CAMERON,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
assessment
to
succession
duties
under
the
Dominion
Succession
Duty
Act
(Statutes
of
Canada,
1940-41,
ec.
14)
and
dated
March
4,
1947.
The
appellant
is
a
beneficiary
under
the
last
will
and
testament
of
John
S.
Chisholm,
late
of
Prince
Albert,
Saskatchewan,
retired
physician,
who
died
on
September
2,
1945.
By
the
terms
of
his
will,
the
trustees
thereof,
after
providing
for
payment
of
his
debts,
funeral
and
testamentary
expenses,
were
directed
to
invest
the
whole
of
the
net
estate,
to
pay
one-half
the
net
income
arising
therefrom
to
his
sister,
Mrs.
Collison,
during
her
lifetime,
and
subject
thereto
the
will
then
provided
as
follows:
"I
WILL,
DEVISE
AND
BEQUEATH
the
rest
and
residue
of
my
estate,
both
real
and
personal,
wheresoever
situate,
of
which
I
may
die
possessed
or
entitled
to,
or
over
which
I
may
have
power
of
appointment,
unto
the
Governors
of
the
University
of
Toronto,
of
the
said
City
of
Toronto
for
the
use
of
the
Faculty
of
Medicine
of
the
said
University.
One-half
of
the
said
net
income
of
my
estate
shall
be
paid
by
my
trustees
to
the
said
Governors
of
the
University
of
Toronto
for
the
said
purpose
during
the
lifetime
of
my
said
sister;
and
upon
the
death
of
my
said
sister
the
surviving
trustees
shall
pay
over
to
the
said
Governors
for
the
said
purpose
the
rest
and
residue
of
my
estate,
including
any
undistributed
income
thereof.”?
The
aggregate
net
value
of
the
estate,
as
shown
by
the
assessment,
was
$495,468.06.
Of
this
amount
$90,181.43
was
attributed
to
the
life
interest
of
the
deceased’s
sister
and
the
balance
of
$405,286.63
was
determined
as
the
value
of
the
gifts
to
the
appellant.
As
of
September
2,
1945—the
date
of
Dr.
Chisholm’s
death—
the
Dominion
Succession
Duty
Act
contained
the
following
provisions:
"17.
(1)
From
the
dutiable
value
of
any
property
included
in
a
succession
the
following
exemptions
shall
be
deducted
and
no
duty
shall
be
leviable
in
respect
thereof
:
(d)
where
the
successor
is
a
charitable
organization
in
Canada
operated
exclusively
as
such
and
not
for
the
benefit,
gain
or
profit
of
any
person,
member
or
share-holder
thereof,
provided
this
exemption
shall
apply
only
to
an
amount
not
exceeding
fifty
per
centum
of
the
value
of
all
the
property
included
in
the
aggregate
net
value;
and
provided
further
that
where
more
than
one
charitable
organization
is
entitled
to
exemption
hereunder
each
such
organization
shall
be
entitled
to
that
proportion
of
the
total
exemption
applicable
in
the
case
of
the
total
number
of
charitable
organizations
entitled
as
the
value
of
the
property
included
in
its
succession
bears
to
the
total
value
of
the
dutiable
property
divisible
amongst
the
organizations,
(e)
where
the
successor
is
the
Dominion
of
Canada
or
any
province
or
political
subdivision
thereof.’’
The
respondent,
in
assessing
the
estate
to
duty,
considered
that
the
gifts
to
the
appellant
came
within
the
provisions
of
section
7(1)
(d)
and
therefore
deducted
$247,734.03
(being
fifty
per
centum
of
the
value
of
all
the
property
included
in
the
aggregate
net
value)
from
$405,286.63
(the
dutiable
value
of
the
property
included
in
the
succession
to
the
appellant),
and
assessed
the
balance
of
$157,552.60
to
tax,
such
tax
amounting
to
$29,068.46.
Pending
the
issue
of
the
formal
assessment,
the
trustees
of
the
estate,
without
the
knowledge
or
approval
of
the
appellant,
paid
almost
the
entire
amount
as
now
claimed
in
the
assessment;
and
following
the
notice
of
assessment
they
paid
the
balance,
apparently
under
protest,
and
without
prejudice
to
the
rights
of
the
appellant.
No
difficulty
now
arises
in
that
connection,
it
being
agreed
by
the
respondent
that
if
the
appeal
herein
should
be
allowed,
the
payments
so
made
in
reference
to
the
benefits
of
the
appellant
would
be
refunded
to
the
trustees.
The
appellant,
considering
that
the
benefits
to
it
came
within
the
provisions
of
section
7(1)
(e)
(supra),
and
were
therefore
totally
exempt,
launched
an
appeal
from
the
assessment.
The
respondent
affirmed
the
assessment
;
notice
of
dissatisfaction
was
given
by
the
appellant
and
by
his
reply
the
respondent
affirmed
the
assessment
as
levied.
By
order
of
the
Court,
pleadings
were
delivered.
The
sole
matter
for
consideration,
therefore,
is
the
claim
of
the
appellant
that
the
gifts
to
it
fell
within
the
ambit
of
section
7(1)
(e)
and
that,
therefore,
they
are
totally
exempt
from
duty.
To
be
successful
in
its
appeal,
the
appellant
must
establish
that
the
"‘successor’’
is
the
Dominion
of
Canada
or
any
province
or
political
subdivision
thereof.
"‘Successor’’
is
defined
by
section
2(n)
as
‘‘the
person
entitled
under
a
succession’’.
“Succession”
is
defined
by
section
2(m)
as
follows:
‘*
“Succession”
means
every
past
or
future
disposition
of
property,
by
reason
whereof
any
person
has
or
shall
become
beneficially
entitled
to
any
property
or
the
income
thereof
upon
the
death
of
any
deceased
person,
either
immediately
or
after
any
interval,
either
certainly
or
contingently,
and
either
originally
or
by
way
of
substitutive
limitation,
and
every
devolution
by
law
of
any
beneficial
interest
in
property,
or
the
income
thereof,
upon
the
death
of
any
such
deceased
person,
to
any
other
person
in
possession
or
expectancy,
and
also
includes
any
disposition
of
property
deemed
by
this
Act
to
be
included
in
a
succession.
’’
Bearing
in
mind
the
definition
of
‘‘successor’’,
it
seems
abundantly
clear
that
the
successor
to
these
benefits
under
Dr.
Chisholm’s
will
is
‘‘the
Governors
of
the
University
of
Toronto’’
(hereinafter
to
be
referred
to
as
‘‘the
Board’’).
The
Board
alone
is
entitled
thereto.
It
alone
could
enforce
payment
of
its
benefits
by
the
trustees
of
the
will
and
it
alone
is
beneficially
entitled
thereto.
Now,
that
being
so,
if
the
appellant
is
to
succeed
it
must
establish
that
it,
i.e.,
the
Governors
of
the
University
of
Toronto,
is
the
Province
of
Ontario,
or
a
political
subdivision
thereof.
