Lor
Morton
or
Henryton:—This
is
an
appeal,
by
special
leave
of
His
Majesty
in
Council,
from
so
much
of
the
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
dated
22nd
April,
1941,
as
is
adverse
to
the
appellant.
The
appeal
relates
to
three
assessments
of
income
tax
made
against
the
appellant
on
23rd
August,
1938,
by
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax
of
the
Province
of
Saskatchewan,
as
follows:
(a)
for
the
taxation
year
1934
|
$
4,382.07
|
(b)
for
the
taxation
year
1935
|
11,541.07
|
(c)
for
the
period
of
ten
months
ending
|
|
dist
October,
1936
|
10,136.60
|
Total
|
$26,059.74
|
The
appellant
is
a
corporation
incorporated
under
the
Companies
Act
of
the
Province
of
Ontario,
having
its
head
office
at
the
City
of
Hamilton,
Ontario.
The
appellant’s
business
is
the
manufacture
and
sale
of
agricultural
implements
and
parts
thereof
and
business
incidental
thereto.
The
manufacturing
operations
of
the
appellant
are
carried
on
entirely
outside
the
Province
of
Saskatchewan
and
its
selling
operations
are
carried
on
partly
in
Saskatchewan
and
partly
in
other
provinces
and
countries.
The
appellant
has
no
directors
resident
in
Saskatchewan,
no
meetings
of
its
Board
of
Directors
are
held
in
Saskatchewan,
and
its
central
management
and
control
abide
at
its
head
office
in
Hamilton,
Ontario.
The
appellant’s
selling
business
in
Saskatchewan
is
carried
on
at
branch
offices.
All
monies
received
by
the
appellant
in
Saskatchewan
are
deposited
in
separate
bank
accounts
and
remitted
in
full
to
the
appellant’s
said
head
office,
which
sends
to
the
Saskatchewan
branches
such
monies
as
are
required
for
operating
and
incidental
expenses.
On
these
facts
it
is
common
ground
that,
for
income
tax
purposes,
the
appellant
resides
outside
of
Saskatchewan,
and
this
has
been
assumed
in
the
Courts
in
Canada.
The
Province
of
Saskatchewan
had
no
income
tax
statute
till
the
Income
Tax
Act,
1932,
was
passed,
applying
to
incomes
earned
or
received
after
1st
January,
1931.
That
Act
was
amended
by
Acts
of
1933,
1934
and
1934-5.
In
1936
the
Income
Tax
Act,
1936,
was
passed,
applying
to
incomes
earned
or
received
in
the
year
1935
or
subsequently.
This
Act
was
mainly
a
consolidation
of
the
Act
of
1932
and
the
subsequent
amending
Acts.
It
will
be
observed
that,
of
the
three
assessments
in
question
on
this
appeal,
the
first
arises
under
the
1932
Act,
as
amended,
while
the
second
and
third
arise
under
the
1936
Act.
It
happens,
however,
that
the
language
of
the
sections
of
the
1932
Act
(as
amended)
which
are
relevant
for
the
present
purpose
is
identical
with
the
language
of
the
corresponding
sections
of
the
1936
Act.
For
the
sake
of
simplicity,
their
Lordships
will
refer
by
their
number
to
the
sections
of
the
1932
Act
as
amended,
without
specifying
the
numbers
of
the
corresponding
sections
of
the
1936
Act.
In
order
that
the
questions
arising
on
this
appeal
may
be
fully
and
accurately
stated,
it
will
be
necessary
to
set
out
a
number
of
the
relevant
sections,
and
to
quote
in
full
certain
regulations
purporting
to
have
been
made
under
section
7(4)
of
the
1932
Act;
but
as
the
main
controversy
centres
on
section
2la
of
that
Act,
it
will
be
convenient
to
quote
that
section
at
once.
It
is
as
follows:
"The
income
liable
to
taxation
under
this
Act
of
every
person
residing
outside
of
Saskatchewan
who
is
carrying
on
business
in
Saskatchewan,
either
directly
or
through
or
in
the
name
of
any
other
person,
shall
be
the
net
profit
or
gain
arising
from
the
business
of
such
person
in
Saskatchewan.
‘
‘
"‘Person’’
under
both
Acts
includes
a
corporation.
The
main
contention
of
the
appellant
is
that
the
method
adopted
by
the
Commissioner
in
ascertaining
the
‘‘net
profit
arising
from
the
business
of
the
appellant
in
Saskatchewan’’,
for
the
purposes
of
section
21a,
is
incorrect,
in
that
it
makes
no
allowance
for
a
‘‘manufacturing
profit’’
earned
outside
Saskatchewan.
The
phrase
“manufacturing
profit’’
used
throughout
the
argument
before
their
Lordships’
Board,
is
inaccurate
in
the
sense
that
no
company
makes
an
actual
profit
merely
by
manufacturing
goods;
the
profit
does
not
come
to
the
company’s
hands
until
the
goods
are
sold.
The
phrase
can,
however,
conveniently
be
used
for
the
present
purpose.
