Docket: T-2990-24
Citation: 2025 FC 1647
Ottawa, Ontario, October 6, 2025
PRESENT: The Honourable Mr. Justice Gleeson
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BETWEEN: |
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THE UNITED STEEL, PAPER AND FORESTRY, RUBBER, MANUFACTURING, ENERGY, ALLIED INDUSTRIAL AND SERVICE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION (UNITED STEEL WORKERS), AND CANADIAN LABOUR CONGRESS |
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Applicants |
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and |
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MARK’S WORK WEARHOUSE LTD. AND CANADIAN TIRE CORPORATION, LIMITED |
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Respondents |
JUDGMENT AND REASONS
I. Overview
[1] The Applicants seek judicial review under subsection 18(1) of the Federal Courts Act, RSC 1985, c F-7 [Federal Courts Act], of the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise’s [CORE] decision to conclude the review of a complaint alleging the Respondent, Mark’s Work Wearhouse Ltd. [Mark’s], relies on suppliers in Bangladesh that fail to pay workers a living wage.
[2] For the reasons that follow, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
II. Background
A. The office of the CORE and its mandate
[3] The CORE, established in April 2019 by Order in Council [OIC], is authorized to review allegations of human rights abuses arising from the operations of Canadian companies abroad in the garment, mining, or oil and gas sectors [Canadian Companies]. OIC 2019-1323, dated September 6, 2019 [2019 OIC], details the CORE’s mandate.
[4] In accordance with section 5 of the 2019 OIC, the CORE is to be guided by the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Framework, UNHCHR, 17th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (2011) [UN Guiding Principles] and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises on Responsible Business Conduct, (Paris: OECD, 2023) [OECD Guidelines] in the discharge of its mandate.
[5] Pursuant to subsection 9(1) of the 2019 OIC, the CORE has established Operating Procedures for the Human Rights Responsibility Mechanism of the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise (CORE), [Operating Procedures], (see https://core-ombuds.canada.ca/core_ombuds-ocre_ombuds/operating_procedures-procedures_exploitation.aspx?). These procedures are triggered where (1) a complaint is initiated, (2) the CORE commences a review, or (3) a request is made to the CORE for informal mediation services (Operating Procedures, s 3.3).
[6] The CORE has the discretion to, among others, determine how a review is to be conducted, when to terminate a review, and may, in its sole discretion, refuse to review a complaint (2019 OIC, s 7 and 8).
[7] In fulfilling its review and reporting functions, the CORE has no authority to compel participation in its review process (Operating Procedures, s 11.1-11.8). Upon the completion or termination of a review, the CORE is limited to making recommendations only (2019 OIC, s 10 and 11).
[8] For ease of reference, the 2019 OIC is reproduced and attached as a Schedule to this Judgment and Reasons.
B. Events leading to this Application
(1) The Parties
[9] The Applicant United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (United Steelworkers) [USW] is one of the largest private-sector unions in North America.
[10] The Applicant Canadian Labour Congress [CLC] is the largest labour organization in Canada, encompassing national and international unions, provincial and territorial federations of labour and community-based labour councils.
[11] The Applicants advocate for the rights of workers and unions in Canada and internationally.
[12] The Respondent Mark’s is a Canadian garment company and wholly owned subsidiary of the Respondent Canadian Tire Corp. Ltd. [Canadian Tire].
(2) The Complaint
[13] On November 21, 2022, the Applicants filed a complaint with the CORE alleging that Mark’s uses suppliers and/or factories in its supply chain in Bangladesh that fail to pay workers, primarily women, a living wage [Complaint].
[14] In the Complaint, the Applicants requested that the CORE investigate the Respondents’ alleged failure to ensure their suppliers in Bangladesh pay a living wage and determine if they are responsible for human rights abuses in the Bangladesh garment industry. The Applicants requested that, in concluding its investigation, the CORE recommend the Respondents (1) commit to ensuring a living wage is paid to all workers in their supply chain, (2) change their policies, (3) disclose information related to their supplier chain, (4) negotiate with independent Bangladeshi trade union federations, and (5) issue a formal apology.
[15] On December 14, 2022, the CORE determined that the Complaint was admissible pursuant to section 6.1 of the Operating Procedures. The Applicants were informed by email of the CORE’s decision on December 16, 2022.
[16] On March 14, 2024, the CORE shared the final version of its initial assessment report [Initial Assessment Report] with the Parties where the CORE determined that it would proceed with an investigation through an independent fact-finding process in response to the human rights abuses alleged in the Complaint.
[17] On October 2, 2024, a final report was communicated to the Applicants [Final Report].
