Major
J.:—This
is
a
motion
under
the
provisions
of
s.
157
of
the
Real
Property
Act,
R.S.M.
1940,
c.
178,
by
way
of
an
appeal
from
the
refusal
of
the
District
Registrar
of
the
land
titles
office
for
the
District
of
Morden
to
issue
a
certificate
of
title
to
the
property
known
as
lots
4,
5
and
6
in
block
2,
Kaleida,
plan
187,
to
William
J.
Rowe
of
Manitou,
barrister-at-law.
Mr.
Rowe
purchased
this
property
from
the
municipality
of
Pembina
on
December
2,
1939,
under
and
by
virtue
of
a
tax
sale
held
by
the
municipality.
The
amount
paid
as
purchaseprice
was
$52.66,
being
taxes
and
penalties
levied
against
the
property
for
the
years
1936,
1937
and
1938.
As
no
redemption
from
the
tax
sale
had
been
made,
Mr.
Rowe
applied
to
the
District
Registrar
for
title,
and
having
completed
all
necessary
services
he
had
requested
the
District
Registrar
to
issue
title
to
him
free
from
all
encumbrances.
The
District
Registrar
refused
to
comply
with
this
request
and
expressed
his
opinion
that
the
title,
if
issued,
would
have
to
be
subject
to
a
lien
in
favour
of
the
Crown
which
had
been
filed
against
the
land
in
May,
1936.
The
property
was
owned
in
his
lifetime
by
John
S.
Sotheran
who,
since
June,
1932,
and
up
to
the
time
of
his
death,
had
been
in
receipt
of
an
old
age
pension
from
the
Province
of
Manitoba,
and
the
amount
paid
to
him,
with
interest,
amounted
in
all
to
the
sum
of
$1,023.42.
The
Provinee
had,
by
virtue
of
the
provisions
of
the
Old
Age
Pensions
Act
and
amendments
thereto,
filed
a
lien
against
the
property
of
the
pensioner
and
this
lien
was
subsisting
at
the
time
of
the
tax
sale.
The
sources
of
provincial
legislation
providing
for
old
age
pensions,
etc.,
are
as
follows:
Statutes
of
Manitoba,
1928,
e.
44;
1929,
ce.
37;
1930,
c.
31;
1935,
c.
33
(blind
persons)
;
1937-1938,
e.
30;
R.S.M.
1940,
c.
154
[Old
Age
and
Blind
Persons’
Pensions
Act].
Section
15
of
c.
154
is
as
follows:
""All
sums
paid
under
this
Act,
or
any
Act
for
which
it
is
substituted,
to
or
on
behalf
of
a
pensioner
shall
as
from
the
day
of
each
payment
be
a
debt
due
and
payable
to
the
province/
‘
Section
16:
"‘The
province
shall,
as
from
the
date
of
the
commencement
of
the
pension,
have
a
lien
on
and
against
all
real
and
personal
property
in
the
province
of
a
pensioner
for
any
such
debt
or
future
debt
to
the
province
under
this
Act,
and
the
lien
shall
continue
to
bind
all
such
property
until
the
debt
together
with
interest
thereon
at
the
rate
of
five
per
centum
per
annum
compounded
annually
has
been
fully
paid
and
satisfied;
but
the
lien
of
the
province
shall
not
have
priority
over
any
transfer,
conveyance,
encumbrance
or
charge
registered
or
filed
prior
to
the
registration
or
filing
of
notice
of
the
lien
of
the
province.”
The
position
taken
by
counsel
for
Mr.
Rowe
is
that
he
is
entitled
to
a
certificate
of
title
clear
of
encumbrances
and
bases
his
claim
on
the
provisions
of
s.
1105
of
the
Municipal
Act,
R.S.M.
1940,
c.
141,
by
which
the
municipality
is
given
priority
for
taxes
over
all
other
claims,
etc.,
registered
against
the
property,
except
those
of
the
Crown.
Section
1105
(1)
is
as
follows:
"‘Unless
otherwise
provided
by
this
or
any
other
Act,
the
taxes
accrued
on
or
in
respect
of
land
or
personal
property
shall
be
a
lien
on
the
land
or
personal
property,
having
preference
and
priority
over
the
claim,
lien,
privilege
or
encumbrance
of
any
person
except
the
Crown,
and
the
lien
shall
not
require
registration
to
preserve
it.’’
It
was
urged
that
the
only
hen
for
which
the
Crown
can
claim
priority
over
taxes
is
a
lien
arising
by
virtue
of
the
sale
of
Crown
land
in
which
the
Crown
appears
as
an
unpaid
vendor,
and
that
the
reservation
in
favour
of
the
Crown
in
s.
