ANGERS,
J.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
an
assessment
by
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax
affirmed
by
the
Minister
of
National
Revenue,
under
sees.
58
and
following
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act.
The
appellant,
Port
Credit
Realty
Ltd.,
is
a
body
corporate
and
politic
incorporated
by
letters
patent
issued
in
virtue
of
the
Companies
Act
of
the
Province
of
Ontario
on
July
4,
1928:
it
was
incorporated
as
a
private
company
with
a
capital
of
10,000
shares
without
any
nominal
or
par
value
and
with
the
power,
among
others,
to
buy,
sell
and
deal
and
invest
in,
either
as
principal
or
agent,
stocks,
bonds,
debentures,
mortgages
on
real
or
personal
property,
notes,
obligations
and
securities
of
all
kinds.
The
notice
of
assessment
bearing
date
the
14th
of
November,
1935,
is
in
respect
of
income
for
the
year
1932.
Port
Credit
Realty
Ltd.
was
organized
for
the
purpose
of
holding
for
and
on
behalf
of
one
James
Harris,
in
his
lifetime
of
the
City
of
Toronto,
Province
of
Ontario,
his
bonds,
shares
and
other
securities
in
corporations
located
outside
of
the
Province
of
Ontario.
The
company
was
controlled
by
the
said
James
Harris
as
long
as
he
lived.
Of
the
10,000
shares
outstanding
he
owned
9,995.
The
five
remaining
shares
stood
in
the
names
of
the
incorporators.
James
Harris
died
on
January
1,
1929,
leaving
a
will
dated
March
19,
1928,
and
a
codicil
which
bears
no
precise
date
but
appears
to
have
been
made
sometime
in
1928.
The
testator,
by
his
will,
appointed
his
wife,
his
brothers
(William
Thomas
and
Joseph)
and
his
friends
James
Stanley
McLean
and
Robert
James
McLaughlin
as
executors
and
trustees.
By
his
codicil
James
Harris
stipulated
that,
in
the
event
of
Robert
James
McLaughlin
predeceasing
him,
his
son,
Hugh
Johnston
McLaughlin,
should
replace
his
father
as
executor
and
trustee.
After
declaring
in
his
will
that
the
proceeds
of
all
policies
of
insurance
on
his
life,
which
may
be
payable
to
his
wife,
shall
be
paid
to
his
trustees
subject
to
the
following
trusts,
to
wit
:
(a)
to
pay
to
his
wife
the
sum
of
$20,000;
(b)to
hold
the
balance
in
trust
for
his
wife
and
children
as
provided
for
in
the
case
of
the
residue
of
his
estate,
the
testator
gives
and
bequeaths
the
residue
of
his
property
to
his
executors
and
trustees
upon
certain
trusts,
particularly
the
following
:
"‘(e)
To
keep
the
residue
of
my
estate
invested
and
to
distribute
the
income
and
the
capital
in
the
following
manner,
namely
:—
i(
(i)
To
set
aside
a
fund,
which,
together
with
the
proceeds
of
the
insurance
on
my
life
payable
to
my
trustees
in
trust
for
my
wife
and
children,
shall
amount
to
Six
Hundred
Thousand
Dollars,
and
to
pay
the
income
thereon
to
my
wife
for
and
during
the
term
of
her
natural
life,
such
income
to
be
paid
to
her
in
monthly
instalments,
or
otherwise
as
may
be
most
convenient
to
her.
Upon
the
death
of
my
wife,
such
fund
shall
be
divided
among
my
children
in
the
same
manner
as
provided
for
in
the
case
of
the
balance
of
the
residue
of
my
estate.
