V., [1940-41] CTC 203

M. le juge FRANCOEUR. La Loi de l’impôt sur le tabac adoptée par la Legislature de la Province de Québec fut sanctionnée le 22 Juin 1940, et est devenue en vigueur le premier juillet suivant ((1940) 4 Geo. VI, ch. 15).

L’appelant aurait violé cette loi. Une plainte a été portée contre lui par le procureur général de la Province de Québec, l’accusant, étant un consommateur, d’avoir le 18 juillet 1940 acheté du tabac dans un magasin situé au No 381, rue Ste- Catherine ouest, Montréal, sans payer la taxe due. L’appelant a comparu devant un Juge de la Cour des sessions de la paix et a plaidé « non coupable » à 1 ’accusation portée contre lui. Il a immédiatement, par ses procureurs, décliné la juridiction de cette Cour et du juge en alléguant que le statut en vertu duquel la plainte est faite est ultra vires des pouvoirs de la Législature de Québec, pour les raisons formulées comme suit dans son mémoire :

a) It did not constitute direct taxation in the province; b) It set up a licensing system which was not "‘in order to the raising of revenue’’ by the licenses ;

c) It provided that the vendor should collect the tax;

d) It was not a direct tax but was a sales tax and one relating to a marketable commodity and upon a commercial transaction between the taxpayer and the other party to the transaction ;

e) It constituted a regulation of trade and commerce under s. 91, ss. 2, of the British North America Act;

f) Its subject-matter was not of a merely local and private nature in the Province;

g) By taxing imports, it violated sections 121 and 122 of the British North America Act ;

Malgré ces objections, le procureur général insista pour procéder au mérite et la cause fut fixée pour enquête et audition le 2 août 1940. L’appelant présenta alors une requête à un juge de la Cour supérieure, demandant l’émanation d’un bref de prohibition. Les allégations de cette requête développent et précisent les objections faites lors de la comparution de l’appelant:

7. That the charge as laid against your petitioner is not and does not constitute any offence in law, the whole for the following reasons :

a) That the statute 4 Geo. VI, ch. 15 described as the Tobacco Tax Act is illegal, null and void inasmuch as it does not legislate upon matters provided for by sec. 92 of the British North America Act but in fact legislates upon matters within the legislative authority of the Dominion of Canada in virtue of sec. 91 of the British North America Act.

b) That, particularly, the Act in question does not constitute direct taxation within the Province in order to the raising of revenue for provincial purposes under s. 92, ss. 2 of the British North America Act.

c) That the licenses provided for in the statute in question are not within the category of shop, saloon, tavern, auctioneer or other licenses in order to the raising of revenue for provincial, local or municipal purposes.

d) That the statute is illegal and ultra vires in providing that the vendor is to collect and remit the tax.

e) That the tax is illegal and ultra vires of the Province of Quebee inasmuch as it is not a direct tax upon the consumer but is a sales tax and a tax relating to a marketable commodity and upon a commercial transaction between the taxpayer and the other party to the transaction.

f) That the tax is illegal and ultra vires of the Province of Quebec as constituting the regulation of trade and commerce under s. 91, ss. 2 of the British North America Act.

g) That the subject-matter of the Act is not a matter of merely local or private nature in the Province of Quebec.

h) That in providing for a tax upon any tobacco brought into the Province or caused to be brought into the Province of Quebec, the tax is illegal and ultra vires of the Province of Quebec and particularly violates Section 121 of the British North America Act providing that "‘all articles of the growth, produce or manufacture of any one of the Provinces shall, from and after the Union, be admitted free into each of the other Provinces.

8. That, in consequence of the foregoing it appears that the complaint and charge against your petitioner and the trial of the said charge constitutes an excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Courts of inferior jurisdiction, the respondents in the present case.

9. That the matter involved in the said charge is one of great importance to the public in general and your petitionerin particular as it represents a serious and unjust interference with his liberties and rights and with those of others. in the Province similarly situated.