To
put
the
problem
in
that
way
is
to
supply
the
answer
thereto.
Whatever
the
relationship
between
the
Board
and
the
Province
of
Ontario
may
be—and
that
will
be
considered
later—
the
Board
is
not
the
Province
of
Ontario
and
the
Province
of
Ontario
is
not
the
Board.
Nor
in
the
view
that
I
have
taken
as
to
the
meaning
of
the
words
“political
subdivision’’
can
it
be
said
that
the
appellant,
i.e.,
the
Governors
of
the
University
of
Toronto—is
‘‘a
political
subdivision
thereof’’.
I
do
not
think
it
is
necessary
for
the
purposes
of
this
case
to
determine
whether
the
“political
subdivision”
must
be
a
political
subdivision
of
the
Dominion
or
of
a
province
thereof.
In
the
Shorter
Oxford
English
Dictionary,
2nd
Ed.,
“political”
is
defined
as
‘‘of,
belonging
or
pertaining
to,
the
state,
its
government
and
policy
’
’
and
*
"
concerned
or
dealing
with
politics
or
the
science
of
government’’.
in
the
same
value,
"‘subdivision’’
is
defined
as
"‘one
of
the
parts
into
which
a
whole
is
subdivided;
part
of
a
part;
a
section
resulting
from
a
further
division’’.
In
vol.
49,
Corpus
Juris,
at
pp.
1074
and
1077,
the
expressions
"‘political
division’’
and
Apolitical
subdivision’’
are
defined
as
follows:
"
‘Political
Division
of
a
State.—A
division
formed
for
the
more
effectual
or
convenient
exercise
of
political
power
within
the
political
localities.’
‘Political
Subdivision.—
1.
In
General.
A
term
implying
a
division
of
a
parent
entity
for
some
governmental
purpose.
2.
Of
a
County.
A
subdivision
of
a
county
exercising
some
function
of
government.
3.
Of
a
State.
A
subdivision
of
a
state
to
which
has
been
delegated
certain
functions
of
local
government.’
”
It
is
further
stated
therein
that
the
distinctive
marks
of
a
division
or
subdivision
of
a
state
are
that
such
divisions
embrace
each
a
certain
territory
and
its
inhabitants,
organized
for
the
public
advantage
and
not
in
the
interests
of
particular
individuals
or
classes,
that
their
chief
design
is
the
exercise
of
governmental
functions,
and
that
the
electors
residing
within
each
is
to
some
extent
committed
the
powers
of
local
government,
to
be
wielded
either
mediately
or
immediately,
for
the
benefit
of
the
people
there
residing.
In
my
opinion,
the
term
"‘political
subdivision’’
as
used
in
section
7(1)
(e)
refers
to
a
geographical
part
of
the
larger
entities—the
Dominion
or
any
of
its
provinces—set
aside
for
the
purposes
of
local
government
by
the
inhabitants
thereof.
The
Board—set
up
by
provincial
statute
to
manage
the
affairs
of
a
provincial
university—and
which
university
was
established
to
carry
out
part
of
the
educational
programme
of
the
Province
of
Ontario—does
not
fall
within
that
description
of
a
political
subdivision.
The
word
"‘is''
in
subsection
7(1)(e)
would
seem
clearly
to
indicate
that
the
successor
must
be
identical
with
one
or
other
of
the
specified
entities.
That
identity
does
not
exist
in
the
case
at
bar.
My
conclusion,
therefore,
is
that
the
Board
is
not
the
Dominion
of
Canada
or
any
province
or
political
subdivision
thereof.
That
finding,
in
my
opinion,
is
sufficient
in
itself
to
dispose
of
the
appeal.
However,
as
I
have
intimated
above,
counsel
for
the
appellant
relied
strongly
on
the
relationship
existing
between
the
Board
and
the
Province
of
Ontario
which
he
submitted
was
of
such
a
nature
that
the
Board
was,
in
fact,
the
agent
of
the
Crown.
His
submission,
I
think,
can
best
be
put
in
his
own
words.
He
said
:
“The
question
involved
is
a
comparatively
narrow
one.
It
is
as
to
whether
or
not
we
fall
within
the
provisions
of
Section
7(1)(e).
In
other
words
the
Governors
of
the
University
of
Toronto,
in
my
submission,
are
the
‘province’
or
a
‘political
subdivision
thereof’.
Our
submission
is
that
their
status
is
that
of
the
Crown
in
the
right
of
the
Province
of
Ontario—
the
Governors,
who,
by
the
Act,
are
incorporated,
being
the
agents
of
the
Crown
to
administer
the
affairs
of
the
Provincial
University
and
I
think,
my
lord,
perhaps
I
should
say
that
in
my
opinion,
from
a
consideration
of
the
University
Act,
it
is
made
abundantly
clear
that
the
control
of
the
University
is
a
function
of
the
government—the
work
of
the
University
being
an
integral
part
of
the
public
educational
system
of
the
province—the
University
being
actually
an
extension
of
the
Department
of
Education
of
the
province
and/or
a
political
subdivision
of
the
provinee
within
the
meaning
of
section
7,
subsection
1(e)
of
the
Succession
Duty
Aet.’’
Briefly,
the
submission
of
the
appellant
is
that
the
control
exercised
by
the
Province
of
Ontario
over
the
Board
and
the
affairs
of
the
University
is
such
that
the
Board
is,
in
fact,
the
agent
of
the
Crown
and
that
the
status
of
the
appellant
is
that
of
the
Crown
in
right
of
the
Provinee
of
Ontario.
Reliance
is
placed
on
the
provisions
of
The
University
Act,
R.S.O.,
1937,
e.
372,
Exhibit
I
(originally
enacted
as
e.
55
of
the
Statutes
of
1906),
hereinafter
to
be
referred
to
as
The
University
Act.
It
is
of
interest
to
note
that
by
the
Act
of
1906—which
for
the
first
time
set
up
the
Board
as
the
governing
body
of
the
University—very
substantial
changes
were
brought
about.
Reference
to
c.
298,
R.S.O.
1897,
indicates
that
a
large
measure
of
control
over
the
affairs
of
the
University
was
then
in
the
Crown.
The
Lieutenant-Governor
was
the
Visitor
with
commission
powers
to
be
exercised
under
the
Great
Seal.
The
President,
professors,
lecturers,
teachers,
officers
and
all
servants
were
appointed
by
the
Lieutenant-Governor
and
held
office
during
his
pleasure.
The
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
appointed
nine
members
to
the
Senate
and
all
statutes
enacted
by
that
body
and
all
regulations
passed
by
the
Council
were
invalid
until
approved
by
the
Visitor.
The
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
determined
the
fees
to
be
paid
by
students
in
attendance.
