MACDONALD,
C.J.B.C.:—This
is
an
appeal
against
an
absolute
order
for
mandamus
obtained
by
a
mining
company
commanding
the
Minister
of
Finance
to
forthwith
ascertain
and
take
into
consideration
the
acquisition
costs
to
the
Pioneer
Gold
Mines
of
B.C.
Ltd.,
of
the
properties
acquired
by
them.
By
virtue
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
1932
(B.C.),
c.
53,
see.
6(1),
el.
(o)
enables
the
Commissioner
of
Income
Tax
to
make
certain
deductions
from
the
mine
owners’
income
tax
on
account
of
depletion
of
the
mine.
This
involves
the
fixing
of
the
costs
to
the
taxpayer
of
the
acquisition
of
the
mines
which
is
an
essential
feature
in
arriving
at
the
tax
to
be
paid.
The
Commissioner
taxed
the
acquisition
costs
to
the
mining
company
(the
respondent)
at
$100,000.
The
respondent
being
dissatisfied
with
this,
appealed
(under
the
Act)
to
the
Minister
of
Finance
who
after
a
full
hearing
of
the
parties
concerned
dismissed
the
appeal.
The
respondent
thereupon
appealed
under
subsec.
(4)
of
the
said
sec.
6
to
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council
before
whom
the
dispute
was
again
heard
in
full.
The
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council
increased
the
acquisition
costs
to
$200,000—a
gain
for
the
respondent.
Being
still
dissatisfied
the
respondent
obtained
this
writ
of
mandamus.
In
my
opinion
it
is
unnecessary
to
consider
the
merits
of
the
case.
Both
tribunals
dealt
with
the
question
of
acquisition
costs,
and
while
one
or
both
may
have
been
wrong
it
is
not
a
ease
for
a
mandamus.
There
are
at
least
several
grounds
upon
any
one
of
which
that
course
is
open,
for
instance
it
is
open
where
a
tribunal
has
refused
or
failed
to
adjudicate
and
if
they
have
so
refused
or
failed
then
mandamus
may
be
the
proper
remedy.
The
granting
of
a
writ
is
a
discretionary
one
and
if
the
applicant
has
so
acted
as
to
merit
no
exercise
of
discretion
his
application
should
be
refused.
In
this
case
the
respondent
has
sought
two
legal
remedies
provided
by
the
statutes
and
failed
in
both.
They
now
ask
for
an
order
to
affirm
the
direction
of
the
first
of
these
tribunals
which
heard
the
case.
The
Minister
of
Finance
in
effect
is
to
be
ordered
to
give
a
judgment
different
from
the
one
he
has
already
given
and
also
to
ignore
the
order
in
appeal
from
him.
The
learned
Judge
in
the
tribunal
of
first
instance
it
is
true
exercised
his
discretion
in
respondent’s
favour,
but
without
referring
to
the
matters
above-mentioned.
He
considered
merely
whether
a
mandamus
will
lie
against
the
Crown
or
a
Crown
officer.
It
may
be
in
a
proper
case
that
it
would,
but
in
my
opinion
there
is
a
matter
of
far
greater
importance
involved
in
this
case,
the
propriety
of
the
multiplicity
of
proceedings
taken
as
well
as
consideration
of
estoppel.
Moreover
said
subsec.
(4)
declares
that
the
appeal
to
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council
shall
be
final
and
that
fact,
I
think,
also
prevents
proceedings
by
mandamus.
The
learned
Judge
who
granted
the
order
for
a
mandamus
I
think
was
in
error
and
the
appeal
should
be
allowed.
MARTIN,
J.A.:—In
concurring
in
the
opinion
that
mandamus
does
not
lie
in
the
present
case
I
do
so
for
the
three
main
reasons
following,
which
briefly
put,
are:—
First:
That
in
‘‘determining
the
cost
.
.
.
of
any
mine”
(sec.
