ANGERS,
J.:—The
present
case
relates
to
four
appeals
from
as
many
assessments
for
the
taxing
years
1931,
1932,
1933
and
1934
made
by
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax
on
July
24,
1936,
and
affirmed
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
acting
and
represented
by
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax,
on
January
6,
1937.
The
appeals
are
brought
under
sections
58
and
following
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
(R.S.C.
1927,
chap.
97).
I
shall
deal
with
the
appeal
concerning
the
year
1931;
the
facts
and
questions
of
law
with
regard
to
the
three
other
years
are
identical,
the
only
difference
being
in
the
sums
involved.
The
decision
shall
apply
to
the
four
taxing
periods
in
question.
On
April
30,
1932,
the
appellant,
Harry
C.
Hatch,
delivered
to
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
in
compliance
with
section
33
of
the
Act,
a
return
showing
an
income
for
the
year
1931
of
$90,522.48.
Included
in
this
amount
was
a
sum
of
$60,717.78
received
from
Trinity
Securities,
Limited.
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
was
incorporated
by
letters
patent
issued
on
November
23,
1925,
under
the
authority
of
The
Ontario
Companies
Act,
by
the
Provincial
Secretary
of
the
Province
of
Ontario;
a
copy
of
the
letters
patent
was
filed
as
exhibit
1.
I
may
note
that
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
is
a
private
company.
The
purposes
and
objects
of
the
company
are,
among
others,
the
following
:
(a)
To
operate
ranches
or
farms
for
live
stock,
dairying
or
agriculture;
to
breed,
raise,
keep,
render
marketable
and
deal
in
horses,
cattle
and
live
stock
of
all
kinds
and
to
produce,
buy,
sell,
manufacture
and
deal
in
all
products
and
by-products
thereof
and
all
agricultural
products;
(e)
To
undertake,
carry
on
and
execute
transactions
as
financial
or
commercial
brokers
or
agents;
(g)
To
acquire,
lease,
construct,
improve,
maintain,
own,
use,
operate,
sell,
let
and
deal
in
dwelling
houses,
lodging
houses
and
hotels;
to
operate
ranches
or
farms
for
live
stock,
dairying
or
agriculture
;
to
breed,
raise,
keep,
render
marketable
and
deal
in
horses,
cattle
and
live
stock
of
all
kinds
and
to
produce,
buy,
sell,
manufacture
and
deal
in
all
products
and
by-products
thereof
and
all
agricultural
products
;
(i)
To
invest
the
moneys
of
the
company
not
immediately
required
for
the
purposes
of
the
company
in
such
investments
as,
from
time
to
time,
may
be
determined.
The
capital
of
the
company
is
fixed
at
$100,000,
divided
into
1,000
shares
of
$100
each.
The
head
office
of
the
company
is
said
to
be
situate
at
the
City
of
Toronto,
in
the
Province
of
Ontario.
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
was
at
all
times
material
herein
controlled
by
the
appellant
;
he
owned
all
the
outstanding
shares,
with
the
exception
of
four
which
were
merely
qualification
shares.
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
is,
and
was
in
1931,
a
personal
corporation
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
(i)
of
section
2
of
the
Act,
as
enacted
by
23-24
George
V,
chapter
14,
section
1,
of
the
said
statute:
(2)
"personal
corporation"
means
a
corporation
or
joint
stock
company,
irrespective
of
when
or
where
created,
whether
in
Canada
or
elsewhere,
and
irrespective
of
where
it
carries
on
its
business
or
where
its
assets
are
situate,
controlled,
directly
or
indirectly,
by
one
individual
who
resides
in
Canada,
or
by
one
such
individual
and
his
wife
or
any
member
of
his
family,
or
by
any
combination
of
them
or
by
any
other
person
or
corporation
or
any
combination
of
them
on
his
or
their
behalf,
and
whether
through
holding
a
majority
of
the
stock
of
such
corporation
or
in
any
other
manner
whatsoever,
the
gross
revenue
of
which
is
to
the
extent
of
one-quarter
or
more
derived
from
one
or
more
of
the
following
sources,
namely:—
(i)
From
the
ownership
of
or
the
trading
or
dealing
in
bonds,
stocks
or
shares,
debentures,
mortgages,
hypothecs,
bills,
notes
or
other
similar
property.
(ii)
From
the
lending
of
money
with
or
without
security,
or
by
way
of
rent,
annuity,
royalty,
interest
or
dividend,
or
(iii)
From
or
by
virtue
of
any
right,
title
or
interest
in
or
to
any
estate
or
trust.
The
income
tax
return
of
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
for
the
year
1931,
a
copy
whereof
was
filed
as
exhibit
2,
contains
in
brief
the
following
statement:
Total
income
|
$153,150.65
|
Total
deductions
|
92,432.87
|
Net
income
|
$
60,717.78
|
Statutory
exemption
|
2,000.00
|
Amount
of
income
subject
to
tax
|
$
58,717.78
|
No
amount
is
set
down
opposite
the
words
"‘Amount
of
tax
at
10
p.c.
”,
because
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
is
a
personal
corporation
and
personal
corporations
are
not
assessable
for
income
tax
save
with
respect
to
the
portion
of
their
income
deemed
to
be
distributed
to
non-residents:
see
sections
21
of
the
Act.