All
endowments
were
vested
‘in
the
Crown:
The
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
was
empowered
to
make
regulations
respecting
the
retirement
of
the
teaching
staff
and
the
officers
and
servants
of
the
University,
subject
to
the
approval
of
the
Legislative
Assembly.
Following
a
report
of
the
Royal
Commission
in
1906,
which
recommended
the
propriety
of
divorcing
the
affairs
of
the
University
from
the
direct
superintendence
of
political
powers
and
which
suggested
a
proposal
‘‘to
delegate
the
powers
of
the
Crown
to
a
Board
of
Governors
dictated
by
the
desire
to
impart
strength,
continuity
and
freedom
of
action
to
the
supreme
governing
body,”
The
University
Act
was
enacted
in
1906.
By
that
Act
there
was
constituted
a
Board
of
Governors
of
the
University
and
University
College,
declared
to
be
a
body
corporate
with
all
the
rights,
privileges
and
powers
mentioned
in
subsection
(25)
of
section
8
of
The
Interpretation
Act,
and
with
the
power
to
hold
real
property
for
the
purposes
of
the
University
without
licensein-mortmain,
and
the
Board
was
declared
to
be
the
successor
of
the
former
‘‘Trustees
of
the
University
of
Toronto’’,
with
the
enlarged
rights,
powers
and
privileges
conferred
by
the
Act.
It
is
not
necessary
to
state
all
the
powers
thus
conferred
on
the
Board,
many
of
which
were
similar
to
the
powers
contained
in
The
University
Act,
R.S.O.
1937,
c.
372,
which
will
be
considered
later.
It
is
sufficient
to
say
that
in
addition
to
a
great
many
specified
powers
it
contained
(s.
37)
the
section
which
now
appears
as
section
29
of
the
1937
Act,
which
is
as
follows:
“29.
The
government,
conduct,
management
and
control
of
the
University
and
of
University
College,
and
of
the
property,
revenues,
business
and
affairs
thereof,
shall
be
vested
in
the
Board.
‘
‘
Exhibit
1
is
The
University
Act,
R.S.O.
1937,
¢.
372.
By
that
Act
the
Board
is
made
the
supreme
governing
body
of
the
University.
By
section
10,
all
property
of
the
University
and
University
College,
and
all
property
conveyed,
devised
or
bequeathed
to
them
or
any
faculty
or
department
thereof,
is
vested
in
the
Board,
subject
always
to
any
trust
affecting
the
same.
In
addition
to
the
general
management
and
control
provided
for
in
section
29
(supra),
the
following
powers
are
conferred
on
the
Board.
In
the
field
of
management
it
has
power
to
appoint
the
president,
officers,
employees
and
servants
of
the
University,
and
upon
the
recommendation
of
the
president
to
appoint
the
deans
and
all
members
of
the
teaching
staff,
to
remove
all
members
of
the
teaching
staff,
employees
and
servants,
to
establish
faculties
and
departments,
to
provide
for
federation
and
affiliation
of
the
University
with
any
other
college
in
Ontario,
to
fix
the
student
fees,
to
regulate
and
manage
the
residences
and
dining
halls,
to
enter
into
arrangements
with
secondary
and
primary
schools.
In
the
field
of
property
it
is
given
power
to
invest
all
monies
coming
into
its
hands,
subject
to
the
limitations
of
any
trust,
to
acquire
and
hold
real
and
personal
property,
however
acquired,
to
purchase
and
acquire
all
such
property
as
it
deems
necessary
for
the
University,
to
sell
all
real
property
of
the
Board,
and
to
lease
the
same
for
a
period
not
exceeding
twenty-one
years.
In
the
field
of
finance
it
has
power
to
expend
such
as
it
considers
necessary
for
the
support
and
maintenance
of
the
buildings
and
for
their
betterment,
and
for
the
erection
of
new
buildings
and
for
the
equipping
of
all
such
buildings;
to
erect
and
equip
and
maintain
residences
and
dining-halls
;
and
to
borrow
from
banks
up
to
$250,000.00.
All
of
the
powers
of
the
Board
which
I
have
above
enumerated
are
absolute
and
not
subject
to
any
control
by
any
outside
authority.
By
sections
41
to
50,
provision
is
made
for
the
composition
of
the
Senate
and
substantial
powers
are
allocated
to
it,
including
power
to
provide
for
the
granting
of
degrees
(except
in
Theology),
the
establishment
of
faculties,
chairs,
departments
and
courses
of
instruction,
scholarships
and
prizes,
and
the
consideration
and
determination
of
the
courses
of
study.
Many
of
the
enactments
of
the
Senate
are
made
subject
to
the
approval
of
the
Board.
In
addition
to
the
above,
certain
other
privileges
and
exemptions
are
conferred
on
the
Board.
It
has
power
to
expropriate
such
real
property
as
the
Board
deems
necessary
;
to
acquire
and
hold
land
without
license-in-mortmain.
Its
real
property,
so
far
as
the
application
of
any
Statute
of
Limitation
is
concerned,
is
deemed
to
be
real
property
of
the
Crown.
Its
property
is
not
subject
to
expropriation
and
is
exempt
from
taxation
except
in
certain
special
cases.
The
consent
of
the
Attorney-General
is
required
before
any
action
can
be
brought
against
the
Board.
The
Act
refers
to
the
University
as
"‘the
Provincial
Univer-
sity‘‘.
The
Board
consists
of
the
Chancellor
(elected
by
the
graduates),
the
President
(appointed
by
the
Board),
and
twenty-
two
persons
all
appointed
by
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council.
Eight
of
the
twenty-two
members
so
appointed
are
first
nominated
by
the
Alumni
Federation
of
the
University.
Any
of
the
twenty-
two
appointed
members
may
be
removed
by
the
Lieutenant-
Governor
in
Council,
apparently
without
cause
assigned.
The
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
appoints
one
of
the
members
of
the
Board
to
be
its
Chairman.
The
Board
may
not
incur.
any
expenditure
which
would
impair
the
endowments,
nor
may
it
expend
monies
for
the
purchase
of
lands
or
erection
of
buildings,
the
cost
of
which
cannot
be
met
out
of
the
year’s
income,
without
the
approval
of
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council.
The
Board
is
given
power
to
borrow
up
to
the
sum
of
$4,000,000.00
for
the
purchase
of
land
and
the
erection
of
buildings,
but
only
with
the
approval
of
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council,
who
may
prescribe
the
terms
and
conditions
thereof
and
the
nature
of
the
securities
to
be
given
therefor,
and
may
provide
for
the
guarantee
of
such
securities
by
the
Province.
For
general
purposes
the
Board
may
not
borrow
a
sum
in
exeess
of
$250,000.00
without
the
approval
of
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council.
The
accounts
of
the
Board
must
be
audited
annually
by
the
provincial
auditor
or
by
some
person
appointed
by
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council.