"(ii)
The
balance
of
the
residue
of
my
estate
shall
be
divided
into
as
many
equal
shares
as
there
may
be
children
of
mine
living
at
the
time
of
my
decease,
and
children
of
mine
who
have
predeceased
me
leaving
issue
or
widow
as
the
case
may
be,
and
such
share
shall
be
dealt
with
in
the
following
manner
:—
Share
of
a
minor
child:
So
much
of
the
income
as
shall
in
their
absolute
discretion
be
considered
advisable,
my
trustees
and
executors
shall
pay
to
the
guardian
of
such
infant
for
his
or
her
maintenance,
support
and
education
until
he
or
she
arrives
at
the
full
age
of
twenty-one
years;
the
balance
of
the
income
to
be
added
to
the
principal
of
such
share;
<(
Shares
of
daughters:
The
income
on
the
share
of
each
daughter
of
the
full
age
of
twenty-one
years
or
when
such
daughter
arrives
at
the
full
age
of
twenty-one
years,
shall
be
paid
to
her
for
and
during
the
term
of
her
natural
life,
and
after
her
death,
such
share
to
be
divided
among
her
issue
in
such
proportions
as
she
may
by
'will
appoint,
and
subject
to
such
terms
as
she
may
direct
by
will,
and
in
default
of
such
appointment
to
be
divided
equally
among
her
issue,
and
the
issue
of
any
child
or
children
of
such
daughter
who
may
have
died,
per
stirpes,
the
issue
of
any
deceased
child
or
children
to
take
the
share
which
would
have
gone
to
the
parent
if
living.
‘*
Shares
of
sons
:
The
income
on
the
share
of
each
son
of
the
full
age
of
twenty-one
years,
or
after
he
arrives
at
the
full
age
of
twenty-one
years,
shall
be
paid
to
such
son
until
he
arrives
at
the
age
of
twenty-five
years,
when
one-half
of
the
capital
shall
be
transferred
to
him,
and
the
income
of
the
other
half
of
the
capital
shall
be
paid
to
him
until
he
arrives
at
the
age
of
thirty
years
when
the
balance
of
the
capital
shall
be
paid
to
the
said
son.
‘‘In
case,
however,
one
or
more
of
my
sons
should
die
before
he
is
entitled
to
receive
the
whole
capital
of
his
share,
the
said
share,
or
any
part
thereof
which
such
son
has
not
received
or
have
become
entitled
to
receive,
shall
go
to
his
widow
or
children
in
such
proportions
as
he
shall
by
will
appoint,
but
any
appointment
to
his
widow
shall
only
be
of
the
income
until
her
death
or
remarraige,
whichever
first
occurs,
and
in
case
such
son
should
die
intestate,
then
his
widow
shall
be
entitled
to
the
income
of
such
share
or
such
part
of
such
share
until
her
death
or
remarriage,
whichever
first
occurs,
and
the
capital
of
such
share
shall
be
divided
among
the
children
of
such
deceased
son
and
the
issue
of
any
deceased
issue
per
stirpes,
the
children
taking
the
share
that
the
parent
would
have
taken
if
living;
and
in
case
any
son
should
die
without
issue,
then,
subject
to
the
provision
aforesaid
for
his
widow,
such
share
shall
be
added
to
the
other
shares
in
equal
proportions,
the
share
set
aside
in
respect
of
any
who
predeceases
me
shall
be
disposed
of
in
the
same
manner
both
as
to
income
and
principal.
‘
’
From
the
date
of
its
organization
Port
Credit
Realty
Ltd.
was
considered
for
income
tax
purposes
as
a
personal
corporation;
it
was
so
considered
not
only
during
the
lifetime
of
James
Harris
but
also
after
his
decease
which
occurred
on
January
1,
1929,
for
the
taxation
periods
of
1929,
1930,
1931,
1932,
1933
and
1934.
It
was
not
until
November
14,
1935,
that
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax
decided
to
assess
the
appellant
as
an
ordinary
corporation
and
sent
a
notice
of
assessment
accordingly.
It
was
submitted
on
behalf
of
the
respondent
that
Port
Credit
Realty
Ltd.
ceased
to
be
a
personal
corporation
the
day
James
Harris
died
(January
1,
1929).