The
sum
of
$153,150.65,
representing
the
gross
income,
is
made
up
as
follows:
Interest
on
call
loans
|
$
1,488.82
|
Interest
on
mortgages
|
6,267.03
|
Interest
on
bonds
|
2,000.10
|
|
$
9,755.95
|
Dividends
from
Canadian
corporations
(specified
|
in
schedule
attached)
|
92,082.95
|
Dividends
from
British
and
foreign
corporations
|
(specified
in
schedule
attached)
|
51,311.75
|
|
$153,150.65
|
The
sum
of
$92,432.87,
representing
the
deductions,
comprises:
the
following
items:
General
expenses
|
|
.
|
$
846.78
|
|
Farm
and
stable
expenses
|
|
85,492.38
|
|
Expenses
re
mortgage
collections
|
|
188.01
|
|
Salaries
|
|
8,600.00
|
|
|
$
89,627.17
|
Depreciation
|
|
Office
furniture
and
fixtures—
|
|
|
Rate
|
Amount
in
|
|
|
per
cent.
|
previous
|
Amount
|
Cost
|
per
annum
|
years
|
this
year
|
$913.26
|
10%
|
$197.46
|
$91.33
|
91.33
|
Allowance
on
account
of
dividends
(specified
in
|
|
schedule)
|
|
.
|
2,714.37
|
|
$
92,432.87
|
On
April
30,
1932,
the
appellant
sent
his
income
tax
return
for
the
year
1931
and
included
in
his
income
the
sum
of
$60,717.78
as
income
derived
from
Trinity
Securities,
Limited.
The
computation
of
the
tax
in
the
appellant’s
return,
which
forms
part
of
the
documents
transmitted
to
the
Registrar
of
this
Court
in
compliance
with
section
63
of
the
Act,
is
made
up
as
follows:
Gross
income
|
|
$90,522.48
|
|
Deductions
|
—
|
....
|
3,105.00
|
a
|
|
.
s
|
|
$87,417.48
|
|
Less
statutory
exemption
—..
..
|
$2,400
|
|
Allowance
for
3
dependent
chil-
|
|
dren
under
21
years
of
age
|
|
at
$500
each
_
...
|
.
|
1,500
|
|
|
3,900.00
|
|
Income
subject
to
tax
|
|
$83,517.48
|
|
Tax
2
|
__
...
|
|
$
19,170.77
|
|
5%
additional
where
net
income
in
excess
of
$5,000
|
958.54
|
|
|
$
20,129.31
|
|
The
appellant
paid
this
sum
of
$20,129.31
in
due
course.
On
February
18,
1935,
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax
sent
to
the
appellant
a
notice
of
assessment
for
the
year
1931
altering
the
amount
of
the
tax;
the
statement
included
in
the
notice
is
made
up
as
follows:
Total
|
income
|
_..
|
|
$112,750.76
|
|
Deductions
|
..
|
|
.-
|
3,105.00
|
|
|
$109,645.76
|
|
Statutory
exemption
|
|
$2,400
|
|
Dependents
|
|
1,500
|
|
|
3,900.00
|
|
|
$105,745.76
|
|
Tax
|
|
.
|
....
|
..
|
_
|
|
$
27,035.93
|
Additional
5%
|
tax
|
..
|
_
|
..
|
..
|
..
|
|
1,351.79
|
|
$
28,387.72
|
Then
comes
a
summary
which
reads
thus
:
|
|
|
Tax
|
Interest
|
Total
|
Amount
levied
|
|
$28,387.72
|
$
1,428.09
|
$29,815.81
|
Amount
paid
on
account
|
-
|
|
20,129.31
|
|
20,129.31
|
Balance
due
|
|
$
8,258.41
|
$
1,428.09
|
$
9,686.50
|
On
February
26,
1935,
the
appellant’s
solicitor
wrote
to
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax
in
part
as
follows:
I
have
just
received
from
Mr.
Hatch’s
office
an
amended
notice
of
assessment
in
regard
to
his
income
tax
for
1931,
dated
February
18th,
1935.
In
effect
the
reassessment
has
disallowed
$21,243.91
of
the
loss
incurred
by
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
in
the
operation
of
the
farm
and
racing
stable.
It
is
my
recollection
that
this
matter
was
settled
without
a
reassessment
down
to
the
end
of
the
taxation
period
of
1931,
but
it
was
understood
that
you
would
make
a
readjustment
in
the
year
1932,
and
Mr.
Hatch
could
appeal
if
he
saw
fit.
In
connection
with
this
I
am
enclosing
herewith
copy
of
letter
from
the
Inspector
of
Taxation
at
Toronto,
dated
October
4th,
1932,
which
refers
to
these
expenses
for
the
year
1982
and
subsequently.
I
wish
you
would
advise
whether
or
not
the
reassessment
for
1931
was
issued
in
error.
On
March
15,
1935,
the
Commissioner
replied
as
follows:
With
reference
to
your
letter
of
the
26th
ultimo,
the
matter
is
under
consideration
and
you
will
be
advised
further
in
due
course.
Meanwhile
you
may
wish
to
preserve
your
client’s
rights
by
the
filing
of
an
appeal.
On
March
16,
1935,
the
appellant
caused
a
notice
of
appeal
to
be
served
upon
the
Minister
by
his
solicitors.
On
March
23,
1935,
the
Commissioner
wrote
to
the
appellant’s
solicitors
acknowledging
receipt
of
the
notice
of
appeal
and
adding
:
An
investigation
is
being
made
into
this
matter
and
you
will
be
advised
further
in
due
course.
Meanwhile,
it
is
suggested
that
the
assessment
as
levied
be
paid
in
order
to
avoid
the
accrual
of
interest
under
the
provisions
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
subject
to
a
refund
at
a
later
date
should
an
adjustment
reducing
the
assessment
be
subsequently
made.
On
May
14,
1936,
the
Minister
rendered
his
decision
affirming
the
assessment.
On
or
about
June
12,
1936,
the
appellant
mailed
a
notice
of
dissatisfaction
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
section
60
and
duly
filed
security
for
costs
as
required
by
section
61.