6(3))
to
the
Pioneer
Gold
Mines
Co.
the
Minister
did,
in
considering
its
claim
for
‘‘an
allowance
for
depletion
or
exhaustion
‘
in
fact
apply
his
mind
to
the
question
of
"
*
acquisition
costs”
and
therefore
even
if
he
did
come
to
a
wrong
conclusion
nevertheless
the
requirement
of
the
statute
that
he
‘‘shall
take
into
consideration
the
following
expenditures
‘
‘
was
satisfied,
and
as
he
was
in
that
‘‘determination’’
acting
in
a
judicial
capacity,
mandamus
is
not
the
remedy
for
any
error
that
may
have
arisen
from
his
‘‘consideration’’
of
the
matter.
Second:
By
subsec.
(4)
an
appeal
is
given
from
any
decision
of
the
Minister
to
the
Lieutenant-Governor
in
Council,
who,
it
is
directed
‘
(
after
hearing
the
parties
interested,
may
either
confirm
or
amend
the
decision
of
the
Minister
and
the
decision
of
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council
shall
be
final’’.
This
confers*
an
unusual
appeal
of
the
most
plenary
and
final
character,
in
fact
and
law,
to
a
special
and
very
high
tribunal,
no
less
than
the
provincial
representative
of
His
Majesty
in
Council,
which
constitutes,
under
the
B.N.A.
Act,
an
appeal
to
the
provincial
‘‘foot
of
the
Throne’’,
and
therefore
to
grant
a
mandamus
when
such
exceptional
facilities
for
the
determination
of
the
whole
matter
have
been
conferred
by
the
Legislature
would
be
without
precedent.
But
not
only
was
the
appeal
so
conferred,
but
the
company
took
advantage
of
it
and.
brought
an
appeal
to
the
nominated
tribunal
and
secured
a
substantial
success
by
having
the
determination
of
the
Minister
"‘amended’’
by
raising
his
allowance
of
$100,000
to
$200,000;
and
no
case
has
been
cited
that
would
warrant
us
in
sanctioning
proceedings
that
would
enable
a
litigant
to
approbate
and
reprobate
the
jurisdiction
and
decision
of
any
tribunal,
much
less
such
a
very
high
one
as
that
which
the
company
deliberately
invoked
for
adequate
relief.
Third:
Though
to
my
mind
there
is
no
doubt
that
the
said
special
tribunal
had
complete
jurisdiction
over
the
matter
in
controversy,
yet
even
if
it
had
not,
the
company
is
in
no
better
position,
as
regards
mandamus
at
least,
than
if
it
had,
because
the
result
of
the
company’s
actions
and
appeal
was
to
put
that
tribunal
in
the
position
of
an
arbitrator
to
which
both
parties
formally
submitted
their
dispute
for
‘‘determination’’
and
having
obtained
a
decision,
or
award,
thereupon,
neither
of
them
can
be
permitted
to
avoid
its
consequences
by
seeking
to
invoke.
the
jurisdiction
of
another
and
entirely
distinct
tribunal.
To
the
many
cases
referred
to
on
the
argument
I
add
the
very
recent
decision
of
the
House
of
Lords
in
Stepney
Borough
Council
v.
John
Walker
c
Sons
Ltd.
(1934)
50
T.L.R.
287;
The
King
at
the
Prosecution
of
Evelyn
Spain
v.
Special
Corner
of
Income
Tax
[1934]
Ir.
27;
and
Cave
v.
Mills,
7
H.
&
N.
913,
at
pp.
927-8
158
E.R.
740
in
the
last
of
which
the
Court
said
:—
‘“We
are
of
opinion
that
both
these
principles
apply
to
the
present
case.
Indeed
they
are
but
variations
of
one
and
the
same
broad
principle,
that
a
man
shall
not
be
allowed
to
blow
hot
and
cold—to
affirm
at
one
time
and
deny
at
another—
making
a
claim
on
those
whom
he
has
deluded
to
their
disadvantage,
and
founding
that
claim
on
the
very
matters
of
the
delusion.
