Date: 20260114

Docket: T-2974-25 Citation: 2026 FC 74

Vancouver, British Columbia, January 14, 2026

PRESENT: Madam Associate Judge Catherine A. Coughlan

BETWEEN:

JEAN LAGACÉ

Applicant

and

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Respondent

JUDGMENT AND REASONS

UPON MOTION in writing dated November 27, 2025, submitted by the Respondent under Rule 369 of the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, [“Rules”] for:

• a)An order that the application for judicial review filed on August 14, 2025 be struck out in its entirety pursuant to Rule 221 of the Rules, without leave to amend;

• b)Costs in the set amount of $500.00;

• c)Such further and other relief as this Honorable Court may deem appropriate in the circumstances;

AND UPON reading the motion record of the Respondent, including the written representations dated November 27, 2025;

AND UPON reading the responding motion record of the self-represented Applicant, Jean Lagacé, including the Affidavit of Jean Lagacé sworn on December 1, 2025;

AND UPON noting that there is no record of the Respondent having submitted a reply within the time provided, or at all, although duly served with the Applicant’s responding motion record;

I. Overview

[1] The Respondent, Attorney General of Canada (“AGC”), brings this motion for an order striking the Notice of Application (“Application”) filed by the self-represented Applicant, Mr. Jean Lagacé, without leave to amend on the basis that this Court lacks jurisdiction to determine the judicial review. In the underlying Application, Mr. Lagacé seeks judicial review of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s (“RCMP”) purported decision to not investigate and/or lay charges against an individual who Mr. Lagacé claims to have assaulted him.

[2] In support of its motion, the AGC relies on two decisions of this Court, George v Canada), 2007 FC 564 [“George”] and Ochapowace First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 920 [“Ochapowace”] to argue that when exercising discretion in the context of a criminal investigation, the RCMP is not acting as a “federal board, commission or other tribunal” within the meaning of sections 2 and 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7 [“FCA”].

[3] Also citing Ochapowace, Mr. Lagacé responds that this Court has jurisdiction to review police discretion taken during a criminal investigation where it constitutes “flagrant impropriety”. Mr. Lagacé further submits that the RCMP has engaged in a pattern of conduct amounting to bias against him as an individual, thereby warranting judicial review.

[4] For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that this Court lacks jurisdiction. Even if an exceptional category of review were available in cases of flagrant impropriety, the Application pleads no facts capable of meeting that exceedingly high threshold. Mr. Lagacé’s allegations of bias are speculative and baseless. I am satisfied that the Application is bereft of any possibility of success and must be struck without leave to amend; amendment will not cure the jurisdictional flaw.

II. Background

[5] In the underlying Application, commenced on August 14, 2025, Mr. Lagacé seeks judicial review of a purported decision by the RCMP—Chestermere Detachment not to investigate or lay charges against an individual who he alleges assaulted him causing bodily harm. The alleged incident involved Mr. Lagacé having his blood drawn for testing by an Alberta Health Services (“AHS”) attendant on September 19, 2024. Mr. Lagacé alleges that after positioning a needle in his arm, the attendant reached across his desk and in so doing, briefly rose from his chair. The Applicant alleges that brief action caused him “pain which lasted a few days and bruising in [his] arm that lasted 3 weeks.”

[6] On September 26, 2024, Mr. Lagacé filed a formal complaint with AHS and was told that the attendant’s blood extraction method would be reviewed. Mr. Lagacé goes on to describe what he alleges to be a pattern of “retribution” following this complaint, including receiving two phishing emails from an unknown source.

[7] On January 31, 2025, Mr. Lagacé reported the incident to the RCMP. According to a transcript attached as an exhibit to the Applicant’s affidavit sworn August 19, 2025, in support of his Application, Mr. Lagacé had a discussion with Constable James Quigley who advised him that there was no evidence of mens rea for an assault nor evidence to connect the phishing emails to the incident. Constable Quigley also consulted with his two supervisors, a Corporal and a Sergeant, who agreed with his assessment. I pause to note that the affidavit provides no information concerning the provenance of the transcript.

[8] On March 5, 2025, Mr. Lagacé filed a complaint with the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission (“CRCC”), alleging that Constable Quigley failed to review Mr. Lagacé’s evidence and investigate the incident. Mr. Lagacé also alleges a pattern of harassment by the RCMP, citing numerous occasions where RCMP vehicles drove by or parked outside his home in a period prior to the incident.

[9] On May 1, 2025, Mr. Lagacé had a discussion with Corporal Kate McIver of the Chestermere Detachment regarding the complaint. Corporal McIver agreed to have a new officer review the materials provided by Mr. Lagacé.