If
an
article
is
sold
at
a
profit
to
a
member
of
the
public
by
a
company
which
has
manufactured
the
article
and
has
also
sold
it
through
its
own
selling
organization,
it
may
be
said
that
there
are
two
stages
in
the
production
of
the
net
profit,
(1)
the
manufacture
of
the
article,
(2)
the
sale
of
the
article,
and
that
part
of
the
net
profit
should
be
attributed
to
each
stage,
the
part
attributed
to
the
earlier
stage
being
described
as
a
manufacturing
profit.
To
quote
from
the
judgment
delivered
by
Sir
Lyman
Duff,
C.J.,
in
the
present
case,
in
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada:
""The
Appellant
Company
is
admittedly
resident
outside
of
Saskatchewan,
within
the
meaning
of
this
provision;
and
the
business
of
the
Company
in
Saskatchewan
is
limited
to
making
contracts
of
sale
by
its
agents
and
by
them
receiving
the
proceeds
of
such
sales.
The
profits
of
the
Company
are
derived
from
a
series
of
operations,
including
the
purchase
of
raw
material
or
partly
manufactured
articles,
completely
manufacturing
its
products
and
transporting
and
selling
them,
and
receiving
the
proceeds
of
such
sales.
The
essence
of
its
profit
making
business
is
a
series
of
operations
as
a
whole.
That
part
of
the
proceeds
of
sales
in
Saskatchewan
which
is
profits
is
received
in
Saskatchewan,
but
it
does
not
follow,
of
course,
that
the
whole
of
such
profit
‘arises
from’
that
part
of
the
Company’s
business
which
is
carried
on
there
within
the
contemplation
of
section
21a.”
Thus,
according
to
the
argument
for
the
appellant,
that
portion
of
the
money
received
in
Saskatchewan
which
represents
net
profit
should
be
subdivided,
and
part
of
it
should
be
treated
as
a
"manufacturing
profit’’
arising
from
the
manufacturing
business
of
the
appellant
outside
Saskatchewan.
Their
Lordships
understand
that,
if
the
principle
for
which
the
appellant
contends
is
well-founded,
there
will
be
no
insuperable
difficulty
in
determining
what
portion
of
the
net
profit
represents
manufacturing
profit.
They
will
now
proceed
to
set
out
the
relevant
sections
of
the
Act
of
1932,
as
amended,
and
to
state,
so
far
as
may
be
necessary,
the
history
of
the
case.
Section
3
of
the
Act
of
1932,
so
far
as
it
is
material
for
the
present
purpose,
provides
as
follows:
‘“For
the
purposes
of
this
Act,
‘income’
means
the
annual
net
profit
or
gain
or
gratuity,
whether
ascertained
and
capable
of
computation
as
being
wages,
salary
or
other
fixed
amount,
or
unascertained
as
being
fees
or
emoluments,
or
as
being
profits
from
a
trade
or
commercial
or
financial
or
other
business
or
calling,
directly
or
indirectly
received
by
a
person
from
any
office
or
employment,
or
from
any
profession
or
calling,
or
from
any
trade,
manufacture
or
business,
as
the
case
may
be,
whether
derived
from
sources
within
Saskatchewan
or
else-
where;
and
includes
the
interest,
dividends
or
profits
directly
or
indirectly
received
from
money
at
interest
upon
any
security
or
without
security,
or
from
stocks,
or
from
any
other
investment,
and
whether
such
gains
or
profits
are
divided
or
distributed
or
not.’’
The
words
‘
‘
whether
derived
from
sources
within
Saskatchewan
or
elsewhere’’
are
qualified,
in
the
case
of
a
non-resident
person,
by
section
21a,
already
quoted.
Section
4
provides:
"'The
following
incomes
shall
not
be
liable
to
taxation
hereunder
:
(m)
profits
earned
by
a
corporation
or
joint
stock
company,
other
than
a
personal
corporation,
in
that
part
of
its
business
carried
on
at
a
branch
or
agency
outside
of
Saskatchewan.”
It
is
clear
that
the
appellant
is
not
a
‘‘personal
corporation”
in
the
sense
in
which
that
phrase
is
used
in
the
Act.
Section
7
imposes
the
tax,
and
the
following
portions
of
it
must
be
quoted:
"
(1)
There
shall
be
assessed,
levied
and
paid
upon
the
income
during
the
preceding
year
of
every
person:
(d)
who,
not
being
resident
in
Saskatchewan,
is
carrying
on
business
in
Saskatchewan
during
such
year;
a
tax
at
the
rates
applicable
to
persons
other
than
corporations
and
joint
stock
companies
set
forth
in
the
first
schedule
to
this
Act,
upon
the
amount
of
income
in
excess
of
the
exemptions
granted
by
this
Act;
provided
that
the
said
rates
shall
not
apply
to
corporations
and
joint
stock
companies,
other
than
personal
corporations.
"(3)
Save
as
herein
otherwise
provided,
every
corporation
and
joint
stock
company,
no
matter
how
created
or
organized,
residing
or
ordinarily
resident
or
carrying
on
business
within
the
province,
shall
pay
a
tax,
at
the
rate
applicable
thereto
set
forth
in
the
first
schedule
to
this
Act,
upon
its
income
during
the
preceding
year.