Such
a
principle
has
its
basis
in
common
sense
and
common
justice,
and
whether
it
is
called
‘estoppel’,
or
by
any
other
name,
it
is
one
which
Courts
of
law
have
in
modern
times
most
usefully
adopted.”
In
the
leading
case
of
The
Queen
v.
Churchwardens
of
All
Saints
(1876)
1
App.
Cas.
611,
at
p.
620,
Lord
Chelmsford
said:
“Now
there
appears
to
me
to
have
been
some
little
confusion
upon
this
subject,
which
can
easily
be
removed.
A
writ
of
mandamus
is
a
prerogative
writ
and
not
a
writ
of
right,
and
it
is
in
this
sense
in
the
discretion
of
the
Court
whether
it
shall
be
granted
or
not.
The
Court
may
refuse
to
grant
the
writ
not
only
upon
the
merits,
but
upon
some
delay,
or
other
matter,
personal
to
the
party
applying
for
it;
in
this
the
Court
exercises
a
discretion
which
cannot
be
questioned.”
That
language
is
most
applicable
to
the
present
very
unusual
case,
and
as
by
our
Court
of
Appeal
Rule
4
it
is
our
duty
to
give
the
judgment
and
make
the
order
which
ought
to
have
been
given
and
made
below,
I
would
also,
therefore,
in
the
exercise
of
my
discretion
upon
the
whole
case,
refuse
the
application
for
mandamus
that,
with
respect,
the
learned
Judge
below
granted
upon
insufficient
grounds,
and
allow
this
appeal,
despite
the
very
commendable
way
in
which
respondent’s
counsel
presented
his
side
of
it.
McPHILLIPS,
J.A.
I
After
setting
out
the
order
for
and
terms
of
the
writ
of
mandamus]
:—Now
upon
the
facts
it
is
perfectly
clear
that
the
Minister
of
Finance
did
find
the
acquisition
costs
of
the
mine
and
did
discharge
his
statutory
duty
in
that
regard.
It
is
convenient
to
here
set
out
the
pertinent
statutory
provisions
governing
the
Minister
of
Finance
in
determining
the
acquisition
costs
of
the
mine,
being
clause
(o)
of
see.
6(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
and
it
reads
as
follows
:—
"‘Any
allowance
for
depletion
or
exhaustion
of
a
mine,
except
such
proportional
amount
as
may
in
the
discretion
of
the
Minister
be
allowed
to
be
deducted
from
the
income
from
the
mine
in
any
year,
having
regard
to
the
anticipated
life
of
the
mine
and
to
the
total
cost
of
the
mine
as
determined
by
the
Minister
pursuant
to
the
provisions
of
subsee.
(3);
and
where
full
effect
cannot
be
given
to
any
such
deduction
in
any
year
owing
to
their
being
no
income
for
that
year
in
excess
of
expenditures,
or
owing
to
the
income
in
excess
of
expenditures
being
less
than
the
deduction,
the
deduction
or
part
of
the
deduction
to
which
effect
has
not
been
given,
as
the
case
may
be,
shall,
for
the
purpose
of
ascertaining
the
net
income
for
the
following
year,
be
added
to
the
amount
of
the
deduction
for
that
year,
and
be
deemed
to
be
part
of
that
deduction,
or,
if
there
is
no
such
deduction
for
that
year,
be
deemed
to
be
the
deduction
for
that
year,
and
so
on
for
succeeding
years,
but
no
deduction
shall
be
allowed
for
any
year
if
the
deduction,
when
added
to
the
deductions
allowed
to
the
taxpayer
on
that
account
for
any
previous
years,
will
make
the
aggregate
amount
of
the
deductions
exceed
the
total
cost
of
the
mine
as
determined
by
the
Minister.”
It
is
also
convenient
to
here
set
forth
subsec.
(3)
(a)
of
sec.
6
and
subsec.
(4)
of
sec.
