Docket: IMM-7992-24
Citation: 2026 FC 81
Ottawa, Ontario, January 19, 2026
PRESENT: Madam Justice Sadrehashemi
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BETWEEN: |
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TSIGE HANES TSEGAY |
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Applicant |
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and |
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THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION |
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Respondent |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] The Applicant Tsige Hans Tsegay, fled Eritrea, her country of citizenship, approximately eight years ago. While she was in Sudan, she and her children applied for permanent residence through either the Convention Refugee Abroad Class or the Country of Asylum Class with the support of a sponsorship by a group of five permanent residents/Canadians. During the processing of the application, the family had to leave Sudan due to the civil war and went to Uganda where they have remained without secure status.
[2] Following an interview with Ms. Tsegay in Uganda, a migration officer from Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (“Officer”
) refused her application because of credibility concerns. Ms. Tsegay challenges this refusal on judicial review.
[3] The determinative issue for me on judicial review is the gap in the Officer’s reasoning and the failures of justification in their decision on whether Ms. Tsegay met the requirements for either the Convention Refugee Abroad Class or the Country of Asylum Class despite the identified credibility concerns. For Ms. Tsegay and her children, this is a long-awaited decision of profound consequence given their insecure living conditions. In light of these severe consequences, there was a heightened obligation on the Officer to provide responsive reasons that justify their decision to the Applicant (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov] at para 133). The Officer’s reasons lack transparency and justification and accordingly, the decision must be set aside.
[4] I also find it unfair that the Officer relied on extrinsic evidence without giving Ms. Tsegay notice or an opportunity to respond.
[5] I am allowing the application for judicial review.
II. Background
[6] Ms. Tsegay is a citizen of Eritrea. She has approximately seven years of education. She was married when she was 17 years old. Her husband was conscripted into indefinite national and military service in 2006 without pay.
[7] Ms. Tsegay alleged that she began practicing the Pentecostal Christian faith in secret house congregations in Eritrea, but the house was raided in 2012. She was arrested and detained for six months. She was released after signing a condition to not practice her faith.
[8] Wanting to escape the repressive conditions, including the continued forced national service, in 2017, Ms. Tsegay fled Eritrea illegally with her two children, making a difficult journey to Sudan. Ms. Tsegay was pregnant. They were unable to register for refugee protection there due to safety issues. Ms. Tsegay has not seen her husband since 2017. Ms. Tsegay’s third child was born in Sudan.
[9] Ms. Tsegay has family members in Canada. With the support of sponsorship from a group of five Canadians/permanent residents, Ms. Tsegay applied to resettle in Canada in 2021. The application forms, including the refugee narrative, were completed without the assistance of a lawyer. It is the determination on this application that is under review before me.
[10] While she was awaiting a determination on her application, Ms. Tsegay was forced to flee Sudan with her three children because of the civil war. They managed to get to Uganda in August 2023. In Uganda, Ms. Tsegay registered herself and her three minor children as refugees.
[11] Ms. Tsegay was interviewed by the Officer in March 2024 in Uganda with the assistance of an interpreter. She did not have counsel. At the time of the determination at issue, her three children were approximately 16, 10 and 6 years old. As she stated in her interview, her eldest daughter had studied to approximately grade 8 in Sudan and was no longer able to study, her other two children had not studied at all because of school fee costs.
[12] The Officer asked questions relating to Ms. Tsegay’s admissibility. In the Global Case Management System (“GCMS”
) notes the Officer noted that they had “no credibility concerns”
with her admissibility based on their “extensive questioning”
of her.
[13] The Officer advised Ms. Tsegay in the interview that they had concerns about the credibility of her claim relating to her Pentecostal faith. Ms. Tsegay maintained throughout the interview that she was not lying about what had happened to her or her faith.
[14] According to the Officer, Ms. Tsegay did not name the Pentecostal sect but instead, despite being invited to specify the particular sect, she only repeatedly stated that she feared practicing the Protestant faith. Further, after asking a series of questions related to her faith, the Officer found that Ms. Tsegay’s knowledge of the faith was “threadbare.”
The Officer also drew a negative inference from the fact that she was not practicing the faith in Uganda. Lastly, though not put to Ms. Tsegay, the Officer drew a negative inference based on their view that the language of Ms. Tsegay’s refugee narrative was similar to other claims they had seen.