[10] On July 21, 2025, Corporal McIver sent an email to Mr. Lagacé advising that the incident had been reviewed by a senior investigator at the Chestermere Detachment, Corporal Jeremiah Jones who determined that it would not be practical or reasonable for the RCMP to lay charges. Corporal McIver further advised that the Alberta Crown Prosecution Service had been consulted and agreed with the RCMP that there was no reasonable likelihood of obtaining a conviction such that charges were warranted.

[11] In this Application, Mr. Lagacé claims that the RCMP had a duty to investigate the incident and failed to do so. He also alleges that such failure to investigate violates his section 7 rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. He seeks an order compelling the RCMP to “thoroughly investigate this criminal offence and to, regardless of their findings, submit this case to the Crown Prosecutor as [he] believe[s] there is sufficient evidence to achieve a conviction.”

III. Relevant Legal Principles

[12] The AGC moves to strike under Rule 221 of the Rules. Rule 221 only applies to actions and cannot be resorted to in applications under Part 5 of the Rules. While the Rules do not expressly contemplate motions to strike applications for judicial review, that jurisdiction is found in the Court’s plenary jurisdiction to restrain the misuse or abuse of its processes: Canada v JP Morgan Asset Management (Canada) Inc, 2013 FCA 250 at para 48 [“JP Morgan”].

[13] The standard for striking a judicial review application is high, requiring there to be “an obvious, fatal flaw striking at the root of this Court’s power to entertain the application.” The application must be bereft of any possibility of success: JP Morgan at paras 47-48; Rahman v Public Service Labour Relations Board, 2013 FCA 117 at para 7; David Bull Laboratories (Canada) Inc v Pharmacia Inc, 1994 CanLII 3529 at 600 (FCA). Lack of jurisdiction is an example of such a fatal flaw: Ochapowace at para 57.

[14] In the Federal Court, section 18.1 of the FCA requires that a decision under review must be that of a federal board, commission, or tribunal. What constitutes a federal board, commission, or tribunal is defined in section 2 of the FCA:

[15] Further, the relief sought on an application for judicial review must be of the sort that the Court has jurisdiction to grant. Section 18.1(3) sets out the Court’s powers on review:

[16] Affidavits are not permissible on motions to strike applications, save for narrow exceptions, such as where an affidavit merely appends documents that were incorporated by reference into an original notice of application: JP Morgan at paras 51-54. Mr. Lagacé has filed an affidavit in support of this motion which contains three exhibits:

• (a)Exhibit “A” is an affidavit filed in support of an unrelated proceeding before the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench on September 12, 2022. It contains a plethora of generic aspersions about individuals or businesses seeking to conspire against or harm him.

• (b)Exhibit “B” corresponds to Exhibit “D” of Mr. Lagacé’s original affidavit sworn in support of the Application. It contains photos of RCMP vehicles on the street outside Mr. Lagacé’s home, and a corresponding description of such incidents.

• (c)Exhibit “C” contains emails between Mr. Lagacé and AGC’s counsel in relation to this motion.

[17] Exhibits “A” and “C” are not incorporated by reference into the Application, and neither are admissible or relevant to this motion; they will not be considered by the Court. Exhibit “B” was incorporated by reference into the Application and will be admitted on this motion.

A. Analysis

[18] This Court has previously held that when the RCMP conducts or declines to conduct a criminal investigation, it does so pursuant to common law police powers, not pursuant to statutory authority conferred by Parliament, such as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, RSC 1985, c R-10: George at para 44. Accordingly, the RCMP is “independent of the control of the executive government” and is not exercising powers as a federal board, commission or other tribunal for the purposes of section 18.1: George at para 46; R v Campbell, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565 at para 29. This Court cannot assume jurisdiction because no statutory power is being exercised: Ochapowace at paras 56-57.

[19] In George, the applicant sought to challenge the RCMP’s decision to initiate a criminal investigation and to have it quashed. Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer held that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the application:

[38] I am inclined to agree with the Respondent and Intervener with regard to the criminal investigation. I am not convinced that the Federal Court has the requisite jurisdiction to sit in review of a peace officer’s decision to initiate a criminal investigation. The Federal Court is a statutory court that derives all of its jurisdiction from the Federal Courts Act and, unlike provincial superior courts, it has no general or inherent jurisdiction to deal with criminal matters: see Letourneau v. Clearbrook Iron Works Ltd., 2005 FC 333, at para 9. While the Federal Court does have limited criminal jurisdiction, for examples see s. 4 of the Federal Courts Act and s.472 of the Federal Courts Rules this jurisdiction is circumscribed by express or implied statutory provisions.