The
Board
is
required
to
make
an
annual
report
of
its
transactions
to
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
with
details
of
its
receipts
and
expenditures
and
of
its
investments
and
such
other
particulars
as
may
be
required,
and
such
report
is
laid
before
the
Assembly.
Provision
is
made
for
an
annual
grant
to
the
Board
of
50
per
centum
of
the
average
yearly
gross
receipts
in
the
Province
from
succession
duties,
up
to
a
maximum
of
$500,000.00
in
any
one
year.
One
of
the
affiliated
colleges
of
the
University
is
the
Ontario
College
of
Education.
It
is
a
training
college
for
all
high
school
teachers
in
the
province.
Appointments
to
its
staff
are
made
by
the
Board
on
the
recommendation
of
the
Minister
of
Education.
The
College
recommends
the
granting
of
teaching
certificates
which
are
actually
granted
by
the
Minister.
The
College
is
administered
by
the
Board
and
its
courses
are
prescribed
by
the
Senate,
subject
to
the
approval
of
the
Minister
of
Education.
It
has
a
separate
budget
which
is
subject
to
the
approval
of
the
Minister
and
of
the
Board
of
Gov
ernors
before
it
is
submitted
to
the
Legislature.
In
addition
to
the
statutory
grant
by
the
Province
to
the
Board,
special
and
supplementary
grants
are
made
from
time
to
time
as
needed.
These
amount
to
very
substantial
sums
as
shown
by
a
number
of
the
Board’s
annual
reports
filed
as
Exhibit
4.
In
1945-6
the
grants
totalled
$1,817,000.00
and
in
1948-9
slightly
over
$3,000,000.00.
The
Board’s
report
for
the
year
ending
June
30,
1946,
indicated
that
it
had
assets
under
its
control
as
follows:
General
Funds,
including
properties—in
excess
of
seventeen
million
dollars;
and
Trust
Funds—in
excess
of
fourteen
million
dollars.
The
status
of
boards,
commissions
and
corporations
which
have
been
established
by
the
Crown
has
been
frequently
considered.
in
the
Courts,
many
of
such
cases
having
to
do
with.
liability
to
taxation
and
to
actions
in
tort
or
in
contract.
It
seems
to
me—
after
a
study
of
all
the
cases
cited—that
each
case
must
necessarily
depend
upon
the
wording
of
the
relevant
statute
and
the
legislative
intention
to
be
inferred
therefrom.
In
City
of
Halifax
v.
Halifax
Harbour
Commissioners,
[1928-
34]
C.T.C.
366,
[1935]
S.C.R.
215,
the
question
for
determination
was
the
liability
of
the
Commissioners—who
occupied
Crown
property—to
assessment
for
business
tax,
as
an
"‘occupier’’.
In
the
Court
en
banc,
three
of
the
Judges
came
to
the
conclusion
that
the
Commissioners
"‘are
to
be
considered
agents
of
the
Government’’,
and
the
other
member
of
the
Court
held
that
the
Commissioners
were
‘‘exempt
from
business
tax
as
agents
and
servants
of
the
Crown
occupying
the
property
on
behalf
of
the
Crown”.
In
dismissing
the
appeal
Duff,
C.J.,
summarized
the
powers
and
duties
of
the
Commissioners
as
follows:
"‘Their
occupation
is
for
the
purpose
of
managing
and
administering
the
public
harbour
of
Halifax
and
the
properties
belonging
thereto
which
are
the
property
of
the
Crown;
their
powers
are
derived
from
a
statute
of
the
Parliament
of
Canada;
but
they
are
subject
at
every
turn
in
executing
those
powers
to
the
control
of
the
Governor
representing
His
Majesty
and
acting
on
the
advice
of
His
Majesty’s
Privy
Council
for
Canada,
or
of
the
Minister
of
Marine
and
Fisheries;
they
cannot
take
possession
of
any
property
belonging
to
the
harbour
property
without
the
consent
of,
and
only
upon
such
terms
as
may
be
imposed
by,
the
Government;
they
cannot
acquire
property
or
dispose
of
property
without
the
same
consent;
they
can
only
acquire
capital
funds
by
measures
taken
under
the
control
of
the
Government
;
they
can
only
apply
capital
funds
in
constructing
works
and
facilities
under
a
supervision
and
control,
the
character
of
which
has
been
explained;
the
tolls
and
charges
which
are
the
sources
of
their
revenue
they
can
only
impose
under
the
authority
of
the
Government;
the
expenditure
of
revenues
in
the
maintenance
of
services
is
under
the
control
and
supervision
of
a
Government
Department;
the
salaries
and
compensation
payable
to
officers
and
servants
are
determined
under
the
authority
of
the
Government;
the
regulations
necessary
for
the
control
of
the
harbour,
the
harbour
works,
officers
and
servants,
the
proceedings
of
the
Corporation,
can
only
take
effect
under
the
same
authority
;
the
surplus
of
revenue
after
providing
for
costs
of
services
and
the
interest
on
the
debenture
debt
goes
into
a
sinking
fund
under
the
direction
of
the
Minister;
finally,
they
are
appointed
by
the
Crown
and
hold
office
during
pleasure.”
At
p.
227
he
added
:
"
"
I
cannot
doubt
that
the
services
contemplated
by
this
legislation
are,
not
only
public
services
in
the
broad
sense,
but
also,
in
the
strictest
sense,
Government
services;
or
that
the
occupation
of
the
Government
property
with
which
we
are
concerned
is,
in
the
meaning
with
which
Lord
Cairns
used
the
words
in
the
passage
cited
(and
in
the
sense
in
which
those
words
were
interpreted
by
Lord
Blackburn
and
Lord
Watson),
an
occupation
by
persons
‘using’
that
property
‘exclusively
in
and
for
the
service
of
the
Crown’.’’
In
that
case
Duff,
C.J.,
found
from
an
examination
of
the
statute
that
the
occupation
by
the
respondents
of
the
property
and
facilities
under
their
jurisdiction,
was
an
occupation
for
the
Dominion
of
Canada;
that
the
property
of
the
respondents
was
part
of
the
public
property
of
Canada
and
that
the
statute
treated
all
of
the
revenues
of
the
respondents
as
moneys
at
the
disposal
of
Parliament
and,
subject
to
the
specifie
directions
of
the
statute,
wave
the
control
of
them
to
the
Government.
In
the
Halifax
case,
the
Court
considered
and
distinguished
two
judgments
of
the
Judicial
Committee
of
the
Privy
Council
to
which
I
shall
now
refer.
In
Fox
v.
Government
of
Newfoundland,
[1898]
A.C.
667,
the
question
was
whether
moneys
owing
to
certain
Boards
of
Education
in
Newfoundland
took
priority
over
ordinary
debts
in
the
liquidation
of
a
bank,
as
falling
within
the
description,
‘‘debts
and
claims
due
to
the
Crown
or
to
the
Government
or
revenues
of
the
Colony’’.
The
Judicial
Committee
held
that
these
Boards
were
not
the
agents
of
the
Government.