[15] The Officer found that having considered the remaining information not tainted by credibility concerns, there was insufficient evidence to find that Ms. Tsegay met the requirements of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA] and therefore the application was refused.
III. Issues and Standard of Review
[16] The Applicant raised a number of issues with the substance of the decision. I need not evaluate each. The key issue is the Officer’s failure to explain transparently how Ms. Tsegay and her children did not meet the requirements of either class – the Convention Refugee Abroad Class or the Country of Asylum Class. The parties agree, as do I, that I ought to review the substance of the Officer’s decision on a reasonableness standard – considering whether it lacked intelligibility, transparency and justification in light of the legal and factual constraints (Vavilov at para 23).
[17] The Applicant also raised a fairness issue with respect to the Officer’s reliance on extrinsic evidence when they referenced the non-specified refugee claim narratives of others. On this issue, the question I need to ask is whether the Officer’s procedure was fair in all the circumstances (Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 43; Canadian Pacific Railway Company v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 69 at para 54).
IV. Analysis
[18] Foreign nationals can be sponsored for permanent residence as an overseas refugee under two categories: the Convention Refugee Abroad Class, which involves a consideration of whether the person meets the definition of a Convention refugee under section 96 of the IRPA; and the Country of Asylum Class, which evaluates whether they “have been, and continue to be, seriously and personally affected by civil war, armed conflict or massive violation of human rights”
in their country of nationality and habitual residence (sections 139, 144-147 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 [IRPR]).
[19] The Officer found that Ms. Tsegay had not established that she met the requirements under either class because of their credibility concerns about her faith. The Officer stated that they had considered what remained of Ms. Tsegay’s claim, taking out the information tainted by their credibility finding, and concluded there was insufficient evidence. The Officer found:
Having removed all the information with which there are credibility concerns from the assessment of the application, there remains insufficient evidence remaining with which to be satisfied that the applicant is not inadmissible to Canada and that you meet the requirements of the Act.
[20] The parties agree that inadmissibility was not at issue as the Officer had found that there were no credibility concerns relating to Ms. Tsegay’s admissibility after “extensive questioning”
on these issues. The only issue was whether she met the eligibility requirements for either class. Ms. Tsegay argues that the Officer failed to explain how their credibility findings impacted other aspects of her eligibility for the Country of Asylum Class or the Convention Refugee Abroad Class, providing only a boilerplate conclusory statement without any explanation for this core finding in their analysis.
[21] The Respondent argues that it was unnecessary for the Officer to provide further reasoning because Ms. Tsegay’s claim was really only about her faith and refugee claims cannot be accepted based solely on general country conditions. The Respondent argues that the focus of Ms. Tsegay’s interview with the Officer was on practicing her faith and despite being asked an open-ended question about her fears, she only stated “neglect.”
In other words, the negative credibility determination about her faith was determinative of her eligibility for either class of overseas refugee.
[22] I am not persuaded by the Respondent’s arguments.
[23] As noted by Ms. Tsegay’s counsel, Ms. Tsegay describes in her refugee narrative fleeing Eritrea approximately five years after she was detained for practicing her faith and released on the condition that she not practice further. At the time that she and her family fled, her husband was a forced conscript for no pay; the family was finding it impossible to survive. The family fled illegally. Ms. Tsegay describes the dictatorship in Eritrea and the government’s human rights violations. Ms. Tsegay describes the difficulties in fleeing and moving from Sudan to Uganda as a single mother in both her narrative and her interview. She further explained that none of her children were in school in Uganda. To the Officer’s question, “what are the reasons for not returning to Eritrea?”
Ms. Tsegay is recorded as saying “If it’s safe, why would I have come here.”
[24] I find that there were other aspects of Ms. Tsegay’s profile that had to be examined in light of the country conditions in Eritrea to determine whether she met the eligibility requirements of either the Convention Refugee Abroad or Country of Asylum categories. This Court has found it necessary for the decision-maker to consider a claimant’s residual profile that is not tainted by the credibility determination (Ashiq v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 72 at paras 14, 17; Isaac v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 940 at paras 27-28; Gberemeskel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 270 at para 4).
