Docket: IMM-7621-24
Citation: 2026 FC 122
Toronto, Ontario, January 28, 2026
PRESENT: The Honourable Madam Justice Furlanetto
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BETWEEN: |
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RATTAN SINGH |
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Applicant |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
[1] The Applicant, Mr. Rattan Singh, seeks judicial review of a decision [Decision] of the Immigration Division [ID] of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada that found him inadmissible to Canada pursuant to paragraph 35(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA]. The ID concluded that there were reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Singh made a voluntary, knowing and significant contribution to the Punjab Police’s criminal purpose of committing crimes against humanity.
[2] For the reasons set out below, the application is dismissed.
I. Background
[3] The Applicant is a citizen of India. He voluntarily became a member of the Punjab Armed Police [PAP] in 1989 and held the position of Constable until 1994. In 1994, he transferred to the Punjab Police [PP] and became a Head Constable. The Applicant remained a Head Constable until 2012 when he left the PP after counterfeit-related charges were filed against him under the Indian Penal Code.
[4] The Applicant came to Canada on a temporary resident visa. He did not declare any police service in his visa application. After arriving in Canada, he claimed refugee status and was interviewed by the Canada Border Services Agency in 2019. The Minister sought a deportation order against the Applicant, alleging he was inadmissible pursuant to paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA for complicity in crimes against humanity and paragraph 35(1)(b) of the IRPA for serious criminality.
[5] Pursuant to paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA, a foreign national is inadmissible to Canada for violating human or international rights if committing an act outside Canada that constitutes an offence referred to in sections 4 to 7 of the Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, SC 2000, c 24 [CAHWCA]. The CAHWCA defines a “crime against humanity”
as:
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crime against humanity means murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, persecution or any other inhumane act or omission that is committed against any civilian population or any identifiable group and that, at the time and in the place of its commission, constitutes a crime against humanity according to customary international law or conventional international law or by virtue of its being criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the community of nations, whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force at the time and in the place of its commission.
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crime contre l’humanité Meurtre, extermination, réduction en esclavage, déportation, emprisonnement, torture, violence sexuelle, persécution ou autre fait — acte ou omission — inhumain, d’une part, commis contre une population civile ou un groupe identifiable de personnes et, d’autre part, qui constitue, au moment et au lieu de la perpétration, un crime contre l’humanité selon le droit international coutumier ou le droit international conventionnel, ou en raison de son caractère criminel d’après les principes généraux de droit reconnus par l’ensemble des nations, qu’il constitue ou non une transgression du droit en vigueur à ce moment et dans ce lieu.
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[6] An individual is complicit in crimes against humanity if there are reasonable grounds to believe the individual voluntarily made a significant and knowing contribution to the organization’s crime or criminal purpose: Ezokola v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 [Ezokola] at paras 8, 29, 84.
[7] In Ezokola, the Supreme Court of Canada identified six non-exhaustive factors for determining whether an individual’s conduct meets the criteria for complicity under paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA. These factors include: i) the size and nature of the organization; ii) the part of the organization with which the person was most directly concerned; iii) the person’s duties and activities within the organization; iv) the person’s position and rank; v) the length of time the person was in the organization, especially after becoming aware of the organization’s crimes or criminal purpose; vi) and the method of recruitment and opportunity to leave the organization: Ezokola at paras 91-99.
[8] In its Decision, the ID found the PP and its subordinate organization, the PAP, operated with impunity to commit crimes against humanity pursuant to state policy both before and after July 1998 when the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 3 was implemented. These acts included widespread torture, extrajudicial executions, enforced disappearances, illegal cremations, and other human rights violations of perceived Sikh separatists, all of which took place during the time period when the Applicant was a policeman and in areas where he was deployed.
[9] The ID found there were no reasonable grounds to believe the Applicant personally or directly committed any of the crimes against humanity committed by the PP and PAP. However, upon applying the Ezokola factors, the ID found there were reasonable grounds to believe the Applicant met the complicity test and was a person who had made a voluntary, knowing and significant contribution to the criminal purpose and crimes committed by the organization.
[10] Based on this finding, the Applicant was rendered inadmissible to Canada under paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA. The ID did not find the Applicant inadmissible under paragraph 35(1)(b) of the IRPA. A deportation order was made based on the paragraph 35(1)(a) finding.
II. Issues and Standard of Review
[11] The sole issue for determination on this application is whether the ID erred when finding the Applicant was complicit in crimes against humanity. Specifically, the Applicant argues that the ID erred in finding the Applicant made a significant contribution to the PP’s criminal purpose.
[12] The parties assert, and I agree, that the standard of review is reasonableness. None of the situations that would rebut the presumption that all administrative decisions are reviewable on a standard of reasonableness are present in this case: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] at paras 16-17 and 25. A reasonable decision is “based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker”
: Vavilov at para 85. A decision will be reasonable if, when read as a whole and taking into account the administrative setting, it bears the hallmarks of justification, transparency, and intelligibility: Vavilov at para 99.
III. Analysis
[13] The Applicant emphasizes that when considering the Ezokola factors, the focus must always be on the individual’s contribution to the crime or criminal purpose of the organization: Ezokola at para 92. In the case of a multifaceted or heterogeneous organization that performs both legitimate and criminal acts, the assessment must be on whether the person significantly contributed to the crimes or criminal purpose of the group and not just to the organization itself.