In
that
case
the
moneys
in
question
had
been
paid
by
the
Government
out
of
public
moneys
to
the
banks
on
behalf
of
the
several
Boards
of
Education.
After
pointing
out
that
the
Government
thereafter
had
no
control
over
the
moneys,
Sir
Richard
Couch
proceeded
:
“It
was
contended
by
Mr.
Asquith,
who
appeared
for
the
Government
before
their
Lordships,
that
the
Boards
of
Education
were
merely
distributing
agents
of
the
Government,
only
distributing
branches.
This
appears
to
be
the
view
of
the
majority
of
the
learned
Judges,
as
expressed
in
the
reasons
they
have
given
for
their
judgment,
and
indeed
is
the
only
way
in
which
the
judgment
can
be
supported.
But
this
view
is
not
consistent
with
the
provisions
in
the
Act.
In
ss.
1
and
2
a
distinction
is
made
between
money
to
be
expended
by
a
board
of
education
and
money
to
be
expended
as
the
Governor
in
Council
may
determine.
By
s.
34
the
boards
have
power
to
make
by-laws
and
rules
to
be
approved
by
the
Governor
in
Council,
but
are
not
bound
to
do
so.
By
s.
37
their
accounts
are
to
be
audited,
and
returns
of
all
schools
with
detailed
accounts
duly
audited
are
to
be
transmitted
to
the
superintendent,
and
these
are
by
s.
72
to
be
laid
before
the
Legislature.
This
seems
to
be
for
the
information
of
the
Government
and
Legislature,
and
not
in
order
that
any
item
of
expenditure
may
be
disallowed
if
the
Government
does
not
approve
of
it.
The
appointment
of
Boards
for
each
of
the
three
religious
denominations,
and
the
constitution
of
the
Boards,
indicate
that
it
is
not
to
be
a
mere
agent
of
the
Government
for
the
distribution
of
the
money,
but
is
to
have
within
the
limit
of
general
educational
purposes
a
discretionary
power
in
expending
it—a
power
which
is
independent
of
the
Government.
‘
‘
In
Metropolitan
Meat
Industry
Board
v.
Sheedy,
[1927]
A.C.
899,
Lord
Haldane,
who
delivered
the
judgment
of
the
Committee,
explained
the
ratio
decidendi
of
Fox
v.
Government
of
Newfoundland,
as
follows:
"The
reason
was
that
the
various
boards
of
education
were
not
mere
agents
of
the
Government
for
the
distribution
of
money
entrusted
to
them,
but
were
to
have,
within
the
limits
of
general
educational
purposes,
uncontrolled
discretionary
power
in
expending
it.
The
service,
in
other
words,
was
not
treated
as
being
the
service
of
the
Sovereign
exclusively
within
meaning
of
the
principle,
but
their
own
service.’’
In
the
Metropolitan
Meat
Industry
Board
case,
the
question
was
whether
a
debt
due
to
the
Board
of
New
South
Wales
was
a
debt
to
the
Crown.
In
considering
the
powers
of
that
Board,
Lord
Haldane
said
:
"
"
They
are
a
body
with
discretionary
powers
of
their
own.
Even
if
a
Minister
of
the
Crown
has
power
to
interfere
with
them,
there
is
nothing
in
the
statute
which
makes
the
acts
of
administration
his
as
distinguished
from
theirs.
That
they
were
incorporated
does
not
matter.
It
is
also
true
that
the
Governor
appoints
their
members
and
can
veto
certain
of
their
actions.
But
these
provisions,
even
when
taken
together,
do
not
outweigh
the
fact
that
the
Act
of
1915
confers
on
the
appellant
Board
wide
powers
which
are
given
to
it
to
be
exercised
at
its
own
discretion
and
without
consulting
the
direct
representatives
of
the
Crown.
Such
are
the
powers
of
acquiring
land,
constructing
abattoirs
and
works,
selling
cattle
and
meat,
either
on
its
own
behalf
or
on
behalf
of
other
persons,
and
leasing
its
property.
Nor
does
the
Board
pay
its
receipts
into
the
general
revenue
of
the
State,
and
the
charges
it
levies
eo
into
its
own
fund.
Under
these
circumstances
their
Lordships
think
that
it
ought
not
to
be
held
that
the
appellant
Board
are
acting
mainly,
if
at
all,
as
servants
of
the
Crown
acting
in
its
service.’’
It
was
held
that
the
debt
due
to
the
Board
was
not
a
debt
due
to
the
Crown.
In
Tamlin
v.
Hannaford,
[1949]
T.L.R.
422,
the
Court
of
Appeal
held
that
the
British
Transport
Commission
was
not
a
servant
or
agent
of
the
Crown.
There
the
plaintiff,
who
was
the
lessee
from
a
railway
company
of
a
house
to
which
the
Rent
Restriction
Acts
applied,
sublet
two
rooms
to
the
defendant.
By
the
Transport
Act,
1947,
the
house
became
vested
in
the
British
Transport
Commission.
The
plaintiff
having
brought
proceedings
for
possession
of
the
rooms,
the
defendant
relied
on
the
Rent
Restrictions
Acts.
In
that
case
the
Court
considered
the
various
powers
delegated
to
the
Commission
and
the
control
retained
by
the
Minister
of
Transport.
At
p.
422-3
Denning,
L.J.,
said
in
part:
“The
Transport
Act,
1947,
brines
into
being
the
British
Transport
Commission,
which
is
a
statutory
corporation
of
a
kind
comparatively
new
to
English
law.
It
has
many
of
the
qualities
which
belong
to
corporations
of
other
kinds
to
which
we
have
been
accustomed.
It
has,
for
instance,
defined
powers
which
it
cannot
exceed;
and
it
is
directed
by
a
group
of
men
whose
duty
it
is
to
see
that
those
powers
are
properly
used.
It
may
own
property,
carry
on
business,
borrow
and
lend
money,
just
as
any
other
corporation
may
do,
so
long
as
it
keeps
within
the
bounds
which
Parliament
has
set.
But
the
significant
difference
in
this
corporation
is
that
there
are
no
shareholders
to
subscribe
to
capital
or
to
have
any
voice
in
its
affairs.
The
money
which
the
corporation
needs
is
not
raised
by
the
issue
of
shares
but
by
borrowing;
and
its
borrowing
is
not
secured
by
debentures
but
it
is
guaranteed
by
the
Treasury.
If
it
cannot
repay,
the
loss
falls
on
the
Consolidated
Fund
of
the
United
Kingdm
;
that
is
to
say,
on
the
taxpayer.
There
are
no
shareholders
to
elect
the
directors
or
to
fix
their
remuneration,
there
are
no
profits
to
be
made
or
distributed.
The
duty
of
the
corporation
is
to
make
revenue
and
expenditure
balance
one
another,
taking,
of
course,
one
year
with
another,
but
not
to
make
profits.
.