This
appeal
has
since
remained
in
abeyance;
I
may
note
that
we
are
not
concerned
with
it
in
the
present
instance.
On
July
24,
1936,
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax
sent
to
the
appellant
another
notice
of
assessment
for
the
year
1931
;
it
contains
in
substance
the
following
items
:
Total
income
-
|
$176,499.28
|
|
Deductions
|
|
8B
1
05.00
|
|
|
$173,394.23
|
|
Statutory
exemption
and
dependents
—
|
3,900.00
|
|
|
$169,494.23
|
|
Tax
|
woe
|
_$
52,597.57
|
Additional
5%
tax
|
.-
|
|
2,629.88
|
|
$
55,227.45
|
There
follows
a
summary
which
reads
as
follows:
|
|
Tax
|
Interest
|
Total
|
Amount
levied
|
$55,227.45
|
$
9,092.71
|
$64,320.16
|
Amount
paid
on
account
|
20,129.31
|
|
20,129.31
|
Balance
due
|
_.
$35,098.14
|
$
9,092.71
|
$44,190.85
|
Amount
payable
as
at
August
24th,
1936
|
$44,190.85
|
The
difference
between
the
amount
of
the
total
income
in
the
notice
of
assessment
of
the
24th
of
July,
1936,
and
the
amount
of
the
total
income
in
the
appellant’s
return
of
the
30th
of
April,
1932,
consists
almost
entirely
of
the
farm
and
stable
expenses
of
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
for
the
year
1931,
amounting
to
$85,492.38,
which
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax
declined
to
allow
as
deduction
from
the
gross
income
of
the
company
for
that
year.
On
or
about
August
18,
1936,
Hatch
served
a
notice
of
appeal
upon
the
Minister,
in
accordance
with
the
provisions
of
section
58
of
the
Act.
On
January
6,
1937,
after
several
letters
from
the
appellant’s
solicitors
to
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax,
dated
September
11
and
29,
October
9
and
December
29,
1936,
and
January
4,
1937,
respectively,
all
of
which
form
part
of
exhibit
10,
the
Minister,
acting
by
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax,
rendered
his
decision
confirming
the
assessment
and
notified
the
appellant
accordingly.
On
or
about
January
20,
1987,
the
appellant
sent
to
the
Minister
a
notice
of
dissatisfaction,
in
accordance
with
the
requirements
of
section
60
of
the
Act.
On
March
31,
1937,
the
Minister
mailed
his
reply
denying
the
allegations
contained
in
the
notice
of
dissatisfaction
and
confirming
the
assessment
under
appeal
for
the
reasons
set
forth
in
his
decision.
Pleadings
were
filed
pursuant
to
an
order
of
the
Court
dated
the
21st
of
April,
1937.
IThe
learned
Judge
referred
to
the
pleadings
and
continued.
I
The
proof
establishes
beyond
doubt
that
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
is
a
personal
corporation
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
(1)
of
section
2
of
the
Act.
It
is
a
corporation
created,
as
we
have
seen,
by
letters
patent
issued
by
the
Provincial
Secretary
of
the
Province
of
Ontario
and
is
controlled
by
the
appellant,
Harry
C.
Hatch,
who
resides
in
the
City
of
Toronto,
through
holding
a
majority
of
the
stock
of
the
corporation,
the
gross
revenue
of
which
is,
to
the
extent
of
more
than
one-quarter,
derived
from
the
ownership
of
bonds,
stocks
and
mortgages.
The
respondent
submits
that
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
has
income
from
more
than
one
source
by
reason
of
exercising
two
trades
or
businesses:
(a)
the
holding
of
bonds,
stocks
and
mortgages;
(b)
the
operation
of
a
breeding
farm
and
racing
stable.
The
respondent
contends
that,
in
the
circumstances,
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
is
subject
to
the
provisions
of
section
10
of
the
Act,
which
reads
as
follows:
10.
In
any
case
the
income
of
a
taxpayer
shall
be
deemed
to
be
not
less
than
the
income
derived
from
his
chief
position,
occupation,
trade,
business
or
calling.
2.
Where
a
taxpayer
has
income
from
more
than
one
source
by
virtue
of
filling
or
exercising
more
than
one
position,
occupation,
trade,
business
or
calling,
the
Minister
shall
have
full
power
to
determine
which
one
or
more,
or
which
combination
thereof
shall,
for
the
purpose
of
this
Act,
constitute
the
taxpayer’s
chief
position,
occupation,
trade,
business
or
calling,
and
the
income
therefrom
shall
be
taxed
accordingly.
3.
The
determination
of
the
Minister
exercised
pursuant
hereto
shall
be
final
and
conclusive.
It
was
urged
on
behalf
of
the
appellant
that
section
10
does
not
apply
to
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
because
the
company
is
not
a
taxpayer.
Prior
to
the
coming
into
force
of
the
statute
24-25
George
V,
chapter
55,
assented
to
on
the
3rd
of
July,
1934,
personal
corporations
paid
no
income
tax
whatever
;
their
income
was
deemed
to
be
distributed
on
the
last
day
of
each
year
to
their
shareholders
and
the
latter
were
taxable
each
year
as
if
the
income
had
been
effectively
distributed.
Section
21
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
as
contained
in
chapter
97
of
the
Revised
Statutes
of
Canada,
1927,
governing
personal
corporations,
comprised
six
subsections;
three
of
these
only
are
material
in
the
present
instance;
they
read
as
follows:
21.
