Swanson,
C.C.J.:—This
is
an
appeal
by
the
Canadian
Pacific
Railway
Company
against
the
assessment
for
school
purposes
confirmed
by
the
Court
of
Revision
of
the
city
of
Vernon,
held
on
February
8,
1939,
at
Vernon,
B.C.,
upon
that
portion
of
the
right-of-way
of
the
Canadian
Pacific
Railway
Co.
situate
and
being
beyond
the
corporate
limits
of
the
city
of
Vernon,
but
included
pursuant
to
the
Public
Schools
Act,
R.S.B.C.,
1936,
ch.
253,
in
the
Vernon
municipal
school
district
for
school
purposes
by
the
city
of
Vernon.
It
is
submitted
on
behalf
of
the
railway
company
by
Mr.
Greaves
that
the
present
assessment
of
$4,000
per
mile
is
excessive
and
in
contravention
of
sec.
114
of
the
Public
Schools
Act
under
which
it
is
submitted
the
proper
assessment
should
be
$3,000
per
mile.
It
is
submitted
by
Mr.
Morrow
on
behalf
of
the
city
of
Vernon
that
the
assessment
of
$4,000
per
mile
is
both
legal
and
quite
reasonable,
and
that
it
is
within
the
power
of
the
city
to
assess
these
lands
at
the
rate
of
$5,280
per
mile,
being
the
rate
now
in
force
pursuant
to
sec.
223(4)
of
the
Municipal
Act,
R.S.B.C.,
1936,
ch.
199,
on
all
lands
of
the
railway
company
situate
and
being
within
the
corporate
limits
of
the
city.
Mr.
Morrow
submits
that
the
present
assessment
of
$4,000
per
mile
now
complained
of
on
the
lands
in
question
has
been
in
force
for
each
year
from
1921
to
the
present,
pursuant
to
a
friendly
arrangement
between
the
city
and
the
railway
company.
This
is
the
first
time
this
assessment
has
been
challenged
by
the
railway
company.
Nevertheless
the
company
is
within
its
statutory
rights
in
now
lodging
an
appeal
to
this
Court.
Mr.
Morrow
fortifies
the
city’s
position
by
invoking
sec.
70
of
the
Public
Schools
Act.
This
sec.
70
in
effect
states
that
where
the
boundaries
of
the
municipal
school
district
(to
which
class
the
city
of
Vernon
belongs)
have
been
extended
so
as
to
embrace
territory
not
included
in
the
municipality
(city
of
Vernon
in
the
present
case),
comprised
in
the
district,
all
property
situate
in
that
territory
shall
be
liable
to
assessment
and
taxation
for
school
purposes
in
the
same
manner
and
to
the
same
extent
as
if
it
were
within
the
limits
of
the
municipality;
Mr.
Greaves
stresses
the
concluding
five
lines
of
sec.
70.
Mr.
Morrow
submits
that
sec.
114
of
the
Public
Schools
Act
has
no
application
whatever
to
the
case
in
question,
that
section
being
applicable
solely
to
‘‘Rural
School
Districts.’’
I
am
quite
of
the
opinion
that
Mr.
Morrow’s
argument
is
correct,
that
sec.
114
has
no
application
to
the
matter
under
consideration.
It
is
very
significant
that
the
Public
Schools
Act
is
divided
into
a
number
of
very
important
“Headings,”
e.g..
“Classification
of
School
Districts’’
is
especially
provided
for
in
the
Act
by
sec.
14
and
succeeding
sec.
15;
“Provincial
Aid
to
Schools’’
is
provided
for
by
sec.
18
and
following
sections;
‘‘Municipal
School
Districts’’
are
dealt
with
under
that
head-
ing
beginning
at
sec.
31
up
to
sec.
76;
"‘Rural
School
Districts”
are
dealt
with
under
that
heading
by
sec.
76,
and
from
that
on
to
sec.
130
of
the
Act;
""
Community
School
Districts’’
under
sec,
130;
and
‘General
Provisions’’
under
sec.
131
to
sec.
170.
“They
[headings
in
a
statute]
govern,
and
may
generally
be
read
before,
each
of
the
sections
which
are
ranged
under
them.
They
are
to
be
regarded
as
parts
of
the
statute
itself,
and
may
be
read
not
only
as
explaining
the
sections
which
immediately
follow,
but
as
affording
an
even
better
key
to
the
general
constructions
than
a
mere
preamble.
Further
as
being
found
and
sometimes
referred
to
in
the
enacting
parts,
they
are
deserving
of
greater
consideration
than
marginal
notes.
The
clear
meaning
and
natural
operation
of
words
found
in
the
various
sections
under
headings
must,
however,
according
to
general
rule,
not
be
restrained
or
confined
by
them.’’
See
Halslyury
}
s
Laws
of
England,
vol.
27,
1st
ed.,
p.
121.
See
also
American
&
English
Encyclopaedia,
vol.
26,
article
“Statutes,”
pp.
629-630.
In
Eastern
Counties
etc.
Ry.
Co.
v.
Marriage
(1860)
9
H.L.
Cas.
32,
Bramwell,
B.
said
at
p.
46
:
“This
general
heading
is
not
only
in
good
sense,
but
as
matter
of
verbal
accuracy
to
be
considered
as
governing,
and
to
be
read
before,
each
section
which
ranges
under
it,
as
though
they
had
been
numbered
1,
2,
and
so
on.”
Channell,
B.
in
the
same
case
at
p.
41
said
:
“These
various
headings
are
not
to
be
treated
as
if
they
were
marginal
notes,
or
were
‘introduced
into
the
Act
merely
for
the
purpose
of
classifying
the
enactments.
They
constitute
an
important
part
of
the
Act
itself.
They
may
be
read,
I
think,
not
only
as
explaining
the
sections
which
immediately
follow
them,
as
a
preamble
to
a
statute
may
be
looked
to,
to
explain
its
enactments,
but
as
affording,
as
it
appears
to
me,
a
better
key
to
the
construction
of
the
sections
which
follow
than
might
be
afforded
by
a
mere
preamble.”
Bramwell,
B.
said
in
the
House
of
Lords,
in
the
case
of
Hammersmith
etc.
Ry.
Co.
v.
Brand
(1869)
L.R.
4
H.L.
171,
38
L.J.Q.B.
265,
at
270:
“Your
Lordships
will
find
that
they
begin
with
a
general
heading
*
*
*
All
that
follows
that
heading
is
to
be
construed
with
reference
to
it
[referring
to
Eastern
Counties
etc.
Ry.
Co.
v.
Marriage,
supra]/
9
See
also
Union
SS.
Co.
of
N.Z.
v.
Melbourne
Harbour
Commrs.
(1884)
9
App.
Cas.
365.
See
Proudfoot,
V.C.
in
Wood
v.
Hurl
(1880)
28
Gr.
146,
quoting
above
judgment
of
Channell,
B.
and
Bramwell,
B.
See
also
ruling
of
Fisher,
J.
in
Yorkshire
and
Pac.
Securities
Ltd.
v.
Fiorenza
52
B.C.R.
509,
at
514
.
For
these
reasons
I
think
I
must
rule
that
the
city
has
acted
within
its
legal
rights
in
making
the
assessment
in
question.
The
appeal
is
accordingly
dismissed.
The
matter
of
the
costs
of
the
appeal
are
allowed
to
the
city,
fixed
at
$25.
Appeal
dismissed.
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