6—all
reading
as
follows
:—
"(3)
In
determining
the
cost
to
any
taxpayer
of
any
mine
in
respect
of
which
he
claims
an
allowance
for
depletion
or
exhaustion
under
clause
(o)
of
subsection
(1),
upon
which
cost
any
such
allowance
is
to
be
computed,
the
Minister
shall
take
into
consideration
the
following
expenditures,
whether
in-
curred
by
the
taxpayer
or
by
and
predecessor
in
title
to
the
mine
:
"‘(a)
Acquisition
costs
incurred
prior
to
the
first
day
of
April,
1928,
together
with
all
expenditures
subsequent
to
the
date
of
acquisition
for
exploration
and
development
costs
and
any
other
expenses
which
the
Minister
may
consider
as
directly
related
to
and
forming
part
of
the
cost
of
the
mine,
subject,
in
the
case
of
any
mine
which
was
in
active
production
prior
to
the
first
day
of
January,
1915,
to
a
deduction
therefrom
of
an
amount
to
be
determined
by
the
Minister
as
representing
the
amount
of
depletion
or
exhaustion
(if
any)
actually
sustained
prior
to
the
first
day
of
January,
1915
:
Provided
that
any
sum
representing
the
cost
to
the
taxpayer
of
the
acquisition
of
any
mine
in
excess
of
the
total
expenditures
and
allowances
included
in
this
clause
shall
not,
unless
incurred
prior
to
the
first
day
of
April,
1928,
be
included
in
the
total
cost
upon
which
the
allowance
for
depletion
or
exhaustion
is
computed,
unless
the
predecessor
in
title
of
the
taxpayer
has
paid
income
tax
at
the
rates
provided
in
the
"
Taxation
Act’
or
in
this
Act
on
an
amount
of
proceeds
received
by
him
from
the
disposition
of
the
mine
equal
to
the
amount
of
such
excess,
or
the
taxpayer
assumes
liability
for
the
payment
of
an
amount
equivalent
to
such
income
tax
in
a
form
and
on
terms
satisfactory
to
the
Minister.
Where
the
taxpayer
assumes
liability
for
the
payment
of
the
tax
in
respect
of
the
amount
of
the
excess,
the
Minister
in
his
descretion
may
permit
the
same
to
be
paid
in
instalments,
one
instalment
to
be
payable
for
each
year
during
which
ore
is
removed
from
the
mine
;
and
in
determining
the
amount
of
the
instalment
payable
for
any
fiscal
year
the
Minister
shall
have
regard
to
the
anticipated
life
of
the
mine
and
to
the
total
amount
of
the
liability
so
assumed;
and
the
amount
of
instalment
payable
for
any
year
shall
for
all
purposes
of
this
Act
be
deemed
to
be
taxes
of
the
taxpayer
duly
assessed
and
taxed
for
that
year
in
respect
of
the
mine
in
addition
to
all
other
taxes
payable
under
this
Act,
and
shall
be
deemed
to
be
due
and
payable
on
the
last
day
of
that
fiscal
year.
.
.
.
"‘(4)
An
appeal
from
any
decision
of
the
Minister
under
clause
(m),
(n),
(0),
(p)
or
(q)
of
subsection
(1)
may
be
taken
to
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council,
who,
after
hearing
the
parties
interested,
may
either
confirm
or
amend
the
decision
of
the
Minister,
and
the
decision
of
the
Lieutenant-
Governor
in
Council
shall
be
final.’’
The
facts
show
that
the
Minister
of
Finance
in
plain
pursuance
of
his
statutory
duty
did
fix
the
acquisition
costs
of
the
mine
at
$100,000
and
an
appeal
was
taken
under
the
existent
statute
law
by
the
company
to
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council
and
it
was
decided
on
the
appeal
that
the
acquisition
costs
be
increased
by
$100,000
more
than
that
allowed
by
the
Minister
of
Finance—that
is
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council,
following
the
hearing
of
the
appeal,
fixed
the
acquisition
costs
at
$200,000.
With
the
appeal
had
and
taken
and
considering
the
existent
statute
law—it
would
occur
to
me
that
it
is
idle
to
contend
that
any
case
could
be
made
out
for
the
issue
of
a
writ
of
mandamus.
