ANGERS,
J.:—In
his
statement
of
reasons
for
appeal
the
appellant
says:
the
appellant’s
marriage
contract
is
valid
as
to
form,
having
been
made
and
executed
in
accordance
with
the
law
of
England
where
it
was
actually
entered
into
and
signed
;
the
domicile
of
the
husband
at
the
date
of
the
marriage
and
the
matrimonial
domicile
of
the
parties
being
in
the
Province
of
Quebec,
the
rights
and
obligations
deriving
from
the
marriage
contract
are
to
be
governed
by
the
law
of
the
said
province;
according
to
the
law
of
the
Province
of
Quebec,
gifts
inter
vivos
of
present
and
future
property
can
be
validly
made
in
a
marriage
contract
(articles
778,
819
and
1257
c.c.)
and
a
donor
may
stipulate
for
the
return
to
him
of
the
property
given,
in
the
event
of
the
donee
dying
before
the
donor
(article
779
0.0.)
.
under
the
law
of
the
Province
of
Quebec,
the
legal
effect
of
a
gift
inter
vivos
is
to
divest
the
donor
by
mere
consent
of
the
parties
and
without
the
necessity
of
delivery
of
his
ownership
into
property
given
and
the
vest
the
donee
with
the
said
ownership
(articles
777
and
795
c.c.).
the
gift
from
the
appellant
to
his
wife
of
the
sum
of
$10,000
was
a
valid
and
irrevocable
disposition
inter
vivos,
duly
accepted
by
the
donee
and
fully
and
effectively
made
and
completed
long
before
the
coming
into
force
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
from
the
date
of
the
marriage
contract,
namely
June
7,
1911,
the
appellant’s
wife
became
the
legal
owner
of
the
property
given,
viz.
the
sum
of
$10,000,
the
precarious
possession
of
which
only
remained
with
the
appellant,
who,
from
that
date,
became
legally
indebted
to
his
wife
for
the
said
sum;
the
payment
by
appellant
to
his
wife,
in
1943,
of
the
sum
of
$9,000,
in
order
to
be
valid
under
the
law
of
the
Province
of
Quebec,
must
necessarily
be
related
to
the
marriage
contract
of
1911
and
both
the
said
contract
and
the
said
payment
form
one
complete
non-severable
transaction
which
cannot
be
governed
by
The
Income
War
Tax
Act
of
1917
and
the
amendments
thereto;
since
the
coming
into
force
of
paragraph
2
of
section
32
of
The
Income
War
Tax
Act
there
has
been
no
transfer
of
property
from
the
appellant
to
his
wife,
either
with
or
without
intent
to
evade
taxation,
and
there
could
have
been
no
valid
transfer
of
property
from
him
to
her
under
the
law
of
the
Province
of
Quebec
;
since
the
coming
into
force
of
section
88
of
The
Income
War
Tax
Act
and
amendments
thereto
there
has
been
no
transfer
of
property
from
the
appellant
to
his
wife
"‘by
way
of
gift
or
donation
a
similar
situation
arose
in
1933,
after
the
death
of
Kenneth
Molson
and
both
the
Exchequer
Court
and
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
held
that
the
payment
of
a
debt
arising
from
a
valid
gift
made
by
marriage
contract
was
not
a
transfer
of
property
within
the
purview
of
paragraph
2
of
section
32
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act;
wherefore
the
appellant
submits:
that
he
is
not
liable
to
income
tax
in
respect
of
the
income
derived,
since
1943,
from
the
Dominion
of
Canada
and
Province
of
Quebec
bonds
handed
over
to
his
wife
as
payment
of
his
debt
to
her;
that
he
is
not
liable
in
any
way
for
the
gift
tax
imposed
by
section
88
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
in
respect
of
the
value
of
the
said
bonds;
that
the
two
assessments
hereby
appealed
from,
dated
October
9,
1946,
for
$122.47,
and
October
29,
1946,
for
$446.24,
should
be
withdrawn
and
cancelled.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
through
his
Assistant
Deputy
Minister,
on
January
16,
1948,
affirmed
the
said
assessments
on
the
ground
that
income
tax
was
correctly
assessed
in
accordance
with
subsection
2
of
section
32
of
The
Income
War
Tax
Act
and
a
gift
tax
in
accordance
with
section
88
thereof
and
‘‘by
reason
of
other
provisions
of
The
Income
War
Tax
Act
f
\
A
notice
of
dissatisfaction,
dated
February
5,
1948,
was
mailed
by
the
appellant
to
the
Minister
in
compliance
with
the
provisions
of
section
60
of
The
Income
War
Tax
Act.
