Docket: T-2492-23
Citation: 2025 FC 2032
Toronto, Ontario, December 31, 2025
PRESENT: Madam Justice Pallotta
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BETWEEN: |
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ALEXANDRE PAPOUCHINE |
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Applicant |
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and |
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COLLEGE OF IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP CONSULTANTS; CANADA (MINISTER OF IMMIGRATION, REFUGEES AND CITIZENSHIP);
CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) |
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Respondents |
ORDER AND REASONS
I. Introduction
[1] The College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants (the College) brings this motion under section 40 of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7 [the Act] for an order declaring the applicant, Alexandre Papouchine, to be a vexatious litigant and prohibiting him from starting or continuing any Federal Court proceeding unless he first obtains leave.
[2] Subsection 40(1) of the Act states:
Vexatious proceedings
40 (1) If the Federal Court of Appeal or the Federal Court is satisfied, on application, that a person has persistently instituted vexatious proceedings or has conducted a proceeding in a vexatious manner, it may order that no further proceedings be instituted by the person in that court or that a proceeding previously instituted by the person in that court not be continued, except by leave of that court.
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Poursuites vexatoires
40 (1) La Cour d’appel fédérale ou la Cour fédérale, selon le cas, peut, si elle est convaincue par suite d’une requête qu’une personne a de façon persistante introduit des instances vexatoires devant elle ou y a agi de façon vexatoire au cours d’une instance, lui interdire d’engager d’autres instances devant elle ou de continuer devant elle une instance déjà engagée, sauf avec son autorisation.
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[3] The College licenses and regulates immigration consultants. It sets the requirements and administers the licensing process for becoming a regulated Canadian immigration consultant (RCIC). Mr. Papouchine wants the College to modify the licensing process for him. In the underlying application for judicial review, he alleges that the RCIC licensing process, with its closed-book entry to practice exam and in-person language test, is discriminatory, and that the College has wrongfully refused to accommodate his disability.
[4] The College submits that Mr. Papouchine has a long history of filing proceedings based on unfounded allegations of discrimination. The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (the HRTO) and the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the CHRC) have declared him to be a vexatious litigant, and the Law Society Tribunal found he does not have the requisite good character to become a licensed paralegal because of his history of vexatious litigation. The College contends that Mr. Papouchine raises similar unfounded allegations of discrimination against it in the underlying judicial review proceeding. It argues that a vexatious litigant designation is necessary to conserve judicial resources and protect parties on the receiving end of Mr. Papouchine’s unmeritorious proceedings.
[5] The College obtained the Attorney General of Canada’s (the AGC) consent to this motion, as required by subsection 40(2) of the Act.
[6] Mr. Papouchine opposes the College’s motion. He argues that his allegations of discrimination against the College have merit, and that his litigation history should not be given as much weight as the College asserts.
[7] For the reasons below, I find that Mr. Papouchine’s conduct warrants an order to control his access to this Court. Mr. Papouchine is a vexatious litigant who should be prohibited from starting or continuing proceedings in this Court without leave.
II. Preliminary issue
[8] Before the hearing, Mr. Papouchine sent a letter to the registry stating that he would be objecting to the filing of the AGC’s consent on the basis that the College had not included its communications with the AGC as part of its motion record, and that he would be seeking leave to file a proposed affidavit addressing this issue. I considered the issue at the outset of the hearing.
[9] The AGC’s counsel appeared at the hearing to address subsection 40(2) of the Act. The AGC’s counsel tendered a written consent for filing, made by the AGC acting through the Assistant Deputy Attorney General of Canada.
[10] The AGC can provide consent “by filing it with the Court at the outset of the hearing”
: Simon v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FCA 28 at para 7. Consent may be delegated to “a departmental officer who acts in a capacity appropriate to the giving of consent”
: Coote v Lawyers’ Professional Indemnity Company (Lawpro), 2014 FCA 98 at para 11. The Assistant Deputy Attorney General of Canada is such an officer: Coote at para 11; Figueroa v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FC 505 at para 17.