In
saying
this
I
do
so
with
the
greatest
respect
for
the
learned
trial
Judge
who
thought
otherwise.
Having
chosen
to
appeal,
it
would
seem
to
me
that
it
is
unanswerable
in
the
face
of
the
statute
law,
viz.,
as
above
set
forth.
"(4)
An
appeal
from
any
decision
of
the
Minister
under
clause
(m),
(n),
(0),
(p)
or
(q)
of
subsection
(1)
may
be
taken
to
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council,
who,
after
hearing
the
parties
interested,
may
either
confirm
or
amend
the
decision
of
the
Minister,
and
the
decision
of
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council
shall
be
final.’’
This
appeal
was
very
ably
presented
and
argued
by
learned
counsel
on
both
sides,
but,
with
every
deference
to
counsel
and
the
industry
displayed
in
the
citation
of
the
authorities
thought
to
be
relevant,
I
cannot
refrain
from
saying
that
it
is
not
a
ease
for
the
application
of
cases—but
the
plain
application
of
the
constraining
and
compellable
statute
law.
I
can
quite
see
that
for
certainty
sake
the
Legislature
was
desirous
of
settling
at
an
early
date
what
the
acquisition
costs
should
be
allowed
at—as
otherwise
the
Income
Tax
Act
could
not
be
speedily
implemented
and
the
taxes
arrived
at—as
against
a
large
body
of
taxpayers
coming
within
the
purview
of
the
Act—mining
being
a
very
considerable
industry
in
the
Province
of
British
Columbia—and
contributing
large
sums
to
the
revenue
of
the
Province
and
the
acquisition
costs
being
once
settled
are
settled:
for
all
time
and
as
set
forth
in
the
Act
"‘the
decision
of
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council
shall
be
final.’’
After
all
the
Legislature
is
the
highest
Court
in
the
land
when
legislating
within
its
constitutional
powers—and
here
under
the
B.N.A.
Act,
sec,
92(2),
"‘Direct
Taxation
within
the
Province
in
order
to
the
raising
of
a
Revenue
for
Provincial
Purposes’’
and
‘‘
(13)
Property
and
Civil
Rights
in
the
Province’’,
is
the
statutory
authority
exercised.
The
company
invoking
by
way
of
appeal
the
action
of
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council
must,
in
my
opinion,
be
held
to
be
concluded
and
bound
by
the
result
of
that
appeal.
I
would
allow
the
appeal.
Macdonald,
J.A.:—Appeal
from
an
order
of
a
writ
of
mandamus
to
the
Minister
of
Finance
commanding
him
to
ascertain
the
acquisition
cost
to
Pioneer
Gold
Mines
of
B.C.
Ltd.
of
the
properties
acquired
by
it
under
an
agreement
of
March
30,
1928,
as
directed
by
the
Income
Tax
Act,
sec.
6.
The
property
was
acquired
from
David
Sloan
for
the
consideration
of
$1,600,000
paid
by
the
allotment
of
1,600,000
fully
paid
shares
of
the
company
at
$1
a
share.
This
it
was
submitted
was,
if
not
an
undervaluation,
the
real
acquisition
cost
of
the
property
to
the
company.
Sloan
acquired
the
property
under
a
working
bond
on
July
16,
1924,
for
$100,000
and
the
Minister
fixed
this
amount,
paid
by
a
predecessor-in-title,
as
the
real
acquisition
cost
to
the
company
when
it
purchased
from
Sloan
in
1928.
He
decided,
rightly
enough,
that
the
issue
of
any
special
number
of
shares
might
not
indicate
actual
cost
and
because
the
property
was
originally
acquired
by
Sloan,
representing
a
syndicate,
and
the
syndicate
in
effect
merely
transferred
their
holdings
to
a
new
company,
substantially
the
acquistion
cost
to
the
latter
was
$100,000.