The
income
of
a
personal
corporation,
in
lieu
of
being
assessed
the
tax
prescribed
by
section
nine
of
this
Act,
shall
on
the
last
day
of
each
year
be
deemed
to
be
distributed
as
a
dividend
to
the
shareholders
thereof
and
shall
in
their
hands
constitute
taxable
income
for
each
year
in
the
proportion
hereinafter
mentioned,
whether
actually
distributed
by
way
of
dividend
or
not.
2.
Each
shareholder’s
taxable
portion
of
the
income
of
the
corporation,
deemed
to
be
distributed
to
him
as
above
provided
for,
shall
be
such
percentage
of
the
income
of
the
corporation,
as
the
value
of
all
property
transferred
or
loaned
by
such
shareholder
or
his
predecessor
in
title
to
the
corporation
is
of
the
total
value
of
all
property
of
the
corporation
acquired
from
the
shareholders.
3.
The
value
of
the
property
transferred
by
each
shareholder
or
his
predecessor
in
title
shall
be
the
fair
value
as
at
the
date
of
the
transfer
of
such
property
to
the
corporation,
and
the
total
value
of
the
property
of
the
corporation
acquired
from
its
shareholders
shall,
for
the
purpose
of
determining
the
percentage
referred
to
in
the
last
preceding
subsection,
be
taken
as
at
the
date
of
acquisition
thereof
by
the
corporation;
and
in
ascertaining
values
under
this
subsection,
regard
shall
be
had
to
all
the
facts
and
circumstances,
and
the
decision
of
the
Minister
in
that
respect
shall
be
final
and
conclusive.
In
virtue
of
section
3
of
chapter
14
of
23-24
George
V,
subsection
1
of
section
21
was
repealed
and
the
following
substituted
therefor
:
21.
(1)
The
income
of
a
personal
corporation,
whether
the
same
is
actually
distributed
or
not,
shall
be
deemed
to
be
distributed
on
the
last
day
of
each
year
as
a
dividend
to
the
shareholders,
and
the
said
shareholders
shall
be
taxable
each
year
as
if
the
same
had
been
distributed
in
the
proportions
hereinafter
mentioned.
By
section
10
of
said
chapter
14
it
is
declared
that
the
provisions
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
shall
be
read
and
construed
as
if
the
amendments
enacted
by,
among
others,
said
section
3,
had
been
contained
therein
since
the
15th
of
June,
1926,
and
that
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
as
amended
shall
apply
to
the
income
of
the
1925
taxation
period,
the
fiscal
periods
ending
in
1925
and
all
subsequent
periods.
In
virtue
of
section
4
of
said
chapter
14,
subsections
7,
8
and
9
were
added
to
section
21
;
these
subsections
read
as
follows
:
(7)
The
shareholder
of
a
personal
corporation
who
controls
such
corporation
shall
file
with
his
income
tax
return
a
statement
of
the
assets,
liabilities
and
income
of
the
personal
corporation.
(8)
Any
such
shareholder
who
fails
to
file
the
statement
required
by
the
last
preceding
subsection
at
the
time
and
in
the
manner
prescribed,
shall
be
taxed
on
double
the
amount
of
his
proportion
of
the
income
of
such
personal
corporation.
(9)
The
rates
of
tax
applicable
to
corporations,
as
in
this
Act
provided,
shall
not
be
imposed
on
any
personal
corporation.
By
section
10
it
is
enacted
that
section
4
shall
apply
to
the
income
of
the
1932
taxation
period,
the
fiscal
periods
ending
in
1932
and
all
subsequent
periods.
In
virtue
of
section
11
of
chapter
55
of
24-25
George
V,
subsection
9
of
section
21
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
as
enacted
by
section
4
of
chapter
14
of
23-24
George
V,
was
repealed
and
the
following
subsection
substituted
therefor
:
9.
The
rates
of
tax
applicable
to
corporations
as
in
this
Act
provided
shall
be
payable
by
a
personal
corporation
on
that
portion
only
of
its
income
which
is
deemed
to
be
distributed
to
non-residents.
By
section
18
of
said
chapter
55
it
is
enacted
that
section
11
shall
be
applicable
to
income
of
the
1933
taxation
period,
the
fiscal
periods
ending
therein
and
all
subsequent
periods.
The
evidence
shows
that
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
never
had
non-resident
shareholders;
consequently
it
never
was
liable
to
pay
income
tax.
The
definition
of
‘‘taxpayer’’
in
paragraph
(k)
of
section
2
of
the
Act
reads
thus:
"taxpayer"
means
any
person
paying,
liable
to
pay,
or
believed
by
the
Minister
to
be
liable
to
pay,
any
tax
imposed
by
this
Act.
A
personal
corporation
does
not,
in
my
opinion,
come
within
the
ambit
of
that
definition.
The
object
of
subsection
9
of
section
21,
as
enacted
by
24-25
George
V,
chapter
55,
section
11,
is
to
tax
at
the
source
income
payable
to
non-residents;
it
does
not
make
a
personal
corporation
a
taxpayer
in
the
sense
of
the
above
definition;
the
personal
corporation
merely
collects
the
tax
for
the
Minister
and
remits
it
to
him.
A
taxing
act
is
not
to
be
interpreted
differently
from
any
other
act,
but
it
must
be
construed
strictly:
effect
must
be
given
to
the
intention
of
the
legislature.
The
subject
is
not
taxable
by
inference
or
analogy;
the
tax
must
be
imposed
in
categorical
and
unambiguous
terms;
in
case
of
doubt
the
construction
of
the
act
must
be
resolved
in
favour
of
the
taxpayer
:
Cox
v.
Rabbits
(1878),
3
App.
Cas.
473,
at
478;
Partington
v.
Attorney-General
(1869)
L.R.
4
H.L.
