Harvey
C.J.A.:—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
plaintiff
from
the
judgment
of
Shepherd
J.,
on
his
interpretation
of
certain
provisions
of
the
Provincial
Income
Tax
Act
(c.
5
of
1932).
The
James
Ramsey
Co.
is
a
provincial
corporation.
Section
8
of
the
Act
makes
provision
for
the
taxation
of
the
income
of
companies,
but
s.
20(1)
provides
that:
*"20(1)
The
income
of
a
personal
corporation,
in
lieu
of
being
assessed
the
tax
prescribed
by
section
8
of
this
Act,
shall
on
the
last
day
of
each
year
be
deemed
to
be
distributed
as
a
dividend
to
the
shareholders
thereof
and
shall
in
their
hands
constitute
taxable
income
for
each
year
in
the
proportion
hereinafter
mentioned,
whether
actually
distributed
by
way
of
dividend
or
not.’’
“Personal
corporation’’
is
defined
by
s.
2(g)
as
“a
corporation
or
joint
stock
company
(no
matter
when
or
where
created)
controlled
directly
or
indirectly
by
one
person,
who
resides
in
Alberta,
or
by
one
such
person
and
his
wife
or
any
member
of
his
family,
or
by
any
combination
of
them,
or
by
any
other
person
or
corporation
on
his
or
their
behalf,
whether
through
holding
a
majority
of
the
stock
of
such
corporation,
or
in
any
other
manner
whatsoever,
the
gross
revenue
of
which
is
to
the
extent
of
one
quarter
or
more
derived
from
one
or
more
of
the
following
sources,
namely:”
The
sources
of
income
specified
include
rent.
The
facts
are
all
agreed
on
and
it
appears
that
for
the
years
1931,
1932
and
1933
none
of
the
income
of
the
company
was
distributed
and
that
more
than
a
quarter
of
it
was
derived
from
rent.
It
also
appears
that
the
appellant
resided
in
Alberta
during
these
years,
and
that
of
the
1,000
shares
of
the
company’s
capital
he
owned
480
shares
and
his
son
T.
N.
Ramsey
owned
100
shares,
the
two
together
having
in
the
words
of
the
stated
ease
‘‘control
of
the
said
company
by
together
holding
the
majority
of
the
stock
thereof.”
The
company
for
the
years
in
question
filed
its
returns
as
an
ordinary
corporation
and
tendered
the
appropriate
tax
which
however
the
Superintendent
of
Income
Tax
refused
to
accept.
The
latter
claimed
that
the
company
was
a
‘‘personal
corporation”
and
assessed
its
members
as
individuals
under
s.
20(1).
The
appellant
appealed
from
this
assessment
but
up
to
the
present
has
failed
in
his
appeal.
T.
N.
Ramsey
while
a
son
of
the
appellant
is
a
married
man
with
a
wife
and
children
who
all
lived
in
his
own
household
apart
from
the
appellant
and
he
was
not
dependent
on
the
appellant
for
support.
The
sole
question
at
issue
is
whether
on
the
facts
stated
T.
N.
Ramsey
is
a
member
of
the
appellant’s
family
within
the
meaning
of
the
term
as
used
in
s.
2(g).
Section
2(g)
appears
to
have
been
taken
in
general
terms
from
the
Dominion
Income
War
Tax
Act
where
it
first
appeared
in
1926
(ce.
10).
In
Plaxton’s
work
on
the
Dominion
Act
published
this
year
only
one
decision
on
this
provision
is
referred
to,
Port
Credit
Realty
Ltd.
v.
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
[1937]
4
D.L.R.
17,
and
it
furnishes
no
assistance.
In
that
case
the
owner
of
almost
the
whole
of
the
shares
died
and
left
his
property
to
trustees,
the
beneficiaries
being
his
wife
and
five
children
who
received
the
income
and
paid
income
tax
as
individuals
for
several
years.
Then
the
Commissioners
of
Income
Tax
took
the
position
that
the
company
was
not
a
personal
company
and
assessed
it
as
an
ordinary
company.
It
will
be
seen
that
it
is
the
converse
of
the
present
case.
It
was
taken
for
granted
that
the
wife
and
children
constituted
a
family
and
there
is
no
suggestion
that
they
did
not
all
live
in
one
household
and
it
was
held
by
Angers
J.
that
the
company
being
controlled
by
the
executors
and
trustees
fell
within
the
clause
“controlled
by
any
other
person
or
corporation
or
any
combination
of
them
on
his
or
their
behalf.’’