[11] I was satisfied that the AGC’s written consent to the College’s motion met the requirements of subsection 40(2) of the Act. I was not satisfied that the College had to include communications with the AGC as part of its motion record. I accepted the written consent and denied Mr. Papouchine’s request for leave to file his proposed affidavit.
III. Legal principles
[12] The rationale underlying section 40 of the Act is that the Federal Courts are community property that exists to serve everyone, not a private resource that can be commandeered in damaging ways to advance the interests of one: Canada v Olumide, 2017 FCA 42 at paras 17-19; Simon at para 9. Section 40 enables the Court to create an extra layer of regulation where necessary to prevent one litigant from squandering judicial resources with duplicative proceedings, pointless litigation, the style or manner of their litigation, their motivations, intentions, attitudes, and capabilities while litigating, or any combination of these things: Simon at paras 15-16.
[13] “Vexatiousness”
does not have a precise meaning (Olumide at paragraph 31):
[31] Vexatiousness is a concept that draws its meaning mainly from the purposes of section 40. Where regulation of the litigant’s continued access to the courts under section 40 is supported by the purposes of section 40, relief should be granted. Put another way, where continued unrestricted access of a litigant to the courts undermines the purposes of section 40, relief should be granted. In my view, all of this Court’s cases on section 40 are consistent with this principle.
[14] The indicia of a vexatious litigant include being admonished by other courts for vexatious behavior, instituting frivolous proceedings (motions, applications, actions, or appeals), making scandalous or unsupported allegations against opposing parties, relitigating settled issues, unsuccessfully appealing decisions, and ignoring rules, court orders, and/or cost awards: Olumide v Canada, 2016 FC 1106 at paras 9-10, aff’d Olumide (FCA); Figueroa at paras 23-24. These indicia are not binding but can be helpful while keeping in mind the purposes of section 40 of the Act: Olumide at paras 32, 34.
[15] It is important to distinguish a vexatious litigant from a “needy, persistent self-represented litigant”
: Canada (Attorney General) v Fabrikant, 2019 FCA 198 at para 20; Simon at paras 13-16. Not every self-represented litigant requires additional regulation to control their dealings with the justice system, but some can be ungovernable or harmful and must thus be controlled for reasons of practicality: Simon at paras 14-16.
[16] While the consequences of a vexatious litigant designation are significant, they should not be overstated. A vexatious litigant order does not bar access to the Court but rather regulates access: Olumide at paras 27-28; Simon at paras 9-10.
IV. The parties’ submissions
[17] The College submits that Mr. Papouchine’s litigation history bears the indicia of a vexatious litigant and shows that he is unable to exercise reasonable judgment:
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Frivolous proceedings and vexatious litigant declarations: Mr. Papouchine has initiated more than 30 proceedings since 2012, including 8 in this Court, all based on unfounded allegations of discrimination. He has abused the processes of the HRTO and the CHRC by repeatedly bringing vexatious proceedings, and both tribunals declared him to be a vexatious litigant: Papouchine v Touram LP, 2014 HRTO 588 HRTO [Papouchine v Touram HRTO], aff’d 2022 ONSC 7010 [Papouchine v Touram ONSC]; Alexandre Papouchine v Canadian Human Rights Commission (17 July 2019), 20190490 (CHRC). The Law Society of Ontario relied on the HRTO’s and the CHRC’s decisions in Mr. Papouchine’s good character hearing before the Law Society Tribunal, and the tribunal concluded that he did not have the requisite good character to provide legal services to the public as a licensed paralegal: Papouchine v Law Society of Ontario, 2023 ONLSTH 66. The Law Society Tribunal stated that Mr. Papouchine had engaged in an unrelenting campaign of complaints against those who he perceived had engaged in discriminatory behaviour or violated his human rights, including 22 complaints to the Law Society against opposing counsel, adjudicators, or those involved in investigating his conduct, at least 17 applications to the HRTO, and at least 34 applications to the CHRC: Papouchine v Law Society at paras 96-97. Mr. Papouchine seems unable to exercise reasonable judgment or accept decisions that he does not agree with, and he brings legal proceedings in retaliation. His conduct has wasted court and tribunal resources and required respondents to address frivolous proceedings. Mr. Papouchine commenced this Federal Court proceeding after ignoring the College’s numerous replies to him, explaining the documents required to support an accommodation request (which he failed to provide) and the College’s inability to alter the entry to practice exam so he can write it as an open-book exam.
