Martin
C.J.S.:—The
respondent,
the
Beaver
Lumber
Co.,
is
a
Dominion
company
incorporated
by
letters
patent
and
carries
on
business
in
several
of
the.
Provinces.
In
its
income
tax
return
for
the
taxation
period
May
1,
1940,
to
April
30,
1941,
under
the
provisions
of
the
provincial
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.S.
1940,
c.
54,
it
claimed
an
exemption
of
$17,950.73,
which
was
the
amount
for
which
it
became
liable
to
the
Dominion
of
Canada
for
the
same
tax
period
under
the
provisions
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1927,
c.
97.
The
exemption
was
claimed
under
the
provisions
of
clause
(m)
of
s.
5(1)
of
the
provincial
Income
Tax
Act
which
clause
was
inserted
in
s.
5
by
amendment
contained
in
s.
4
of
1941,
c.
10
and
assented
to
on
April
8,
1941.
After
deducting
the
exemption
claimed
the
respondent
estimated
its
provincial
income
tax
at
$4,088.78
and
paid
this
sum
to
the
Provincial
Tax
Commission.
The
relevant
portions
of
s.
5
of
the
provincial
Income
Tax
Act
are
as
follows:
"‘5.(1)
Income
shall
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act
be
subject
to
the
following
exemptions
and
deductions:
.
.
.
.
il
(m)
the
amount
of
income
tax
(not
including
the
National
Defence
Tax)
which
the
taxpayer
paid
or
became
liable
to
pay
within
the
taxation
period
to
the
Dominion
of
Canada
under
The
Income
War
Tax
Act
(Canada)
and
the
amount
of
National
Defence
Tax
which
the
taxpayer
paid
within
the
taxation
period
to
the
Dominion
of
Canada
under
the
said
Act;
provided
that
such
deductions
shall
be
limited
to
such
proportions
of
the
said
amounts
as
the
income
of
the
taxpayer
taxable
in
the
province
bears
to
the
income
of
the
taxpayer
taxable
under
The
Income
War
Tax
Act
(Canada)’’.
The
Provincial
Tax
Commission
disallowed
the
exemption
claimed
by
the
respondent
and
allowed
instead
an
exemption
of
$2,269.11
which
was
the
amount
of
income
tax
paid
by
the
respondent
to
the
Dominion
of
Canada
in
respect
of
its
Saskatchewan
income
for
the
preceding
year,
namely,
from
May
1,
1939
to
April
30,
1940.
The
Provincial
Tax
Commission
accordingly
fixed
the
tax
payable
by
the
respondent
at
$4,878,
and
after
crediting
the
sum
of
$4,088.78
already
paid,
claimed
a
balance
of
$789.22.
An
appeal
taken
by
the
respondent
to
the
Board
of
Revenue
Commissioners
was
dismissed
and
the
respondent
then
appealed
to
a
Judge
of
the
Court
of
King’s
Bench
in
Chambers.
The
appeal
was
heard
by
Bigelow
J.
who
in
a
written
judgment
allowed
it.
The
learned
Chamber
Judge
was
of
the
opinion
that
under
the
provisions
of
clause
(m)
s.
5(1),
the
respondent
was
entitled
to
an
exemption
in
the
sum
of
$17,950.73,
as
liability
to
pay
that
amount
to
the
Dominion
of
Canada
arose
during
the
taxation
period
of
1940-41,
or
as
stated
in
his
judgment
the
liability
to
pay
"‘arose
when
the
income
was
received”.
From
this
judgment
the
Provincial
Tax
Commission
has
appealed
to
this
Court.
The
question
involved
in
the
appeal
is
when
did
the
respondent
become
liable
to
pay
to
the
Dominion
of
Canada
the
income
tax
payable
by
it
to
the
Dominion
in
respect
of
its
income
for
the
year
1940-41
?
It
will
be
observed
that
the
exemption
to
which
it
is
entitled
under
clause
(m)
is
in
the
following
language:
"‘the
amount
of
income
tax
.
.
.
.
which
the
taxpayer
paid
or
became
liable
to
pay
within
the
taxation
period
to
the
Dominion
of
Canada
under
The
Income
War
Tax
Act
(Canada).’’
The
respondent
contends
that
under
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
(Can.)
the
liability
to
pay
income
tax
arises
as
the
income
is
earned
and
that
it
became
liable,
during
the
fiscal
year
1940-41
to
pay
to
the
Dominion
of
Canada
a
sum
of
$17,950.73
and
that
it
is
therefore
entitled
to
an
exemption
for
that
amount.
The
appellant,
the
Provincial
Tax
Commission,
on
the
other
hand
argues
that
the
liability
to
pay
income
tax
under
the
Federal
statute
does
not
arise
until
after
the
income
tax
return
has
been
filed
by
the
taxpayer
and
assessments
have
been
completed
by
the
minister,
and
that
the
only
tax
for
which
the
respondent
became
liable
within
the
taxation
period
in
question,
namely
1940-41,
was
the
tax
for
the
preceding
year
of
1939-40.
Section
9
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
(Can.)
as
it
was
in
1941,
provides
that
the
tax
levied
is
upon
the
income
of
the
preceding
year.
The
relevant
portions
of
s.