While
there
seems
to
be
no
other
decision
on
this
section
there
seems
also
to
be
a
great
dearth
of
authority
on
the
meaning
of
the
word
‘‘family’’
where
used
in
a
statute
as
opposed
to
its
use
in
wills.
The
word
of
course
may
be
used
in
different
senses
and
the
difficulty
is
to
determine
what
sense
is
intended
here
there
being
no
interpretation
given
by
the
statute.
In
Rex
v.
Darlington,
4
T.R.
797,
100
E.R.
1308,
the
Court
was
considering
an
old
Statute
of
William
III
which
provided
that
an
unemployed
person,
a
charge
on
the
parish
in
which
he
resided
who
thought
he
could
obtain
employment
in
another
parish
and
so
cease
to
be
a
charge,
could
obtain
a
certificate
from
his
own
parish
directed
to
the
other
parish
which
certificate
‘‘shall
oblige
the
said
parish
or
place
to
receive
and
provide
for
the
person
mentioned
in
the
said
certificate
together
with
his
or
her
family,
as
inhabitants
of
that
parish
whenever
he
or
she
as
they
shall
happen
to
become
chargeable
to,
or
be
forced
to
ask
relief
of
the
parish.’’
Lord
Kenyon
C.J.
said
(p.
800):
‘‘In
common
parlance,
the
family
consists
of
those
who
live
under
the
same
roof
with
the
pater
familias:
those
who
form
(if
I
may
use
the
expression)
his
fireside.
But
when
they
branch
out,
and
become
the
heads
of
new
establishments,
they
cease
to
be
part
of
the
father’s
family.”
Buller
J.
said
(p.
802)
:
‘‘This
Act
is
then
confined
to
the
person
to
whom
the
certificate
is
granted,
‘together
with
those
who
reside
with
him;’
the
words
are,
‘together
with
his
family/
”
and
Grose
J.
said
(p.
804):
“When
the
son
becomes
the
head
of
a
new
branch,
and
has
children
of
his
own,
he
ceases
to
be
part
of
his
father’s
family;
and
his
children
then
form
a
part
of
his
own
family.”
The
above
decision
was
considered
and
adopted
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Massachusetts
in
Dodge
v.
Boston
&
Providence
Railroad
Corp.
(1891),
154
Mass.
299.
It
is
stated
(p.
301):
‘‘The
word
‘family’
has
several
meanings.
Its
primary
meaning
is
the
collective
body
of
persons
who
live
in
one
house
and
under
one
head
or
management.
Its
secondary
meaning
is
those
who
are
of
the
same
lineage,
or
descend
from
one
commonprogenitor.
“Unless
the
context
manifests
a
different
intention,
the
word
‘family’
is
usually
construed
in
its
primary
sense.’’
The
Massachusetts
decisions
though
not
decisive
are
always
looked
on
with
great
respect
and
the
rule
laid
down
in
the
Dodge
case
seems
to
be
reasonable
and
deserving
of
being
adopted.
It
is
clear
that
in
the
primary
sense
of
the
word
“family,”
T.
N.
Ramsey
is
not
a
member
of
the
appellant’s
family.
Then
can
one
gather
from
the
statute
any
reason
to
think
that
any
other
sense
was
intended?
In
my
opinion
so
far
as
one
can
obtain
any
assistance
from
the
terms
of
the
Act
it
is
rather
the
other
way.
The
important
element
to
constitute
a
“personal
corporation’’
is
control
by
a
person,
actual
or
virtual.
One
would
think
that
the
head
of
a
household
would
be
able
to
exercise
greater
control
over
his
household
than
over
his
descendants
who
might
be
scattered
over
the
world,
even
though
limited
to
his
sons
and
daughters,
and
so
over
the
company
of
which
they
were
members.
I
can
see
nothing
else
to
furnish
any
guide
and
it
would
seem
to
follow
that
the
word
‘‘family’’
should
be
construed
in
its
primary
sense
and
therefore
as
not
including
T.
N.
Ramsey.
I
would
therefore
allow
the
appeal.
The
appellant
should
have
his
costs
both
here
and
on
the
appeal
to
a
Judge.
As
the
point
is
one
of
importance
the
scale
of
column
5
should
apply.
Appeal
allowed.
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