100
at
122;
Tennant
v.
Smith,
[1892]
A.C.
150
at
154;
Commissioners
of
Inland
Revenue
v.
The
Duke
of
Westminster,
[1936]
A.C.
1
at
24;
Maxwell
on
the
Interpretation
of
Statutes,
7th
ed.
p.
246.
I
deem
it
apposite
to
quote
an
extract
from
the
judgment
of
Lord
Russell
of
Killowen
in
the
case
of
Commissioners
of
Inland
Revenue
v.
The
Duke
of
Westminster
(ubi
supra,
at
p.
24)
:
I
confess
that
I
view
with
disfavour
the
doctrine
that
in
taxation
cases
the
subject
is
to
be
taxed
if,
in
accordance
with
a
Court’s
view
of
what
it
considers
the
substance
of
the
transaction,
the
Court
thinks
that
the
case
falls
within
the
contemplation
or
spirit
of
the
statute.
The
subject
is
not
taxable
by
inference
or
by
analogy,
but
only
by
the
plain
words
of
a
statute
applicable
to
the
facts
and
circumstances
of
his
case.
As
Lord
Cairns
said
many
years
ago
in
Partington
v.
Attorney-General
(1869),
L.R.
4
H.L.
100,
122):
"As
I
understand
the
principle
of
all
fiscal
legislation
it
is
this:
If
the
person
sought
to
be
taxed
comes
within
the
letter
of
the
law
he
must
be
taxed,
however
great
the
hardship
may
appear
to
the
judicial
mind
to
be.
On
the
other
hand,
if
the
Crown,
seeking
to
recover
the
tax,
cannot
bring
the
subject
within
the
letter
of
the
law,
the
subject
is
free,
however
apparently
within
the
spirit
of
the
law
the
case
might
otherwise
appear
to
be."
If
all
that
is
meant
by
the
doctrine
is
that
having
once
ascertained
the
legal
rights
of
the
parties
you
may
disregard
mere
nomenclature
and
decide
the
question
of
taxability
or
non-taxability
in
accordance
with
the
legal
rights,
well
and
good.
That
is
what
this
House
did
in
the
case
of
Secretary
of
State
in
Council
of
India
v.
Scoble
(
[1903]
A.C.
299);
that
and
no
more.
If,
on
the
other
hand,
the
doctrine
means
that
you
may
brush
aside
deeds,
disregard
the
legal
rights
and
liabilities
arising
under
a
contract
between
parties,
and
decide
the
question
of
taxability
or
non-taxability
upon
the
footing
of
the
rights
and
liabilities
of
the
parties
being
different
from
what
in
law
they
are,
then
I
entirely
dissent
from
such
a
doctrine.
I
do
not
think
that
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
was
a
taxpayer
within
the
meaning
of
the
Act.
The
appellant’s
contention
that
Trinity
Securities,
Limited
carried
on
only
one
business
seems
to
me
well
founded.
The
evidence
discloses
that,
during
the
first
year
of
its
existence,
i.e.,
1926,
and
the
first
few
months
of
1927,
the
corporation
merely
held
investments
and
collected
the
interest
and
dividends
thereon.
The
appellant
transferred
to
the
company
a
large
quantity
of
securities
and
in
exchange
received
shares
of
the
company.
In
the
spring
of
1927
the
farm
was
acquired,
the
first
horses
were
purchased
and
the
breeding
operations
were
commenced.
The
company
from
time
to
time
disposed
of
some
of
its
securities
and
purchased
others
presumably
with
the
object
of
improving
its
investments
and
augmenting
its
income.
From
the
day
it
started
to
operate
its
farm
and
racing
stable,
the
company
gradually
increased
the
number
of
its
horses;
it
had
three
in
1927
and
in
1937
it
owned
about
seventy.
In
his
examination
for
discovery,
put
in
evidence,
the
appellant,
speaking
of
the
activities
of
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
says
:
A.
It
holds
a
goodly
number
of
investments
and
it
operates
that
farm
out
there
and
the
racing
stables;
that
is
about
the
extent
of
its
activities.
Q.
And
its
securities
are
one
hundred
per
cent.
securities
of
yours;
that
is,
they
were
securities
transferred—
A.
Are
you
asking
about
mine
or
the
company’s
now?
Q.
Well,
they
are
securities
that
reached
the
company
through
you.
Is
that
correct?
A.
Through
me.
Yes.
Q.
When
the
company
was
first
brought
into
existence
you
transferred
to
the
company—
A.
Some
securities
in
exchange
for
its
shares.
Q.
In
exchange
for
its
shares?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And
then
from
time
to
time,
I
suppose,
the
company
acquired
other
securities?
A.
Well
only
through
the
sale
of
some
it
had
and
changing
investments.
Further
on
in
his
testimony
Hatch
deals
with
the
farm
and
racing
stable
;
it
seems
to
me
expedient
to
quote
therefrom
the
,
following
extracts
:
Q.
Now,
when
did
you
acquire
the
farm
and
racing
establishment
?
A.
Just
about
the
same
time—around
1926
or
1927.
I
guess
maybe
1927,
I
think
I
started
the
racing
business.
Q.
Well,
the
farm,
was
that
farm
registered
in
your
name
for
a
time?
A.
I
think
it
is
yet
perhaps.
Q.
It
is
still
in
your
name;
the
corporation
is
simply—
A.
They
paid
for
it
and
I
have
it
in
trust
for
them.
The
witness
was
later
examined
about
the
financial
aspect
of
the
operations
of
the
farm
and
racing
stable;
I
may
perhaps
cite
a
passage
from
his
deposition
on
the
subject
:
Q.