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Scandalous and unsupported allegations: In this proceeding, Mr. Papouchine alleges that the College has discriminated against him and he seeks outrageous and exorbitant compensation from the College. He has asked the College’s counsel to report herself to the Law Society of Ontario for “harassing/bullying/mobbing.”
He alleges that the College brings this section 40 motion in retaliation for a CHRC complaint that does not exist. Mr. Papouchine has made scandalous and unsupported allegations in the past. The Divisional Court found that the only basis for his allegations was his “subjective belief that his treatment could not be the result of anything other than discrimination”
: Papouchine v Touram ONSC at para 33. Others have described Mr. Papouchine’s allegations as an assertion that he is a member of a protected group and something happened to him, which is insufficient: Papouchine v Smith, 2013 HRTO 646 at para 16; Papouchine v Touram HRTO at para 25.
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Relitigating and appealing settled issues: Mr. Papouchine’s numerous judicial reviews and appeals show that when he does not get his way, he brings complaints and litigates: Papouchine v Law Society at para 54.
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Ignoring court rules and orders: After Mr. Papouchine was ordered to seek leave before filing applications with the HRTO, he circumvented the order by filing applications in his mother’s name. As a result, the HRTO broadened the order against Mr. Papouchine and declared his mother to be a vexatious litigant: Papushina v University Health Network, 2023 HRTO 1104 at para 41; Papushina v University Health Network, 2025 HRTO 269 at para 65.
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Cost awards and monetary relief: While it is unclear if Mr. Papouchine has any outstanding cost awards, he has been ordered to pay over $35,000 in costs and over $15,000 in rental arrears and he has not worked since 2014. Innocent parties will likely bear the cost of frivolous litigation. Furthermore, Mr. Papouchine seeks monetary gain from litigation, including in this application. On a March 2025 Ontario Disability Support Program application, he included compensation awards and lawsuits as a type of income, which demonstrates the purpose of his litigation history.
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Voluminous and irrelevant materials: Mr. Papouchine files irrelevant and voluminous materials. His affidavits on this motion include exhibits like a drawing of a tree, a dinosaur, and a person, and a fictional story of colonial injustice and racial prejudice. He asked the College’s affiants irrelevant questions on cross-examination, like whether they were educated enough to know about Prometheus, Viola Desmond, and Jesus Christ.
[18] Mr. Papouchine submits that the College has not met its burden on this motion. He submits the College has not met its burden to show that the RCIC licensing process has no adverse discriminatory effect or that there is a mechanism to protect RCIC candidates from possible human rights violations.
[19] Mr. Papouchine argues that his litigation history should not be given much weight and past vexatious litigant declarations should not be factored into the analysis because a litigant’s success rate could be a consequence of a lack of access to justice and an inability to afford a lawyer, rather than vexatiousness. He criticizes the College’s reliance on Olumide, arguing that Mr. Olumide was declared a vexatious litigant in circumstances where he was unable to retain a lawyer, did not respond to the motion, and may have been suffering from mental stress. Mr. Papouchine states the HRTO accused him of wrongdoing but did not allow him to defend the allegations, and he considers his treatment before the HRTO to be similar to the case of Groia v Law Society of Upper Canada, 2018 SCC 27. Mr. Papouchine submits that the Court should not rely on findings of other courts or tribunals that are under appeal or judicial review. For example, he has commenced proceedings in this Court to challenge the CHRC’s vexatious litigant declaration and in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Divisional Court) to challenge the Law Society Tribunal’s finding that he did not possess the requisite good character to provide services to the public as a paralegal.