After
reiterating
the
facts
recited
in
the
notice
of
appeal
and
reaffirming
the
statutory
reasons
for
appeal
therein
contained,
the
appellant
adds:
that
the
transfer
of
property
involved
herein
was
legally
effected
and
accepted
prior
to
his
marriage
with
Helen
Maffett,
so
that
there
never
was
and
could
not
be
a
transfer
of
property
between
consorts
as
contemplated
by
subsection
2
of
section
32
of
the
Act;
that
the
payment
by
him
to
his
wife,
in
1943,
of
$9,000,
mentioned
in
the
notice
of
appeal,
is
not
a
transfer
of
property
within
the
meaning
of
said
subsection
2
of
section
32,
nor
is
it
a
transfer
by
way
of
gift
or
donation
within
the
meaning
of
section
88.
In
his
reply
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
through
the
Deputy
Minister
of
National
Revenue
for
Taxation,
denies
the
allegations
in
the
notice
of
appeal
and
notice
of
dissatisfaction
in.
so
far
as
incompatible
with
the
statements
contained
in
his
decision
and
affirms
the
assessment
as
levied.
The
attorney
for
appellant
produced
a
copy
of
a
deed
of
deposit
done
and
passed
before
W.
Noble
Campbell,
Notary
Public,
on
July
31,
1911,
and
of
an
indenture
of
agreement
or
contract
of
marriage
entered
into
between
Alfred
Curzon
Dobell,
of
St.
Colomba
of
Sillery,
Province
of
Quebec,
and
Helen
Maffett,
of
the
City
of
Kingston,
County
of
Dublin,
Ireland,
on
June
7,
1911
;
a
copy
of
those
two
documents
was
marked
as
exhibit
1.
The
marriage
contract
is
valid
accordingly
to
article
7
3.0.;
its
validity
is
admitted
in
paragraph
1
of
the
defence.
The
matrimonial
domicile
of
appellant
and
his
wife
has
always
been
in
the
Province
of
Quebec.
Clause
1
of
the
marriage
contract
stipulates
separation
of
property;
it
reads
thus:
"‘That
there
shall
be
no
community
of
property
(communauté
de
biens)
between
the
said
intended
consorts,
any
law,
usage
or
custom
of
the
said
Province
of
Quebec
or
of
any
other
Province,
State
or
Country
to
the
contrary
notwithstanding,
and
the
said
Alfred
Curzon
Dobell
and
Helen
Maffett
shall
be
separate
as
to
property
(séparés
de
biens)
and
the
property
now
belonging
or
which
may
hereafter
belong
or
accrue
to
either
of
them
shall
be
and
continue
the
sole
and
distinct
property
of
each
respectively,
and
neither
of
them
shall
be
liable
for
the
debts
of
the
other.’’
Clause
6
relating
to
the
donation
of
the
sum
of
$10,000
is
worded
as
follows:
"‘In
further
consideration
of
the
renunciation
aforesaid
and
of
the
Love
and
Affection
which
he
beareth
towards
her,
the
said
Alfred
Curzon
Dobell
did
and
doth
hereby
give
and
grant
unto
the
said
Helen
Maffett
accepting
thereof
the
sum
of
Ten
thousand
dollars
($10,000)
payable
from
time
to
time
by
instalments
at
the
option
of
the
said
Alfred
Curzon
Dobell
as
his
means
shall
permit,
during
the
continuation
of
the
said
intended
marriage,
and
which
said
sum
of
Ten
thousand
dollars
shall
be
a
first
claim
upon
the
following
described
property
of
the
said
Alfred
Curzon
Dobell
which
did
and
doth
hereby
for
the
purpose
of
securing
the
said
amount
and
each
and
every
instalments
thereof
unto
the
said
Helen
Maffett,
bind,
pledge,
mortgage
and
hypothecate
unto
her
the
said
property,
that
is
to
say.’’
The
designation
of
the
property
follows;
I
do
not
deem
it
necessary
to
reproduce
it.
Clause
6
then
contains
this
provision:
“And
the
present
mortgage
is
hereby
granted
as
aforesaid
in
order
to
secure
unto
the
said
Helen
Maffett
the
absolute
and
undisputed
possession
of
the
present
gift
of
Ten
thousand
dollars
which
is
hereby
declared
to
be
made
by
way
of
aliment
and
not
liable
to
seizure
for
any
of
the
debts
of
her
the
said
Helen
Maffett.’’