Après avoir entendu le requérant et le procureur général, le juge de la Cour supérieure a, le 29 août 1940, refusé d’émaner le bref, et, statuant en même temps sur le fond, décrète que l’acte attaqué est légal, constitutionnel, intra vires des pouvoirs de la Législature.

Les allégations de la requête justifient-elles l’émanation du bref de prohibition? Les moyens invoqués au sujet de l’excès de juridiction sont-ils prima fade suffisamment sérieux pour accueillir cette procedure?

Le litige présente une question de droit très importante: l’illégalité et l’inconstitutionnalité d’une loi qui oblige les contribuables de toute la province à payer une certaine taxe.

Le juge de la Cour supérieure considère que la Cour des sessions de la paix a juridiction. Les parties devraient done être renvoyées devant ce Tribunal qui aurait exercé sa compétence. Il est admis que le bref de prohibition est un remède extraordinaire auquel on ne doit recourir qu’avec grande circonspection.

Avec beaucoup de déférence pour la Cour supérieure, je ne peux pas accepter comme juridiques tous les motifs formulés contre l’émanation de ce bref. Appelé à décider si la loi est constitutionnelle ou non, le tribunal, en se conformant à la procédure, n’a pas à se préoccuper des ennuis ou inconvénients dont le fisc pourrait souffrir. Tout en s’opposant aux raisons invoquées en faveur de l’émanation du bref, celui-ci est implicitement accordé, puisqu’on a disposé aussitôt du mérite de la cause. Cependant, il ne me paraît pas justifiable, sauf dans des cas très exceptionnels, de déroger à la jurisprudence établie par les décisions suivantes de cette cour. Sung Lung v. Cité de Québec (1921) 31 B. R. 212; Asch Ltd. v. Recorder’s Court of the City of Lachine (1932) 52 B. KR. 363; Procureur général de Québec v. Lazarovitch (1940) 69 B. KR. 214.

Le requérant a obtenu, toutefois, la conclusion principale de sa requête obligeant les intimés

to appear before this Honourable Court to answer to the demand contained in the present Petition and particularly that the said Tobacco Tax Act 4 Geo. VI, ch. 15 is illegal and ultra vires of the Province of Quebee and unconstitutional, null and void.

La Cour s’est prononcée sur ce point.

L’unique question qui se pose est celle-ci: la taxe prélevée en vertu de cet acte (4 Geo. VI, ch. 15) est-elle indirecte ou directe ? L'appelant soutient que c’est une taxe indirecte; le procureur général intimé maintient que c’est une taxe directe. La Cour a donné raison à celui-ci. Elle donne une interprétation juste de cette loi, en tenant compte de la règle générale sur laquelle le législateur s’est appuyé.

Cette règle, c’est de faire payer la taxe par le consommateur, c’est-à-dire par celui qui achète pour consommer et non pas pour revendre dans le but de se rembourser. Voilà la tendance générale de la loi, l’intention qui apparaît nettement au texte d’exiger l’impôt du consommateur au moment de l’achat (art. 8). C’est Jui qu’on a voulu atteindre. Ce n’est done pas une taxe sur la vente, mais sur l’achat.

C’est normalement la taxe directe perçue du consommateur qui achète mais ne revend pas. Il ne peut pas transférer cette taxe à un autre. Il faut écarter les cas spéciaux ou exceptionnels, les arrangements particuliers en vue d’une revente éventuelle.

Nos tribunaux ont souvent été appelés à se prononcer sur l’étendue des pouvoirs des Législatures provinciales en matière de taxation. Plusieurs causes importantes ont été jugées par le Conseil privé. Il me paraît inutile de répéter les propositions qui ont été longuement discutées.

Les parties, au soutien de leurs prétentions respectives, ont cite de nombreux arrêts, tant de nos cours que du Conseil privé. Après les avoir examinés, il faut je crois, en arriver à la conclusion que celui qui s’applique au présent litige est: Attorney General for British Columbia v. King come Navigation Co. Ltd. (Plaxton Canadian Constitutional Decisions of The Privy Coun- cil (1930-39), p. 228, (1984) A.C. 45). Dans cette cause, le Conseil privé a interprété une loi presqu ’identique à celle soumise à notre considération. Lord Thankerton analyse plusieurs jugements dans lesquels on retrouve la définition de la taxe directe et la taxe indirecte.