.
.
Indeed,
the
taxpayer
is
the
universal
guarantor
of
the
corporation.
But
for
him
it
could
not
have
acquired
its
business
at
all,
nor
could
it
now
continue
it
for
a
single
day.
.
.
.
The
protection
of
the
interests
of
all
these—taxpayer,
user
and
beneficiary—is
entrusted
by
Parliament
to
the
Minister
of
Transport.
He
is
given
powers
over
this
corporation
which
are
as
great
as
those
possessed
by
a
man
who
holds
all
the
shares
in
a
private
company,
subject,
however,
as
such
man
is
not,
to
a
duty
to
account
to
Parliament
for
his
stewardship.
It
is
the
Minister
who
appoints
the
directors—the
members
of
the
commission—and
fixes
their
remuneration.
They
must
give
him
any
information
he
wants
;
and
lest
they
should
not
prove
amenable
to
his
suggestions
as
to
the
policy
which
they
should
adopt,
he
is
given
power
to
give
them
directions
of
a
general
nature
in
matters
which
appear
to
him
to
affect
the
national
interest—as
to
which
he
is
the
sole
judge—and
they
are
then
bound
to
obey.
‘These
are
great
powers,
but
still
we
cannot
regard
the
corporation
as
being
his
agent
any
more
than
a
company
is
the
agent
of
the
shareholders,
or
even
of
a
sole
shareholder.
In
the
eyes
of
the
law
the
corporation
is
its
own
master
and
is
answerable
as
fully
as
any
other
person
or
corporation.
It
is
not
the
Crown
and
has
none
of
the
immunities
or
privileges
of
the
Crown.
Its
servants
are
not
Civil
servants
and
its
property
is
not
Crown
property.
It
is
as
much
bound
by
Acts
of
Parliament
as
any
other
subject
of
the
King.
It
is,
of
course,
a
public
authority
and
its
purposes,
no
doubt,
are
public
purposes.
But
it
is
not
a
Government
department,
nor
do
its
powers
fall
within
the
province
of
Government.
"
"
The
only
fact
in
this
case
which
can
be
said
to
make
the
British
Transport
Commission
a
servant
or
agent
of
the
Crown
is
the
control
over
it
which
the
Minister
of
Transport
exercises.
But
there
is
ample
authority
both
in
this
Court
and
the
House
of
Lords
for
saying
that
such
control
as
he
exercises
is
insufficient
for
the
purpose:
see
Central
Control
Board
{Liquor
Traffic)
v.
Cannon
Brewery
Company,
Limited,
[1919]
A.C.
744,
at
p.
797.
When
Parliament
intends
that
a
new
corporation
should
act
on
behalf
of
the
Crown,
it
as
a
rule
says
so
expressly,
as
it
did
in
the
case
of
the
Central
Land
Board
by
the
Town
and
Country
Planning
Act,
1947,
which
was
passed
on
the
very
same
day
as
the
Transport
Act,
1947.
In
the
absence
of
any
such
express
provision,
the
proper
inference,
in
the
case
at
any
rate
of
a
commercial
corporation,
is
that
it
acts
on
its
own
behalf,
even
though
it
is
controlled
by
a
Government
department.
"‘In
our
opinion,
therefore,
the
British
Transport
Commission
is
not
a
servant
or
agent
of
the
Crown,
and
its
property
is
as
much
subject
to
the
Rent
Restriction
Acts
as
the
property
of
any
other
person.’
In
Scott
v.
Governors
of
University
of
Toronto
(1913),
10
D.L.R.,
the
appellant
here
was
the
defendant.
The
action
was
for
damages
sustained
by
the
plaintiff
while
at
work
for
the
defendant.
It
was
held
that
the
appointment
under
the
authority
of
a
statute
by
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
of
members
of
the
Board
of
Governors
of
the
University
of
Toronto
does
not
constitute
them
Crown
officers,
nor
does
it
confer
on
them
immunity
from
Civil
actions.
After
considering
the
provisions
of
The
University
Act,
1906,
Meredith,
C.J.C.P.,
said
at
p.
155:
"'The
contention
that
the
rule
that
the
King
can
do
no
wrong
applies
to
the
wrongs
of
‘The
Governors
of
the
University
of
Toronto’
was
ruled
against
upon
the
argument.
The
mere
fact
that
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
of
the
Province
appoints
most—not
all—of
the
Governors
does
not
confer
upon
them
the
character
of
Crown
officers.
Such
an
appointment,
in
itself,
has
no
such
extraordinary
effect;
and
indeed
is
not
even
extremely
unusual.
I
mentioned,
during
the
argument,
two
other
instances;
one
being
the
appointment
of
a
member
of
a
municipal
hospital
board;
and
the
King
in
council,
I
believe,
appoints
the
members
of
a
University
board
in
England.
There
is
no
reason
why
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
might
not
appoint
members
of
a
board
of
directors,
or
of
management,
of
any
concern;
I
mean
there
is
no
legal
reason;
and,
if
that
were
done,
the
effect
in
law
would
be
none
other
than
the
effect
of
a
like
appointment
made
in
any
valid
manner,
"
'
Nor
do
the
other
powers,
respecting
the
university,
which
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
has,
under
the
enactments
mentioned,
bring
to
the
Governors
the
character
of
Crown
officers
governing
Crown
property
for
the
use
or
benefit
of
the
Crown.
They
are
but
officers
of
the
University,
having
power
to
deal
with
the
property
under
their
control
for
the
uses
and
benefit
of
the
University
only.
The
case
of
the
Niagara
Falls
Parks
Commission
is
quite
different;
there
the
Commissioners
are
Crown
officers,
dealing
with
Crown
lands
in
the
right
of
the
Crown,
and
in
the
public
interests
only.
The
University
of
Toronto
is
a
body
having
its
own
separate
and
independent
rights
and
interests,
upon
which
the
Crown
cannot
infringe;
and
the
University
press,
in
the
carrying
on
of
the
work
in
which
the
accident
which
is
the
subject-matter
of
this
litigation
happened,
is
one
of
those
things.’’
In
Powlett
et
al.
v.
University
of
Alberta
et
al.,
[1934]
2
W.W.R.
209,
the
Court
of
Appeal
had
under
consideration
the
liability
of
the
Board
of
Governors
of
the
University
for
damages
sustained
by
a
student
during
initiation
proceedings.
Three
of
the
five
Juages
agreed
with
the
trial
Judge
that
the
Board
was
liable
for
such
damages
but
reduced
the
amount
awarded
by
him.
The
other
two
Judges
found
no
liability
and
would
have
allowed
the
appeal.
The
powers
and
duties
of
the
Board
of
Governors
under
The
University
Act,
R.S.A.
1922,
c.
56,
were
considered.
By
that
Act
the
Board
of
Governors
was
established
as
a
body
corporate.