[20] Mr. Papouchine argues that the underlying application has merit, and the allegations against the College are not scandalous or unsupported. The College has not proven that its closed-book exam format is connected to the practice of a RCIC and not discriminatory, or that requiring a specific accommodation request form does not have a “built-in adverse discriminatory component.”
He states his request to waive or postpone the in-person language test for the RCIC licensing process was based on a danger to his life and health, and on this motion, the burden was on the College to prove that the feared danger did not exist. He adds that the College has not proven that his needs could not be accommodated without undue hardship.
[21] Mr. Papouchine states the College has not pointed to any court orders that he allegedly ignored, and he argues that tribunal orders should not be given the same weight as court orders. To the best of his knowledge, the only outstanding cost order is under appeal. He was in arrears on rent because of the COVID-19 pandemic and it would be discriminatory to declare him vexatious for this reason. Mr. Papouchine states he had a duty to report all income in his Ontario Disability Support Program application, and the College wrongly attempts to present this as unethical or illegal.
[22] Mr. Papouchine denies that he filed irrelevant materials. The drawing, fictional story, and references to Prometheus, Viola Desmond, and Jesus Christ were meant to illustrate the College’s wrongdoing.
[23] Mr. Papouchine also contends that:
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the College refused his request for disclosure of its communications with the AGC about the subsection 40(2) request for consent, claiming privilege, and the lack of transparency raises a question of whether consent was given as a punishment;
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the College’s counsel engaged in professional misconduct and may have been involved in doctoring the College’s supporting affidavits; in any event, the College’s affiants are not vexatious litigant experts, and their evidence should be evaluated with caution; and
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this motion is an act of reprisal and discriminatory in itself; the College seeks a vexatious litigant declaration because of conduct that is connected to his disability or his family members’ disabilities, and the College’s request can be considered discriminatory and connected to grounds that are protected by human rights laws.
V. Analysis
[24] The College has established that Mr. Papouchine’s conduct exhibits the indicia of a vexatious litigant: Olumide at paras 32-34; Figueroa at paras 23-24. The conduct that is most indicative of vexatiousness is Mr. Papouchine’s litigation history, which reveals a pattern of bringing multiple frivolous proceedings, making scandalous and unsupported allegations against opposing parties, and relitigating settled issues. I do not accept Mr. Papouchine’s argument that his litigation history and the prior vexatious litigant orders should be given little weight. They are key reasons why his access to this Court should be regulated. I agree with the College that Mr. Papouchine’s litigation history, including the past orders declaring him to be a vexatious litigant, should be accorded significant weight: Olumide at paras 37-38.
[25] The Law Society Tribunal summarized Mr. Papouchine’s litigation history in Papouchine v Law Society (the good character hearing). In describing the nature and duration of Mr. Papouchine’s conduct, the Law Society Tribunal wrote (at paragraphs 96 to 98):
[96] Since 2011, Mr. Papouchine has engaged in an unrelenting campaign of complaints against those who he perceives have violated his human rights or engaged in discriminatory or harassing behaviour. This campaign has involved 22 complaints to the Law Society, mainly against licensees acting as opposing counsel or adjudicators in matters Mr. Papouchine was involved in; two complaints against individuals involved in investigating his conduct; at least 17 applications to the HRTO and 34 applications to the CHRC.