Before
dealing
with
the
legal
aspect
of
the
case,
it
will
be
convenient
to
see
what
was
the
position
of
the
appellant
company
after
the
death
of
James
Harris.
Arthur
E.
Allen,
a
chartered
accountant,
who
is
secretary
of
Port
Credit
Realty
Ltd.
and
of
the
estate
of
the
late
James
Harris
and
was
at
the
time
of
the
death
of
the
latter
his
secretary,
examined
as
witness
for
appellant,
says
in
substance
as
follows:
At
the
beginning
as
well
as
at
the
end
of
the
year
1932
there
were
outstanding
10,000
shares
of
Port
Credit
Realty
Ltd.
of
which
9,995
were
still
in
the
name
of
James
Harris
and
five
in
the
names
of
the
incorporators
;
these
shares
had
been
paid
for
in
full
by
James
Harris
;
the
widow
and
five
children
were
the
beneficiaries
in
receipt
of
all
the
income
of
the
late
James
Harris
during
the
year
1932;
from
the
date
of
the
death
of
James
Harris
to
the
end
of
1932
there
was
no
change
in
beneficiaries
in
receipt
of
the
income
and
there
has
been
no
change
since
the
end
of
1932
;
the
assets
of
Port
Credit
Realty
Ltd.
in
1932
consisted
of
stocks
and
the
entire
income
of
the
company
during
that
year
was
derived
from
these
stocks
;
in
his
capacity
of
secretary
of
the
company
and
of
the
estate,
the
deponent
filed,
for
the
year
1932,
income
tax
returns
for
the
estate
of
James
Harris,
for
Port
Credit
Realty
Ltd.
and
for
each
of
the
beneficiaries,
namely,
the
wife
and
the
five
children;
the
beneficiaries
paid
approximately
$1,700
for
the
1932
taxation
period
on
Port
Credit
Realty
Ltd.
income
and
the
assessment
notice
of
November
14,
1935,
shows
a
further
tax
of
$1,275
for
the
same
year;
the
corporate
accounting
and
office
expenses
of
Port
Credit
Realty
Ltd.
were
paid
by
James
Harris
to
the
time
of
his
death
and
afterwards
by
his
estate;
the
same
returns
as
in
1932
were
made
for
the
years
1933
and
1934,
1.e.,
a
return
for
the
estate
of
James
Harris,
a
return
for
the
company
and
a
return
for
the
widow
and
each
of
the
children;
similar
returns
were
also
filed
for
the
years
1929,
1930
and
1931;
no
assessment
notices
were
received
for
the
company,
but
the
usual
notices
were
received
for
the
beneficiaries
and
receipted
in
full;
there
was
no
reason
for
continuing
the
company’s
existence
when
James
Harris
died
but
there
did
not
appear
to
be
any
object
in
winding
it
up
at
once
and
it
was
continued,
the
idea
being
that
as
soon
as
the
securities
were
sold
the
company
would
be
wound
up;
had
there
been
any
notion
that
additional
taxes
would
be
claimed
the
company
could
have
been
wound
up
on
January
2,
1929;
the
estate
could
not
be
wound
up
at
once
because
there
are
large
real
estate
holdings
and
also
because
there
are
life
interests
;
technically
the
income
from
the
stocks
goes
into
the
company,
but
it
is
immediately
turned
over
to
the
estate,
before
any
expenses
are
paid
;_
all
expenses
are
paid
by
the
estate.
It
is
quite
obvious
that
after
the
decease
of
James
Harris
as
well
as
during
his
lifetime
Port
Credit
Realty
Ltd.
had
no
other
assets
than
the
shares
assigned
to
it
by
James
Harris
and
that
the
only
income
it
ever
received
was
the
dividends
derived
from
these
shares.