Clause
7
provides
that,
in
the
event
of
the
said
Helen
Maffett
predeceasing
her
husband
without
issue
of
their
intended
marriage
surviving
her,
all
the
linen,
china
and
glassware
and
the
sum
of
money
or
the
investments
representing
the
same
hereby
given
shall
revert
to
the
said
Alfred
Curzon
Dobell
in
full
ownership
from
the
time
of
the
death
of
the
said
Helen
Maffett.
By
deed
passed
before
Yves
Montreuil,
N.P.,
on
May
4,
1943,
a
copy
whereof
was
filed
as
exhibit
2,
Helen
Maffett
declared
to
have
received
from
the
appellant
the
sum
of
$10,000
in
full
payment
of
a
mortgage
for
the
same
amount
by
the
said
Dobell
in
her
favour
under
and
in
virtue
of
the
marriage
settlement
dated
at
Leeds,
Yorkshire,
England,
on
June
7,
1911,
of
which
a
copy
was
marked
as
exhibit
1.
The
deed
states
that
in
consideration
of
this
payment
the
said
Helen
Maffett
grants
a
release
pure
and
simple
and
requests
from
the
registrar
of
the
said
registration
division
the
cancellation
of
the
hypothecary
inscriptions
of
the
said
deed
in
her
favour.
The
case
is
governed
by
the
civil
code
of
the
Province
of
Quebec,
particularly
articles
754,
755,
819,
821
and
1257.
The
donation
inter
vivos
of
the
sum
of
$10,000
made
by
Alfred
Curzon
Dobell
to
his
future
wife
Helen
Maffett,
by
their
marriage
contract,
is
legal
and
valid.
Article
755
c.c.
defines
the
gift
inter
vivos
thus:
"‘Gift
inter
vivos
is
an
act
by
which
the
donor
divests
himself,
by
gratuitous
title,
of
the
ownership
of
a
thing,
in
favour
of
the
donee,
whose
acceptance
is
requisite
and
renders
the
contract
perfect.
This
acceptance
makes
it
irrevocable,
saving
the
cases
provided
for
by
law,
or
a
valid
resolutive
condition.''
Article
819
0.0.
enacts:
"
1
Subject
to
the
same
rules,
when
particular
exceptions
do
not
apply,
future
consorts
may
likewise
by
their
contract
of
marriage
give
to
each
other,
or
one
to
the
other,
or
to
the
children
to
be
born
of
their
marriage,
property
either
present
or
future.''
Article
821
0.0.
stipulates
that
gifts
of
present
property
by
contracts
of
marriage
are,
like
all
others,
subject
to
acceptance
inter
vivos.
It
adds
that
the
acceptance
is
presumed
in
the
cases
mentioned
in
the
second
section
of
this
chapter,
namely
Chapter
Second.
Article
1257
provides
as
follows:
"All
kinds
of
agreements
may
be
lawfully
made
in
contracts
of
marriage,
even
those
which,
in
any
other
act
inter
vivos,
would
be
void
;
such
as
the
renunciation
of
successions
which
have
not
yet
devolved,
the
gift
of
future
property,
the
conventional
appointment
of
an
heir,
and
other
dispositions
in
contemplation
of
death.
‘
‘
Alfred
Curzon
Dobell
and
his
wife
Helen
Maffett
are
separate
as
to
property
in
virtue
of
their
marriage
contract.
The
wife
separate
as
to
property
has
the
full
ownership
of
her
property,
retains
the
entire
administration
of
it
and
has
the
free
enjoyment
of
her
revenues.
Article
1422
0.
0.
stipulates:
"When
the
consorts
have
stipulated
by
their
marriage
contract
that
they
shall
be
separate
as
to
property,
the
wife
retains
the
entire
administration
of
her
property
moveable
and
immoveable,
the
free
enjoyment
of
her
revenues
and
the
right
to
alienate,
without
authorization,
her
moveable
property.
She
cannot,
without
authorization,
alienate
her
immoveables,
or
accept
a
gift
of
immoveables.''
The
marriage
contract,
as
already
said,
was
duly
registered.
The
donation
therein
stipulated
was
unquestionably
made
in
good
faith
and
not
for
the
purpose
of
evading
taxation,
as
it
was
effected
prior
to
the
coming
into
force
of
The
Income
War
Tax
Act,
1917,
on
September
20,
1917.