9
are
as
follows:
"‘9.(1)
There
shall
be
assessed,
levied
and
paid
upon
the
income
during
the
preceding
year
of
every
person:
‘‘(a@)
residing
or
ordinarily
resident
in
Canada
during
such
year;
.
.
.
a
tax
at
the
rates
applicable
to
persons
other
than
corporations
and
joint
stock
companies
set
forth
in
the
First
Schedule
of
this
Act
upon
the
amount
of
income
in
excess
of
the
exemptions
provided
in
this
Act
:
Provided
that
the
said
rates
shall
not
apply
to
corporations
and
joint
stock
companies.
(2)
Save
as
herein
otherwise
provided,
corporations
and
joint
stock
companies,
no
matter
how
created
or
organized,
shall
pay
a
tax
upon
income
at
the
rate
applicable
thereto
set
forth
in
the
First
Schedule
of
this
Act.
‘
‘
Section
9
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
is
the
charging
section
of
the
Act
and
it
provides
that
there
shall
be
assessed,
levied
and
paid
on
the
income
during
the
preceding
year
of
every
person,
etc.
"Person’’
is
defined
in
the
Act
as
including
"any
body
corporate
and
politic.”
Liability
to
pay
depends
upon
the
charging
provisions
of
the
statute.
The
language
of
s.
9
and
particularly
the
use
of
the
word
"preceding’’
makes
it
plain
that
assessment,
levy
and
payment
are
all
to
be
made
in
the
year
following
the
one
in
which
the
income
is
earned
and
in
my
opinion
there
can
be
no
liability
to
pay
until
after
the
assessment
and
levy.
There
cannot
be
liability
to
pay
during
the
year
in
which
the
income
is
earned
except
in
the
sense
that
if
the
Act
remains
unrepealed
the
taxpayer
will
be
assessed
on
such
income
and
called
upon
to
pay
at
some
time
in
the
year
following
that
in
which
the
income
is
earned.
Minister
of
Nat
f
l
Revenue
v.
Molson,
[1938],
2
D.L.R.
481,
S.C.R.
218.
Duff
C.J.C.
at
pp.
485
and
486.
Kerwin
J.
at
p.
498.
Kerr
v.
Sup
f
t
of
Income
Tax,
[1942],
4
D.L.R.
289,
S.C.R.
435.
Kerwin
J.,
p.
299.
Hudson
J.,
at
pp.
303-4.
In
the
last
referred
to
case
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada
had
under
consideration
provisions
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
of
the
Province
of
Alberta
similar
to
those
contained
in
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
(Can.).
Section
33(1)
provides
that
every
person
liable
to
taxation
under
the
Act
shall
on
or
before
the
31st
day
of
March
in
each
year
without
any
notice
or
demand
deliver
to
the
Minister
a
return
on
a
prescribed
form
of
his
total
income
for
the
preceding
year;
and
in
s.
35(2)
it
is
provided
that
notwithstanding
the
provisions
of
s.
33,
a
corporation
shall
make
a
return
within
four
months
from
the
close
of
its
fiscal
period.
The
fiscal
period
of
the
respondent
ended
on
April
30,
1941,
and
accordingly
it
had
till
August
31,
1941,
to
comply
with
s.
35
and
file
its
return
with
respect
to
its
income
for
the
year
1940-41.
As
a
fact
the
respondent
filed
its
return
on
August
31,
1941,
and
until
that
date
while
it
was
liable
to
be
taxed
on
its
income
for
1940-41,
it
cannot
be
said
that
it
was
""liable
to
pay”.
Section
48,
before
it
was
amended
by
s.
23
of
1942-3
(Can.),
c.
28,
provided
that
every
person
liable
to
pay
any
tax
under
the
Act
shall
estimate
the
amount
of
the
tax
payable
by
him
and
shall
send
with
the
return
not
less
than
one-third
of
the
amount
of
such
tax
and
shall
pay
the
balance
within
four
months
thereafter
together
with
interest
at
the
rate
of
5%
per
annum
upon
the
balance
"‘from
the
last
day
prescribed
for
making
such
return
to
the
time
payment
is
made.’’
The
provisions
of
section
48
in
my
opinion
make
it
clear
that
liability
to
pay
arises
at
the
time
when
the
return
is
required
to
be
made.
I
am
of
the
opinion
therefore
that
the
respondent
company
did
not
become
"‘liable
to
pay
within
the
taxation
period’’
any
part
of
the
Dominion
Tax
for
the
period
in
question,
namely,
May
1,
1940
to
April
30,
1941,
until
August
31,
1941,
when
it
made
its
return
according
to
the
provisions
of
the
Dominion
Income
War
Tax
Act.
That
an
exemption
must
be
strictly
construed
is
clear
from
authority.
Roenisch
v.
Minister
of
Nat
y
l
Revenue,
[1931],
2
D.L.R.
90,
Ex.
C.R.
1.
Toronto
Gen
f
l
Trusts
v.
Ottawa,
[1935],
4
D.L.R.
337,
S.C.R.
531.
Lamont
J.,
at
p.
5386.
Episcopal
Corp.
of
Saskatoon
v.
City
of
Saskatoon
[1936]
2
W.W.R.
92,
at
pp.
95
and
99.
The
appeal
should
be
allowed
with
costs,
the
judgment
of
the
Chamber
Judge
set
aside,
and
the
judgment
of
the
Board
of
Revenue
Commissioners
restored.
Appeal
allowed.