It
is
admitted
by
the
respondent
that
during
the
lifetime
of
James
Harris
the
appellant
company
was
a
personal
corporation
and
was
recognized
as
such
for
the
purposes
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act;
it
is
submitted,
however,
that
upon
the
decease
of
James
Harris
the
appellant
company
ceased
to
be
a
personal
corporation
and
that
it
lost
any
claim
that
it
might
have
for
special
treatment
under
the
Act
as
such.
There
was
no
mention
of
personal
corporation
in
the
original
Income
War
Tax
Act,
1917
(7-8
Geo.
V,
c.
28).
The
personal
corporation
was
first
introduced
into
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
by
16-17
Geo.
V,
c.
10,
assented
to
on
June
15,
1926.
Sec.
3
of
this
statute
reads
in
part
as
follows
:
"
1
Section
three
of
the
said
Act
is
amended
by
adding
thereto
the
following
subsections
:—
(10)
(a)
For
the
purposes
of
this
Act
‘a
personal
corporation’
means
a
corporation
or
joint
stock
company
(no
matter
when
or
where
created)
controlled
directly
or
indirectly
by
one
person,
who
resides
in
Canada,
or
by
one
such
person
and
his
wife
or
any
member
of
his
family,
or
by
any
combination
of
them,
or
by
any
other
person
or
corporation
on
his
or
their
behalf,
whether
through
holding
a
majority
of
the
stock
of
such
corporation,
or
in
any
other
manner
whatsoever,
the
gross
revenue
of
which
is
to
the
extent
of
one-quarter
or
more
derived
from
one
or
more
of
the
following
sources,
namely
:—
"
from
the
ownership
of
or
the
trading
or
dealing
in
bonds,
stocks
or
shares,
debentures,
mortgages,
hypothecs,
bills,
notes
or
other
similar
property,
or
from
the
lending
of
money
with
or
without
security,
or
by
way
of
rent,
annuity,
royalty,
interest
or
dividend,
or
from
or
by
virtue
of
any
right,
title
or
interest
in
or
to
any
estate
or
trust.
(b)
The
income
of
a
personal
corporation,
in
lieu
of
being
assessed
the
tax
prescribed
by
subsection
two
of
section
four
of
this
Act,
shall
on
the
last
day
of
each
year
be
deemed
to
be
distributed
as
a
dividend
to
the
shareholders
thereof
and
shall
in
their
hands
constitute
taxable
income
for
each
year
in
the
proportion
hereinafter
mentioned,
whether
actually
distributed
by
way
of
dividend
or
not.”
Paragraphs
(c)
to
(g)
inclusive
have
no
relevance
to
the
question
at
issue
herein.
When
the
statutes
were
revised
in
1927,
the
definition
of
the
personal
corporation
contained
in
para.
(a)
of
subsec.
(10)
of
sec.
3
became
para.
(i)
of
sec.
2‘of
the
new
Act
(R.S.C.
1927,
¢.
97)
and
the
provisions
relating
to
the
tax
on
personal
corporations
contained
in
paras,
(b)
to
(g)
inclusive
of
subsec.
10
of
sec.
3
became
sec.
21
of
the
new
Act.
Paragraph
(i)
of
sec.
2
of
e.
97
of
the
Revised
Statutes
is
similar
to
para.
(a)
of
subsec.
(10)
of
sec.
3
of
c.
10
of
the
statute
of
1926
(16-17
Geo.V)
and
subsec.
1
of
sec.
21
of
said
c.
97
is
similar
to
para,
(b)
of
said
subsec.
(10).
By
23-24
Geo.
V,
c.
14,
sec.
1
(assented
to
on
March
30,
1933),
para.
(i)
of
sec.
2
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
(R.S.C.
1927,
c.