The
claim
of
the
Minister
is
based
upon
subsection
2
of
section
32
of
the
said
Income
War
Tax
Act
(R.S.C.,
1927,
chap.
97).
Prior
to
the
revision
of
the
statutes
in
1927
subsection
2
of
section
32
was
paragraph
(b)
of
subsection
4
of
section
4
as
enacted
by
16-17
Geo.
V,
chap.
10.
Subsection
2
of
section
32
and
paragraph
(b)
of
subsection
4
of
section
4
are
literally
the
same
and
read
thus:
*
Where
a
husband
transfers
property
to
his
wife,
or
vice
versa,
the
husband
or
the
wife,
as
the
case
may
be,
shall
nevertheless
be
liable
to
be
taxed
on
the
income
derived
from
such
property
or
from
property
substituted
therefor
as
if
such
transfer
had
not
been
made.”
it
seems
to
me
evident
that
the
object
of
subsection
2
of
section
32
is,
as,
before
the
revision
of
the
statutes
in
1927,
the
object
of
paragraph
(b)
of
subdivision
4
of
section
4
was,
to
tax
in
the
hands
of
transferor
property
transferred
for
the
purpose
of
evading
taxation.
The
grant
made
by
Alfred
Curzon
Dobell
to
his
future
wife
was
not
a
transfer
to
evade
taxation
and
it
is
not,
in
my
judgment,
subject
to
the
provisions
of
subsection
2
of
section
32
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act.
It
was
effected
by
said
Dobell
in
fulfilment
of
the
donation
of
$10,000
which
he
made
and
had
the
right
to
make
to
his
wife
by
his
marriage
contract.
Counsel
for
appellant
relied
on
the
case
of
Molson
et
al.
v.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
[1938-39]
C.T.C.
12,
[1937]
Kix.
C.R.
55.
The
material
facts
in
that
case
were
very
similar
to
those
existing
in
the
present
one.
The
testamentary
executors
of
one
Kenneth
Molson,
of
Montreal,
appealed
from
the
assessments
dated
April
11,
1933,
whereby
additional
taxes
were
levied
against
the
estate
for
the
years
ending
December
31,
1925
to
1931
inclusive,
the
said
assessments
having
been,
as
usual,
affirmed
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue.
The
headnote,
fairly
accurate
and
comprehensive,
contains,
after
a
short
recital
of
the
facts,
this
summary
of
the
decision:
‘“Held:
That
the
conveyance
made
by
Kenneth
Molson
to
his
wife
was
not
a
transfer
to
evade
taxation;
it
was
made
in
fulfilment
of
his
marriage
contract
and
from
the
date
of
transfer
he
had
no
further
interest
in
the
shares
transferred
to
his
wife
and
was
no
longer
liable
to
taxation
on
the
income
derived
therefrom.”’
The
Minister
appealed;
the
appeal
was
dismissed,
[1938-39]
C.T.C.
20,
[1938]
S.C.R.
213.
Counsel
for
respondent
pointed
out
that
four
members
of
the
Supreme
Court
had
not
expressed
any
opinion
on
the
question
set
forth
in
the
judgment
a
quo
and
that
Cannon,
J.,
alone
had
dealt
with
it.
I
do
not
think
that
this
can
affect
the
merit
of
the
judgment
appealed
from,
if
merit
there
be.
The
appeal
of
the
executors
was
allowed
and
the
assessments
set
aside.
The
reasons
of
Duff,
C.J.,
Davis
and
Hudson,
J
J.,
are
summed
up
in
the
abstract
of
the
judgment,
which
reads
in
part
as
follows
:
"Sec.
32
of
e.
97,
R.S.C.,
1927,
had
not
the
effect
of
making
M.
liable
to
be
taxed
on
the
income
derived
in
1930
from
the
property
transferred
by
him
to
his
wife
in
1925,
in
the
circumstances
mentioned,
because
s.
32,
as
it
stands
in
the
Revised
Statutes
can
have
no
application
to
properties
transferred
prior
to
the
original
enactment
of
it
in
1926.1’
Cannon,
J.,
in
his
notes,
after
relating
the
facts,
expresses
the
following
opinion
(p.
224,
in
fine)
:
*
‘Prior
to
the
institution
of
the
appeal,
it
was
agreed
between
the
parties
that
the
decision
of
the
Exchequer
Court
with
reference
to
the
notice
of
assessment
No.