1105
of
the
Municipal
Act
was
never
intended
to
apply
to
a
debt
of
the
subject
other
than
for
such
unpaid
purchase-money.
I
do
not
think
this
restricted
meaning
can
be
given
to
that
section.
Its
language
is
clear
and
unambiguous.
It
gives
the
municipality
priority
for
its
taxes
over
all
claims,
liens,
privileges
or
encumbrances
except
those
of
the
Crown.
This
appears
to
be
all-embracing
and
will
include
all
claims
which
the
Crown
may
have
against
the
owner
of
the
land
and
which
appear
on
the
title
to
the
land:
Quirt
v.
The
Queen
(1891),
19
S.C.R.
510.
To
limit
the
lien
of
the
Crown’
to
unpaid
purchase-money
on
the
sale
of
Crown
lands
would
be
to
amend
the
statute
by
inserting
words
of
limitation
which,
in
view
of
the
clarity
of
the
language
of
the
section,
was
not
the
object
and
purpose
of
the
legislation.
See
G.T.P.R.
Co.
v.
Dearborn
(1919),
47
D.L.R.
27
at
p.
30,
58
S.C.R.
315
at
p.
320.
A
ease
similar
to
the
one
in
question
is
The
King
v.
Rumsey,
[19261
2
D.L.R.
792.
The
municipality
had
acquired
title
to
the
land
under
tax-sale
proceedings.
The
title
had
been
subject
to
a
charge
in
favour
of
the
Province
of
Alberta
for
moneys
advanced
for
the
purchase
of
livestock.
The
title
had
issued
subject
to
the
encumbrance.
Section
13
of
the
Tax
Recovery
Act,
R.S.A.
1922,
c.
122,
provided
that
lands
acquired
through
tax-sale
proceedings
should
vest
in
the
municipality
free
from
all
claims
except
those
arising
from
claims
by
the
Crown.
On
reference
to
the
Court
it
was
held
the
title
of
the
municipality
was
subject
to
the
claim
of
the
Crown.
The
Province
has
by
the
legislation
above
quoted
declared
that
all
sums
paid
to
a
pensioner
shall
be
a
debt
due
and
payable
to
the
Province,
and
it
has
secured
such
debt
by
creating
a
statutory
lien
on
all
real
and
personal
property
of
the
pensioner.
By
s.
16
of
the
Old
Age
and
Blind
Persons’
Pensions
Act
the
Province
has
recognized
priorities
in
time
of
registration
by
declaring
that
its
lien
shall
not
rank
in
priority
to
any
transfer,
conveyance,
encumbrance
or
charge
registered
or
filed
prior
to
the
lien
of
the
Province.
By
the
above
quoted
s.
1105
of
the
Municipal
Act
the
municipality
is
given
a
lien
on
the
land
for
its
accrued
taxes
which
takes
priority
over
all
other
claims,
liens,
etc.,
except
those
of
the
Crown.
The
municipal
lien
does
not
require
registration
to
preserve
it.
I
accordingly
interpret
this
s.
16
to
include
the
lien
of
the
municipality
for
accrued
taxes
and
it
therefore
follows
that
the
municipality
would
have
priority
over
a
Crown
lien,
for
a
debt
created
by
the
payment
of
old
age
pension,
for
any
taxes
which
had
accrued
against
the
land
of
the
pensioner
prior
to
the
filing
of
the
notice
of
the
lien
of
the
Province.
In
this
case
the
lien
of
the
Province
was
filed
against
the
title
to
the
land
in
the
Morden
land
titles
office
on
May
15,
1936.
The
land
was
sold
by
the
municipality
of
Pembina
on
December
2,
1939,
for
the
taxes
which
had
been
levied
against
the
land
for
the
years
1936,
1937
and
1938.
By
s.
1096
(1)
of
the
Municipal
Act,
taxes
levied
for
any
year
shall
be
deemed
to
have
been
imposed
and
be
due
and
payable
on
October
31,
unless
the
municipality
by
by-law
sets
an
earlier
date.
There
is
nothing
to
show
that
any
earlier
date
was
set
for
payment
of
the
1936
tax
and
it
accordingly
appears
that
there
were
no
accrued
taxes
against
the
land
as
of
the
date
of
the
filing
of
the
lien
of
the
Province.
The
municipality
therefore
cannot
rank
as
a
creditor
in
priority
to
the
Province.
It
was
urged
on
behalf
of
Mr.
Rowe
that
the
Dominion
Parliament,
by
its
Old
Age
Pensions
Act,
R.S.C.
1927,
ce.
156,
s.
9,
had
provided
the
only
remedies
by
which
recovery
can
be
made
of
payments
made
to
old
age
pensioners
and
that
the
Province
is
limited
to
the
provisions
of
that
section.