[18] The record before me includes more than one version of the Final Report. Although the different versions appear to be substantively the same, the published version of the report, reproduced at Exhibit N to the November 29, 2024 Affidavit of Guillaume Charbonneau Quintal [Charbonneau Affidavit], includes the Applicants’ commentary on the report as an Appendix. In oral submissions, the Parties agreed that Exhibit N to the Charbonneau Affidavit is the version of the Final Report under review, and it is that version that has been considered in this Application.
[19] On December 23, 2024, the Initial Assessment Report and the Final Report were published on the CORE’s website.
III. Decision under review
[20] In the Final Report, the CORE detailed its fact-finding activities, addressed the issues identified in the Initial Assessment Report, and made a series of recommendations. The CORE further determined that upon the publication of the Final Report, the review process was to be concluded.
[21] The CORE acknowledged that international human rights instruments provide guidance on the issue of living wage, but found what constitutes a living wage and how the right is to be operationalized lacks international consensus and remains unsettled. The CORE further found that companies in Canada are not obligated to pay their workers a living wage, but rather a mandatory minimum wage, and that the Government of Canada does not provide advice on the issue of living wage standards.
[22] The CORE acknowledged that the Initial Assessment Report indicated it may be appropriate for the CORE to “develop a list of criteria to define a living wage in Bangladesh”
as part of the review. However, in the Final Report, the CORE found the International Labour Organization [ILO] – which the CORE described as the premier international body for establishing labour standards – to be the appropriate body to determine the content of the right to a living wage and to develop the criteria to be applied where assessing whether a human rights abuse arises. The CORE held it should not make these determinations because this would be duplicative of the ILO’s work, interfere with the ILO’s tripartite structure (government, employer, and worker), and contravene the 2019 OIC which specifically states that the CORE is not to create new standards concerning business conduct (2019 OIC, s 6).
[23] The CORE concluded that, pending the outcome of the ILO’s work, it was not in a position to assess the conduct of an individual Canadian company and determine whether an alleged failure to ensure its foreign suppliers pay an unspecified wage constituted a human rights abuse.
[24] The CORE also outlined the actions and commitments undertaken by the Respondents to address the transparency issues raised by the Applicants in the Complaint. Relying on these, the CORE concluded no further follow-up from the Respondents was required.
[25] Finally, the CORE made seven recommendations, three directed to the Minister of International Trade [Minister] and four to Canadian Companies sourcing abroad. The recommendations issued to the Minister concerned the review of best practices with respect to the concept of living wage, while those directed to Canadian Companies related to Canada’s responsible business conduct standards and policies.
IV. Issues
[26] The Applicants argue that the Final Report is justiciable, that they meet the test established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45 for public interest standing, and that the Final Report is unreasonable – the CORE having erred by narrowly interpreting its mandate, by improperly relying on irrelevant information relating to the work of the ILO, and by failing to provide reasons in support of its key findings.
[27] The Respondents first take the position that the Final Report is not a decision that is subject to judicial review. In the alternative, the Respondents argue that the decision is reasonable and that in any event the relief sought is beyond that available to the Applicants on judicial review.
[28] For the reasons set out in the section that follows, the sole issue I need to address is that of justiciability.
V. Analysis
A. The Final Report is not a decision that is subject to judicial review
[29] When undertaking judicial review, the first matter a Court must address is whether the administrative action or decision in issue is one that is subject to judicial review.
[30] Section 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act provides that an application for judicial review may be made by anyone directly affected by a decision or order of a federal board, commission, or other tribunal. However, as was noted by Justice Donald Rennie in Canada (Attorney General) v Democracy Watch, 2020 FCA 69 [DW FCA 2020] at para 19, “[n]ot all administrative action gives rise to a right of review. There are many circumstances where an administrative body’s conduct will not trigger a right to judicial review.”
[31] To argue that the public nature of the CORE’s Final Report renders the matter reviewable, the Applicants rely on Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee) v Wall, 2018 SCC 26 [Highwood Congregation] where the Supreme Court of Canada identifies the public nature of a decision as relevant consideration in determining whether the decisions of voluntary associations, including religious groups, may be amenable to judicial review. This argument does not respond to the issue raised by the Respondents and does not assist the Applicants.
[32] It is not disputed that the CORE falls within the meaning of a “federal board, commission or tribunal”
as defined at section 2 of the Federal Courts Act. The public nature of the Final Report is not in issue.
[33] Rather, the Respondents argue the Final Report is not reviewable because it does not impact legal rights, impose legal obligations, or cause prejudicial effects. Relying on Democracy Watch v Canada (Attorney General), 2021 FCA 133, the 2019 OIC and the Final Report, the Respondents submit the CORE fulfills an advisory function only – the CORE’s activities do not directly affect anyone, and the Final Report does not impact legal rights, impose legal obligations, or cause prejudicial effects.
[34] The Applicants rely on the decision of this Court in Democracy Watch v Canada (Attorney General), 2019 FC 388 [DW FC 2019] at paras 94-107 – a case where I concluded a decision of the Commissioner of Lobbying [Commissioner] not to investigate was justiciable on the basis that the right to initiate a complaint coupled with the Commissioner’s duty to determine whether an investigation is necessary to ensure compliance with the Lobbying Act engages legal rights (para 106). However, my conclusions on the issue of justiciability were reversed in DW FCA 2020 where the Court of Appeal held that a mandate to receive a complaint, in the absence of an obligation to investigate, is insufficient to render a decision not to investigate justiciable – “[t]he solicitation of information from the general public, does not, in and of itself, create rights for those who provide information where they are not directly affected by the outcome”
(para 38).
[35] The Applicants submit that contrary to the legislative scheme considered in DW FCA 2020, a scheme the Court of Appeal found only provided for the solicitation of information from the public, the 2019 OIC expressly makes provision for a public complaints mechanism. This right to complain, the Applicants argue, is sufficient to render the CORE’s Final Report reviewable for the reasons set out in DW FC 2019.
[36] It was in the context of a refusal to investigate decision that the Court of Appeal highlighted the distinction between a statutorily authorized public complaints mechanism and the ability of a decision-maker to solicit information from the public. It concluded the latter to be insufficient to create rights for those who provide information, yet nevertheless opened the door to the argument that a right to complain, provided for in the statutory instrument establishing an administrative decision-maker, may be sufficient to render a refusal to investigate decision justiciable. However, that is not the issue here; the Final Report is not a refusal to investigate.
[37] The Final Report concerns the conclusion of a review process, which followed the CORE’s decision to initially consider the Applicants’ Complaint, to conduct a review, and engage in independent fact-finding. In this case, the Complaint was received and acted upon.
[38] The right for the Applicants to complain in this context is not sufficient to render the Final Report justiciable. Instead, the Final Report is only justiciable if the CORE in issuing the report has impacted legal rights, imposed legal obligations, or caused prejudicial effects. Considering both the CORE mandate and the Final Report, I conclude it has not.
[39] The 2019 OIC establishes the CORE as a means of promoting responsible conduct for Canadian Companies conducting business abroad. To accomplish this goal, the CORE is mandated to:
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promote the implementation of identified international human rights guidelines and principles;
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advise Canadian Companies on their practices and policies;
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review alleged human rights abuses arising from the operation of Canadian Companies abroad, offer informal mediation services and provide advice to the Minister.
[40] The 2019 OIC does not provide a complainant with a right to have their complaint reviewed. Instead, the CORE, in its sole discretion, may refuse to review any complaint (2019 OIC, s 8).
[41] Where a complaint is reviewed, as has occurred here, the CORE is limited to making recommendations. Finally, the CORE is expressly precluded from creating “new standards concerning responsible business conduct”
(2019 OIC, s 6).
[42] The CORE’s mandate allows alleged human rights issues involving Canadian Companies operating abroad to be identified and considered. It also contemplates the possible amelioration of any alleged abuse by way of cooperative engagement or informal mediation. However, the CORE has no authority to compel participation in a review or to impose consequences that will impact upon any individual, organization, or community. The CORE is essentially an advisor, a role that is expressly acknowledged in the April 30, 2024 OIC (PC Number 024-0424) appointing the interim CORE and describing the incumbent as “a special adviser to the Minister of International Trade.”
[43] The Applicants disagree with the CORE’s conclusion relating to the “content”
of the right to a living wage. However, this finding does not impact upon legal rights. No legally relevant consequence flows from the Final Report, and this would remain so were the CORE to have taken a different approach in addressing the issue.
[44] The CORE’s Final Report is advisory only. It does not impact legal rights, impose legal obligations, or cause prejudicial effects, and therefore no right of review arises (DW FCA 2020 at para 19, citing Sganos v Canada (Attorney General), 2018 FCA 84 at para 6; Air Canada v Toronto Port Authority, 2011 FCA 347 at para 29; Irving Shipbuilding Inc v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FCA 116; and Democracy Watch v Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner, 2009 FCA 15).
[45] Having concluded the Final Report is not justiciable, I need not consider the issues of public interest standing (British Columbia (Attorney General) v Council of Canadians with Disabilities, 2022 SCC 27 at para 50) or the reasonableness of the decision (DW FCA 2020 at para 41).
[46] As the successful party, the Respondents shall be awarded costs.