97)
was
repealed
and
replaced
by
the
following:
iC
(i)
‘Personal
corporation’
means
a
corporation
or
joint
company,
irrespective
of
when
or
where
created,
whether
in
Canada
or
elsewhere,
and
irrespective
of
where
it
carries
on
its
business
or
where
its
assets
are
situate,
controlled,
directly
or
indirectly,
by
one
individual
who
resides
in
Canada,
or
by
one
such
individual
and
his
wife
or
any
member
of
his
family,
or
by
any
combination
of
them
or
by
any
other
person
or
corporation
or
any
combination
of
them
on
his
or
their
behalf,
and
whether
through
holding
a
majority
of
the
stock
of
such:
corporation
or
in
any
other
manner
whatsoever,
the
gross:
revenue
of
which
is
to
the
extent
of
one-quarter
or
more
derived.
from
one
or
more
of
the
following
sources,
namely
:—
(i)
From
the
ownership
of
or
the
trading
or
dealing
in
bonds,
stocks
or
shares,
debentures,
mortgages,
hypothees,
bills,
notes
or
other
similar
property.
(ii)
From
the
lending
of
money
with
or
without
security,
or
by
way
of
rent,
annuity,
royalty,
interest
or
dividend,
or
(iii)
From
or
by
virtue
of
any
right,
title
or
interest
in
or
to
any
estate
or
trust.
’
’
By
sec.
3
of
the
same
statute
(23-24
Geo.
V,
c.
14)
subsee.
(1)
of
sec.
21
of
the
said
Act
was
repealed
and
replaced
by
the
following
:
"21.
(1)
The
income
of
a
personal
corporation,
whether
the
same
is
actually
distributed
or
not,
shall
be
deemed
to
be
distributed
on
the
last
day
of
each
year
as
a
dividend
to
the
shareholders,
and
the
said
shareholders
shall
be
taxable
each
year
as
if
the
same
had
been
distributed
in
the
proportions.
hereinafter
mentioned.
’
’
By
sec.
4
of
the
same
statute
sec.
21
was
further
amended
by
the
addition
thereto
of
subsees.
(7),
(8)
and
(9).
Subsee.
(9)
reads
as
follows:
"(9)
The
rates
of
tax
applicable
to
corporations,
as
in
this
Act
provided,
shall
not
be
imposed
on
any
personal
corporation.
’
’
Paragraph
(i)
of
sec.
2
and
subsee.
1
of
sec.
21
have
not
been
amended
since.
See.
10
of
€.
14
of
23-24
Geo.
V
dealing
with
the
application
of
the
various
sections
of
the
Act
says
inter
alia:
"
‘10.
It
is
hereby
declared
and
enacted
that
the
provisions
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
shall
be
read
and
construed
as
if
the
amendments
enacted
by
sections
one,
two
and
three
of
this
Act
had
been
contained
therein
since
the
fifteenth
day
of
June,
1926,
and
the
said
Income
War
Tax
Act
as
amended
shall
apply
to
the
income
of
the
1925
taxation
period
and
fiscal
periods
ending
in
1925
and
all
subsequent
periods
.
.’’
Sec.
10
then
goes
on
to
say
that
sees.
4,
5,
6
and
7
shall
apply
to
the
income
of
the
1932
taxation
period,
fiscal
periods
ending
in
1932
and
subsequent
periods
and
that
see.
8
shall
apply
to
the
income
of
the
1917
taxation
period,
fiscal
periods
ending
in
1917
and
subsequent
periods;
these
last
provisions
are
irrelevant.
The
question
coming
up
for
determination
is
whether
the
appellant
company
ceased
to
be
a
personal
corporation
when
James
Harris
died.
I
may
say
that
the
question
narrows
down
to
a
mere
interpretation
of
the
definition
of
a
personal
corporation,
seeing
that
the
operations
of
the
appellant
company
remained
the
same
after
the
decease
of
James
Harris
as
they
were
prior
thereto.
Both
before
and
after
his
death
the
company’s
operations
were
confined
to
holding
shares
conveyed
to
it
by
James
Harris,
to
draw
the
income
derived
therefrom
and
to-hand
it
over
to
James
Harris
during
his
lifetime
or
to
his
estate
after
his
death.