[25] I agree with the Applicant that Ms. Tsegay was not required to set out the particular ground of persecution to be considered, but rather the decision-maker had to consider, based on the circumstances Ms. Tsegay put forward, whether in light of her profile and the country conditions, she qualifies (Canada (Attorney General) v Ward, 1993 CanLII 105 (SCC), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at page 745; Ghirmatsion v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 519 [Ghirmatsion], at para 102-105; Saifee v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 589, at paras 28-29).
[26] The Respondent relies on this Court’s decision in Abreham v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 908 for the proposition that the decision-maker need not do further assessment where there has been a determinative negative credibility finding. The issue here is that there remains a question as to how the Officer’s particular negative credibility findings about Ms. Tsegay’s religion affects the assessment of her eligibility for both the Convention Refugee Abroad Class and the Country of Asylum Class.
[27] The Officer does not determine, as the Respondent asks the Court to infer, that there is nothing remaining to consider because their negative credibility determination about her faith affected all aspects of the claim. The Respondent is providing arguments that are not found in the Officer’s reasons. The Officer understood that they had to consider what remained of Ms. Tsegay’s claim.
[28] The Officer says that they have considered the claim stripped of the information affected by the negative credibility determination but fails to indicate what information remains and how it was insufficient to meet the requirements of either class. The same language the Officer used here was used in a decision recently reviewed by this Court in Tekle v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1235 [Tekle]. Justice Fothergill’s reasoning at paragraph 23 of that decision applies equally here:
[23] The Officer did not indicate what portions of Mr. Tekle’s evidence were tainted by credibility concerns, or why the remaining evidence was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the application. The Officer’s reasons lacked the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency.
[29] There is no indication that the Officer did not accept that Ms. Tsegay is an Eritrean citizen, that she is a single mother, that she made a refugee claim abroad and that she fled the country illegally. The Officer had to consider these aspects of her profile in relation to the country condition evidence and explain why they were insufficient to meet the requirements of either the Convention Refugee Abroad Class or the Country of Asylum Class. There is no analysis provided. Simply stating that it is insufficient does not provide a transparent justification for the decision. This is a sufficient basis to set aside the decision and have it redetermined.
[30] Ms. Tsegay also raised concerns with the reasonableness of the Officer’s credibility findings. It is unnecessary for me to address these arguments because of my determination that even if the credibility finding with respect to Ms. Tsegay’s religious claim was maintained, the matter has to be redetermined. This should not, however, be interpreted as an endorsement of the Officer’s credibility findings.
[31] I will, however, address one aspect of the Officer’s credibility determination which the Applicant has raised as a fairness breach. The Officer drew a negative inference due to the similarities between the Applicant’s refugee narrative and that of other undisclosed narratives they had seen. The Officer stated: “The Schedule 2 you provided presents similar template/script as seen on multiple other applications, indicating that it is generic and not specific to your situation.”
This issue was not raised with Ms. Tsegay in her interview with the Officer, nor were redacted narratives included in the Certified Tribunal Record.
[32] Again, in Tekle, Justice Fothergill addressed this same issue and found the other narratives the Officer considered were not publicly available and the refugee claimant could not be expected to know their contents and therefore they amounted to extrinsic evidence. I find the Court’s reasoning in Tekle at paragraph 17 applies here:
[33] Where extrinsic evidence forms the basis of an Officer’s concern, an applicant must be given an opportunity to meaningfully respond to the concern and be given details of the evidence. It is not enough merely to advise an applicant of the general nature of the concern (Shen v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2024 FC 1997 at para 9; Chawla v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 434 at para 14).
[34] Without notice of the issue or disclosure of the narratives, I find Ms. Tsegay was not given the opportunity to meaningfully respond to the Officer’s concern about the alleged similarities of these narratives with her own. This was procedurally unfair.
[35] I note that this Court has also found the practice of decision-makers relying on undisclosed narratives from other cases in the overseas refugee context to lack transparency and justification (see Justice Little’s discussion of the hazards of this approach: Amanuel v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2021 FC 662, at paras 37-39, 44-45; Tafere v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2025 FC 1358, at paras 37-39).
V. Disposition
[36] The application for judicial review is allowed and sent back to be redetermined by a different decision-maker. Neither party raised a question for certification, and I agree none arises.
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