[…]

[41] The Applicant applied for judicial review of C/Supt. Paulson’s decision to initiate a criminal investigation pursuant to section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act. The remedies under section. 18.1 are available only in relation to decisions of “a federal board, commission or other tribunal”. The term “federal board, commission or other tribunal” is defined in s.2 of the Federal Courts Act as follows:

[…]

[43] The Applicant suggested at the hearing that these sections constitute a grant of police powers on RCMP officers by Parliament and, therefore, are sufficient to bring C/Supt. Paulson’s decision within the scope of the Federal Court’s review jurisdiction.

[44] I disagree. While I recognize that the powers of peace officers are incorporated into the RCMP Act, nevertheless, it is well established that when peace officers conduct criminal investigations they are acting pursuant to powers which have their foundation in the common law independent of any Act of Parliament or Crown prerogative. In other words, the RCMP Act imports and clothes with statutory authority police powers, duties and privileges which remain largely defined by common law: Doe v. Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality) Commissioners of Police (1990) 74 O.R. (2d) 225 (Div. Ct.). [Emphasis added.]

[20] The above reasoning was expressly adopted in Ochapowace: aff’d 2009 FCA 124 [“Ochapowace FCA”]. In that case, the applicants sought to challenge the RCMP’s decision not to lay charges in relation to activities taken on First Nations’ reserve lands. Mr. Justice de Montigny, as he then was, followed George and held that a decision by the RCMP not to lay charges likewise falls outside the scope of a section 18.1 judicial review:

[55] In a decision released May 29, 2007, my colleague Justice Tremblay-Lamer addressed the issue of the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain an application for judicial review in the course of a criminal investigation by the RCMP. That investigation was conducted to determine whether the applicant contravened section 131 of the Criminal Code, and section 12 of the Parliament of Canada Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-1, during her appearance before the Public Accounts Committee. After having stressed that the Federal Court has no inherent jurisdiction, she focused on the first leg of the test set out in ITO—Int’l  Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics,) [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752, at p. 766 to determine whether it has jurisdiction in a particular instance. As will be remembered, the first condition to be met is that there must be a statutory grant of jurisdiction by the federal Parliament. That means, in that specific case, that the applicant had to establish an express or implied grant of jurisdiction which authorizes the Federal Court to quash and declare invalid a criminal investigation.

[Emphasis added.]

[56] The only possible source of jurisdiction was section 18.1 of the Act, which confers jurisdiction to review decisions made by “a federal board, commission or other tribunal”, as these entities are defined in section 2of the same Act. After reviewing the legislation and the case law on the subject, Justice Tremblay-Lamer came to the conclusion that the decision to initiate a criminal investigation cannot be properly characterized as a decision by a “federal board, commission or other tribunal”. In her view, police officers are independent from the Crown when conducting criminal investigations, and their powers have their foundation in the common law. Being independent of the control of the executive, they cannot be assimilated to a “federal board, commission or other tribunal”.  I fully agree with this most compelling analysis of my colleague.

[Emphasis added.]

[57] In the result, this application for judicial review could be dismissed on the sole ground that this Court does not have the jurisdiction to entertain it. But as already mentioned, even if I were to proceed on the assumption that a decision not to lay charges by the RCMP can properly be the subject of an application pursuant to section 18.1 [of] the Act, I can find nothing in the conduct of the RCMP officers involved in the investigation that meets the flagrant impropriety test mentioned earlier.

[Emphasis added.]

[21] The same reasoning must apply in the present matter. Mr. Lagacé seeks judicial review of the RCMP’s purported failure to investigate the incident and/or lay charges against the AHS attendant. The RCMP’s conduct falls outside this Court’s section 18.1 jurisdiction, and the Application ought to be struck on that basis alone.