Both
prior
and
subsequent
to
Harris’
death
the
company
had
no
assets
other
than
the
shares
aforesaid;
it
did
nothing
else
but
hold
these
shares,
receive
the
income
therefrom
and
remit
it
to
the
persons
entitled
thereto.
A
personal
corporation,
according
to
para.
(i)
of
see.
2
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
as
amended
by
23-24
Geo.
V,
ce.
14,
see.
1,
is
a
Corporation
or
joint
stock
company
controlled,
directly
or
indirectly,
by
one
individual
who
resides
in
Canada,
or
one
such
individual
and
his
wife
or
any
member
of
his
family,
or
any
combination
of
them,
or
any
other
person
or
corporation
or
any
combination
of
them
on
his
or
their
behalf.
The
substitution
of
the
word
"'individual''
for
the
word
"per-
son’’
by
sec.
1
of
c.
14
of
the
statute
23-24
Geo.
V,
was
made,
it
seems
to
me,
with
the
intent
of
avoiding
the
definition
of
the
word
‘‘person’’
contained
in
para,
(h)
of
sec.
2
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act;
this
definition
reads
thus
:
"‘Person
includes
any
body
corporate
and
politic
and
any
association
or
other
body,
and
the
heirs,
executors,
administrators
and
curators
or
other
legal
representatives
of
such
person,
according
to
the
law
of
that
part
of
Canada
to
which
the
context
extends.
‘
‘
The
word
^individual”
only
applies
to
a
natural
person
whilst
the
word
""person”
may
also
apply,
as
it
does
according
to
said
para.
(li),
to
an
artificial
person
such
as
a
corporation
or
association.
I
may
say,
however,
that
I
do
not
think
that
the
substitution
of
the
word
"‘individual’’
for
the
word
^person”
in
para.
(i)
of
sec.
2
has
had
the
effect
of
restricting
the
scope
of
the
definition
therein
contained;
it
is
clear
that
the
word
‘‘person’’
included
in
the
definition
of
the
personal
corporation
in
para.
(a)
of
subsec.
(10)
of
sec.
3
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
as
enacted
by
16-17
Geo.
V,
e.
10,
sec.
3,
applied
only
to
a
natural
person,
seeing
that
it
refers
to
a
person
who
resides
in
Canada,
or
to
one
such
person
and
his
wife
or
any
member
of
his
family;
the
inclusion
of
the
wife
or
any
member
of
the
family
evidently
excludes
the
artificial
person.
However
it
may
be,
the
first
question
for
me
to
determine
is
whether
the
word
"‘individual’’
is
intended
to
apply
exclusively
to
males,
thus
preventing
a
widow
or
spinster
from
organizing
a
personal
corporation.
In
common
use,
the
word
"
"
individual
applies
to
either
sex;
as
the
word
"
"
person,
‘
it
may
mean
a
woman
as
well
as
a
man.
Had
the
definition,
on
the
subject
of
control,
been
limited
to
the
first
hypothesis,
the
matter
would
offer
no
difficulty
;
even
so,
I
believe,
if
the
definition
had
in
addition
merely
mentioned
any
member
of
the
family.
The
difficulty
arises
from
the
inclusion
in
the
definition
of
the
words
"‘his
wife’’.
Does
this
mean
that
the
word
"individual''
is
used
exclusively
in
the
masculine
gender?
This
would
imply
that
a
personal
corporation
could
not
be
controlled
by
a
widow
or
by
a
widow
and
a
member
of
her
family
or
by
a
spinster.
A
woman
could
only
control
a
personal
corporation
jointly
with
her
husband
or
with
her
husband
and
any
member
of
his
family.
I
must
say
that
this
does
not
seem
reasonable
to
me.
I
am
unable
to
convince
myself
that
the
legislature
intended
to
deprive
widows
and
spinsters
of
the
right
to
enjoy
the
convenience
of
a
personal
corporation.
