicant upon the passing of his paternal grandfather on March 5, 2013.

[7] By January 2014, the Applicant had sold some of the plots of land to two different purchasers. To sell additional lands, a survey was required. The Applicant claimed to have been beaten by unknown persons sent by his Kinsmen to prevent the necessary land survey.

[8] Following a meeting with his Kinsmen on June 30, 2014, the Applicant promised not to sell additional lands.

[9] The Applicant was in Canada from November 2015 to August 2017.

[10] On August 20, 2017, the Applicant and a friend met at a lawyer’s office to sign documents to sell 4 additional plots of the land to two different purchasers. Following the meeting, two of the Applicant’s uncles and other unknown persons approached and attacked the Applicant and his friend, claiming they knew he was trying to sell more of their land. The Applicant’s friend also received a threatening phone call from one of the uncles.

[11] Following this encounter, the Applicant did not return home; he went into hiding and planned for his wife and children to stay with friends. The Applicant and a friend stayed at Coast Cape until he could leave Ghana. His uncle came to the hotel where they were staying, looking for the Applicant with police on September 17, 2017. The Applicant left for Canada that same day.

[12] The Applicant claims that the police have not been of assistance, because they do not like to get involved with matters involving the Chiefs, who have considerable influence within the community.

[13] The Applicant entered Canada on September 19, 2017, and made an immediate claim for Convention refugee status. The Refugee Protection Division (“RPD”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on April 3, 2019. The RPD found that the determinative issue in the Applicant’s claim was credibility.

[14] The Applicant appealed the RPD decision to the Refugee Appeal Division (“RAD”). On March 30, 2021, the RAD dismissed the Applicant’s appeal. The Applicant filed an application for leave and judicial review to challenge the RAD decision at the Federal Court, however, on September 22, 2021, leave was denied.

[15] The Applicant submitted a PRRA application on February 5, 2024. The PRAA application was rejected on September 6, 2024, which is the matter that is the subject of the within Application for judicial review.

[16] In support of his PRRA application, the Applicant submitted two new affidavits, from his wife Afua Afriyie sworn on February 14, 2024, and his brother-in-law, Kennedy Amankwah-Appiah sworn on February 15, 2024.

III. Issues and Standard of Review

[17] The standard of review applicable to the Decision in this case is reasonableness (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 (Vavilov) at paras 25, 86).

[18] Reasonableness review is a deferential standard and requires an evaluation of the administrative decision to determine if the decision is transparent, intelligible, and justified (Vavilov at paras 12–15, 95). The starting point for a reasonableness review is the reasons for decision. Pursuant to the Vavilov framework, a reasonable decision is “one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker” (Vavilov at para 85).

[19] To intervene on an application for judicial review, the Court must find an error in the decision that is central or significant to render the decision unreasonable (Vavilov at para 100).

[20] The sole issue in this application is: was the Officer’s decision reasonable?

IV. Analysis

[21] The Applicant submits that the two new affidavits he submitted in support of his PRRA application constituted new evidence of country condition and personal circumstances. He submits that the officer erred in his determination that the new evidence was not substantially different from the evidence presented to the Immigration and Refugee Board (“IRB”) in support of his claim for refugee protection. The Applicant argued that the failure of the Officer to consider this evidence was a denial of natural justice and procedural fairness; which the Applicant argues should be reviewed on the standard of correctness.

[22] The Respondent submits that the Officer applied the applicable law and jurisprudence in his consideration of the new evidence submitted by the Applicant in support of his PRRA application.

[23] As noted by the Federal Court of Appeal in Raza v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385 [“Raza”] at paras 13 – 15, Section 113(a) of the IRPA is rooted in the premise that RPD determinations of applications for refugee protection must be respected, unless there are new facts that may have impacted the outcome of the RPD hearing. In addition, I note that Section 113(a) of the IRPA clearly states that an application may only present “new evidence that arise after the rejection or was not reasonably available, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented at the time of the rejection”.

[24] Further, the Federal Court of Appeal in Raza summarised considerations for PRRA officers concerning the reception of new evidence. These include credibility; relevance; newness; materiality; and statutory conditions.

