THE
CHIEF
JUSTICE
:—It
is
unnecessary
to
recite
the
facts
in
this
appeal.
They
are
fully
stated
in
the
judgment
of
the
learned
President
of
the
Exchequer
Court
and
at
Bar
counsel
for
the
appellant
declared
that
he
accepted
them
as
stated
in
that
judgment.
The
appellant
is
a
commercial
traveller
and
during
the
material
years
he
represented
several
mills,
or
business
houses.
He
did
not
make
sales
or
contracts
for
the
concerns
for
whom
he
acted,
his
authority
being
confined
to
obtaining
orders
for
them
and
transmitting
such
orders
to
them.
He
assumed
all
expenses
for
the
carrying
out
of
his
calling
and
in
no
year
could
it
be
said
that
his
commissions
came
from
only
one
concern.
He
was
free
to
go
and
solicit
orders
as
he
saw
fit
for
any
one
of
the
business
concerns
for
whom
he
acted.
He
operated
from
his
own
house
and
selected
his
own
customers,
his
remuneration
depending
on
his
own
efforts
and
their
results.
He
was
not
subject
to
the
direction
or
control
of
any
one
of
the
business
houses.
He
was
independent
of
them
and
absolutely
his
own
master.
The
learned
President
found
that
the
merchandise
for
which
the
appellant
solicited
orders
was
the
most
important
factor
in
his
success.
The
question
is
whether,
under
these
circumstances,
the
appellant
was
properly
assessed
for
Excess
Profits
Taxes
and
the
learned
President
held
that
he
was,
on
appeal
from
the
decision
of
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
the
respondent.
The
decision
of
the
Minister
affirmed
the
assessment
on
the
ground
that
"‘the
profits
of
the
taxpayer
have
been
correctly
assessed
for
Excess
Profits
Tax’’,
adding
that
‘‘the
Minister
is
not
satisfied
that
the
taxpayer
is
virtually
in
the
position
of
an
employee
of
one
employer
and
he
is
therefore
not
exempt
from
tax
under
the
proviso
to
paragraph
(b)
of
Section
7
of
the
Excess
Profits
Tax
Act.’’
By
force
of
Section
3(1)
of
that
Act,
in
addition
to
any
other
tax
or
duty
payable
under
any
other
Act,
"‘there
shall
be
assessed,
levied
and
paid
a
tax
in
accordance
with
the
rate
set
out
in
the
Third
Part
of
the
Second
Schedule
to
this
Act.
during
the
taxation
period.’’
By
section
2(1)
(g)
"‘profits’’
in
the
case
of
a
taxpayer
other
than
a
corporation
or
joint
stock
company,
for
any
taxation
period,
means
the
income
of
the
said
taxpayer
derived
from
carrying
on
one
or
more
businesses,
as
defined
by
section
three
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
and
before
any
deductions
are
made
therefrom
under
any
other
provisions
of
the
said
Income
War
Tax
Act.
Now,
although
there
is
no
definition
of
the
word
"‘business’’
in
either
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
or
the
Excess
Profits
Tax
Act,
it
is
easy
to
understand
the
meaning
of
the
word
“business”
in
the
latter
Act
by
the
context
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act.
Of
course,
the
appellant
cannot
be
considered
as
exercising
a
“profession”
within
the
meaning
of
that
word
in
the
usual
language,
but
he
relies
on
the
use
of
the
word
“profession”
in
section
7(b)
of
the
Act,
and
he
claims
to
be
entitled
to
the
exemption
therein
provided.
As
it
can
be
said
that
it
is
important
to
consider
every
word
of
that
section
for
the
purpose
of
deciding
the
present
appeal,
the
section
is
quoted
in
full:—
“7.
The
following
profits
shall
not
be
liable
to
taxation
under
this
Act
:—
(b)
the
profits
of
a
profession
carried
on
by
an
individual
or
by
individuals
in
partnership
if
the
profits
of
the
profession
are
dependent
wholly
or
mainly
upon
his
or
their
personal
qualifications
and
if
in
the
opinion
of
the
Minister
little
or
no
capital
is
employed:
Provided
that
this
exemption
shall
not
extend
to
the
profits
of
a
commission
agent
or
person
any
part
of
whose
business
consists
in
the
making
of
contracts
on
behalf
of
others
or
the
giving
to
other
persons
of
advice
of
a
commercial
nature
in
connection
with
the
making
of
contracts
unless
the
Minister
is
satisfied
that
such
agent
is
virtually
in
the
position
of
an
employee
of
one
employer
in
which
case
this
exemption
shall
apply
and
in
any
case
the
decision
of
the
Minister
shall
be
final
and
conclusive.”
It
will
be
noted
from
the
wording
of
that
Section
that
the
exemption
applies
first
to
a
“profession”
and
by
no
means
can
the
appellant,
in
the
ordinary
sense,
be
held
to
exercise
a
"‘profession’’.
But,
moreover,
it
is
not
"
all
professions’’
that
can
claim
the
exemption.
It
must
be
a
‘‘profession’’
where
the
profits
are
dependent
wholly
or
mainly
upon
his
personal
qualifications;
and
the
finding
of
the
learned
President
that
the
profits
of
the
appellant
in
the
present
case
do
not
either
wholly
or
mainly
depend
upon
his
personal
qualifications
but
that,
on
the
contrary,
his
merchandise
is
the
most
important
factor
in
his
suecess,
cannot
be
disturbed
upon
the
evidence
in
the
case.
For
that
reason
alone,
therefore,
the
appellant
would
fail
to
bring
himself
under
the
exemption
of
section
7(b).
Of
course,
in
order
to
claim
the
exemption,
the
appellant
had
first
to
show
that
his
profits
depended
entirely,
or
at
least
mainly,
upon
his
personal
qualifications,
but
the
proviso
in
the
section
must
also
be
considered.
He
is
not
a
commission
agent,
nor,
aS
we
have
seen,
does
his
business
consist
in
the
making
of
contracts
on
behalf
of
others,
nor
in
the
giving
to
other
persons
advice
of
a
commercial
nature
in
connection
with
the
making
of
contracts.
In
these
several
respects
the
proviso
does
not
apply
to
him.
Finally,
he
was
not
able
to
satisfy
the
Minister
that
he
was
virtually
in
the
position
of
an
employee
of
one
employer—the
evidence
is
decisive
on
the
point
that
he
is
not
such
an
employee.
The
decision
of
the
Minister
states
that
he
was
‘‘not
satisfied
that
the
taxpayer
is
virtually
in
the
position
of
an
employee
of
one
employer
and
he
is
therefore
not
exempt
from
tax
under
the
proviso
to
paragraph
(b)
of
section
7
of
the
Excess
Profits
Tax
Act.’’
On
that
point
the
section
enacts:
“In
any
case
the
decision
of
the
Minister
shall
be
final
and
conclusive.
’
In
this
case,
the
decision
of
the
Minister
is
to
that
effect.
Therefore,
as
it
has
not
been
contended
that
the
decision
of
the
Minister
was
arbitrary
and
reached
upon
a
wrong
principle,
it
follows
from
all
points
of
view
that
section
7(b)
does
not
relieve
the
appellant.
The
appeal
should
be
dismissed
with
costs.
CARTWRIGHT,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
a
judgment
of
the
President
of
the
Exchequer
Court
pronounced
on
the
26th
of
October,
1949,
affirming
the
decision
of
the
Minister
holding
the
appellant
liable
to
taxation
under
the
Excess
Profits
Tax
Act
in
respect
of
his
earnings
as
a
commercial
traveller
during
the
years
1942,
1943
and
1944.
The
following
findings
of
fact
made
by
the
learned
President
are
accepted
by
both
parties
:—
‘‘The
appellant
is
a
commercial
traveller
and
resides
in
London,
Ontario.
During
the
years
in
question
he
represented
several
mills
or
business
houses,
nine
altogether
in
1942
and
1943
and
eight
in
1944.
His
activity
consisted
in
travelling
throughout
his
territory
with
samples
of
the
merchandise
of
the
business
concerns
he
represented,
calling
on
customers,
displaying
the
samples
and
soliciting
and
obtaining
orders
for
the
merchandise.
When
he
obtained
such
orders
he
sent
them
to
the
credit
manager
of
the
mill
or
business
house
concerned.
If
the
order
was
accepted
the
merchandise
was
shipped
to
the
customer
and
thirty
days
after
the
date
of
such
shipment
the
appellant
was
paid
a
commission
based
on
its
amount.
He
received
no
salary,
wages
or
remuneration
from
any
of
the
mills
or
business
houses
except
these
commissions
and
if
a
customer
did
not
pay
for
the
goods
the
commission
that
had
been
paid
to
him
thereon
was
charged
back
to
him.
He
did
not
make
sales
or
contracts
for
the
concerns
for
whom
he
acted,
his
authority
being
confined
to
obtaining
orders
for
them
and
transmitting
such
orders
to
them.
He
had
no
office
or
office
staff
and
no
telephone,
typewriter
or
stationery
of
his
own.
The
samples
he
carried
belonged
to
the
concerns
he
represented.
In
the
course
of
his
activities
he
incurred
expenses
for
such
items
as
hotels
and
meals,
baggage
and
sample
rooms,
telephone,
telegrams
and
tips,
rail
fares
and
excess
baggage,
car,
gasoline,
oil,
etc.
He
did
not
send
in
any
expense
accounts
in
respect
of
these
items
to
any
of
his
mills
or
business
houses
or
apportion
them
amongst
them
but
assumed
them
all
himself.
The
particulars
of
his
commissions
with
the
amount
received
from
each
mill
or
business
house
for
each
of
the
years
in
question
appear
in
his
income
tax
returns.
In
no
year
could
it
be
said
that
they
came
virtually
from
one
concern.’’
It
was
admitted
at
the
trial
by
counsel
for
the
Respondent
that
the
Appellant
employed
capital
only
to
the
extent
sufficient
to
maintain
a
car
and
to
pay
his
expenses
on
the
road.
One
further
finding
of
fact
made
by
the
learned
President
is
as
follows
:—
“The
appellant
has
not
shown
that
his
profits,
even
if
it
were
conceded
that
they
are
those
of
a
profession,
depended
wholly
or
mainly
upon
his
personal
qualifications.
When
he
was
asked
what
his
success
as
a
commercial
traveller
depended
upon
he
mentioned
his
personality,
his
ability
to
show
his
merchandise
to
the
best
advantage,
his
health
and
his
experience,
but
on
cross-examination
he
stated
that
his
merchandise
was
the
most
important
factor
in
his
success.”
In
my
view
this
finding
is
supported
by
the
evidence.
The
main
grounds
relied
upon
in
support
of
the
appeal
were,
first,
that
the
appellant’s
earnings
were
not
11
profits”
within
the
meaning
of
the
charging
provision
of
The
Excess
Profits
Tax
Act
and
secondly,
that
even
if
such
earnings
fell
prima
facie
within
the
terms
of
such
charging
provisions
they
were
exempt
under
the
terms
of
section
7(b)
of
the
Act.
It
was
submitted
by
counsel
for
the
Respondent
that
on
the
pleadings
the
first
point
was
not
open
but
I
think
it
desirable
to
deal
with
the
appeal
on
the
assumption,
but
without
deciding,
that
the
point
is
properly
before
us.
By
section
3
of
the
Excess
Profits
Tax
Act
the
tax
claimed
is
levied
upon
the
profits
of
every
person
residing
or
ordinarily
resident
in
Canada
or
who
is
carrying
on
business
in
Canada.
The
relevant
definition
of
"profits’’
is
contained
in
section
2(g)
:—
""(g)
‘profits’
in
the
case
of
a
taxpayer
other
than
a
corporation
or
joint
stock
company,
for
any
taxation
period,
means
the
income
of
the
said
taxpayer
derived
from
carrying
on
one
or
more
businesses,
as
defined
by
section
three
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
and
before
any
deductions
are
made
therefrom
under
any
other
provisions
of
the
said
Income
War
Tax
Act;”
The
relevant
words
of
section
3
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
are
as
follows:—
“3(1)
For
the
purposes
of
this
Act,
‘income’
means
the
annual
net
profit
or
gain
or
gratuity,
whether
ascertained
and
capable
of
computation
as
being
wages,
salary,
or
other
fixed
amount,
or
unascertained
as
being
fees
or
emoluments,
or
as
being
profits
from
a
trade
or
commercial
or
financial
or
other
business
or
calling,
directly
or
indirectly
received
by
a
person
from
any
office
or
employment,
or
from
any
profession
or
calling,
or
from
any
trade,
manufacture
or
business,
as
the
case
may
be
whether
derived
from
sources
within
Canada
or
elsewhere;
and
shall
include
the
interest,
dividends
or
profits
directly
or
indirectly
received
from
money
at
interest
upon
any
security
or
without
security,
or
from
stocks,
or
from
any
other
investment,
and,
whether
such
gains
or
profits
are
divided
or
distributed
or
not,
and
also
the
annual
profit
or
gain
from
any
other
source
including
.
.
.”
It
is
suggested
that
section
3
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
divides
all
earned
income
into
three
classes
according
to
whether
it
is
received
from
(i)
any
office
or
employment
or
(ii)
any
profession
or
calling
or
(iii)
any
trade,
manufacture
or
business,
and
that
the
words
in
section
2(g)
of
the
Excess
Profits
Tax
Act
‘‘Income
derived
from
carrying
on
one
or
more
businesses’’
refer
to
income
received
from
source
(iii)
to
the
exclusion
of
that
received
from
sources
(i)
and
(ii)
;
and
that
the
income
earned
by
a
commercial
traveller
is
more
aptly
described
as
being
derived
from
a
‘‘calling’’
than
from
a
"‘business’’.
It
is
suggested
that
the
words
in
section
3
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
"profits
from
a
trade,
or
commercial
or
financial
or
other
business
or
calling”
also
show
that
the
word
‘‘business’’
is
used
in
contradistinction
from
the
word
calling”.
It
seems
to
me
from
reading
the
last-mentioned
section
as
a
whole
that
the
purpose
of
Parliament
was
not
to
subdivide
earned
income
into
classes
according
to
its
source
but
rather
to
use
words
which
would
embrace
earned
income
from
every
source.
I
do
not
think
that
the
words
‘‘business’’
or
""
calling”
are
used
in
the
section
as
terms
of
art
intended
to
define
mutually
exclusive
categories
of
sources
of
income
but
in
the
popular
and
ordinary
sense
and,
so
used,
I
think
that
the
words
‘‘profits
derived
from
a
commercial
or
financial
or
other
business’’
are
wide
enough
to
include
the
earnings
of
a
commercial
traveller.
It
was
further
argued
in
support
of
the
first
ground
of
appeal
that
when
the
Æxcess
Profits
Tax
Act
is
read
as
a
whole
it
appears
that
the
intention
of
Parliament
was
to
tax
only
such
persons
as
employ
capital
in
their
businesses
and
that
the
whole
scheme
of
the
Act
contemplates
the
taxation
of
abnormal
return
on
capital
received
during
the
life
of
the
Act.
It
appears
to
me
that
the
words
of
the
charging
section
are
too
wide
to
permit
so
restricted
an
application.
If
the
matter
were
doubtful,
a
consideration
of
the
words
of
section
7(b)
would
seem
to
indicate
that
the
fact
that
little
or
no
capital
is
employed
by
a
person
is
not
alone
sufficient
to
create
an
exemption
from
taxation
under
the
Act.
In
my
view
the
earnings
of
the
appellant
fall
within
the
terms
of
the
charging
provisions
and
are
liable
to
tax
unless
specially
exempted.
It
now
becomes
necessary
to
examine
the
second
main
ground
of
appeal,
that
the
appellant
is
entitled
to
exemption
under
the
terms
of
section
7(b)
reading
as
follows
:—
“7
.
The
following
profits
shall
not
be
liable
to
taxation
under
this
Act
:—
.
.
.
(b)
the
profits
of
a
profession
carried
on
by
an
individual
or
by
individuals
in
partnership
if
the
profits
of
the
profession
are
dependent
wholly
or
mainly
upon
his
or
their
personal
qualifications
and
if
in
the
opinion
of
the
Minister
little
or
no
capital
is
employed:
Provided
that
this
exemption
shall
not
extend
to
the
profits
of
a
commission
agent
or
person
any
part
of
whose
business
consists
in
the
making
of
contracts
on
behalf
of
others
or
the
giving
to
other
persons
of
advice
of
a
commercial
nature
in
connection
with
the
making
of
contracts
unless
the
Minister
is
satisfied
that
such
agent
is
virtually
in
the
position
of
an
employee
of
one
employer
in
which
case
this
exemption
shall
apply
and
in
any
case
the
decision
of
the
Minister
shall
be
final
and
conclusive;
.
.
.’’
Assuming,
without
deciding,
that
the
appellant’s
occupation
falls
within
the
meaning
of
the
word
"profession''
as
used
in
this
clause,
and
without
passing
upon
the
submission
of
counsel
for
the
respondent
that
the
opinion
of
the
Minister
that
little
or
no
capital
is
employed
has
not
been
obtained,
I
think
that
this
argument
cannot
prevail.
It
is
a
condition
of
the
operation
of
the
exemption
that
the
profits
of
the
person
claiming
it
be
dependent
wholly
or
mainly
upon
his
personal
qualifications.
On
this
question
of
fact
the
learned
President
has
found
against
the
appellant
and,
as
stated
above,
I
think
this
finding
is
supported
by
the
evidence.
I
therefore
do
not
find
it
necessary
to
consider
the
proviso
to
the
clause.
I
would
dismiss
the
appeal
with
costs.
Appeal
dismissed.