It
was
composed
of
the
Chancellor
(elected
by
the
graduates)
;
the
President
(appointed
by
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council)—both
of
whom
were
members
ex
officio—and
a
Chairman
and
six
other
persons
appointed
by
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council,
and
all
such
appointed
members
were
subject
to
removal
by
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council.
Many
of
the
powers
and
duties
of
that
Board
were
similar
to
those
of
the
appellant
herein
as
will
be
seen
from
a
summary
contained
in
the
judgment
of
MeGillivray,
J.A.,
at
p.
264-5.
"‘It
is
to
be
observed
that
all
University
property
is
vested
in
the
Board
of
Governors,
that
the
government,
conduct,
management
and
control
of
the
University
and
its
affairs
are
vested
in
the
Board
subject
only
to
the
reservations
in
the
Act
contained.
Interference
by
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
is
in
some
instances
contemplated
but
not
so
as
to
make
the
‘acts
of
administration’,
resulting
from
any
such
interference,
acts
of
the
Crown
and
not
those
of
the
Board.
“It
will
also
be
seen
that
the
Board
appoints
all
deans
and
professors
with
the
approval
of
the
president
and
all
officers,
clerks
and
servants;
that
the
Board
has
wide
discretionary
powers
with
respect
to
the
investment
of
money
and
the
acquiring
and
holding
of
real
estate
and
the
expropriation
of
lands
;
that
the
Board
has
power
to
spend
money
for
the
maintenance
and
improvement
of
the
buildings
already
in
existence
and
the
erection
of
such
new
buildings
as
the
Board
may
think
necessary
and
in
the
furnishing:
and
equipping
of
the
same.
There
is
also
the
power
before
quoted
with
respect
to
erecting,
furnishing
and
maintaining
residences
and
dining
halls.
The
Board
also
has
the
power
of
fixing
and
determining
the.
fees
to
be
paid
by
students
in
the
University.
In
addition
the
Board
is
given
generous
borrowing
powers
and
may
with
the
approval
of
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
issue
bonds,
debenture
stock
or
securities
of
a
like
nature.
“It
is
quite
true
that
the
Government
of
the
province,
which
puts
up
a
goodly
share
of
the
moneys
necessary
to
carry
on
j
the
activities
of
the
University,
has
seen
to
it
that
it:
has
à
goodly
measure
of
control
in
the
expenditure
of
those
moneys
but
I
cannot
think,
having
regard
to
the
wide
general
powers
given
to
the
Board
and
having
regard
to
the
fact
that
it
is
at
liberty
to
accept
endowments
and
subscriptions
from
anyone
willing
to
contribute
and
having
regard
to
the
fact
that
the
Board
according
to
the
bursar
receives
large
sums
of
money
from
sources
other
than
the
Government,
and
having
regard
to
the
fact
that
neither
the
fees
collected
by
the
Board
nor
any
other
moneys
received
by
it
go
into
the
general
revenue
fund
of
the
province,
that
it
can
be
said
that
the
Board
is,
to
use
the
words
of
Viscount
Haldane,
‘acting
mainly
if
at
all
as
servants
of
the
Crown
acting
in
its
service.’
"I
may
add
that
I
am
of
the
further
opinion
that
there
is
nothing
in
the
Act
contained
which
would
justify
the
inference
that
the
Legislature
intended
to
make
the
Board
immune
from
actions
based
upon
tortious
negligence.
"‘In
the
result
I
have
come
to
the
conclusion
that
the
Board
cannot
escape
liability.”
The
case
of
re
Taxation
of
University
of
Manitoba
Lands,
[1940]
1
D.L.R.
579,
was
a
reference
to
determine
whether
the
provincial
Legislature
of
Manitoba
had
power
to
enact
legislation
rendering
lands
of
the
University
of
Manitoba,
not
used
for
educational
purposes,
subject
to
taxation
by
certain
municipalities.
One
of
the
questions
submitted
for
the
opinion
of
the
Court
was:
li
(1)
Is
the
University
of
Manitoba
an
emanation
or
arm
or
branch
of
the
Government
of
Manitoba
so
that
any
property
standing
in
its
name
is
therefore
exempt
from
taxation
?
’
’
In
answering
‘‘no’’
to
that
question,
Robson,
J.A.,
speaking
also
for
Prendergast,
C.J.M.,
Dennistoun
and
Richards,
JJ.A.,
said
at
p.
595
:
"‘The
other
argument
advanced
on
behalf
of
the
University
is
that
it
is
an
emanation
from
the
Crown
or
an
arm
of
government.
I
think
a
perusal
of
the
University
Act
(1936),
(Man.),
ce.
47,
repels
this
argument.
In
one
sense
I
suppose
it
is
true
that
every
corporation
is
an
emanation
from
the
Crown
but
that
is
a
different
thing
from
being
an
arm
of
the
Executive
government.
It
may
be
quite
true
that
the
Crown
exercises
a
prerogative
of
naming
a
majority
of
the
board
of
governors;
that
it
appoints
the
Chancellor
after
nomination
by
the
committee
on
nominations;
that
it
annually
makes
large
financial
augmentations
and
that
the
main
buildings
are
on
Crown
property
;
but
nevertheless
neither
the
appointment
of
authorities
nor
the
grants
of
funds
in
aid
of
education
are
necessarily
inconsistent
with
the
independence
of
the
University
as
an
institution
of
higher
learning.
It
is
not
to
be
imputed
to
the
Crown
that
any
of
its
acts
or
subsidies
would
be
actuated
by
any
motive
of
direction,
let
alone
control,
of
the
University’s
free
scope
in
its
normal
sphere
of
action.
“I
think
the
words
of
Hon.
R.
M.
Meredith
in
Scott
v.
Toronto
University,
(1913),
10
D.L.R.
154,
are
applicable
here.
That
was
a
case
wherein
the
Board
set
up
immunity
from
liability
for
injury
to
an
employee.
The
Board
of
Governors
there
were
themselves
a
corporation
but
the
point
is
the
same.
The
learned
Chief
Justice
said
(p.
156)
:
‘Nor
do
the
other
powers,
respecting
the
university,
which
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
council
has,
under
the
enactments
mentioned,
bring
to
the
Governors
the
character
of
Crown
officers
governing
Crown
property
for
the
use
or
benefit
of
the
Crown.
They
are
but
officers
of
the
University,
having
power
to
deal
with
the
property
under
their
control
for
the
uses
and
benefit
of
the
University
only.’
‘‘
Now
the
test
applied
in
all
the
cases
to
which
I
have
referred
above,
was
the
degree
of
control
exercised
or
retained
by
the
Crown,
and
counsel
for
the
Board,
in
submitting
that
it
was
but
the
servant
or
agent
of
the
Province
of
Ontario,
have
stressed
all
those
matters
in
which
the
complete
independence
of
the
Board
may
be
thought
to
be
curtailed
in
any
way.
