ROBERTSON
C.J.O.:—This
is
an
appeal
by
way
of
a
stated
case,
o
from
the
decision
of
Judge
Barton
of
the
County
Court
of
the
County
of
York,
in
an
assessment
appeal.
Toronto
Millstock
Co.
Ltd.,
in
April
1937,
gave
notice,
pursuant
to
s.
66
of
the
Separate
Schools
Act,
R.S.O.
1937,
ce.
362,
requiring
that
40%
of
its
assessment
for
land
and
business
or
other
assessments
in
the
City
of
Toronto,
be
entered,
rated
and
assessed
for
separate
school
purposes.
The
notice
has
not
since
been
withdrawn,
varied
or
cancelled
by
any
subsequent
notice.
In
the
year
1942
the
assessor,
in
compiling
his
roll,
entered
the
Company
as
a
separate
school
supporter
on
the
assessment
roll,
in
respect
of
that
proportion
of
the
assessments
designated
in
the
notice.
The
respondent
Dolson
appealed
to
the
Court
of
Revision
in
respect
of
this
assessment
of
the
Company
as
a
separate
school
supporter.
When
the
appeal
came
on
to
be
heard,
no
evidence
being
given
by
anyone
to
show
whether
or
not
the
share
or
portion
of
the
Company
‘s
assessment
to
be
rated
and
assessed
for
the
support
of
separate
schools,
bore
a
greater
proportion
to
the
whole
of
the
Company’s
assessment
than
the
amount
of
the
stock
or
shares
held
by
Roman
Catholics
bears
to
the
whole
amount
of
the
stock
or
shares
of
the
Company,
the
Court
of
Revision
allowed
the
appeal
and
directed
that
the
Company
be
entered
as
a
publie
school
supporter
for
all
of
its
assessments.
From
this
decision
an
appeal
was
taken
to
the
County
Judge,
who
dismissed
the
appeal,
holding
that
in
the
absence
of
affirmative
evidence
that
the
notice
did
not
contravene
the
provisions
of
s.
66(3)
of
the
Separate
Schools
Act,
the
whole
of
the
assessments
of
the
Company
‘‘should
be
entered,
rated
and
assessed
for
the
purpose
of
Public
Schools."
An
appeal
is
now
taken
to
this
Court,
and
it
is
claimed
that
the
assessment
as
entered
on
the
roll
by
the
assessor
ought
to
be
restored,
there
being
no
evidence
that
the
notice
given
in
1937
in
any
way
contravened
that
statute.
The
question
raised
on
this
appeal
would
appear
to
be
fully
answered
by
the
judgment
of
the
Judicial
Committee
in
Board
of
Education
of
Windsor
v.
Ford
Motor
Co.,
[1941]
3
D.L.R.
721,
A.C.
453.
Mr.
Phelan
earnestly
contended
that
the
judgment
in
that
case
was
upon
its
special
facts:
that
there
had
been,
in
that
case,
evidence
that
the
company
giving
the
notice
had
not
first
informed
itself
as
to
the
number
of
its
shares
held
by
Roman
Catholics,
and
its
notice
was
not
based
upon
actual
knowledge,
but
was
only
a
guess
or
estimate,
and
that
the
effect
of
this
evidence
was
to
place
upon
those
supporting
the
assessment
for
separate
school
purposes
the
burden
of
justifying
the
notice.
While
it
may
be,
as
appellant’s
counsel
contends,
that,
speaking
generally,
one
who
appeals
against
an
assessment
must
establish
some
ground
for
attacking
it,
I
am
unable
to
read
the
decision
of
the
Judicial
Committee
in
the
Ford
case
in
any
other
sense
than
as
establishing
that
in
such
a
case
as
is
now
before
us
the
burden
is,
from
the
commencement,
upon
those
supporting
the
assessment
for
separate
school
purposes,
to
establish
that
it
is
properly
made.
"‘The
supporters
of
separate
schools
must
establish
their
right
to
the
statutory
privilege.”
That
is
the
decision
in
the
Ford
ease.
It
is
equally
applicable
here,
and
is
binding
upon
us.
The
appeal
must,
therefore,
be
dismissed
with
costs.
There
were
argued
with
this
appeal,
appeals
in
the
cases
of
Dillon
v.
Russell
Construction
Co.
and
Dillon
v.
Atlantic
Service
Co.,
and
it
was
conceded
that
our
decision
in
this
case
will
apply
equally
to
the
two
other
cases.
They
will,
therefore,
likewise
be
dismissed
with
costs.
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