By
s.
9,
(2)
and
(3),
of
this
Act,
power
is
given
to
a
pensions
authority
to
recover
from
the
homestead
and
the
estate
of
a
deceased
pensioner,
as
a
debt
due
by
the
pensioner,
payments
made
to
him
from
time
to
time.
I
do
not
think
it
is
necessary
for
me
in
this
inquiry
to
determine
the
validity
of
the
provincial
legislation
covering
old
age
pensions,
but
by
analogy
with
the
decision
of
the
Privy
Council
in
A.G.
Can.
v.
A.-G.
Ont.,
Reference
re
Employment
and
Social
Insurance
Act,
1935,
[1937],
1
D.L.R.
684,
A.C.
355,
old.
age
pensions
would
appear
to
be
in
the
Same
category
as
employment
and
social
insurance
and
come
within
the
class
of
property
and
civil
rights
in
the
Province,
and
would
be
within
the
exclusive
competence
of
the
provincial
Legislature.
It
I
am
right
in
this
respect,
then
there
appears
to
be
no
ground
to
challenge
the
power
of
the
Province
to
determine
by
legislation
or
regulation
the
conditions
under
which
these
pensions
are
paid.
In
any
event,
so
far
as
I
can
see,
there
is
no
conflict
between
s.
9
(3),
of
the
Dominion
Act
and
s.
15
of
the
provincial
Act.
These
sections
declare
the
amounts
paid
to
a
pensioner
to
be
a
debt
due
to
the
Crown,
and
the
Province
by
s.
16
of
its
legislation
declares
the
manner
in
which
the
debt
shall
be
secured.
It
was
further
urged
on
behalf
of
Mr.
Rowe
that
the
Province,
having
been
served
with
notice
of
the
application
for
title
by
the
tax-sale
purchaser
and
having
failed
as
required
by
s.
48
of
the
Real
Property
Act
to
contest
the
claim
of
the
taxsale
purchaser
or
to
redeem
the
land
from
such
sale,
is
now
estopped
and
debarred
from
setting
up
any
claim
in
respect
of
the
said
land.
Section
48
refers
to
tax-sale
applications
where
the
land
exceeds
$1,000
in
value.
In
the
present
case
the
value
is
less
than
$1,000
and
s.
48
would
not
apply.
It
is
to
be
noted
however
that
s.
1169
of
the
Municipal
Act
deals
with
tax-sale
applications
where
the
value
of
the
land
is
$1,000
or
less,
and
s-ss.
(2)
and
(4)
of
that
section
contain
like
provisions
to
that
of
s.
48
of
the
Real
Property
Act.
I
do
not
think
that
either
of
these
sections
could
be
applied
to
the
Crown.
Clause
26
of
s.
28
(1)
of
the
Manitoba
Interpretation
Act,
R.S.M.
1940,
c.
105,
defines
"‘person’’
as
a
corporation
and
the
heirs,
executors,
administrators
or
other
legal
representatives
of
a
person.’’
Both
the
above-mentioned
sections
refer
to
persons;
the
Crown
is
not
mentioned.
Section
9
of
the
Manitoba
Interpretation
Act
provides:
"‘No
provision
in
an
Act
shall
affect
the
rights
of
His
Majesty
unless
it
is
expressly
stated
therein
that
His
Majesty
is
bound
thereby.”
Counsel
was
unable
to
cite
any
provision
in
either
the
Municipal
Act
or
the
Real
Property
Act
by
which
the
Crown
was
bound,
but
took
the
ground
that
by
filing
this
lien
against
the
title
to
the
land
the
Crown
voluntarily
made
itself
a
‘‘person’’
and
became
subject
to
all
the
provisions
applicable
thereto.
I
cannot
agree
with
this
contention.
In
order
to
bind
the
Crown
there
must
be
an
express
provision
to
that
effect
in
the
statutes:
The
Queen
v.
Bank
of
Nova
Scotia
(1885),
11
S.C.R.
1;
North
Pac.
Lbr.
Co.
v.
Minister
of
Nat
f
l
Revenue,
[1928]
Ex.
C.R.
68;
Pulkrabek
V.
Russell
(1908),
18
Man.
R.
26.
I
am
not
entitled
to
infer
that
the
Crown
has,
by
filing
its
lien,
waived
the
provisions
of
the
statute.
I
therefore
conclude
that
the
District
Registrar
was
justified
in
refusing
to
issue
a
certificate
of
title
to
Mr.
Rowe
except
subject
to
the
lien
which
has
been
filed
against
the
land
by
the
Province.
The
motion
is
dismissed
with
costs.
Motion
dismissed.
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