[97] The conduct which he engaged in that resulted in him being declared a vexatious litigant by two tribunals is similar to the conduct that we witnessed during the hearing – engaging in irresponsible allegations and commencing litigation without regard for its consequences. We saw that in the summonses he sought to have issued, particularly against the four lawyers who were required to attend or hire counsel to attend the motion to quash the summonses. We saw that in the baseless and unfair allegations of discrimination he made against the two Law Society witnesses and against Ms. MacDonald, the prosecutor. We saw it in his written representations, evidence and submissions which relied on irrelevant information, leaps of logic, and a primary focus on the process rather than the substantive issue before us – his current good character.
[98] Mr. Papouchine’s conduct over the years and continuing to present has wasted valuable court and tribunal resources, clogged the system and required the many, many respondents that he targets to either hire counsel or respond themselves to frivolous and vexatious proceedings.
[26] The College provides further evidence of frivolous proceedings. In addition to the proceedings before other courts and tribunals, Mr. Papouchine has brought multiple proceedings in the Federal Court since 2016. There is no evidence that Mr. Papouchine was successful in any of them.
[27] Two tribunals, the HRTO and the CHRC, have found that Mr. Papouchine misused their processes and conducted himself in a manner that warranted access restrictions. The Divisional Court affirmed the HRTO’s vexatious litigant declaration. Mr. Papouchine commenced an application for judicial review in 2019, seeking to overturn the CHRC’s vexatious litigant declaration (Court file no. T-1354-19); however, I am not persuaded that I should disregard the CHRC’s findings because Mr. Papouchine is challenging them. The record before me shows that Mr. Papouchine is unable to accept decisions with which he does not agree. It does not show that Mr. Papouchine’s challenge to the CHRC’s vexatious litigant order has any better prospect of success than the dozens of his proceedings that have been dismissed or discontinued.
[28] In my view, Mr. Papouchine’s conduct before this Court resembles his conduct before the HRTO and CHRC, and I find the orders regulating Mr. Papouchine’s access to those tribunals to be highly relevant to whether his access to this Court should be regulated. Mr. Papouchine’s conduct warrants an order to prevent him from monopolizing judicial resources through duplicative and/or unmeritorious litigation in the Federal Court, as he has been doing in other court and tribunal systems for over a decade.
[29] Mr. Papouchine contends that the vexatious litigant designations are related to his status as a self-represented litigant, and the Court should distinguish self-represented litigants who need extra attention and assistance from vexatious litigants: Simon at para 13. In my view, there is no reason to expect that Mr. Papouchine would modify his behaviour with extra attention and assistance. The Law Society Tribunal described his conduct as “unrelenting”
and I see no indication that the HRTO, CHRC, and Law Society Tribunal decisions have had an effect on his conduct. Mr. Papouchine’s litigation history makes it clear that he needs the extra layer of regulation supplied by a vexatious litigant declaration: Simon at para 13.
[30] The College has not established that Mr. Papouchine has outstanding cost awards against him, and I am not persuaded that including lawsuit awards on his Ontario Disability Support Program application is indicative of vexatiousness. Nonetheless, Mr. Papouchine does not bear the full costs of his proceedings—respondents are forced to expend resources to address his allegations, and his proceedings consume scarce judicial resources at others’ expense. I agree with the Divisional Court’s comments about the cost of vexatious proceedings and I find those comments to be applicable here (Papouchine v Touram ONSC at paragraph 5):
[5] Justice is not free. Quite the contrary. Justice is expensive. To the extent that the cost of justice is not borne by the parties, it is borne by the public purse. Tribunals, like courts, are responsible for overseeing their own processes so that public resources are applied effectively to matters worthy of adjudication. To achieve this, tribunals, like courts, must control their own processes, including restraining vexatious conduct and abuse of process.
[31] Even litigants with good intentions can be declared vexatious if they litigate in a way that invokes the purpose behind section 40: Olumide at para 33; Coady v Canada (Attorney General), 2020 FCA 154 at para 24. The threshold question is whether the litigant’s ungovernability or harmfulness to the court system and its participants justify a leave-granting process: Simon at paras 14-18.