"
(4)
Where
the
commissioner
is
unable
to
determine
or
to
obtain
the
information
required
to
ascertain
the
income
within
the
province
of
any
corporation
or
joint
stock
company
or
of
any
class
of
corporations
or
joint
stock
companies,
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council
may,
on
the
recommendation
of
the
commissioner,
make
regulations
for
determining
such
income
within
the
province
or
may
fix
or
determine
the
tax
to
be
paid
by
a
corporation
or
joint
stock
company
liable
to
taxation.
‘
‘
Section
21
is
as
follows:
“21.
Where
any
corporation
carrying
on
business
in
Saskatchewan
purchases
any
commodity
from
a
parent,
subsidiary
or
associated
corporation
at
a
price
in
excess
of
the
fair
market
price,
or
where
it
sells
any
commodity
to
such
a
corporation
at
a
price
less
than
the
fair
market
price,
the
minister
may,
for
the
purpose
of
determining
the
income
of
such
corporation,
determine
the
fair
market
price
at
which
the
purchase
or
sale
shall
be
taken
into
the
accounts
of
the
corporation.
‘
‘
This
section
is
immediately
followed
by
section
21a
which
has
already
been
quoted.
Sections
22
to
25
are
also
of
importance
:
(i
22.
The
income
liable
to
taxation
under
this
Act
of
every
person
residing
outside
of
Saskatchewan,
who
derives
income
for
services
rendered
in
Saskatchewan,
otherwise
than
in
the
course
of
regular
or
continuous
employment,
for
any
person
resident
or
carrying
on
business
in
Saskatchewan,
shall
be
the
income
so
earned
by
such
person
in
Saskatchewan.
"23.
(1)
Where
a
non-resident
person
produces,
grows,
mines,
creates,
manufactures,
fabricates,
improves,
packs,
preserves
or
constructs,
in
whole
or
in
part,
anything
within
Saskatchewan
and
exports
the
same
without
sale
prior
to
the
export
thereof,
he
shall
be
deemed
to
be
carrying
on
business
in
Saskatchewan
and
to
earn
within
Saskatchewan
a
proportionate
part
of
any
profit
ultimately
derived
from
the
sale
thereof
outside
of
Saskatchewan.
‘
‘
(2)
The
minister
shall
have
full
discretion
as
to
the
manner
of
determining
such
proportionate
part.
<f
24.
(1)
Any
non-resident
person
soliciting
orders
or
offering
anything
for
sale
in
Saskatchewan
through
an
agent
or
employee,
whether
any
contract
or
transaction
which
may
result
therefrom
is
completed
within
Saskatchewan
or
without
Saskatchewan,
or
partly
within
and
partly
without
Saskatchewan,
or
any
non-resident
person
who
lets
or
leases
anything
used
in
Saskatchewan,
or
who
receives
a
royalty
or
other
similar
payment
for
anything
used
or
sold
in
Saskatchewan,
shall
be
deemed
to
be
carrying
on
business
in
Saskatchewan
and
to
earn
a
proportionate
part
of
the
income
derived
therefrom
in
Saskatchewan.
"‘(2)
The
minister
shall
have
full
discretion
as
to
the
manner
of
determining
such
proportionate
part.
"25.
Nothing
in
sections
23
and
24
shall
in
any
way
affect
the
generality
of
the
term
‘carrying
on
business’
as
used
elsewhere
in
this
Act.’’
Regulations
were
made
by
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council,
in
purported
exercise
of
the
power
conferred
upon
him
by
section
7(4)
of
the
1932
Act.
They
are
in
the
following
terms
:
"‘1.
Interest,
dividends,
rents
and
royalties
less
their
proportionate
share
of
deductions
allowed
shall
be
separately
determined
or
ascertained,
and
if
they
are
received
in
connection
with
the
trade
or
business
of
the
taxpayer
in
the
Province,
shall
be
income
liable
to
taxation.
‘‘2.
The
income
referred
to
in
regulation
1
having
been
separately
determined
and
ascertained,
the
remainder
of
the
income
of
the
taxpayer
liable
to
taxation
shall
be
taken
to
be
such
percentage
of
the
remainder
of
the
income
as
the
sales
within
the
Province
bear
to
the
total
sales.
"'The
sales
of
the
taxpayer
shall
be
measured
by
the
gross
amount
which
the
taxpayer
has
received
during
the
preceding
year
from
sales
and
other
sources
in
connection
with
the
said
business,
excluding,
however,
receipts
from
the
sale
or
exchange
of
capital,
assets
and
property
not
sold
in
the
regular
course
of
business
and
also
receipts
from
interest,
dividends,
rents
and
royalties
the
income
of
which
has
been
separately
determined
or
ascertained
under
the
provisions
of
regulation
1.
“3.
If
for
any
reason
the
portion
of
income
attributable
to
business
within
the
Province
cannot
be
determined
under
the
provisions
of
regulation
2,
the
income
referred
to
in
regulation
1
shall
first
be
separately
ascertained
or
determined
and
for
the
purpose
of
ascertaining
or
determining
the
proportion
of
the
remainder
of
the
income
of
the
taxpayer,
such
remainder
of
income
shall
be
specifically
allocated
or
apportioned
within
and
without
the
Province
by
the
Commissioner.
"4.
If
a
taxpayer
believes
that
the
method
of
allocation
and
apportionment
herein
prescribed
or
as
determined
and
as
applied
to
his
business,
has
operated
or
will
so
operate
as
to
subject
him
to
taxation
on
a
greater
portion
of
his
income
than
is
reasonably
attributable
to
business
or
sources
within
the
Province,
he
shall
be
entitled
to
file
with
the
Commissioner
a
statement
of
his
objections
and
of
such
alternative
method
of
allocation
and
apportionment
as
he
believes
to
be
proper
under
the
circumstances,
with
such
details
and
proof
and
within
such
time
as
the
Commissioner
may
reasonably
prescribe,
and
if
the
Commissioner
shall
conclude
that
the
method
of
allocation
and
apportionment
heretofore
employed
is
in
fact
not
applicable
or
equitable,
he
shall
re-determine
the
taxable
income
by
such
other
method
of
allocation
and
apportionment
as
seems
best
calculated
to
assign
to
the
Province
for
taxation
the
portion
of
the
income
reasonably
attributable
to
business
and
sources
within
the
Province.
“5.
These
regulations
shall
not
be
applied
to
determine
the
income
within
the
Province
of
a
corporation
or
joint
stock
company
carrying
on
a
trade
or
business
within
and
without
the
Province
where
(a)
the
method
or
system
of
accounting
used
by
the
taxpayer
enables
the
Commissioner
to
determine
or
to
obtain
the
information
required
to
ascertain
the
income
of
the
taxpayer
liable
to
taxation.
(b)
the
income
of
the
taxpayer
liable
to
taxation
can
be
determined
or
ascertained
by
allowing
the
exemption
provided
by
paragraph
(m)
of
Section
4
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
1932.’’
It
is
common
ground
between
the
parties
that
in
making
the
three
assessments
now
in
question
the
Commissioner
acted
upon
Regulation
2.
It
is
also
common
ground
that
the
Commissioner,
in
making
these
assessments,
had
no
evidence
of
and
did
not
compute
or
ascertain
any
net
profit
or
gain
arising
from
or
earned
in
the
appellant’s
business
in
Saskatchewan,
but,
after
computing
the
net
income
of
the
appellant
everywhere,
purported
to
fix
the
appellant’s
"‘income
applicable
to
Saskatchewan''
by
applying
the
percentage
mentioned
in
that
Regulation.
The
"‘assessment''
for
1936
is
typical,
reading
in
part
as
follows:
On
3rd
September,
1938,
the
appellant
appealed
against
each
of
the
said
three
assessments
to
the
Board
of
Revenue
Commis-
sioners,
pursuant
to
section
40(8)
(a)
of
The
Treasury
Department
Act,
1938.
On
the
hearing
of
that
appeal
a
written
admission
of
facts
was
filed
with
the
Board,
with
schedules
and
exhibits
as
therein
referred
to.
The
appellant
put
in
the
viva
voce
evidence
of
Arthur
Brown,
its
Branch
Manager
at
Regina,
showing
the
conditions
under
which
the
appellant
was
carrying
on
business
in
Saskatchewan
during
the
years
in
question.
The
appellant
also
filed
an
affidavit
of
its
Vice-President,
Frank
M.
Morton
of
Hamilton,
Ontario,
in
order
to
show
that
the
cost
to
the
appellant
of
doing
business
in
Canada
varies
greatly
in
different
provinces
and
sections,
and
does
not
bear
any
fixed
proportion
to
the
amount
of
sales
in
any
province
or
section.
The
respondents
put
in
no
evidence
apart
from
the
said
Admission
of
Facts
and
schedules
and
exhibits
thereto.
The
Board
of
Revenue
Commissioners,
after
reserving
its
decision,
gave
a
written
decision
on
27th
January,
1939,
dismissing
the
appellant’s
appeals
from
all
three
assessments
and
affirming
the
assessments.
"Net
income
subject
to
allocation
|
$
1,148,239.88
|
Gross
Sales
of
Company
everywhere
|
|
11,489,313.45
|
Gross
Sales
of
Company
in
Sask.
|
|
2,128,603.92
|
Percentage
of
Sask.
Sales
to
Total
Sales
|
|
18.5268
%
|
Income
applicable
to
Sask.
18.5268%
of
|
|
$1,148,239.88
|
|
212,732.11
|
Amount
of
tax
at
5%
|
.-
|
10,636.60
|
Less
tax
paid
under
Corporation
Taxation
|
|
Act
|
|
500.00
|
Net
tax
payable
|
|
10,136.60”
|
On
25th
February,
1939,
the
appellant
appealed
to
a
Judge
of
the
Court
of
King’s
Bench
of
Saskatchewan
from
the
decision
of
the
Board
of
Revenue
Commissioners
respecting
all
three
assessments,
pursuant
to
section
41
of
The
Treasury
Department
Act,
1938.
On
the
hearing
of
that
appeal
the
appellant
filed
with
the
Kine’s
Bench
Judge,
Mr.
Justice
Anderson,
under
section
41(6)
of
The
Treasury
Department
Act,
1938,
subject
to
the
respondent’s
objection,
three
affidavits
of
Clarence
B.
Munger,
General
Auditor
of
the
appellant,
of
Hamilton,
Ontario.
The
first
and
third
of
these
affidavits
dealt
mainly
with
the
question
of
a
reserve
for
bad
debts,
but
in
the
second
affidavit
Mr.
Munger
submitted
two
different
methods
or
tests
directed
to
showing
that
the
assessments
were
excessive
and
arbitrary
and
had
the
effect
of
taxing
manufacturing
profit
arising
outside
Saskatchewan.
Mr.
Justice
Anderson,
after
hearing
argument,
reserved
judgment
and
on
10th
August,
1939,
delivered
a
written
decision,
dismissing
the
appellant’s
appeals
with
costs.
On
25th
August,
1939,
the
appellant
appealed
to
the
Court
of
Appeal
of
Saskatchewan
pursuant
to
section
42
of
The
Treasury
Department
Act,
1938,
and
before
that
Court
the
three
appeals
were,
by
consent,
treated
and
argued
as
one
appeal.
The
Court
of
Appeal
reserved
judgment
and
on
April
2nd,
1940,
delivered
judgment
holding
that
it
had
no
jurisdiction
to
entertain
the
appeal
with
respect
to
the
assessment
for
1934,
but
holding
that
the
assessments
for
1935
and
1936
were
defective
in
not
giving
the
appellant
a
deduction
in
respect
of
a
reserve
for
bad
debts.
The
assessments
for
those
two
years
were
set
aside
and
referred
back
to
the
Commissioner
for
re-assessment,
with
instructions
to
reconsider
the
question
of
bad
debt
reserve,
as
stated
in
the
judgment.
In
other
respects
the
Court
of
Appeal
dismissed
the
appellant’s
appeal,
but
allowed
the
appellant
two-
thirds
of
its
costs
of
the
appeals
to
the
Court
of
Appeal
and
to
the
Judge
of
the
King’s
Bench
Court.
By
special
leave
of
the
Court
of
Appeal,
the
appellant
appealed
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
from
the
judgment
of
the
Court
of
Appeal,
except
those
parts
of
the
said
judgment
upon
which
the
appellant
succeeded.
The
respondents
cross-appealed
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
against
those
parts
of
the
judgment
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
upon
which
the
appellant
succeeded.
On
22nd
April,
1941,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
delivered
judgment
holding
that
there
was
a
right
of
appeal
respecting
the
1934
assessment
and
allowing
the
appellant’s
appeal
to
the
extent
that
the
assessment
for
1934
was
set
aside
and
referred
back
to
the
Commissioner
and
placed
in
the
same
position
as
the
said
assessments
for
the
year
1935
and
the
taxation
period
of
1936.
The
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
dismissed
the
respondent’s
crossappeal
with
costs
and
allowed
the
appellant
one-half
of
its
costs
of
appeal
to
the
Supreme
Court.
In
other
respects
the
majority
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
(Rinfret,
Crocket,
Kerwin
and
Hudson,
JJ.),
held
that
the
appellant’s
appeal
failed
and
was
dismissed.
Sir
Lyman
Duff,
then
Chief
Justice
of
Canada,
delivered
a
minority
judgment,
concurred
in
by
Davis
and
Taschereau,
J
J.,
in
favour
of
allowing
the
appellant’s
appeal
and
setting
aside
the
said
assessments,
with
costs
to
the
appellant
throughout.
On
27th
March,
1942,
special
leave
was
given
to
the
appellant
to
appeal
against
so
much
of
the
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
as
is
adverse
to
the
appellant.
The
presentation
of
the
appeal
has
been
delayed
by
various
causes
which
need
not
be
set
out.
The
first
contention
of
counsel
for
the
appellant
has
already
been
indicated
and
may
be
summarized
as
follows
:
Since
the
appellant
is
a
non-resident
company,
the
only
income
of
the
appellant
liable
to
taxation
in
respect
of
the
three
periods
in
question
was
the
net
profit
or
gain
arising
from
the
business
of
the
appellant
in
Saskatchewan.
The
Commissioner
did
not
ascertain
that
net
profit
or
gain,
but
instead
resorted
to
Regulation
2.
By
adopting
the
method
already
described,
he
taxed
a
percentage
of
the
appellant’s
‘‘manufacturing
profit’’
all
of
which
was
earned
outside
Saskatchewan.
This
is
the
argument
which
was
accepted
by
the
minority
in
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
and
Sir
Lyman
Duff,
C.J.,
expressed
himself
as
follows
:
"Nowhere
does
the
Statute
authorize
the
Province
of
Saskatchewan
to
tax
a
manufacturing
company,
situated
as
the
appellant
company
is,
in
respect
of
the
whole
of
the
profits
received
by
the
company
in
Saskatchewan.
It
is
not
the
profits
received
in
Saskatchewan
that
are
taxable;
it
is
the
profits
arising
from
its
business
in
Saskatchewan,
not
the
profits
arising
from
the
company’s
manufacturing
business
in
Ontario
and
from
the
company’s
operations
in
Saskatchewan
taken
together,
but
the
profits
arising
from
the
company’s
opera*
tions
in
Saskatchewan.”
Their
Lordships
find
themselves
entirely
in
agreement
with
these
observations.
They
think
that
there
is
to
be
found
in
sections
21
to
25
inclusive
a
scheme
for
dealing
(inter
alia)
with
the
taxation
of
profits
which
are
earned,
or
arise,
or
accrue
or
are
derived—it
matters
not
which
phrase
is
used—from
the
activities
of
persons
or
corporations
who
carry
on
certain
activities
within
the
Province
of
Saskatchewan
and
other
activities
outside
that
Province.
Section
21
applies
both
to
resident
and
to
non-resident
corporations,
and
is
plainly
directed
to
preventing
an
artificial
reduction
of
the
net
profit
arising
from
the
business
of
such
corporations
in
Saskatchewan.
Section
22
contemplates
the
case
of
a
person
residing
and
regularly
employed
outside
Saskatchewan,
who
renders
certain
services
within
that
Province.
Sections
23
and
24
show
that
the
legislature
contemplated,
in
the
case
of
a
non-resident
person,
a
charge
of
tax
upon
an
apportioned
part
of
income
which,
although
it
might
be
received
outside
the
Province
of
Saskatchewan,
could
fairly
be
regarded
as
having
been
partially
earned
inside
that
Province.
In
their
Lordships’
view
it
would
be
reasonable
to
suppose
that
in
the
present
case
the
legislature
would
regard
a
proportion
of
the
profit
received
by
the
appellant
in
Saskatchewan
as
"‘arising''
from
its
manufacturing
business
carried
on
outside
that
Province,
and
as
being,
in
consequence,
exempt
from
taxation
under
the
Act.
They
think
that
no
distinction
is
intended
between
income
‘‘earned’’
in
the
Province
and
income
‘‘arising’’
within
the
Province.
The
word
‘‘earn’’
is
employed
in
sections
23
and
24
merely
because
of
the
grammatical
structure
of
the
sections.
In
each
case
the
intention
is
to
bring
within
the
ambit
of
section
2la
an
apportioned
part
of
the
“profit”
mentioned
in
section
23
and
the
“income”
mentioned
in
section
24,
because
such
part
of
the
profit
or
income
is
regarded
as
being
earned
within
the
Province.
Their
Lordships
think
that
if
section
2la
is
construed
as
excluding
from
taxation
a
‘‘manufacturing
profit’’
earned
outside
the
Provinee,
effect
is
given
to
the
general
scheme
of
taxation
set
out
in
the
Act.
Further,
this
construction
seems
to
their
Lordships
to
result
in
a
fair
and
reasonable
scheme
of
taxation,
in
accordance
with
that
comity
which
naturally
prevails
between
one
Province
and
another.
Although
the
sections
under
consideration
in
the
case
of
Commissioners
of
Taxation
v.
Kirk,
[1900]
A.C.
588,
differed
in
their
language
from
the
section
now
under
consideration,
the
reasoning
which
appears
in
the
judgment
in
that
case
is
helpful
to
the
appellant’s
contention
in
the
present
case.
Lord
Davey,
in
delivering
the
judgment
of
the
Board,
said:
“Their
Lordships
attach
no
special
meaning
to
the
word
‘derived,’
which
they
treat
as
synonymous
with
arising
or
accruing.
It
appears
to
their
Lordships
that
there
are
four
processes
in
the
earning
or
production
of
this
income—(1)
the
extraction
of
the
ore
from
the
soil;
(2)
the
conversion
of
the
crude
ore
into
a
merchantable
product,
which
is
a
manufacturing
process;
(3)
the
sale
of
the
merchantable
product;
(4)
the
receipt
of
the
moneys
arising
from
the
sale.
All
these
processes
are
necessary
stages
which
terminate
in
money,
and
the
income
is
the
money
resulting
less
the
expenses
attendant
on
all
the
stages.
.
.
.
The
fallacy
of
the
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court
in
this
and
in
Tindalls
case
is
in
leaving
out
of
sight
the
initial
stages,
and
fastening
their
attention
exclusively
on
the
final
stage
in
the
production
of
the
income.”’
In
their
Lordships’
view,
the
fallacy
of
regarding
a
profit
as
arising
solely
at
the
place
of
sale
appears
also
in
the
arguments
advanced
on
behalf
of
the
respondents
in
the
present
case.
Counsel
on
their
behalf
contended
that
when
money
was
received
by
the
appellant
in
Saskatchewan
as
a
result
of
a
sale
in
Saskatchewan
the
whole
of
the
net
profit
on
the
sale
‘‘arose””
from
the
business
of
the
appellant
in
Saskatchewan,
and
no
apportionment
was
necessary.
They
referred
to
certain
cases
in
which
various
Courts
have
found
no
reason
for
treating
a
profit
as
being
earned
or
as
arising
partly
within
and
partly
without
a
particular
country.
In
no
one
of
these
cases,
however,
was
relevant
section
accompanied
by
other
sections
contemplating
such
an
apportionment
of
profits
as
is
provided
for
by
sections
23
and
24
in
the
present
case.
Reference
was
also
made
to
the
judgment
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
in
Wm.
Wrigley
Junior
Company
Ltd.
v.
The
Provincial
Treasurer
of
Manitoba,
[1947]
S.C.R.
431,
but
as
this
case
is
at
present
the
subject
of
an
appeal
to
their
Lordships’
Board
it
would
not
be
proper
to
make
any
observations
upon
it.
The
result
is
that,
in
their
Lordships’
view,
any
part
of
the
appellant’s
net
profit
which
may
fairly
be
attributed
to
it:
manufacturing
operations
outside
the
Province
of
Saskatchewan,
referred
to
throughout
the
argument
as
its
‘‘manufacturing
profit,’’
is
not
profit
arising
from
the
business
of
the
appellant
in
Saskatchewan
within
the
meaning
of
section
21a
of
the
Act,
and
must
be
excluded
in
ascertaining
the
income
of
the
appellant
liable
to
taxation
under
that
section.
It
was
suggested
in
argument
that
the
proper
method
of
ascertaining
the
"
"
manufacturing
profit,
‘
‘
was
to
estimate
the
net
profit
which
the
appellant
would
have
obtained
if,
instead
of
selling
goods
retail
through
its
own
selling
organization
in
Saskatchewan,
it
had
sold
the
same
goods,
direct
from
its
factory,
to
a
wholesaler.
This
method
seems
not
unreasonable,
but
their
Lordships
do
not
desire
to
select
any
particular
method
as
being
the
best,
since
this
would
appear
to
be
a
practical
matter,
not
fully
explored
in
argument.
The
assessments
now
in
question
have
already
been
set
aside
and
referred
back
to
the
Commissioner
for
re-assessment,
with
instructions
to
reconsider
the
question
of
bad
debt
reserve.
They
must
be
further
reconsidered
in
the
light
of
this
judgment.
Turning
to
the
other
matters
raised
in
argument,
their
Lordships
see
no
reason
why
the
Regulations
made
under
section
7(4)
should
be
construed
as
applying
only
to
persons
or
corporations
resident
within
the
Province
of
Saskatchewan,
and
they
do
not
think
that
the
Lieutenant-Governor
exceeded
his
powers
in
making
these
Regulations.
No
objection
to
Regulation
1
has
been
raised
in
argument.
Regulation
2
might
well
be
open
to
objection,
as
being
likely
to
tax
income
outside
the
Province,
if
it
were
not
modified
by
Regulations
3,
4
and
5.
So
modified,
it
does
not
appear
to
contravene
the
provisions
of
the
Statutes
of
1932
and
1936.
It
merely
provides
a
rough
and
ready
way
of
measuring
"‘the
remainder
of
the
income
of
the
taxpayer
liable
to
taxation’?
in
cases
coming
within
section
7(4),
and
in
some
of
such
cases
it
may
be
a
not
inappropriate
method
of
measuring
such
income.
It
is
not,
however,
appropriate
in
the
present
case,
because
it
pays
no
regard
to
the
question
of
manufacturing
profit.
In
their
Lordships’
opinion
the
present
case
falls
within
Regulation
3
and
the
Commissioner
should
have
carried
out
the
assessment
under
that
Regulation,
giving
due
regard
to
the
question
of
manufacturing
profit.
They
add
that
in
their
view
the
facts
brought
the
present
case
within
the
terms
of
section
7(4),
as
the
appellant’s
system
of
keeping
accounts
during
the
three
periods
in
question
resulted
in
the
Minister
being
"‘unable
to
determine
the
income
within
the
Province’?
of
the
appellant
without
recourse
to
the
Regulations.
Two
other
points
raised
by
counsel
for
the
appellant
should
be
briefly
mentioned.
They
contended
that
if
the
Acts
of
1932
and
1936
or
the
Regulations
purported
to
tax
income
of
the
appellant
arising
outside
Saskatchewan,
then
they
went
beyond
the
power
conferred
upon
the
Province,
by
section
92(2)
of
the
British
North
America
Act,
1867,
to
impose
taxation
‘‘
within
the
Province.’’
This
was
an
alternative
argument,
and
as
the
appellant’s
main
contention
has
succeeded
the
alternative
argument
does
not
arise.
In
their
Lordships’
view,
neither
the
Acts
of
1932
and
1986
nor
the
Regulations,
correctly
construed,
purport
to
tax
income
of
the
appellant
arising
outside
Saskatchewan.
Counsel
also
contended
that,
apart
altogether
from
the
argument
as
to
“manufacturing
profit,”
the
method
followed
by
the
Commissioner
did
not
result
in
ascertaining
the
net
profit
arising
from
the
business
of
the
appellant
in
Saskatchewan,
because
the
appellant’s
ratio
of
costs
to
sales
was
not
uniform
throughout
Canada,
and
had
been
shown
by
evidence
to
be
greater
in
Saskatchewan
than
in
other
parts
of
Canada.
In
their
Lordships’
view
this
contention
cannot
succeed,
in
regard
to
the
three
periods
now
in
question,
by
reason
of
the
view
taken
by
the
Board
of
Revenue
Commissioners
as
to
the
evidence
before
that
Board.
It
will
be
sufficient
to
quote
one
passage
from
the
Board’s
decision.
After
referring
to
the
evidence
of
Mr.
Brown
and
Mr.
Morton,
already
mentioned,
the
Board
continued:
“Both
portions
of
said
evidence
compared
certain
factors
in
Saskatchewan
with
factors
elsewhere
but
neither
witness
eave
evidence
or
established
that
when
all
factors
are
taken
into
consideration
the
cost
of
doing
business
in
Saskatchewan
exceeds
that
of
doing
business
elsewhere.
The
Board,
therefore,
while
finding
on
this
evidence
that
there
are
varying
ratios
of
expense
of
sales
in
various
parts
of
Canada
cannot,
on
the
evidence
submitted,
make
any
finding
as
to
whether
that
ratio
in
Saskatchewan
is
higher,
equal
to
or
less
than
that
ratio
elsewhere.
Certain
special
items
of
expense
or
loss
in
Saskatchewan
were
referred
to
by
each
witness.
No
findings
can
be
made
on
such
an
incomplete
picture.
These
special
items
of
expense
or
loss
may
be
offset
or
exceeded
by
favourable
factors
such
as
volume
of
sales
in
an
agricultural
province
where
a
highly
mechanized
type
of
farming
is
engaged
in.
Insofar
as
the
witness
Arthur
Brown
in
some
of
his
replies
suggested
a
comparatively
unfavourable
result
in
Saskatchewan,
the
Board
finds
his
evidence
inconclusive
and
not
definitely
enough
linked
up
with
the
three
taxation
years
under
review.
The
Board
further
finds
that
it
was
not
sufficiently
shown
that
this
witness
had
personal
knowledge
of
all
the
facts
in
other
provinces
necessary
to
make
a
complete
comparison.
Frank
M.
Morton’s
affidavit
is
not
directed
to
a
complete
comparison
at
all.
It
has
not,
therefore,
been
established
that
the
tax
levied
in
any
of
the
three
years
is
higher
than
it
should
have
been.’’
This
particular
view
of
the
facts
is
not
shown
to
be
vitiated
by
any
incorrect
view
of
the
law,
as
no
question
of
"
manufacturing
profit’’
outside
of
Saskatchewan
entered
into
it.
Counsel
for
the
respondents
sought
to
rely
upon
certain
findings
by
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax,
the
Board
of
Revenue
Commissioners
and
Anderson,
J.,
as
being
findings
of
fact
which
concluded
the
matter
in
favour
of
the
respondents.
This
argument
was
accepted
by
Rinfret,
J.
(as
he
then
was).
In
his
judgment
in
the
Supreme
Court
with
which
Crocket
and
Kerwin,
JJ.,
concurred,
he
said:
.
.
at
the
outset,
the
appellant
is
met
by
the
difficulty
that
the
question
whether
profits
or
gains
arose
within
or
without
Saskatchewan
is
really
a
question
of
fact
already
decided
against
it
by
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax,
the
Board
of
Revenue
Commissioners
and
the
Judge
of
the
Court
of
King’s
Bench.’?
Hudson,
J.,
who
agreed
with
Rinfret,
J.,
in
dismissing
the
appeal
to
the
Supreme
Court,
observed:
Now
it
is
claimed
that
the
mode
of
allocation
prescribed
in
the
regulations,
in
its
application
to
the
assessments
here,
fails
to
take
into
account
manufacturing
profits
which
may
have
been
earned
by
the
appellants
outside
of
Saskatchewan.
This
claim
was
made
before
the
Board
and,
although
it
does
not
seem
to
have
received
as
much
consideration
there
as
it
did
before
us,
it
was
considered
by
them.
Apparently
the
Board
thought
that,
while
it
was
a
factor
to
be
considered,
it
formed
only
one
of
a
group
of
imponderables,
incapable
of
separate
evaluation
with
any
degree
of
certitude.
.
.
.
"‘If
it
could
be
said
that
the
Commissioner
and
the
Board
and
Mr.
Justice
Anderson
had
misconstrued
the
statute
or
the
regulations,
or
failed
to
direct
their
minds
to
the
questions
involved,
then
the
Court
would
be
justified
in
sending
it
back
for
reconsideration.
’
‘
In
their
Lordships’
view
section
2la
of
the
statute
has
been
misconstrued,
to
the
extent
already
indicated,
and
for
this
reason
any
findings
of
fact
based
upon
this
misconstruction
cannot
be
treated
as
being
binding
upon
the
appellants.
In
the
result,
their
Lordships
will
humbly
advise
His
Majesty
that
this
appeal
should
be
allowed,
and
that
the
three
assess-
ments
in
question,
already
set
aside
and
referred
back
to
the
Commissioner
for
re-assessment,
should
be
further
reconsidered
in
the
light
of
the
opinions
expressed
herein.
The
appellant
has
already
been
awarded
two-thirds
of
its
costs
of
the
appeals
to
the
Court
of
Appeal
and
to
the
Judge
of
the
King’s
Bench
Court
and
one-half
of
its
costs
of
the
appeal
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada.
The
respondents
must
now
pay
to
the
appellant
the
balance
of
all
these
costs
and
also
the
whole
of
the
appellant’s
costs
of
this
appeal.
Appeal
allowed.