Le débat porte principalement, comme dans la cause actuelle, sur la question de savoir si la taxe fixée est directe et relève exclusivement de la juridiction de la Législature provinciale, en vertu de l’art. 92 de l’Acte de 4’Amérique Britannique du Nord, ou est indirecte, du ressort du Parlement fédéral, art. 91 du même acte.

Notons que l’intimé Kingcome Navigation Co. Ltd. soulevait, en substance, pour faire déclarer la loi de la Colombie Britannique inconstitutionnelle les moyens invoqués par l’appelant Parsons. Référant à la cause Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 A.C. 575, lord Thankerton cite une partie des remarques faites par lord Hobhouse. Celui-ci cite la définition de la taxe directe et indirecte donnée par John Stuart Mill. C'est la suivante (p. 582) :

Taxes are either direct or indirect. A direct tax is one which is demanded from the very persons who it is intended or desired should pay it. Indirect taxes are those which are demanded from one person in the expectation and intention that he shall indemnify himself at the expense of another; such as the excise or customs.

Lord Hobhouse ajoute (p. 582) :

Their Lordships then take Mill’s definition above quoted as a fair basis for testing the character of the tax in question, not only because it is chosen by the appellant’s counsel, nor only because it is that of an eminent writer nor with the intention that it should be considered a binding legal definition, but because it seems to them to embody with sufficient accuracy for this purpose an understanding of the most obvious indicia of direct and indirect taxation, which is a common understanding, and is likely to have been present to the minds of those who passed the Federation Act.

Après avoir étudié d’autres arrêts rendus par le même tribunal, lord Thankerton conclut (p. 99):

It follows that the tax here in question must be tested by Mill’s definition, as adopted by the decisions of the Board.

Turning then to the provisions of the Fuel-Oil Act here in question, it is clear that the Act purports to exact the tax from a person who has consumed fuel-oil, the amount of the tax being computed broadly according to the amount consumed. The Act does not relate to any commercial transaction in the commodity between the taxpayer and someone else. Their Lordships are unable to find, on examination of the Act, any justification for the suggestion that the tax is truly imposed in respect of the transaction by which the taxpayer acquires the property in the fuel-oil nor in respect of any contract or arrangement under which the oil is consumed, though it 1s, of course, possible that individual taxpayers may recoup themselves by such a contract or arrangement but this cannot affect the nature of the tax. Accordingly their Lordships are of opinion that the tax is direct taxation within the meaning of s. 92, head 2, of the British North America Act.

The last contention of the respondents was that the Fuel-oil Act invaded the province of the Dominion Parliament, in that it regulated trade and commerce. Except that the Act taxes persons in respect of a commercial commodity, which is not produced in its raw state within the Province, there is nothing in the Act to suggest that its purpose was the regulation of trade and commerce,, and the respondent has to rely on extrinsic circumstances such as the competition of coal in the fuel market. But, if the taxation falls within the terms of s. 92, head 2, that is, if it is direct taxation within the Province in order to raise a revenue for Provincial purposes, and it does not purport to regulate trade and commerce, there is no reason to limit the legislative power expressly conferred on the Province.

Comme on le voit, le Conseil privé adopte comme finale la définition de la taxe directe et indirecte donnée par Mill. Elle a toujours été admise depuis. Elle est devenue le critérium d’appréciation. Il faut donc accepter cette décision. Elle résume et clôt le débat. Elle donne une réponse péremptoire à toutes les objections soulevées par l’appelant. Les motifs très élaborés du jugement a quo basé sur la décision susmentionnée en disposent.

Ce jugement est done bien fondé. Je rejetterais l’appel avec dépens.