[32] I find that Mr. Papouchine’s conduct is both ungovernable and harmful. Mr. Papouchine has a long history of unsuccessful claims of discrimination and the underlying application against the College makes similar claims of discrimination. Mr. Papouchine’s litigation history and the allegations he advances in the underlying judicial review warrant an order under section 40 of the Act, declaring him to be a vexatious litigant.
VI. Remedy
[33] The College seeks an order that would prohibit Mr. Papouchine from instituting or continuing litigation in this Court and prohibiting him from filing any document or procedure, whether acting for himself or through a representative, except with the Court’s leave. The requirement for leave to institute or continue litigation is a typical restriction under section 40 of the Act and I find this restriction to be reasonable.
[34] The Court may impose additional requirements as necessary: Olumide at para 23. Preventing litigation by proxy is one of the aims of a vexatious litigant order: Fabrikant at para 45. Mr. Papouchine attempted to circumvent the HRTO’s order by filing proceedings in his mother’s name and I find that additional restrictions are warranted to prevent similar conduct before this Court. My order will include a term to prevent Mr. Papouchine from starting or continuing litigation or filing any document or process in this Court in the name of or on behalf of anyone other than himself.
[35] Mr. Papouchine frequently writes to the Court, and the materials he files are lengthy, unfocused, and not in compliance with the Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106 (his responding motion record, with its 76-page memorandum of fact and law, is an example). This conduct wastes the Court’s and the parties’ time. Unless he obtains leave to start or to continue a specific proceeding, the only material Mr. Papouchine may file in connection with any new or existing Court file is an application for leave under subsection 40(4) of the Act. The registry or the Court may reject an application for leave that does not comply with the Federal Courts Rules.
[36] The restrictions will apply to all new and existing proceedings at the Federal Court that involve Mr. Papouchine, including files T-949-18, T-1130-18, T-1354-19, as well as this application, file T-2492-23. The restrictions do not bar Mr. Papouchine’s access to this Court, but they will regulate his access.
[37] The College also asked for an order dismissing the underlying application for judicial review. While the College’s notice of motion included a request for such relief, its memorandum of fact and law did not address the issue or request an order dismissing the underlying application in the “order sought”
section of the memorandum. I did not allow the College to argue the point in oral submissions. However, I allowed the College to file written submissions on the issue after the hearing, and I gave Mr. Papouchine the opportunity to file written submissions in response.
[38] The College’s post-hearing submissions argue that the Court has the power to dismiss Mr. Papouchine’s application under section 40 of the Act. The test for whether a vexatious litigant’s matter should be discontinued under section 40 is “… if the [party], as a vexatious litigant, sought leave to start [the matter in question], would the Court have granted leave?”
: Bernard v Canada (Professional Institute of the Public Service), 2019 FCA 236 at para 11, citing Fabrikant at para 43. Apart from the power to discontinue proceedings under section 40, the Court can quash proceedings that are doomed to fail using its plenary powers to regulate litigation before it: Bernard at para 10. The College argues that failing to dismiss this proceeding after a finding of vexatiousness would require more time and resources to dismiss a meritless claim and would be contrary to section 40’s purpose.
[39] I understand that the College is concerned with wasting further resources on what it sees as a meritless application. However, the College’s submissions do not squarely address why the application should be dismissed pursuant to section 40 of the Act or pursuant to the Court’s plenary powers. In the circumstances, I will not dismiss the underlying application on this motion.
[40] The College had asked for costs of the motion but changed its position at the hearing. In view of the College’s position that it would be content to forego a cost award, I will not award costs of this motion.
VII. Conclusion
[41] Mr. Papouchine has conducted proceedings in a vexatious manner. I find that his proceedings in this Court should be stayed, and he should be prohibited from starting or continuing litigation in this Court (directly or through someone else) without first obtaining leave. Mr. Papouchine’s access to the Federal Court should be regulated in accordance with the terms of my order.
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