[25] The Applicant has not demonstrated how the Officer failed to properly consider the factors for reception of new evidence in support of a PRRA application nor how the Officer breached the duty of procedural fairness owed to the Applicant. On the contrary, a review of the decision illustrates that the Officer clearly turned their mind to this issue. The reasons for Decision state:

In view of the application for protection, paragraph 113(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act provides that persons whose claim to refugee protection has been rejected may only present new evidence that arose after the rejection, evidence that was not reasonably available or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented at the time of the rejection.

Additionally, according to Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulation 161(2), a person who makes written submissions must identify the evidence presented that meets the requirements of paragraph 113(a) of the Act and indicate how that evidence relates to them.

The Federal Court has stated in Raza that a PRRA application by a failed refugee claimant is not an appeal or reconsideration of the decision of the RPD to reject a claim for refugee protection. A negative refugee determination by the RPD must be respected by the PRRA officer, unless there is new evidence of facts that might have affected the outcome of the RPD hearing if the evidence had been presented to the RPD.

The applicant has presented statutory declarations from Kennedy Amankwah-Appiah dated 15 February 2024 and from Akua Afriyie dated 14 February 2024. Both explained that the applicant was involved in a property dispute with family members who were angered and still wish to harm the (sic) him if he returns to Ghana.

I do not find that these submissions provided by the applicant establish any facts that are substantially different from those that were presented to the IRB. Rather, I find that the applicant has reiterated facts which are materially consistent with those already argued before the IRB and not capable of overcoming its findings. Namely, those of credibility.

Overall, the applicant has provided insufficient objective evidence that would be indicative of new risk developments in either country conditions or personal circumstances which have arisen since the date of the IRB decision. As such, I am not persuaded to conclude differently from the decision of the IRB.

[26] I am not persuaded by the Applicant’s submission that this error must be reviewed on a standard of correctness. The Applicant did not provide any support for this proposition.

[27] In my view, the Officer clearly considered the relevant and applicable legal and statutory framework governing the admissibility of new evidence in support of a PRRA application. Accordingly, the decision is reasonable.

[28] In addition, the Respondent submitted that the Court ought to accord deference to the factual determinations made by the PRRA Officer. PRRA officers have specialised expertise in the assessment of risk, in the context of refugee applications, and accordingly, Courts ought to accord such findings considerable deference; Yousef v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 864, at para 19.

[29] I agree. Reviewing Courts ought not intervene, absent evidence that illustrates that the decision-maker fundamentally misapprehended or failed to account for the evidence before them; Vavilov, at paras 125 – 126.

[30] The Applicant has not pointed to specific errors of the Officer that illustrate a fundamental misapprehension or a failure to engage with the evidence that was before them in the context of the PRRA application. The Applicant has suggested that the Officer’s conclusions were based on speculation, conjecture and not based on the evidence; however, he has failed to set out what the specific errors were. In my view, the Applicant’s argument is premised on the admissibility of the new evidence and as noted above, the Officer’s decision concerning the new evidence was clearly rooted in the applicable law and is reasonable.

[31] Further, the Respondent submitted that in the context of a PRRA, an applicant must provide sufficient evidence to support their application; Traoré v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1647. Officers do not have an onus to establish that an applicant is not a person in need of protection.

[32] I agree. PRRA applicants have the burden to establish their claim, the onus is on them to demonstrate that they should be granted refugee status.

V. Conclusion

[33] Considering the foregoing, this Application for judicial review is dismissed.

[34] While the Applicant does not agree with the Decision, and in particular the Decision concerning new evidence submitted in support of his PRRA application, that does not make the Decision unreasonable. Nor did the Applicant demonstrate that the Officer breached the duty of procedural fairness. A review of the record illustrates that the Officer considered the applicable factual and legal frameworks and the conclusions reached are reasonable. The Decision is justified, transparent and intelligible and there is no reviewable error to justify this Court’s intervention.

[35] The parties did not pose a question for certification, and I agree that there are none.

JUDGMENT in IMM-23095-24

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. The application for judicial review is dismissed.

2. No question is certified.

"Julie Blackhawk"

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

APPEARANCES:

SOLICITORS OF RECORD: