Murphy,
J.:—The
municipality
derives
its
powers
of
assessment
from
the
Municipal
Act,
R.S.B.C.,
1936,
ce.
199.
Section
223(1),
prescribes
how
a
municipality
must
proceed
in
ascertaining
values
for
assessment
purposes.
It
reads
as
follows:
223(1)
For
the
purposes
of
taxation,
land,
except
as
hereinafter
provided,
shall
be
assessed
at
its
actual
value,
and
im-
provements
shall
be
assessed
for
the
amount
of
the
difference
between
the
actual
value
of
the
whole
property
and
the
actual
value
of
the
land
if
there
were
no
improvements:
Provided,
however,
the
land
and
improvements
shall
be
assessed
separately.”
Unless
the
assessment
in
question
is
made
in
accordance
with
the
law
authorizing
it
such
assessment
is
invalid:
Consumers
Gas
Co.
v.
Toronto
(1897),
27
S.C.R.
453.
Dealing
first
with
the
land
assessment,
land
must
be
assessed
at
its
actual
value.
Actual
value
of
land
for
assessment
purposes,
where
no
actual
market
is
in
sight,
is
what
a
prudent
person,
attempting
to
measure
the
forces
at
work
making
for
a
present
shrinkage
in
value
for
a
time
and
again
likely
to
arise
making
for
an
increase
in
value,
would
be
likely
to
agree
to
pay
in
way
of
investment
for
such
land:
Bishop
of
Victoria
v.
Victoria,
[1933]
4
D.L.R.
524,
47
B.C.R.
264.
Such
possible
purchaser
will
be
hereinafter
referred
to
as
an
investing
purchaser.
No
evidence
was
given
that
a
present
market
for
any
of
the
parcels
of
land
involved
in
this
appeal
is
in
sight
and
consequently
the
principle
above
set
out
applies.
Taking
first
lot
5805,
this
lot
is
assessed
at
$3,170,
which
was
the
price
paid
for
it
by
appellant
in
1936.
It
was
purchased
from
the
Dominion
Government.
That
Government
must
in
fixing
the
price
be
taken
to
have
been
acting
in
the
interests
of
the
people.
It
had
to
take
into
account
two
considerations:
First,
as
administrator
of
the
public
domain
it
had
to
see
that
it
obtained
a
fair
price
for
the
lot.
Second,
as
to
its
knowledge
the
land
was
required
as
part
of
the
site
of
the
First
Narrows
Bridge
and
as
that
structure
if
built
would
be
of
great
benefit
to
the
citizens
of
the
City
of
Vancouver
and
the
residents
on
the
north
shore
of
Vancouver
harbour
it
would,
in
my
opinion,
feel
impelled
to
place
no
undue
obstacles
in
the
way
of
the
construction
of
the
bridge
by
asking
for
the
land
more
than
it
was
worth
at
the
time
of
sale.
Of
course
sale
price
does
not
fix
actual
value
for
assessment
purposes
as
the
Bishop
of
Victoria
case,
supra,
shows
but
it
is
in
my
opinion
one
of
the
factors
to
be
kept
in
mind
together
with
the
circumstances
surrounding
its
sale
in
applying
the
principle
laid
down
in
that
case.
What
factors
would
influence
an
investing
purchaser
in
deciding
the
price
he
would
be
willing
to
pay
for
said
lot?
I
find
on
the
evidence
there
would
be
three,
viz.,
the
possibility
of
subdividing
that
portion
fronting
on
Marine
Drive,
the
possibility
of
the
remainder
being
utilized
as
sites
for
light
factories
and
the
possibility
that
the
whole
of
said
lot
might
some
day
be
required
as
part
of
a
bridge
site
should
a
bridge
over
the
First
Narrows
be
constructed.
This
last
consideration
is
I
think
justified
by
the
decision
in
Re
Ontario
c
Minnesota
Power
Co.
C
Fort
Frances
(1916),
28
D.L.R.
30,
35
O.L.R.
459.
These
considerations
in
my
opinion
would
lead
an
investing
purchaser
to
be
willing
to
pay
the
assessed
price
for
lot
0805.
The
assessment
is
accordingly
confirmed.
Taking
up
next
lot
5797,
the
assessment
made
on
it
is
also
the
price
the
First
Narrows
Bridge
Co.
paid
for
it
in
1936.
What
has
been
said
in
reference
to
sale
price
when
dealing
with
lot
5805
applies
likewise
to
this
lot,
the
only
difference
being
that
in
this
instance
the
vendor
was
the
provincial
Government.