M. le juge LETOURNEAU :—Depuis que cet appel nous a été soumis, Me Chipman, l’avocat de l’appelant, nous a très loyalement fait tenir copie de ce qu’ont récemment dit deux juges de la Cour suprême du Nouveau-Brunswick, division des appels, au sujet d’un cas analogue. Atlantic Smoke Shops Ltd. v. A.G. for N.B., [1941] C.T.C.

Vu cette opinion et les raisons que donnent respectivement dans leurs notes mes collègues les juges Hall et Francoeur, Je confirmerais le jugement a quo, sans toutefois en retenir tous les considérants, encore que l’élément «inconvénients » devait avoir sa valeur pour que fût décidée sur-le-champ, soit aussi bien avant qu’après l’émission du bref de prohibition, la question de droit, celle d’une inconstitutionnalité de la loi invoquée, qui servait de base à la plainte.

J’ajouterais, bien que ceci soit étranger à cette plainte dont l’appelant est l’objet, que pas plus que les autres, l’art. 9 de la loi ne me paraît ultra vires, car en le lisant attentivement, on se rend compte que la disposition ne vise pas le cas de douane ou accise que généralement implique une importation, mais tout au plus d’atteindre là aussi le «consommateur » en l’assujettissant à un contrôle équivalant à celui du << vendeur en détail >> qui, pour ce cas, ferait défaut.

Je rejetterais l’appel.

Mr. Justice Hall:—By the "Tobacco Tax Act’’ (4 Geo. VI, ch. 15), the Province of Quebec imposed a tax upon consumers of tobacco in the following words :

8. In order to provide for the exigencies of the publie service of the Province, every consumer shall pay to His Majesty in the rights of the Province, at the time of making a purchase of tobacco in this Province, for consumption by himself or by any other person, a tax in respect of the consumption of such tobacco at the rate of ten per centum of the retail price.

The appellant, having refused to pay the tax in question, was charged before the Court of Sessions of the Peace, and when the complaint was due to be heard, he presented to the Superior Court a petition for the issue of a writ of prohibition, ordering the Judges of Sessions of the Peace to appear before the Superior Court to answer the demand that the said Tobacco Tax Act be declared illegal ultra vires of the Provincial Legislature because it does not constitute ceedings in the matter with reference to the complaint and charge.

The material allegations of the petition are that the Act is ultra vires of the Provincial Legislature because it does not constitute direct taxation; because the licenses provided for in the Statute in question are not within the category of licenses issued for the purpose of raising revenue for provincial, local or municipal purposes : because, upon the vendor is imposed the duty of collecting and remitting the tax; because the said tax is a sales ‘ tax, and a tax relating to a marketable commodity, and upon a commercial transaction; and further because the subjectmatter of the Act is not a matter of merely local or private nature in the Province of Quebec because, by Section 9, it imposes restrictions upon inter-provincial transactions, and thereby violates section 121 of the British North America Act.

By a carefully reasoned and comprehensive judgment, the learned trial Judge declared that, since the questions at issue were fully disclosed in the pleadings and in the Act itself, no useful or essential requirement would be served by issuing a writ of prohibition, and he, therefore, concluded that the Act in question was within the competence of the Provincial Legislature; that the tax imposed was a direct tax, which could not be passed on to any other person, and that the other criticisms were equally unfounded in law. He, accordingly, refused to grant the writ of prohibition, and dismissed the appellant’s petition. From that judgment the appellant now appeals.

The fundamental contention of the appellant is that the Tobacco Tax Act, under which he is charged, is ultra vires of the Province, because its provisions do not constitute direct taxation ; because the licensing system set up is not one ‘‘in order to the raising of revenue ’ ; because it provides that the vendor should collect the tax; because the tax is not a direct tax but a sales’ tax, and one relating to a marketable commodity and upon a commercial transaction between the taxpayer and the vendor.

The test upon which rests the classification of a tax is found in Mill’s definition, which has been uniformly followed by the judgments of the Privy Council since the ruling in Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 A.C. 575. This definition reads as follows:

A direct tax is one which is demanded from the person who it is intended or desired should pay it. Indirect taxes are those which are demanded from one person in the expectation and intention that he shall indemnify himself at the expense of another; such as the excise or customs.