We
are
not
on
the
question
of
law
arising
concerned
with
his
logic
or
the
accuracy
of
his
findings
of
fact.
The
point
is—
did
he
address
his
mind
to
the
problem
of
ascertaining
acquisition
cost
to
Pioneer
Gold
Mines
of
B.C.
Ltd.
or
merely
to
the
cost
to
Sloan,
a
predecessor
in
title,
a
subject
he
was
not
concerned
with
under
the
wording
of
the
Act?
Mr.
Clark
recognized
that
from
his
viewpoint
it
was
essential
to
show
that
the
Minister
did
not
in
fact,
or
in
substance,
4
‘take
into
consideration’’,
as
required
in
express
terms
by
sec.
6(3)
the
acquisition
cost
to
the
company.
The
evidence
and
the
decision
of
the
Minister
was
fully
reviewed
by
counsel.
Without
referring
to
it
in
detail
my
conclusion
is
that
the
Minister
did
direct
his
mind
to
the
proper
point,
viz.,
acquisition
cost
to
the
company
and
decided,
rightly
or
wrongly,
that
under
the
special
circumstances
the
best
indicia
of
actual
cost
was
found
in
the
amount
paid
by
Sloan
for
the
working
bond.
He
might
be
entirely
wrong
in
this
conclusion
—I
think
he
was—but
at
least
he
applies
his
mind
to
the
real
point
in
issue.
Nor,
as
a
matter
of
law,
are
we
affected
by
the
fact
that
he
may
have
overlooked
a
new
element,
viz.,
additional
claims
transferred
to
the
company
not
included
in
the
Sloan
option
or,
rightly
or
wrongly,
concluded
that
evidence
of
value
in
respect
of
them
was
not
conclusive.
We
are
not
concerned
with
possible
errors
in
findings
of
fact.
He
cannot
be
directed
to
make
a
finding
that
$1,600,000
in
shares
or
any
other
sum
represent
the
real
acquisition
cost
to
the
company.
If
in
fact
he
exercised
bona
fide
the
discretion
given
the
Courts
cannot
interfere.
There
must
of
course
be
a
real
hearing
directed
to
the
point
in
issue
not
to
some
other
point,
e.g.,
the
cost
to
a
predecessor.
If
his
mind
was
directed
to
the
latter
point
as
an
end
in
itself
then
the
Minister
never
entered
upon
the
real
inquiry.
"This
conclusion
may
be
drawn
from
decided
cases,
that
there
is
no
refusal
to
hear
and
determine
unless
the
tribunal
or
authority
has
in
substance
shut
its
ears
to
the
application
which
was
made
to
it,
and
has
determined
upon
an
application
which
was
not
made
to
it.”’
Rex
v.
Port
of
London
Authority,
Ex.
p.
Knoch
Ltd.
[1919]
1
K.B.
176,
at
p.
183.
In
Rex
v.
Board
of
Education
[1910]
2
K.B.
165,
at
p.
179,
Farwell,
L.J.
said
:
""
If
the
tribunal
has
exercised
the
discretion
entrusted
to
it
bona
fide,
not
influenced
by
extraneous
or
irrelevant
considerations,
and
not
arbitrarily
or
illegally,
the
Courts
cannot
interfere;
they
are
not
a
Court
of
Appeal
from
the
tribunal,
but
they
have
power
to
prevent
the
intentional
usurpation
or
mistaken
assumption
of
a
jurisdiction
beyond
that
given
to
the
tribunal
by
law,
and
also
the
refusal
of
their
true
jurisdiction
by
the
adoption
of
extraneous
considerations
in
arriving
at
their
conclusion
or
deciding
a
point
other
than
that
brought
before
them,
in
which
cases
the
Courts
have
regarded
them
as
declining
jurisdiction.
‘
‘
That
the
Minister,
however
mistakenly,
acted
bona
fide
I
have
no
doubt.
Consideration
too
of
the
$100,000
paid
for
the
working
bond
in
its
relation
to
the
determination
of
the
cost
to
the
ultimate
purchaser,
was
not
extraneous
or
irrelevant.