88893
for
the
taxation
period
for
1930
shall
apply
to
and
include
six
similar
notices
of
assessment,
all
bearing
date
the
11th
April,
1933,
and
covering
the
other
taxation
periods
included
from
the
23rd
March,
1925,
to
the
31st
December,
1931.’’
For
that
period
of
1930,
we
must
apply
to
the
above
facts
parags.
2
of
sec.
32,
R.S.C.,
1927,
e.
97,
which
says:
(Text
of
paragraph
2
of
section
32,
R.S.C.
1927,
chap.
97
quoted
)
“I
take
it
that
the
‘‘transfer
of
property’’
means
and
contemplates
a
valid
and
real
transfer.
This
reaction,
when
property
is
transferred
gratuitously
between
husband
and
wife
or
vice
versa,
cannot
apply
to
consorts
governed
by
the
Quebec
law
.
.
.”
(Article
1265
:.c.
referred
to)
In
order
to
favour
and
encourage
marriages,
article
1257
of
the
Code
says:
“All
kinds
of
agreements
may
be
lawfully
made
in
contracts
of
marriage,
even
those
which,
in
any
other
act
inter
vivos,
would
be
void;
such
as
the
renunciation
of
successions
which
have
not
yet
devolved,
the
gift
of
future
property,
the
conventional
appointment
of
an
heir,
and
other
dispositions
in
contemplation
of
death.’’
Article
118
reads
as
follows
:
"‘Present
property
only
can
be
given
by
acts
inter
vivos.
All
gifts
of
future
property
by
such
acts
are
void,
as
made
in
contemplation
of
death.
Gifts
comprising
both
present
and
future
property
are
void
as
to
the
latter,
but
the
cumulation
does
not
render
void
the
gift
of
the
present
property.
The
prohibition
contained
in
this
article
does
not
extend
to
gifts
made
in
a
contract
of
marriage.
Both
litigants
have
considered
the
transfer
as
valid
and
binding
on
the
parties.
It
appears
from
the
above
quotations
that,
in
order
to
be
valid
and
binding,
the
transfer
made
in
1925
must
necessarily
be
related
and
linked
to
the
antenuptial
contract
of
March,
1918,
whereby
was
created
the
obligation
and
indebtedness
of
the
future
husband
to
his
future
wife,
and
the
deed
of
conveyance
of
the
28th
March,
1925,
which
evidences
the
payments,
satisfaction
and
discharge
of
this
pre-nuptial
obligation
cannot
be
considered
apart
from
the
other,
as
they
must,
to
be
valid
and
legal
under
the
law
of
Quebec,
form
but
one
complete
non-severable
transaction.
The
legislation
which
is
now
sought
to
be
applied
originated
in
1917,
years
after
the
ante-nuptial
contract;
and
subsection
4
of
section
4
of
7
&
8
Geo.
V,
c.
28,
applied
only
to
a
person
who,
"‘after
the
first
day
of
August,
1917,
has
reduced
his
income’’
by
the
transfer
of
any
movable
or
immovable
property
to
such
person’s
wife
or
husband,
as
the
case
may
be,
if
the
Minister
was
satisfied
that
such
transfer
or
assignment
was
made
for
the
purpose
of
evading
the
taxes
imposed
under
the
Act.’’
I
deem
fair
to
note
incidentally
that
my
judgment
in
this
case
was
disapproved
by
the
President
of
the
Court
in
The
Executors
of
the
estate
of
David
F
ask
en
and
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1948]
C.T.C.
265,
[1948]
Ex.
C.R.
580,
as
was
also
that
of
the
Supreme
Court.
With
due
deference,
I
must
say
that
I
adhere
to
my
opinion.
In
the
ease
of
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
v.
National
Trust
Company
Limited
[1947]
C.T.C.
201,
[1946]
Ex.
C.R.
650,
an
appeal
was
made
by
the
company
‘from
an
item
in
an
assessment
under
the
Dominion
Succession
Duty
Act,
4-5
Geo.
VI,
chap.
14,
as
amended.
The
item
in
question
consisted
of
certain
securities
in
a
trust
fund
established
by
a
deed
of
settlement
dated
December
8,
1930,
to
take
effect
on
January
1,
1931,
between
one
Edward
Rogers
Wood,
referred
to
as
the
settlor,
and
F.
Fisher
and
Hastie
as
trustees
and
the
daughter
of
the
settlor,
Mildred
P.
S.
Fleming,
referred
to
as
the
donee.