Discussing this definition, Lord Haldane said (Att. Gen. for B.C. v. C.P.R. (1927), A.C. 934, 938) :

The definition given by John Stuart Mill was accordingly taken as a fair basis for testing the character of the tax in question, not as a legal definition, but as embodying with sufficient accuracy an understanding of the most obvious indicia of direct and indirect taxation, such as might be presumed to have been in the minds of those who passed the Act of 1867.

In that case it is true, the tax in question was held to be an indirect tax because "‘from the terms of the Act there appears an expectation and intention that the person required to pay the tax will indemnify himself upon a resale of the commodity taxed. ‘ ‘

In the more recent case, Attorney General for B.C. v. King come Navigation Co. Ltd. (1934), A.C. 45, it was however, held that:

The fuel-oil tax, 1930, of British Columbia, which imposes a tax upon every consumer of fuel-oil according to the quantity which he has consumed, is valid under s. 92, head 2, of the British North America Act, 1867; the tax is direct taxation, because it is demanded from the very persons who it is intended or desired should pay it. As the tax does not relate to any commercial dealing with the commodity, it does not fall within the category of customs and excise duties, which are within the legislative powers of the Dominion, both because they are by nature indirect taxes and having regard to s. 122 of the Act. The Act being within the legislative power given by s. 92, head 2, and not purporting to regulate trade and commerce, is not invalid as infringing the Dominion authority under s. 91, head 2, to legislate for that purpose. Lord Thankerton discussing this question, says at p. 52 :

The question whether it is a direct or indirect tax cannot depend upon those special events which may vary in particular cases; but the best general rule is to look to the time of payment; and if at the time the ultimate incidence is uncertain, then, as it appears to their Lordships, it cannot, in this view, be called direct taxation within the meaning of the 2nd section of the 92nd clause of the Act in question (B.N.A. Act). It is clear that the ‘‘ultimate incidence” is not there used in the sense of the political economists, but refers to the ultimate incidence among the parties to the transaction in respect of which the tax is imposed.

Applying these rules of interpretation to the provisions of the Tobacco Tax Act, it appears to me to be obvious that the tax is a direct tax imposed upon the consumer, who can have neither the expectation nor the intention to indemnify himself at the expense of another.

It is to be noted that the tax is to be paid by the consumer at the time of making a purchase on a retail sale, and such a purchaser is precluded from making a subsequent sale, both by the terms of the Act, section 3 of which declared that no person may sell tobacco in the Province unless he has received a license therefor, and also by the virtual impossibility of making a remunerative sale after he himself has paid a special tax of 10% on the original retail price.

Counsel for the appellant have emphasised the contention that, since the Act applies to one who purchases for the consumption "‘by any other person,’’ it implies that such other person would indemnify the purchaser for the tax.

I am unable to discover any valid basis for this argument, for the insertion of the words "‘by any other person,’’ in my opinion clearly points to a gratuitous transfer of the consumption by the purchaser to another. If, on the other hand, the purchaser, in making the purchase, was acting for another, he would in effect be the agent of the other, and the real purchaser would be the principal, to whom would apply the maxim 6( qui facit per alium se facere videtur.’’

I have no hesitation, therefore, in expressing the opinion that the tax is a direct tax and, therefore, intra vires of the Provincial Legislature.

Insofar as the question of a license is concerned, I conclude that the pith and substance of this Act is to regulate the tobacco business within the Province, and the purpose of the license is to provide the necessary machinery for that regulation.

In Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products (1938), A.C. 708, it was held:

Further, the regulation of trade within the Province being valid, the method of regulation by a system of licenses is also admissible, and it is no objection that license fees should be charged either to defray the costs of administering the local regulation or to inerease the general funds of the Province, or for both purposes, and the Act is accordingly intra vires of the Provincial Legislature under s. 92(9) of the British North America Act, 1867. The license fees can also be supported as validly imposed, on the ground that they are fees for services rendered by the Province, or by its authorized instrumentalities, under the powers given by s. 92(13) and (16) of the Act of 1867.