Be
that
as
it
may,
if
the
significance
or
import
of
the
word
"‘individual''
is
rather
indefinite
and
doubtful,
it
seems
to
me
that
the
insertion
in
the
definition
of
the
phrase
"‘any
combination
of
them’’
elucidates
the
subject
and
removes
all
doubt.
"‘Any''
combination
may
consist
of
the
individual
and
his
wife.
or
the
individual,
his
wife
and
any
member
of
his
family,
or
the
individual
and
any
member
of
the
family
or
the
wife
and
any
member
of
the
family.
It
may
be
contended
and
it
was
in
fact
contended
that
the
corporation
is
not
controlled
by
the
wife
nor
even
by
the
wife
and
the
children
or
any
other
member
of
the
family.
Apart
from
particular
legacies
consisting
of
a
sum
of
$20;000,
of
the
household
goods,
furniture
and
furnishings
and
of
the
free
use
of
the
family
residence
or
of
another
residence
at
her
option,
the
widow
has
only
a
life
interest,
to
wit
the
income
of
a
sum
of
$600,000
during
her
lifetime.
James
Harris,
at
the
time
of
his
death,
left
five
children,
two
daughters
and
three
sons.
No
child
had
predeceased
him.
The
balance
of
the
residue
of
the
estate,
as
previously
stated,
is
divided
among
the
testator
‘s
children.
Each
of
the
daughters
is
entitled
to
the
income
on
her
share
from
the
age
of
21
years
during
the
term
of
her
life,
the
capital
of
such
share
to
be
divided
among
her
issue
in
such
proportions
as
she
may
by
will
appoint
and,
in
default
of
such
appointment,
equally
among
her
issue
and
the
issue
of
any
child
or
children
who
may
have
died.
The
sons
get
the
income
on
their
shares
from
the
age
of
21
years
until
the
age
of
25
years
when
one-half
of
the
capital
is
to
be
paid
to
them;
the
income
on
the
other
half
of
the
capital
is
payable
to
them
until
they
reach
the
age
of
30
years
when
they
become
entitled
to
the
balance
of
the
capital.
It
seems
obvious
that
during
the
lifetime
of
Mrs.
Harris
and
of
her
daughters
the
bulk
of
the
estate
and
in
consequence
the
control
of
the
appellant
company
remain
vested
in
the
trustees
and
executors.
The
personal
corporation,
besides
being
controlled
by
an
individual
who
resides
in
Canada
or
by
such
an
individual
and
his
wife
or
any
member
of
his
family
or
by
any
combination
of
them,
may,
according
to
the
definition
contained
in
para.
(7)
of
sec.
2,
be
controlled
by
"
"
any
other
person
or
corporation
or
any
combination
of
them
on
his
or
their
behalf.
‘
‘
The
word
‘
"
person
‘
‘
for
which
the
word
"‘individual’’
has
been
substituted
in
other
parts
of
the
sentence
has
been
left
here,
intentionally
it
may
be
assumed.
The
definition
of
the
word
"person’’
in
para,
(h)
of
sec.
2
here
applies.
The
word
"‘person,’’
according
to
this
definition,
includes
any
body
corporate
and
politic
and
any
association
or
other
body
and
the
heirs,
executors,
administrators
and
curators
or
other
legal
representatives
of
such
person.
This
definition
is
broad
;
it
seems
to
me
to
appy
to
the
trustees
and
executors
of
the
will
of
the
late
James
Harris.
The
appellant
company
is
at
present
controlled
by
these
trustees
and
executors.
Port
Credit
Realty
Ltd.
has,
since
the
decease
of
James
Harris,
preserved
all
the
characteristics
of
a
personal
corporation
and
I
see
no
reason
why
it
ought
not
to
be
considered
as
such.
The
appeal
is
allowed
and
the
assessment
of
the
14th
of
November,
1935,
is
set
aside.
The
appellant
will
be
entitled
to
its
costs.
Appeal
allowed.
Email this Content