That
body
would
I
think
have
the
same
considerations
before
it
in
fixing
the
price
as
presumably
the
Dominion
Government
had.
What
factors
would
influence
an
investing
purchaser
in
reference
to
this
lot
in
deciding
the
price
he
would
be
willing
to
pay
for
it
?
Again
I
find
on
the
evidence
there
would
be
three,
viz.,
the
fact
that
it
is
a
waterfront
lot
and
therefore
that
a
portion
of
it
would
be
capable
of
development
as
waterfront
property,
the
possibility
of
utilizing
the
remainder
as
a
site
for
light
factories
enhanced
as
to
this
lot
by
the
fact
that
rail
shipping
facilities
over
the
P.G.E.
would
be
obtainable
at
relatively
small
cost
and
the
possibility
of
the
whole
lot
being
some
day
required
as
a
part
of
a
bridge
site
for
a
First
Narrows
bridge.
It
was
strongly
contended
that
waterfront
development
could
not
be
profitably
undertaken
because
of
strong
currents
and
other
physical
difficulties.
I
am
convinced
on
the
evidence
that
taking
the
long
view
such
is
not
the
case
and
that
an
investing
pur-
chaser
would
give
that
possibility
some
favourable
consideration.
With
all
enumerated
factors
in
mind
I
think
such
investing
purchaser
would
be
willing
to
pay
the
amount
of
the
assessment
for
this
lot
and
the
assessment
is
also
accordingly
confirmed.
As
to
the
pier
site
lease,
which
under
the
Municipal
Act
has
to
be
assessed
as
if
it
were
owned
in
fee,
I
find
on
the
evidence
that
the
only
factor
that
an
investing
purchaser
would
take
into
consideration
would
be
the
possibility
of
its
being
required
for
the
purpose
for
which
it
is
actually
in
use,
viz.,
as
a
pier
site
for
a
First
Narrows
bridge.
But
with
that
in
mind
I
consider
he
would
be
willing
to
pay
the
assessed
price
of
$1,000
therefor
and
the
assessment
is
likewise
confirmed.
Subsection
(1)
of
s.
223
of
the
Municipal
Act
above
set
out
directs
how
assessments
for
improvements
are
to
be
made.
The
actual
value
of
the
land
is
to
be
determined,
then
the
actual
value
of
the
whole
property,
land
and
improvements
is
to
be
fixed
and
the
figure
for
assessment
of
improvements
is
to
be
arrived
at
by
deducting
from
the
actual
value
of
the
whole
property
the
actual
value
of
the
land.
Then
land
and
improve-
ments
are
to
be
assessed
separately.
Actual
value
has
the
same
meaning
for
assessment
purposes
in
the
case
of
improvements
as
it
has
in
the
case
of
land,
subject
to
the
qualification
that
in
determining
what
an
investing
purchaser
would
be
willing
to
pay
regard
must
be
had
to
the
likelihood
that
the
reversible
currents
which
affect
land,
causing
it
at
times
to
depreciate
and
again
to
appreciate
in
value,
will
not,
at
least
to
the
same
degree,
affect
an
improvement
dedicated
for
all
time
to
a
given
purpose—in
this
instance
a
bridge:
Bishop
of
Victoria
v.
Victoria,
supra.
"‘Improvement,’’
as
defined
in
s.
2
of
the
Municipal
Act,
when
used
with
regard
to
district
municipalities
"‘shall
extend
to
and
mean
all
buildings,
structures,
fences,
storage-tanks
for
oil
or
gasoline
for
sale
by
wholesale
or
retail
of
a
capacity
greater
than
three
thousand
gallons,
and
all
machinery
or
other
things
affixed
to
the
soil.
ff
Respondent
is
a
district
municipality.
Improvements
by
the
definition
must
be
affixed
to
the
soil.
I
cannot
see
how
anything
can
be
regarded
as
affixed
to
the
soil
of
a
particular
parcel
of
land
unless
such
thing
is
situate
within
the
vertical
planes
of
the
boundaries
of
the
particular
parcel
of
land
under
consideration.
If
this
view
is
correct
then
the
improvement,
say
on
lot
5805,
disclosed
in
the
evidence,
is
that
portion
of
the
bridge
enclosed
by
the
planes
of
its
boundaries
extended
vertically
upward
with
the
rest
of
the
bridge
conceived
of
as
being
non-existent
since
such
remaining
part
is
not
affixed
to
the
soil
of
lot
5805.
Following
then
the
directions
contained
in
said
s.