The
deed
of
settlement
was
amended
on
February
1,
1937.
The
Domimon
Succession
Duty
Act
was
assented
to
on
June
14,
1941.
The
settlor
died
on
June
16,
1941.
In
an
Act
to
amend
the
Dominion
Succession
Duty
Act,
6-7
Geo.
VI,
chap.
25,
assented
to
on
August
1,
1942,
there
is
a
clause
relating
to
the
application
of
the
Act
which
reads
thus:
"‘11.
The
provision
of
this
Act
shall
apply
retrospectively
to
successions
derived
from
persons
dying
on
or
after
the
fourteenth
day
of
June,
one
thousand
nine
hundred
and
forty-
one.”
O’Connor,
J.,
in
his
reasons
for
judgment,
stated
that
the
Dominion
Succession
Duty
Act
must
be
considered
in
the
form
in
which
it
stood
at
the
date
of
the
settlor’s
death.
The
subject-matter
of
the
tax
is
obviously
not
the
same
as
in
the
case
now
pending
and
the
law
applicable
thereto
is
different.
The
underlying
principle,
however,
is
similar
and
for
this
reason
I
believe
that
the
judgment
of
O’Connor,
J:,
is
relevant.
It
was
affirmed
by
the
Supreme
Court,
[1948]
C.T.C.
339,
[1949]
S.C.R.
127,
131.
In
the
matter
of
The
Royal
Trust
Company
et
al
and
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1948]
C.T.C.
21,
[1948]
Ex.
C.R.
34,
the
headnote
of
the
judgment
of
Cameron,
J.,
fully
comprehensive,
reads
as
follows:
"
1
By
an
ante-nuptial
contract
dated
May
25,
1916,
F.
obligated
himself
inter
alia
during
the
existence
of
his
intended
marriage
to
D.
to
pay
to
her
the
sum
of
$20,000
for
her
own
use
and
enjoyment.
F.
and
D.
were
married
on
June
1,
1916.
F.
died
on
April
23,
1943,
predeceasing
his
wife.
By
his
will
he
had
directed
his
executors
to
pay
to
his
wife
any
indebtedness
remaining
unpaid
under
the
terms
of
the
marriage
contract.
The
executors
claimed
a
deduction
from
succession
duties
of
the
said
sum
of
$20,000,
none
of
which
F.
had
paid
to
his
wife
during
his
lifetime.
This
deduction
was
disallowed
by
the
respondent
and
the
executors
appealed
to
this
Court.
Held:
That
any
property
transferred,
settled
or
agreed
to
be
transferred
or
settled
in
consideration
of
marriage,
prior
to
April
29,
1941,
is
not
a
succession
within
the
meaning
of
the
Dominion
Succession
Duty
Act.
2.
That
the
bare
possibility
of
future
rights
to
community
property
and
to
dower,
in
non-existing
estates,
is
not
a
subject
of
value
at
the
date
of
an
ante-nuptial
contract,
and
the
release
of
such
a
possibility
is
not
one
‘‘for
full
consideration
in
money’s
worth’’
within
s.
8(2)
(a)
of
the
Dominion
Succession
Duty
Act.’’
The
judgment
of
Mr.
Justice
Cameron
was
affirmed
by
the
Supreme
Court,
[1950]
C.T.C.
21,
[1949]
S.C.R.
727.
The
summary
of
the
latter
judgment,
fairly
exact
and
complete,
is
thus
worded
:
“By
antenuptial
contract
made
in
1916,
the
husband
obligated
himself
during
the
existence
of
his
intended
marriage,
to
pay
his
wife
$20,000,
in
consideration
of
her
renunciation
of
community
and
dower.
This
sum
remained
unpaid
at
the
husband’s
death
in
1948.
His
executors
claimed
to
deduct
this
from
the
value
of
his
estate
for
the
purpose
of
the
Succession
Duty
Act
of
the
Dominion.
The
deduction
was
disallowed
by
the
Minister
but
restored
by
the
Exchequer
Court.
Held:
(Kerwin,
J.,
dissenting),
that
the
agreement
did
not
fall
within
the
definition
of
‘‘succession’’
in
s.
2(m)
of
the
Dominion
Succession
Duty
Act.
Held,
further
(Kerwin,
J.,
dissenting),
that
property
transferred
or
agreed
to
be
transferred
in
consideration
of
marriage,
prior
to
April
29,
1941,
is
not
deemed
to
be
a
“succession”
under
s.
3(1)
(j)
of
the
Act.
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