Counsel for the appellant based a further argument upon section 9 of the Act, which refers to the importation into the Province of tobacco, in which event the importer must produce to the Comptroller of Customs his invoice, and pay the same tax in respect of the consumption as is provided for by section 8.

I am of the opinion that the provisions of section 9, are entirely irrelevant to the issues in the present appeal, which concern only a retail purchase within the Province.

The respective provisions have to do with transactions of an entirely different character, and are, therefore, severable, so that, even if it should be held that section 9 was ultra vires, the validity of the tax imposed by sec. 8, would not be affected.

On the question of severability, the recent judgment of the Privy Council, in Toronto Corporation v. Att. Gen. for Ontario (1938), A.C. 415, is instructive:

Held . . . Assuming that the Ontario Municipal Board Act, 1932, which set up the Board, does by some of its sections purport to constitute the Board a Court of Justice analogous to a Superior, District or County Court, it is to that extent invalid. There is, however, nothing to suggest that the Board would not have been granted its administrative powers without the addition of the alleged judicial powers, and although, therefore, such parts of the Act of 1932 as purport to vest in the Board the functions of a Court have no effect, they are severable, and the Board is validly constituted for the performance of its administrative functions.

As to the procedure, it is contended by the appellant that the trial Judge should have granted the writ of prohibition, and reserved his consideration of the constitutional question until the parties appeared before him upon the merits.

Our jurisprudence seems to have adopted the rule that " a writ of prohibition should not be refused if the petitioner presents what appears to be prima facie a serious ground of complaint, or attacks the jurisdiction in question for reasons which deserve a serious and attentive study’’ (Asch Ltd. v. Recorder’s Court of Lachine (1932), 52 K.B. 363).

The question in that case was whether the by-law of the City of Lachine was ultra vires because it discriminated between one part and another part of the City’s territory, and interfered, without compensation, with vested rights, and it seems to me to be obvious that the examination of that plea called for a much more serious and attentive study than the present claim that the Act in question is ultra vires because it imposed a tax which is indirect rather than direct.

It is evident from the terms of the judgment and the contents of the record, that the constitutional question was fully argued before the trial Judge, and he reached the conclusion that the Privy Council had clearly laid down the rules which govern the application of Mill’s definition of a direct tax, and that the application of that jurisprudence to the issues in the present case offered no peculiar difficulty. In other words, that the appellant had failed to make out even a prima facie case in support of his contention.

I am unable to discover that the appellant’s rights were in any way prejudiced by the refusal of the trial Judge to issue a writ of Prohibition since, if that had been done, the constitutional question would have been presented to him in the same manner, and without any further evidence at the hearing on the merits.

This Court, similarly, is fully conversant with the issues raised, and no useful purpose could possibly be served by sending the record back to the Superior Court for the issue of a writ of prohibition and a new argument on the merits. <All essential elements of the controversy have been effectively presented both to the Superior Court and to this Court.

I conclude, therefore, that the appeal should be dismissed, with costs.

Mr. Justice WALSH :—It was submitted that the law is invalid, because it constitutes indirect taxation, and such cannot be imposed by the province.

In order to provide . . . (V. supra p. 106).

The Privy Council declared (Att. General of B.C. v. King come Navigation Co., (1984), A.C. 45)

. . . the test to be applied in determining what is "‘direct taxation’’ within the meaning of Section 92, head 2, of the Act of 1867, is to be found in Mill’s definition of direct and indirect taxes.

A direct tax is one which is demanded from the very persons who it is intended or desired should pay it. Indirect taxes are those which are demanded from one person in the expectation and intention that he shall indemnify himself at the expense of another ; such are the Excise or Customs.

(Plaxton p. 223 & seq.)

In this instance the tax is made to fall on the person, who, it is intended, should pay it. Such is the general tendency of the law, although there may be exceptional cases.