223(1),
of
the
Municipal
Act
in
the
light
of
the
decision
in
the
Bishop
of
Victoria
case,
supra,
the
question
is
what
additional
sum
would
an
investing
purchaser
be
willing
to
give
for
lot
5805
with
this
segment
of
bridge
upon
it
to
what
he
would
be
willing
to
give
for
said
lot.
with
nothing
annexed
to
it
except
by
nature?
No
evidence
was
led
by
respondent
which
would
enable
the
Court
to
give
an
answer
to
this
query.
The
only
evidence
adduced
was
as
to
quantity
of
steel
and
cement
in
such
segment
of
bridge
and
their
value
conceived
of
as
an
integral
part
of
the
bridge
as
a
whole.
Such
evidence
can
have
no
bearing
on
the
question
propounded
so
far
as
I
can
see.
If
evidence
had
been
led
showing
that
such
segment
of
bridge
had
a
value
in
exchange
to
use,
if
I
may,
with
respect,
the
language
of
Macdonald
J.A.
in
the
Bishop
of
Victoria
case,
supra,
then
Re
Maritime
T.
&
T.
Co.,
[1940]
1
D.L.R.
602,
cited
by
counsel
for
respondent
might
call
for
consideration
but
again
the
record
contains
no
such
evidence.
Further,
if
evidence
had
been
led
to
show
that
an
investing
purchaser
would
be
willing
to
give
more
for
lot
5805
with
said
segment
of
bridge
upon
it
than
he
would
give
for
it
in
a
state
of
nature
because
of
the
possibility
of
its
being
used
as
a
portion
of
a
First
Narrows
toll
bridge
which
might
thereafter
be
authorized
and
constructed
and
that
consequently
such
segment
had
a
value
in
exchange
such
evidence
would
have
to
be
weighed
and
a
conclusion
based
upon
it
arrived
at.
No
such
evidence
however
was
given.
It
follows
that
since
the
Court
has
before
it
no
evidence
that
the
improvements
on
lot
5805—if
the
segment
of
bridge
standing
upon
it
conceived
of
as
standing
alone
with
the
rest
of
the
bridge
non-existent
can
be
called
improvements—
have
any
actual
value
for
assessment
purposes
within
the
meaning
of
s.
223(1),
of
the
Municipal
Act
the
appeal
against
the
assessment
of
improvements
upon
it
must
be
allowed.
What
has
been
said
in
reference
to
improvements
on
lot
5805
applies
mutatis
mutandis
to
improvements
on
lot
5795
and
on
the
pier
site
and
the
appeal
against
assessments
of
improvements
on
these
parcels
must
likewise
be
allowed
for
the
same
reasons.
If
I
am
in
error
in
my
view
of
what
constitutes
improvements
and
if
the
segments
of
bridge
on
each
of
these
parcels
of
land
are
to
be
dealt
with
for
assessment
purposes
as
integrated
portions
of
the
whole
bridge,
I
would
still
be
of
opinion
that
the
appeal
against
assessments
for
improvements
must
succeed.
However
great
may
be
the
value
in
use
of
the
bridge
in
question
its
value
in
exchange
within
the
meaning
of
said
s.
223(1),
of
the
Municipal
Act,
interpreted
in
the
Bishop
of
Victoria
ease,
supra,
aS
a
Structure
is
in
my
opinion
nil.
Its
only
value
in
exchange
arises
I
think
from
the
franchise
authorizing
the
collecting
of
tolls
over
a
period
of
years
on
traffic
traversing
it.
Reverting
then
to
the
definition
of
"‘improvements’’
in
the
Municipal
Act
I
cannot
see
how
such
an
intangible
thing
as
a
franchise
to
collect
tolls
can
be
said
to
be
affixed
to
the
soil
upon
which
the
supports
of
the
bridge
stand
or
over
which
it
passes.
Still
less
in
my
opinion
can
such
franchise
be
conceived
of
as
being
divided
into
parts
with
some
indeterminate
part
affixed
to
the
soil
of
each
particular
lot
over
which
the
bridge
passes.
If
the
views
herein
expressed—assuming
they
are
correct—result
in
valuable
property
escaping
taxation
the
remedy
lies
with
the
Legislature.
The
Court
can
only
apply
the
law
as
it
stands
on
the
statute
book.
The
Ontario
cases
cited
in
argument
are
not
I
think
of
assistance
in
deciding
how
improvements
are
to
be
assessed
under
the
Municipal
Act.
The
statute
they
deal
with
makes
no
distinction
between
land
and
improvements,
contains
no
definition
of
improvement
and
by
the
combined
effect
of
its
definition
of
land
and
its
section
prescribing
method
of
assessment
directs
that
improvements
be
assessed
as
land.
Judgment
accordingly.
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