Hudson,
J.:—In
the
year
1935
the
Manitoba
Administrator
of
Income
Tax
assessed
the
appellant,
Thos.
Jackson
and
Sons,
Ltd.,
for
income
tax
in
respect
of
moneys
received
by
them
in
the
year
1934
from
the
Nelson
River
Construction
Co.
The
moneys
so
paid
were
dividends
out
of
profits
accumulated
by
the
Nelson
Co.
prior
to
the
31st
December,
1929.
From
the
decision
of
the
Administrator
the
appellants
appealed
unsuccessfully
to
the
Municipal
Commissioner,
to
Mr.
Justice
Dysart
in
the
Court
of
King’s
Beneh
of
Manitoba
and
form
there
to
the
Court
of
Appeal
in
Manitoba
where
its
appeal
was
unanimously
dismissed.
It
is
from
that
Court
that
this
appeal
is
now
brought
to
us.
The
Manitoba
income
tax
law
originally
applied
only
to
individuals
but
in
1930
it
was
amended
to
apply
to
companies
as
well.
The
material
charging
section
in
the
amendment
then
passed,
and
still
in
force,
is
8(4)
reading
as
follows:
"8.
(4)
Save
as
herein
otherwise
provided,
every
corporation
and
joint
stock
company,
other
than
a
personal
corporation,
no
matter
how
created
or
organized,
carrying
on
business
within
the
Province
shall
pay
a
tax
of
five
per
centum
upon
the
amount
of
its
income
within
the
Province
during
the
preceding
year.
"The
tax
imposed
by
this
subsection
shall
be
paid
in
the
manner
provided
by
this
Act
on
the
thirtieth
day
of
April,
1931,
and
annually
thereafter.”
This
section
taken
by
itself
is
clearly
sufficient
to
authorize
the
assessment
of
the
appellants.
There
was
also
inserted
in
the
amendments
of
that
year
a
section,
4(p),
reading
as
follows:
"‘4.
The
following
shall
not
be
liable
to
taxation
hereunder:
*****
(p)
profits
of
a
corporation
or
joint
stock
company
other
than
a
personal
corporation
accumulated
prior
to
and
undistributed
at
the
31st
day
of
December,
1929,
shall
not
be
liable
to
taxation
under
subsection
(4)
of
section
8
of
‘‘The
Income
Tax
Act’’.
This
section
read
by
itself
clearly
would
not
exempt
the
appellants
from
the
liability
created
by
8(4).
Read
literally
it
applies
only
to
profits
in
the
hands
of
the
accumulating
company
and
would
not
relieve
the
beneficiaries
on
any
distribution.
But
is
argued,
and
with
some
force,
that
if
see.
4(p)
is
read
literally
and
see.
8(4)
given
its
full
effect,
the
result
would
be
that
4(p)
would
be
wholly
unnecessary,
and
the
real
intention
of
the
Legislature
must
have
been
to
relieve
corporate
shareholders
from
the
tax
which
they
would
otherwise
be
liable
for
under
8(4),
and
that
effect
should
be
given
to
this
intention.
However,
in
the
absence
of
some
more
definite
expression
of
intention
by
the
Legislature,
in
my
opinion
we
cannot
hold
that
a
clear
and
specific
charging
section
is
limited
by
an
exempting
section
which,
read
literally,
does
not
impose
such
a
limitation.
The
mere
fact
that
the
effect
might
be
to
render
the
exempting
section
altogether
ineffective
is
not
sufficient
to
overcome
the
language
of
the
statute.
The
appeal
is
dismissed
with
costs.
Appeal
dismissed.
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