[14] The Applicant submits that in conducting the Ezokola analysis, the ID erred by conflating the Applicant’s contribution to the legitimate law enforcement function of the police with contributions to the organization’s alleged crime or criminal purpose. The Applicant argues that the size and nature of the PP, and the fact that it also fulfils a legitimate purpose, militates against finding simply an organizational connection. The Applicant contends that the ID did not point to any evidence demonstrating that crimes against humanity were widespread in the Applicant’s own stations or local police force and as a result, the ID erroneously found the Applicant guilty by association.
[15] The Respondent disputes the Applicant’s argument. It argues that the Applicant is imposing a higher threshold of proof than required. The Respondent submits that the ID conducted an extensive and thorough review of the evidence and reasonably found upon application of the relevant legal principles that paragraph 35(1)(a) of the IRPA applied. I agree.
[16] As noted by the ID, complicity requires neither physical presence during the crimes, nor active participation in the crimes: Ukoniwe v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2021 FC 753 at para 16. Rather, it requires reasonable grounds to believe that the Applicant voluntarily made a significant and knowing contribution to the organization’s crime or criminal purpose. This is an evidentiary threshold that is lower than what is contemplated by the standards of “balance of probabilities”
and “serious reasons for considering”
and requires an objective basis for belief that is based on compelling and credible information: Ghazala Asif Khan v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 269 at para 24; Sandhu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 869 at para 7.
[17] In this case, and contrary to the decision that was before the Court in the recent case of Malhi v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2026 FC 6, the ID conducted a thorough and robust review of the evidence before it. This included reviewing the extensive objective country condition evidence and providing a detailed analysis of the Ezokola factors and its implications on the three requirements of paragraph 35(1)(a).
[18] In doing so, the ID found the evidence supported a reasonable belief that: a) the Applicant knew about the criminal acts and purpose of the organization before he joined the PAP in 1989 and throughout his lengthy tenure with the PP, including the policies, powers and legislation changes linked to the counterinsurgency operations given to the police, military, and paramilitary forces; b) the Applicant voluntarily joined the PAP and PP, serving for 23 years with motivation, in part, to participate in the counterinsurgency campaign against Sikhs; and c) the Applicant significantly contributed to the criminal purpose of the organization. I agree with the Respondent that each of these findings in the Decision are supported by the evidence and that the ID provides a rational chain of analysis in reaching these findings.
[19] In its 40-page analysis of paragraph 35(1)(a), the ID first conducted an extensive review of the objective evidence, finding it “replete with credible, reliable, and trustworthy primary source details that give reasonable grounds to believe that state security forces, including the PAP and the Punjab Police, operated with impunity to commit crimes against humanity”
. This review provides important contextual background relating to the PAP and the hierarchical structure within the PP, the criminal operations of these organizations, including in the districts of Patiala, Sangrur and Kapurthala where the Applicant was deployed during his service, and the many legislative changes in effect during the Applicant’s tenure that allowed state authorities to commit crimes against humanity. The Applicant does not dispute any of the ID’s findings in this part of its analysis.
[20] In considering whether the Applicant was complicit in the PP’s actions, the ID recognized the PP also had a legitimate role but found that this role did not take away from the PP’s widespread engagement in human rights abuses and the commission of crimes against humanity. Given the contextual history, size and hierarchical structure of the PP, the ID had reasonable grounds to believe the Applicant was aware of the priority of PP counterinsurgency operations against Sikhs prior to joining the PAP in 1989, and that he was aware the PAP and the PP were participating in the counterinsurgency operations throughout his 23 years within the organization. I see no error with this line of reasoning.
[21] As recognized by the ID, for a significant portion of the Applicant’s service, he interfaced directly with people who were investigated and detained by the PP in the Sangrur and Kapurthala Districts where the evidence showed significant human rights abuses were committed by police forces, including the torture of suspects while in police custody. It was reasonable for the ID to infer that the Applicant knew about the PP’s criminal activities and that he was voluntarily contributing to the PP’s criminal purpose.
[22] While the Applicant argues that it was unreasonable for the ID to find that the Applicant’s position in the organization supported a significant contribution to the criminal activities in issue, I cannot agree.
[23] The ID was aware of the Applicant’s position in the organization but found based on the bottom-heavy hierarchal structure that there was heavy reliance on Constables and Head Constables to perform law enforcement duties. The ID found persons at these ranks carried out the primary enforcement duties that interfaced with the public. Similar to the facts before the Court in Talpur v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 822 at paragraph 13, the Applicant’s lower rank placed him closer to the perpetration of the crimes.
[24] The ID considered the Applicant’s role within the organization carrying out job functions such as, assisting in investigations, transporting suspects to police stations for interrogations, participating in taking statements from suspects, and transporting persons in custody to Court or jail. The ID found these duties created a direct nexus to the criminal purpose of the organization.
[25] The ID recognized that for an individual to make a significant contribution to the organization’s crimes or criminal purpose, the contribution had to be more than mere association or passive acquiescence: Ezokola at paras 85, 87-88. However, it found the Applicant’s long‑standing tenure and responsibilities during a time when documented human rights abuses were being committed by the PP, including torture of suspects in police custody, supported a finding of significant contribution to the criminal purpose of the PAP and PP.
[26] There is no basis for the Court to intervene or to reweigh the evidence. The ID considered the totality of the evidence when making its findings. Given the legal and evidentiary framework, and the deference owed to the ID’s Decision, the ID provided sufficient justification, transparency and intelligibility for its Decision.
[27] The Applicant has not established a reviewable error. As such, the application is dismissed.
[28] There was no question for certification proposed by the parties, and I agree none arises in this case.
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