You
were
closely
in
touch
with
the
operations
of
the
stable
from
a
financial
point
of
view?
A.
Very
closely.
Q.
And
you
arranged
for
the
meeting
of
the
losses
or
the
payment
of
the
expenses
from
time
to
time;
I
mean
you
were
called
on
to
do
that,
I
suppose?
A.
I
supervised
them.
I
should
know
what
they
were.
Q.
Trinity
Corporation
paid
for
this
farm
and
I
suppose
paid
for
the
extensions
and
improvements
that
you
have
made
from
time
to
time.
Is
that
so,
Mr.
Hatch?
A.
That
is
right.
Q.
Then
how
was
that
financed?
What
was
the
financial—
A.
Trinity
Securities
had
a
fairly
decent
income
and
they
paid
for
that
out
of
their
income.
Q.
It
paid
for
the
farm
out
of
income,
did
it?
A.
Well,
the
records
will
show
that.
I
expect
they
did.
I
don’t
know.
Ward
Wright,
examined
de
bene
esse
on
behalf
of
appellant,
stated
that
he
had
been
solicitor
for
Hatch
since
about
1924
and
that
he
had
been
intimately
connected
with
his
affairs
for
the
last
ten
years.
He
is
a
director
and
vice-president
of
Trinity
Securities,
Limited.
He
did
not
incorporate
the
company
but,
immediately
after
its
organization,
he
got
into
it
;
he
was
elected
a
director
in
August,
1927,
and
he
has
held
that
position
ever
since;
he
was
made
vice-president
in
1932.
Asked
what
the
business
of
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
involved,
the
witness
replied
:
A.
Well,
the
chief
business
that
we
do
is
operating
the
breeding
farm
;
that
is
where
the
loss,
as
far
as
there
is
any
loss,
really
comes
in,
I
think.
We
had
certain
very
definite
ideas
about
the
class
of
horse
that
we
wanted
to
breed
in
Canada;
the
farm
has
gradually
developed,
the
establishment
has
gradually
developed
and
as
it
has
developed
the
racing
stable
has
also
developed.
The
racing
stable
is
a
necessary
adjunct
to
the
breeding
farm;
you
have
got
to—just
like
showing
stock—you
have
to
demonstrate
what
you
have
and
in
the
thoroughbred
business
the
demonstration
takes
place
on
a
race
track.
After
stating
that
the
company
employed
twenty-two
men
in
1931
and
that
it
probably
had
the
same
number
in
1937,
Wright
added
:
A.
They
are
all
engaged
in
connection
with
the
operations
of
the
farm
at
Sullivan’s
Corners
and
with
branches
of
the
racing
stable,
wherever
they
are.
Of
course,
at
the
present
time
we
will
have
some
men
in
other
places;
we
have
four—(when
I
use
the
term
"horses"
it
means
horses,
mares
and
foals)—we
have
four
horses
in
Kentucky
and
twenty-three
in
California
and
we
have
twenty-three
at
Woodbine
Park
at
the
moment
and
eighteen
at
the
farm.
We
have
about
sixtyeight
or
seventy
horses
now
all
together.
Referred
then
to
the
subject
of
investments,
the
witness
gave
the
following
version:
A.
Well,
we
have
a
very
large
portfolio
which
we
invested
and
it
stays
invested;
there
is
no
business
except
we
now
and
again
make
up
our
minds
to
change
investments,
as,
for
instance,
in
1933
we
decided
to
get
out
of
United
States
investments
and
we
did.
We
had
about
a
million
and
a
half
in
United
States
at
that
time
and
we
sold
that
and
reinvested
in
Canada.
We
try
to
keep
our
surplus
funds
invested
in
as
well
paying
companies
as
we
can
and
we
have
gradually
got
them
into
things
that
we
are
largely
interested
in
ourselves,
other
companies.
Q.
Does
it
buy
and
sell
stocks
frequently?
A.
Oh,
no,
we
have
never
done
any
buying
and
selling
of
stock
except
when
necessary
changes
had
to
be
made
in
the
investment
portfolio.
Q.
Has
it
ever
bought
and
sold
for
others?
A.
Oh,
no,
we
have
never
done
anything
like
that.
********
Q.
Has
the
company
ever
received
any
commissions
for
the
sale
or
purchase
of
stock?
A.
No,
the
company’s
whole
income
is
limited
to
the
income
from
the
breeding
farm
and
racing
stable
and
income
from
our
investments;
the
investments
are
very
diversified;
they
include
stocks
and
mortgages
and
sometimes
if
we
have
surplus
money
we
have
made
call
loans.
It
was
argued
on
behalf
of
the
respondent
that
the
operations
of
the
breeding
farm
and
racing
stable
were
not
business
operations
but
were
recreational
operations
carried
on
by
the
appellant
himself,
the
corporation
being
merely
a
screen
or
device
to
shield
the
appellant.
In
support
of
this
proposition
counsel
cited:
Thacker
v.
Lowe
(1922),
288
Fed.
994;
Deering
v.
Blair
(1927),
23
Fed.
(2nd)
975;
Fisher
v.
Commissioner
of
Internal
Revenue
(1934),
29
U.S.
Board
of
Tax
Appeals
Rep.
1041;
74
Fed.
(2nd),
1014;
Commissioner
of
Internal
Revenue
v.
Field
(1932),
26
U.S.
Board
of
Tax
Appeals,
Rep.
116;
67
Fed.
(2nd),
876.
In
the
last
mentioned
case,
Manton
J.,
delivering
the
judgment
of
the
Circuit
Court
of
Appeals,
which
affirmed
the
decision
of
the
Board
of
Tax
Appeals,
said
(p.