[22] Pointing to Ochapowace (the Applicant relies on a summary of the case in the Federal Court Reports at 2008, vol 3, part 3) to argue that police discretion may nonetheless be reviewed in cases of flagrant impropriety. While de Montigny J in Ochapowace considered such an argument in the alternative, the Federal Court of Appeal subsequently questioned whether the “flagrant impropriety” standard applies to the exercise of police discretion: Ochapowace FCA at paras 28-30. Indeed, flagrant impropriety was developed primarily in the context of prosecutorial discretion: See e.g. Jefford v Canada, [1988] 2 FC 189 at 190; Labrador Métis Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FC 939 at paras 32-33 [“Labrador Métis Nation”]; Stucky v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 1769 at para 32 [“Stucky”]; Krieger v Law Society of Alberta, 2002 SCC 65 at para 49. Courts have held that prosecutorial discretion is immune from judicial intervention save for instances rising to the level of flagrant impropriety or abuse of process: Labrador Métis Nation at paras 32-33; Stucky at para 32. An alternative standard has been used for police discretion, albeit not in the context of judicial review; it asks whether the discretion was rationally justifiable, both subjectively and objectively: Ochapowace FCA at para 27. Regardless, whether framed as flagrant impropriety or as a lack of rational justification, the threshold for judicial intervention in the exercise police discretion is exceptionally high.

[23] Mere disagreement with investigative choices, or dissatisfaction with the outcome of a police report, does not approach this threshold. Judicial intervention is reserved for extreme cases, where courts must be able to protect the administration of justice and prevent abuses of the judicial process: Ochapowace at para 47, citing R v Power, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601. This is not such a case. Indeed, the Application asserts nothing more than that the RCMP failed to investigate the incident and lay charges.

[24] There is nothing inherently wrongful about such conduct. As the Court observed in Ochapowace at para 52, police officers have discretion as to whether to investigate and/or lay criminal charges.

[25] On this motion, Mr. Lagacé alleges that bias underpinned the RCMP’s purported failure to investigate the incident. He asserts that between June 2019 and November 2021, RCMP vehicles were photographed near his home on 10 occasions. He describes this as a pattern of “intimidating visits” and “persecution” by the RCMP. Even taken as true, these allegations are speculative and incapable, as a matter of law, of establishing bias amounting to flagrant impropriety. The Application pleads no facts explaining how these sightings were connected to Mr. Lagacé personally or how they relate to the incident reported in January 2025, more than three years after the last sighting.

[26] In any case, the evidence before the Court demonstrates that Mr. Lagacé was afforded multiple opportunities to present his concerns and supporting materials to the RCMP. His complaint was initially assessed by Constable Quigley, who consulted with two supervisors. He then had an opportunity to discuss the complaint with Corporal McIver following his complaint to the CRCC. As a result, his file was ultimately re-examined by a different senior investigator, Corporal Jones. The RCMP also consulted the Alberta Crown, which agreed that there was no reasonable prospect of conviction.

[27] Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Application is bereft of any possibility of success. This Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the Application and, in any event, it pleads no facts that could engage the flagrant impropriety doctrine so as to trigger this Court’s residual jurisdiction. Following the reasoning in George and Ochapowace, I find that Mr. Lagacé’s Application concerns conduct and decision-making that falls within the RCMP’s common law powers. As such, it does not concern conduct of a federal board, commission or tribunal within the meaning of section 2 of the FCA and is not reviewable by this Court under section 18.1. Because this jurisdictional defect cannot be cured by amendment, the Application shall be struck without leave to amend.

 

IV. Amendment of Style of Cause

[28] In its written representations, the Respondent also seeks to amend the style of cause pursuant to Rule 303 and section 23 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, RSC 1985, c C-50 to reflect that the Attorney General of Canada is the proper Respondent. I agree with that amendment, and it will be made with immediate effect.

V. Costs

[29] The AGC seeks costs fixed in the amount of $500.00. Mr. Lagacé seeks costs fixed in the amount of $35.00 for transportation and printing.

[30] In my view, the AGC, as the successful party, is entitled to their costs. I see no reason to depart from the general rule that costs follow the event. Moreover, the amount proposed by the AGC is a modest sum.

THIS COURT’S JUDGMENT is that:

1. The motion is granted.

2. The style of cause is amended with immediate effect to name the Attorney General of Canada as the sole Respondent.

3. The Notice of Application is struck without leave to amend.

4. The AGC shall have costs from the Applicant fixed in the all-inclusive amount of $500.00.

blank	“Catherine A. Coughlan”
blank	Associate Judge

FEDERAL COURT

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

DOCKET:	T-2974-25
STYLE OF CAUSE:	JEAN LAGACÉ v ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

MOTION IN WRITING CONSIDERED AT VANCOUVER, BRITISH COLUMBIA PURSUANT TO RULE 369 OF THE FEDERAL COURTS RULES

JuDGMENT AND REASONS:	COUGHLAN A.J.
DATED:	january 14, 2026

WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS BY:

Jean Lagacé	For The Applicant (SELF-REPRESENTED)
Jessica Karam	For The Respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Attorney General of Canada

For The Respondent