The
question,
however,
is
settled
beyond
doubt
inasmuch
as
appellant,
not
satisfied
with
the
decision
of
the
Minister,
exercised
its
right
of
appeal
to
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council
under
subsec.
(4)
of
sec.
6.
This
appeal
was
successful
to
the
extent
of
a
$100,000
increase
in
the
amount
allowed,
showing
again
that
attention
was,necessarily
directed
to
the
point
in
issue,
viz.,
cost
to
the
company;
not
to
the
predecessor
in
title.
By
this
subsection
the
decision
of
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council
is
final.
Appellant,
although
invoking
the
right
to
appeal,
now
contends
that
it
was
in
fact
nugatory—that
there
is
under
the
Act
no
appeal
from
a
decision
fixing
once
and
for
all
acquisition
costs.
I
think
there
was
a
right
of
appeal.
The
Minister
acts,
in
arriving
at
a
decision
under
sec.
6(1)
(o)
pursuant
to,
or
in
accordance
with,
directions
given
in
subsec.
(3)
and
an
appeal
from
any
decision
by
the
Minister
under
sec.
6(1)
(o)
is
given
by
subsee.
(4).
It
follows
that
by
vesting
authority
in
the
Minister
to
determine
acquisition
costs
subject
to
appeal
to
the
Lieutenant
Governor
in
Council
the
legislation
in
itself
*
4
made
provision
for
working
out
the
system
specified
in
that
Act’’
and
that
the
prerogative
writ
of
mandamus
is
not
available,
assuming
that
otherwise
it
might
be
resorted
to
(Rex
v.
London
Assessment
Committee
[1907]
2
K.B.
764,
at
p.
782).
Even
‘‘assuming
that
there
is
no
right
of
appeal,
that
fact
does
not
necessarily
lead
us
to
the
conclusion
that
a
mandamus
ought
to
issue,
for
the
Legislature
may
well
have
provided
that
which
it
intended
to
be
a
sufficient
and
convenient
remedy”
(p.
786).
Here
once
the
right
of
appeal
to
the
council
is
established,
the
matter
ends
as
the
decision
of
that
body
is
final.
The
conclusion
is
clear.
There
was
no
refusal,
or
conduct
amounting
to
a
refusal,
on
the
part
of
the
Minister
to
exercise
the
jurisdiction
conferred
to
determine
the
real
point
in
dispute
and
for
any
error
a
convenient
remedy
by
way
of
appeal
was
provided.
I
would
allow
the
appeal.
MCQUARRIE,
J.A.
(dissenting)
:—I
would
dismiss
the
appeal.
I
am
of
opinion
that
the
Minister
did
not
determine
the
acquisition
costs
to
the
respondent
but
to
its
predecessor
in
title.
I
do
not
think
that
the
respondent
was
estopped
from
appealing
from
the
decision
herein.
In
the
answer
of
the
Minister
of
Finance
to
the
writ
of
mandamus
he
said:
"
"
In
deference
to
what
I
believe
to
be
the
reasons
of
the
Hon.
Mr.
Justice
D.
A.
McDonald
for
granting
this
Writ,
I
hereby
further
state
that
if
the
basis
for
determining
the
said
acquisition
costs
were
not
a
matter
for
my
personal
judgment,
but
that
I
am
legally
bound
to
rule
that
the
acquisition
costs
consisted
of
the
value
which
the
shares
given
in
consideration
for
the
said
mine
acquired
after
the
said
Pioneer
Gold
Mines
of
B.C.
Ltd.
had
received
title
to
the
said
properties,
then
I
would
find
the
said
acquisition
costs
of
the
said
properties
were
the
sum
of
$1,600,000.”
Counsel
for
the
Minister
during
his
argument
stated
that
the
Minister
did
not
wish
to
rely
on
technicalities
but
desired
a
decision
on
the
merits.
I
consider
that
the
acquisition
costs
should
be
fixed
at
$1,600,000.
Appeal
allowed.
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