The Act does not relate to any commercial transaction in the commodity between the taxpayer and some one else. Their Lordships are unable to find, on examination of the Act, any justification for the suggestion that the tax is truly imposed in respect of the transaction by which the taxpayer acquires the property in the fuel-oil not in respect of any contract or arrangement under which the oil is consumed, though it is, of course, possible that individual taxpayers may recoup themselves by such a contract or arrangement; but this cannot affect the nature of the tax. {Ibidem,)

For consumption by himself or by any other person. This does not mean that the tax will be passed to the principal by an agent; this cannot be considered a sale.

In regard to the writ of prohibition, which was denied, it might be indicated that the appellant was afforded what he sought: study by the Court of the Act that imposed this tax, so Mr. Justice Francoeur remarks.

I concur with him and Mr. Justice Hall.

The Act in question is within the competence of the Province. Since the hearing and study of this case by this Court, the same issue was decided by the Court of Appeal of New Brunswick (Atlantic Smoke Shops Ltd. v. A.G. for N.B., [1941] C.T.C.) ; the tax was there upheld. The New Brunswick case is presently before the Supreme Court, I understand.

I would dismiss the appeal, with costs.

M. le juge St-Jacques:—La ‘our supérieure aurait pu, sur la requête qui lui était présentée, ordonner l’émission du bref de prohibition. En refusant de la faire, a-t-elle violé un principe de droit? Je ne le crois pas.

Elle a jugé qu'il valait mieux disposer immédiatement des motifs invoqués par la requérante, étant donné les conséquences graves que pourrait entraîner l’émission du bref. La Cour s’est done prononcée sur la véritable question de droit que soulève le litige, à savior: la constitutionnalité de la loi de l’impôt sur le tabac, édictée par la législature de la province de Québec. Arrivant à la conclusion que les dispositions de cette loi sont du ressort de la province, elle a rejeté la demande de bref de prohibition.

La Cour d’appel n’a done maintenant qu’à résoudre cette seule question de la validité de la loi, et, quant à moi, la solution n'est pas dépourvue de difficultés.

S'il fallait s’en rapporter au sens naturel et ordinaire des mots, que devrait-on entendre par «une taxe directe » ? Ne serait-ce pas celle qui atteint directement les biens qui sont déjà dans le patrimoine de celui qui est appelé à la payer, comme, par exemple, les taxes municipales et scolaires, l’impôt sur le revenu, les taxes sur les successions et autres du même genre?

Or, la taxe imposée par la loi attaquée pèse sur le consommateur ; pour consommer une chose, il faut la produire soi-même, ou se la procurer par voie d’achat, c’est-à-dire par une opération commerciale. La loi ne vise pas le producteur de tabac, mais uniquement le consommateur qui s’en procure pour des fins de consommation. La taxe est payable lors de l’achat, c’est-à-dire au moment même où le tabac entre dans le domaine de propriété du consommateur. Il me paraîtrait que ce circuit d’opérations rende assez douteux le caractère de la taxe et qu’elle ne soit pas clairement << une taxe directe ».

Toutefois, si l’on s’en rapporte aux directives données par le Conseil privé, et il faut le faire, ce n'est pas dans le sens commun des mots qu’il faut rechercher la nature et le caractère de la taxe. Suivant la définition qu’en a donnée Mill, et qui aurait inspiré le parlement anglais lorsque l’Acte de l’Amérique Britannique du Nord a été adopté, une taxe est directe lorsque celui qui en supporte le poids ne peut le faire passer sur les épaules d’une autre personne. La loi de l’impôt sur le tabac a été rédigée de façon telle que l’acheteur ne peut raisonnablement pas trouver le moyen de se faire rembourser par un autre la taxe qu’il a payée à l’occasion de cet achat.

La poursuite instituée contre l’appelant est fondée sur les dispositions de l’art. 8 de la loi, et appliquant la règle posée par le Conseil privé, il y avait lieu pour la Cour supérieure de déclarer que le bref de prohibition demandé par l’appelant n’avait pas sa raison d’être.

Je rejetterais donc l’appel avec dépens.