Docket: IMM-4808-25
Citation: 2026 FC 129
Toronto, Ontario, January 28, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Justice Battista
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BETWEEN: |
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ZHENHAO SONG |
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Applicant |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY
AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] The Applicant challenges the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) to cease his refugee status after he made four trips back to China, the country in which he claimed to fear persecution.
[2] The RPD decision is reasonable except for the failure of the RPD to assess the Applicant’s subjective knowledge of the consequences of his actions. This assessment is described by the Federal Court of Appeal as a key factual consideration and its absence renders the decision unreasonable. For this reason, the application for judicial is granted.
II. Background
[3] The Applicant is a Chinese citizen who came to Canada in 2006 and made a refugee claim the following year. His claim was based on his practice of Christianity, which began secretly in China and continued in Canada. He was determined to be a Convention refugee in Canada in September of 2009.
[4] Shortly after becoming a Canadian permanent resident, he obtained a Chinese passport and made the following trips back to China:
a) July 4, 2014 – July 13, 2014
b) April 26, 2016 – July 7, 2016
c) August 23, 2016 – October 11, 2016
d) March 7, 2017 – March 20, 2017
[5] When these trips were discovered, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness applied to the RPD to cease the Applicant’s refugee status pursuant to section 108 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].
[6] On February 14, 2025, the RPD found that the test for cessation was met. In its reasons, the RPD questioned whether the Applicant’s refugee determination could be vacated based on the Applicant’s vague testimony and the possibility of an internal flight alternative. It then pointed out aspects of the Applicant’s testimony that undermined his credibility. The RPD ultimately decided that the required criteria for cessation, specifically voluntariness, intention and the presence of actual protection in China, were present.
III. Issues and Standard of Review
[7] The Applicant raises three challenges to the RPD decision, two of which involve the proper application of the test for cessation, and the other involving the RPD’s treatment of the evidence. These challenges will be assessed pursuant to the reasonableness standard set out in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov], affirmed in Mason v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 SCC 21. A reasonable decision must be consistent with the relevant factual and legal constraints for the decision (Vavilov, at para 99).
IV. Analysis
[8] As described below, the RPD made reasonable conclusions regarding the Applicant’s voluntariness, his receipt of actual protection, and most of the evidence related to the Applicant’s intention. However, the RPD failed to assess the Applicant’s subjective knowledge of the consequences of his return trips to China, which is required by constraining jurisprudence.
A. The RPD did not reassess the Applicant’s refugee claim
[9] The RPD made several observations about the ease with which the Applicant was able to enter and leave China and noted the Applicant’s poor ability to describe the reasons that motivated his refugee claim. It then suggested that there was a basis for vacation of the decision conferring refugee status.
[10] The Applicant argues that these aspects of the decision, combined with the fact that the RPD referred to the Applicant as “the claimant”
rather than “the Respondent”
at several points in the decision, indicates that the RPD unreasonably reassessed the refugee claim.
[11] I do not agree that the decision represents a reassessment of the Applicant’s refugee claim. The RPD’s comments regarding the prospect of a vacation application are found at the beginning of the decision preceding the “Analysis”
section, under a heading that describes the commentary as an observation. This indicates that the RPD was aware that these comments were separate from the criteria it had to apply for the cessation application. The RPD’s comments about the ease of the Applicant’s entry and exit from China underscore its later conclusion that the Applicant obtained actual protection. The references to the Applicant as a “claimant”
are unfortunate, but the decision viewed holistically does not indicate that the criteria for cessation were misapplied. Perfection is not the standard for reasons (Vavilov, at para 91).
B. The RPD did not misconstrue documentary evidence
[12] At several points in its decision, the RPD quotes documentary evidence establishing that religious dissidents were prevented from traveling abroad from China and it notes that the Applicant had no problems leaving China after his visits. The Applicant objects to his characterization as a “dissident”
and argues that the RPD unreasonably applied the documentary evidence.
[13] It is debatable whether the Applicant could be considered a dissident given his alleged non-conformity with China’s policies on religious practice. Regardless, the RPD’s main observation at these points of its decision concerned the Applicant’s unobstructed exits from China, which reinforced the RPD’s view that China was not interested in him and provided him with protection. The Applicant has not met the burden of establishing unreasonableness on this point.
C. The RPD unreasonably failed to address the Applicant’s subjective understanding of the consequences of his actions
[14] The Applicant argues that in the assessment of his intention in returning to China, the RPD considered factors that had unclear relevance such as the Applicant’s low English fluency, his use of an agent to obtain his passport, and the short period of time between the Applicant’s receipt of permanent resident and his application for a Chinese passport. While the RPD’s reasons could have been more transparent regarding some of the factors it used to assess intention, its analysis of the Applicant’s intention was generally transparent and intelligible.
[15] The Applicant further argues that the RPD erred by not reaching a conclusion regarding the Applicant’s subjective lack of knowledge that he was re-availing himself to China.
[16] In assessing a refugee’s intention for returning to their country, the Federal Court of Appeal has described an individual’s subjective understanding of the immigration consequences of their actions as a key factual consideration. This evidence is not necessarily determinative, but it must be weighed with the other evidence relevant to intention (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Galindo Camayo, 2022 FCA 50 at paras 70, 71, 84; Anvar v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1194 at paras 38-39).
[17] The RPD did refer to the Applicant’s evidence that if he had known the potential consequences of his return, he would have arranged virtual meetings with his grandmother in China. However, the RPD did not weigh this evidence with other considerations relevant to his intention. This inconsistency with binding precedent renders the decision unreasonable for its discordance with a relevant legal constraint (Vavilov, at para 112).
[18] It was open to the RPD to disbelieve the Applicant’s evidence regarding his knowledge of the consequences of his return, or to find that his lack of knowledge did not outweigh other factors suggesting intent. However, the task for the RPD was to weigh this “key factual determination”
with other evidence, rather than to simply refer to it.
V. Conclusion and Amendment to the Style of Cause
[19] While most of the RPD’s decision is reasonable, its failure to specifically address the Applicant’s subjective knowledge of the consequences of returning to China is inconsistent with a legal constraint imposed by the jurisprudence. Accordingly, the decision is unreasonable and the application for judicial review is granted.
[20] The Respondent proposed that the style of cause be amended to reflect the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness as the proper Respondent. The Applicant resisted this request with the argument that cessation matters involve not enforcement but the administration of the IRPA, which is the responsibility of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration pursuant to the division of authority between the Ministers (IRPA, s 4).
[21] The Applicant’s resistance was later dropped when counsel for the Respondent pointed out that it was the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness who appeared before the RPD to advance the cessation application.
[22] It would be odd to issue an order binding a Minister that did not participate in the underlying proceedings, and the style of cause will therefore be amended pursuant to the Respondent’s request.
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