877)
:
The
Board
of
Tax
Appeals
found
that
both
the
farm
and
racing
stable
were
conducted
as
businesses
for
profit
and
that
the
losses
in
connection
therewith
were
deductible
in
computing
his
net
income.
If
the
findings
of
the
Board
have
evidence
to
sustain
them,
we
may
conclude
that
the
enterprises
were
conducted
as
businesses
for
profit
and
therefore
the
losses
were
properly
deducted.
Comm’r
v.
Widener,
33
F.
(2d)
833
C.C.
A.
3;
Wilson
v.
Eisner,
282
F.
38
(C.C.
A.
2).
In
Flint
v.
Stone
Tracy
Co.,
220
U.S.
107,
171,
31
S.
Ct.
342,
357,
55
L.
Ed.
389,
Ann.
Cas.
1912B,
1312,
the
court
repeated
a
definition
of
business
as
“That
which
occupies
the
time,
attention
and
labour
of
men
for
the
purpose
of
a
livelihood
or
profit.”
It
is
not
essential
that
the
taxpayer
be
engaged
solely
in
one
business.
He
may
have
interests
in
several
enterprises
among
which
he
divides
his
time.
His
intention
is
important.
Thacher
v.
Lowe
(D.C.)
288
F.
994.
********
In
the
instant
case,
there
is
substantial
evidence
that
the
enterprises
were
conducted
as
a
business
for
profit
and
with
an
expectation
of
ultimate
profits.
We
cannot
say
that
the
expectation
of
profits
is
unreasonable
or
forecast
continuous
losses
in
the
light
of
experience
in
cattle
or
horse
breeding
and
racing.
If
the
right
to
deduct
losses
under
the
statute
required
that
profit
appear
to
the
court
to
be
possible,
that
requirement
would
be
quite
general
and
would
be
applicable
to
any
enterprise,
whether
it
was
farming,
manufacturing,
or
promotion
of
any
character.
We
may
not,
in
this
way,
foredoom
any
business
venture.
Cattle
breeding
and
horse
racing
projects
are
old.
Some
have
been
profitable;
others
have
not.
It
is
a
matter
of
intention
and
good
faith,
and
all
the.
circumstances
in
the
particular
case
must
be
our
guide.
In
this
case
we
think
the
respondent
embarked
in
these
enterprises
with
the
expectation
of
making
profits;
at
least
he
did
so,
with
an
earnest
and
honest
intention.
.
The
testimonies
of
the
appellant
and
of
Ward
Wright
satisfy
me
that
the
farm
and
stable
were
operated
in
good
faith
for
profit
and
constituted
a
business.
In
support
of
his
contention
that
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
was
engaged
in
the
business
of
investment,
counsel
for
respondent
cited
the
case
of
Commissioners
of
Inland
Revenue
v.
Korean
Syndicate
Ltd.,
[1921]
3
K.B.
258,
and
referred
to
the
judgment
of
the
Master
of
the
Rolls,
Lord
Sterndale,
at
page
272,
quoting
therefrom
the
following
observations
:
The
word
“business”
as
defined
in
that
section
is
therefore
the
governing
word
here,
and
it
has
the
widest
possible
meaning.
It
is
a
trade
or
business
of
any
description
owned
or
carried
on
in
any
other
place
than
the
United
Kingdom
by
persons
ordinarily
resident
in
the
United
Kingdom.
It
seems
to
me
that
if
a
company
comes
into
existence
for
the
very
purpose
of
acquiring
concessions
and
turning
them
to
account,
it
is
impossible
to
say
that
that
is
not
such
a
business
as
is
contemplated
by
and
referred
to
in
s.
39
of
the
Act.
The
remarks
of
the
Master
of
the
Rolls
particularly
in
point
are
included
in
the
preceding
paragraph
on
the
same
page
and
read
thus:
In
my
opinion
the
effect
of
that
agreement
is
that
it
is
a
carrying
out
of
the
object
which
the
Syndicate
undertook
to
attain,
and
which
is
mentioned
in
sub-clause
1
of
clause
3
of
memorandum
which
I
have
already
read,
of
acquiring
a
concession
and
working,
exploiting
and
turning
the
same
to
account,
the
same
words
as
are
used
in
the
agreement
of
February
7,
1905.
That
is
not
in
any
way
like
the
case
of
a
person
who
holds
certain
investments
and
merely
draws
the
interest
from
them,
or
of
an
owner
of
mines
who
simply
leases
them
in
consideration
of
the
payment
to
him
of
royalties.
It
is
nothing
in
the
least
like
either
of
those
cases,
but
it
is
a
carrying
out
of
that
object
mentioned
in
the
memorandum,
and
which
the
Syndicate
hopes
to
attain.
Counsel
also
referred
to
the
judgment
of
Lord
Atkin
at
page
276,
where
the
latter
makes
certain
comments
on
the
definition
of
the
word
"‘business’’
given
by
Rowlatt
J.
in
the
case
of
Commissioners
of
Inland
Revenue
v.
Marine
Steam
Turbine
Company
Limited,
[1920]
K.B.
193
at
203.
I
do
not
think
that
the
case
of
Commissioners
of
Inland
Revenue
v.
Korean
Syndicate
Ltd.
supports
the
contention
expressed
by
counsel
for
respondent;
I
feel
inclined
to
believe
that
it
is
rather
the
contrary.
On
the
other
hand,
counsel
for
appellant
relied
on
the
following
decisions
:
Smith
v.
Anderson
(1880),
15
Ch.
D.
247
and
Liverpool
and
London
and
Globe
Insurance
Co.
v.
Bennett,
[1911]
2
K.B.
577
at
989;
[1912]
2
K.B.