The
main
submission
is,
of
course,
that
as
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
appoints
twenty-two
members
of
a
Board
of
twenty-four—only
eight
of
whom
are
appointed
following
recommendation
by
the
Alumni
Federation,
and
as
ten
members
are
required
to
constitute
a
quorum—the
actions
of
the
Board
could
at
all
times
be
controlled
by
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
removing
members
who
are
not
carrying
out
the
will
of
the
Government;
and
by
replacing
them
by
others
of
a
more
compliant
disposition.
Theoretically,
it
might
be
possible
for
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
to
appoint
only
members
of
the
Board
who
were
committed
to
carry
out
the
instructions
and
wishes
of
the
Government.
It
could
hardly
be
suggested,
however,
that
anyone
possessed
of
the
knowledge,
experience
and
independence
essential
to
the
proper
carrying
out
of
the
important
and
difficult
duties
of
a
Board
such
as
this
would
accept
the
appointment
under
any
such
conditions.
The
Board
is
a
body
with
wide
discretionary
powers
and
there
is
nothing
in
the
statute
which
makes
the
Board’s
administrative
acts
the
acts
of
the
Crown
rather
than
its
own
acts.
Nothing
that
the
Board
is
empowered
to
do
is
subject
in
any
way
to
the
control
or
veto
of
the
Minister
of
Education
or
of
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council;
and
in
the
carrying
out
of
its
duties
it
acts
for
itself
and
not
as
agent
to
bind
the
Crown—its
alleged
principal.
The
only
other
manner
in
which
any
degree
of
control
can
be
said
to
be
reserved
to
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council
is
in
the
field
of
finance.
In
considering
this
aspect
of
the
matter,
it
is
essential
to
keep
in
mind
that
the
University
of
Toronto
is
a
provincial
university,
established
by
the
Province.
The
Province,
therefore,
has
always
assumed
a
degree
of
financial
responsibility
for
its
operations
as
evidenced
by
the
very
substantial
grants
made
each
year.
The
statutory
payment
of
50
per
centum
of
the
annual
succession
duties
collected
by
the
Province—up
to
a
maximum
of
$500,000.00
in
any
year—is
made
without
any
restrictions
as
to
its
expenditure,
the
Board
having
complete
control
thereover.
The
Board’s
accounts
are
audited
by
the
provincial
auditor
or
by
some
person
appointed
for
that
purpose,
and
the
Board
each
year
renders
a
report
of
its
receipts
and
expenditures
for
the
preceding
year.
This,
however,
appears
to
be
for
information
purposes
only,
no
doubt
being
a
matter
for
consideration
when
additional
funds
are
asked
for
by
the
Board
from
the
Province.
Such
receipts
and
expenditures
of
the
Board
cannot
be
questioned
in
any
way.
The
Board
is
master
in
its
own
financial
house
save
that
it
may
not
without
the
consent.
of
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council:
(a)
impair
its
endowments;
(b)
in
the
purchase
of
land
or
erection
of
buildings
expend
moneys
other
than
from
its
income
of
the
year;
(c)
borrow
from
banks
or
lenders
more
than
$250,000.00;
and
(d)
borrow
on
the
security
of
its
assets
for
the
purchase
of
land,
the
erection
of
buildings,
and
the
equipment
thereof.
Any
moneys
so
borrowed
become
the
property
of
the
Board
free
of
any
control
on
the
part
of
the
Province.
Without
attempting
to
recapitulate
all
the
powers
of
the
Board,
the
following
matters
in
my
opinion
are
essentially
significant.
It
administers
its
own
property,
all
the
assets
both
real
and
personal
being
vested
in
it
for
its
own
use.
It
administers
its
own
endowments,
receives
its
income
and
makes
its
expenditures
entirely
on
its
own
behalf
and
limited
only
in
the
manner
which
I
have
indicated.
Its
members
are
not
Civil
servants.
It
appoints
and
removes
all
the
members
of
the
teaching
staff
and
the
officers
and
servants
of
the
University,
none
of
whom
are
Civil
servants.
The
Province
of
Ontario
has
nothing
to
say
as
to
the
departments
of
the
University
or
the
courses
of
instruction
or
the
fees
to
be
charged.
The
Board
may
buy,
expropriate,
sell
and
lease
lands,
erect
buildings
and
borrow
money.
The
statute
itself
says
that
the
management
and
control
of
the
revenues,
business
and
affairs
of
the
University
are
not
in
the
Crown
but
in
the
Board.
Its
very
wide
powers,
in
my
opinion,
indicate
that
the
Act
conferred
on
the
Board
these
powers
to
be
exercised
at
its
own
discretion
and
without
consulting
in
any
way
the
representatives
of
the
Crown.
The
Board
is
not
a
mere
agent
of
the
Government
for
the
purposes
of
distributing
such
money
as
may
be
given
annually
by
way
of
subsidy
or
otherwise,
but
is
to
have,
within
the
limits
of
the
purposes
for
which
the
University
was
established,
a
very
wide
discretionary
power
in
the
management
and
control
of
the
University—a
power
which
I
think
is
quite
independent
of
the
Government.
In
doing
what
it
does
it
acts
on
its
own
behalf
and
not
on
behalf
of
the
Government
and
is
not
controlled
by
a
department
of
the
Government.
My
conclusion
is,
therefore,
that
the
Board
cannot
be
said
to
be
the
agent
or
servant
of
the
Crown
and
the
contention
of
the
appellant
fails
on
that
point.
A
consideration
of
subsections
7(d)
and
(e)
(supra)
suggests
very
strongly
that
Parliament
wished
to
draw
a
distinction
between
two
different
categories
of
bequests
and
to
treat
them
in
a
different
way.
In
subsection
(e),
gifts
to
the
Dominion
or
any
province
or
political
subdivision
thereof,
where
the
benefits
would
accrue
to
all
the
inhabitants
of
a
geographical
area,
the
exemption
from
tax
was
complete.
But
in
regard
to
charitable
organizations,
such
exemption
was
limited
to
50
per
centum
of
all
the
property
included
in
the
aggregate
net
value.
"‘Charitable
organization’’
is
a
term
well
known
to
the
law
as
including
not
only
institutions
directly
devoted
to
charitable
purposes,
but
also
to
religious
and
educational
purposes.
It
would
seem
reasonable
to
assume
that
because
the
beneficiaries
of
such
charitable
bequests
would
be
more
limited
than
the
inhabitants
of
a
geographical
subdivision
such
as
are
specifically
named,
Parliament
intended
to
confer
a
larger
degree
of
exemption
on
the
latter
than
on
the
former.
It
may
be
of
interest
to
note
that
by
the
amendment
of
1948,
the
limitations
on
exemptions
to
charitable
organizations
were
removed.
For
the
reasons
which
I
have
given,
the
appeal
fails
and
will
be
dismissed
with
costs—if
demanded.
I
have
been
informed
that
this
is
a
test
case.
Judgment
accordingly.
Appeal
dismissed.
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