41
at
52;
[1915]
A.C.
610
at
616.
It
seems
convenient
to
quote
a
brief
extract
from
the
judgment
of
the
Master
of
the
Rolls,
Sir
George
Jessel,
in
the
case
of
Smith
v.
Anderson
(p.
260)
:
You
cannot
acquire
gain
by
means
of
a
company
except
by
carrying
on
some
business
or
other,
and
I
have
no
doubt
if
any
one
formed
a
company
or
association
for
the
purpose
of
acquiring
gain,
he
must
form
it
for
the
purpose
of
carrying
on
a
business
by
which
gain
is
to
be
obtained.
But
whether
that
be
so
or
not,
I
am
clearly
of
opinion
that
where
investment
is
made
a
business,
or
where
the
dealing
in
securities
is
made
a
business,
it
is
a
business
within
the
purview
of
this
Act.
There
are
many
things
which
in
common
colloquial
English
would
not
be
called
a
business,
even
when
carried
on
by
a
single
person,
which
would
be
so
called
when
carried
on
by
a
number
of
persons.
That
is
a
distinction
not
to
be
forgotten,
even
if
we
were
trying
the
question
by
the
ordinary
use
of
the
English
language.
********
When
you
come
to
an
association
or
company
formed
for
a
purpose,
you
say
at
once
that
it
is
a
business,
because
there
you
have
that
from
which
you
would
infer
continuity;
it
is
formed
to
do
that
and
nothing
else,
and,
therefore,
at
once
you
would
say
that
the
company
carried
on
a
business.
So
in
the
ordinary
case
of
investments,
a
man
who
has
money
to
invest,
invests
his
money
and
he
may
occasionally
sell
the
investments
and
buy
others,
but
he
is
not
carrying
on
a
business.
But
when
you
have
an
association
formed,
or
where
an
individual
makes
it
his
continuous
occupation—the
business
of
his
life
to
buy
and
sell
securities—he
is
called
a
stock-jobber
or
share-jobber,
and
nobody
doubts
for
a
moment
that
he
is
carrying
on
business.
So,
if
a
company
is
formed
for
doing
the
very
same
thing,
that
is,
for
investing
money
belonging
to
persons
in
the
purchase
of
stocks
and
shares,
and
changing
them
from
time
to
time,
either
with
limited
or
unlimited
powers,
I
should
say
there
can
be
no
question
that
they
are
carrying
on
a
business,
whether
you
call
it
a
business
of
investment
or
a
business
of
dealing
in
securities,
or,
as
in
the
case
before
me,
both
the
business
of
investment
and
the
business
of
dealing
in
securities.
I
am
satisfied
that
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
did
not
carry
on
two
separate
businesses
and
that
the
investment
of
its
funds
was
not
in
itself
a
business.
The
only
business
exereised
by
the
company
was
the
operation
of
its
breeding
farm
and,
as
an
adjunct,
its
racing
stable.
Mere
investment
for
investment’s
sake
is
not
a
business.
In
its
income
tax
return
for
1931,
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
indicated
the
nature
of
its
business
as
‘‘
Racing
and
Stud
Farm
‘
‘
;
in
its
returns
for
1932,
1933
and
1934
it
mentioned
"
‘Invest-
ments.’’
I
do
not
think
that
we
need
attach
much
importance
to
this
indication
;
the
nature
of
the
business
of
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
must
be
determined
according
to
the
facts
disclosed
in
the
evidence.
After
a
minute
perusal
of
the
evidence,
documentary
and
oral,
and
a
careful
review
of
the
precedents,
I
have
reached
the
conclusion
that
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
carried
on,
during
the
period
with
which
we
have
to
deal,
only
one
business,
to
wit,
that
of
operating
a
breeding
farm
and
a
racing
stable;
the
disbursements
and
expenses
laid
out
in
connection
with
the
said
business
must
be
deducted
from
the
profits
or
gains
realized
therefrom
and,
if
necessary,
from
the
revenues
derived
from
the
investments
in
order
to
determine
the
amount
liable
to
income
tax.
It
was
urged
on
behalf
of
the
appellant
that
an
arrangement
had
been
arrived
at
between
the
appellant
and
the
respondent
whereby
the
full
expenses
of
Trinity
Securities,
Limited,
for
the
years
1930
and
1931
were
to
be
allowed.
I
may
say
that
I
am
not
satisfied
that
such
an
arrangement
was
made;
however,
seeing
the
conclusion
which
I
have
reached
on
the
main
issue,
this
question
offers
no
interest.
For
the
reasons
aforesaid
I
believe
that
the
appeal
in
connection
with
the
year
1931
must
be
maintained
and
that
the
assessment
of
the
24th
of
July,
1936,
must
be
set
aside.
For
the
same
reasons,
a
similar
decision,
mutatis
mutandis,
applies
to
the
years
1932,
1933
and
1934;
the
amendments
made
by
23-24
George
V,
chapter
14,
and
24-25
George
V,
chapter
55,
do
not
give
rise
to
a
different
conclusion.
The
appellant
is
claiming
a
refund
of
the
sum
of
$27,314.60,
which
he
paid
under
protest;
I
do
not
think
that
a
refund
can
be
sought
by
an
appeal
against
the
decision
of
the
Minister
;
the
only
procedure
available
is
the
petition
of
right;
Lovibond
v.
Grand
Trunk
Railway
Company
et
al.,
[1933]
O.R.
727
;
[1936]
3
D.L.R.
449
;
Attorney-General
for
Ontario
et
al.
v.
McLean
Gold
Mines
Ltd.,
[1927]
A.C.
185.
The
appellant
will
have
his
costs
against
the
respondent.
Judgment
accordingly.