RIDDELL,
J.A.:—The
appellant
is
the
proprietor
of
the
well-
known
race-course
known
as
the
Woodbine,
and
is
appealing
against
the
decision
of
the
Railway
and
Municipal
Board,
whereby
its
property
was
ordered
to
be
assessed
for
$765,308,
being
$565,308
on
the
land
and
$200,000
on
the
buildings
;
it
was
further
to
be
assessed
as
"‘business
assessment’’
on
$191,325.
The
property
of
the
appellant
is
situated
in
the
eastern
part
of
the
city,
much
of
it
being
land
left
by
the
recession
of
the
lake;
and
its
extent
is
some
85
or
86
acres.
The
appeal
is
on
two
lines,
(1)
as
to
the
assessment
on
the
land
and
buildings,
and
(2)
as
to
the
"‘business
assessment.”
As
respects
the
land,
the
Assessment
Act,
R.S.O.
1927,
c.
238,
sec.
4,
expressly
declares
that,
"‘all
real
property
in
Ontario
.
.
.
shall
be
liable
to
taxation,
subject
to’’
specified
exceptions,
none
of
which
is
applicable
here
;
and
the
sole
question
is
the
‘‘actual
value;’’
sec.
40(1).
The.
actual
value
is
to
be
determined
by
the
evidence,
and,
not
only
the
present
use
of
the
land
and
the
benefits
derived
therefrom
by
the
owner,
but
all
the
potentialities
are
to
be
taken
into
consideration.
The
principle
is
precisely
the
same
as
in
expropriation
cases,
damage
cases,
&c.,
as
to
which
Cripps
on
Compensation,
7th
ed.,
pp.
164-5,
gives
the
rules,
citing
such
cases
as
Cedar
Rapids
Mfg.
&
Power
Co.
v.
Lacoste
(1914)
16
D.L.R.
168;
Re
Lucas
c
Chesterfield
Gas
c
Water
Bd.
[1909]
1
K.B.
16;
Fraser
v.
Fraserville
(1917)
34
D.L.R.
211;
Trent-Stoughton
v.
Barbados
Water
Supply
Co.
Ltd.
[1893]
A.C.
502.
The
Ontario
cases
are
usefully
collected
in
2
C.E.D.
(Ont.),
pp.
601-2.
See
especially
Re
Macpherson
&
Toronto
(1895)
26
O.R.
558;
James
v.
Ont.
&
Que.
Ry.
Co.
(1885)
12
O.R.
624;
15
A.R.
(Ont.)
1;
Turnbull
Real
Estate
Co.
v.
The
King
(1903)
33
8.C.R.
677.
"
"
Land
which
may
probably
be
used
for
building
purposes
must
not
be
valued
on
the
same
basis
as
purely
agricultural
land:”
The
Queen
v.
Brown
(1867)
L.R.
2
Q.B.
630;
South
Eastern
Ry.
Co.
v.
Cooper
[1924]
1
Ch.
211.
It
is,
to
my
mind,
abundantly
manifest
that
the
Board
estimated
the
value
of
these
lands
upon
the
hypothesis
that
they
might
conveniently
and
profitably
be
used
as
building
lands—
on
what
has
been
called
the
‘‘subdivision’’
plan;
that
course
is,
I
think
wholly
unexceptionable;
and,
indeed,
an
appeal
would
not
lie
if
that
were
all
that
is
in
the
case.
But
while
the
value
of
the
lands
is
fixed
by
considering
what
they
might
be
worth—might
sell
for—were
they
exploited
in
the
manner
suggested,
the
Board
has
added
to
this
valuation
the
value
of
the
buildings,
which,
admittedly
must
be
taken
away
entirely
before
the
lands
could
be
utilized
in
the
manner
suggested—in
other
words,
the
Board
has
fixed
the
value
of
the
lands
as
they
would
be
without
the
buildings,
without
considering
that
that
implied
the
removal
or
destruction
of
the
buildings—in
still
other
words,
the
Board
has
fixed
the
value
of
the
lands
by
considering
what
value
they
might
acquire
without
considering
what
was
necessary
to
enable
them
to
acquire
that
value.
In
the
manner
pursued
in
fixing
this
value,
it
has
been
considered
that
the
buildings
are
to
be
removed,
and
then,
though
this
value
is
arrived
at
on
the
hypothesis
that
the
buildings
are
to
be
removed,
the
total
assessment
is
made
on
the
hypothesis
that
the
buildings
stay
and
improve
the
value
of
the
lands.
That
this
is
illogical,
will,
I
think
be
admitted—it
is
unjust
and
improper
to
remove
the
buildings
for
one
purpose
and
retain
them
for
another.
In
the
manner
by
which
this
value
of
the
lands
was
arrived
at,
the
buildings
do
not
increase
the
value
of
the
lands;
and
consequently
"‘the
value
of
the
buildings”
being
for
the
purposes
of
the
statute
"‘the
amount
by
which
the
value
of
the
land
is
.
.
.
increased”
should
be
placed
at
Q,
and
the
whole
assessment
of
lands
and
buildings
reduced
to
$565,308.
There
is,
of
course,
no
appeal
as
to
fact:
Re
Consolidated
Tel.
Co.
Ltd.
&
Caledon
&
Erin
Tps.
(1920)
55
D.L.R.
673,
48
O.L.R.
140;
Re
S.
H.
Knox
c
Co.
(1909)
18
O.L.R.
645;
Re
Hollinger
Cons.
Gold
Mines
Ltd.
c
Tisdale
Tp.,
[1931],
4
D.L.R.
239,
O.R.
640,
but
the
matter
on
which
we
are
now
passing
is
matter
of
law.
The
other
question
may
at
first
sight
present
more
difficulty,
1.€.,
the
assessment
of
appellant
in
the
form
of
a
‘‘business
assessment’’.
This
is
provided
for
in
sec.
9(2)
of
the
Assessment
Act,
which
reads
:—
‘“Every
proprietory
or
other
club
in
which
meals
are
furnished,
whether
to
members
or
others,
shall
be
liable
to
a
business.
assessment
for
a
sum
equal
to
twenty-five
per
centum
of
the
assessed
value
of
the
land
occupied
or
used
for
the
purposes
of
the
club.”
It
will
be
seen
that
the
clubs
that
are
to
be
liable
to
a
“business
assessment’’
are
only
those
in
which
meals
are
furnished;
I
fail
to
find
any
evidence
that
meals
are
furnished
in
this
club,
and,
consequently,
it
is
not
liable.
Even
were
it
the
case
that
meals
were
furnished
at
all,
it
would
be
only
during
the
Race
Meets,
which
last
only
two
weeks
in
the
year,
according
to
the
evidence.
Remembering
that
all
taxing
statutes
must
be
interpreted
strictly,
it
seems
to
me
that
the
intention
of
this
section
is
to
cover
clubs
which
habitually
and
regularly
furnish
meals
and
not
such
clubs
as
do
this
only
for
a
few
days
at
the
most,
and
as
a
mere
incident
to
their
real
object.
In
this
view,
I
do
not
think
it
necessary
to
discuss
the
case
of
Rideau
Club
v.
Ottawa
(1907)
15
O.L.R.
118,
which
it
was
argued
concludes
the
appeal
in
favour
of
the
appeal.
I
would
allow
the
appeal
to
the
extent
indicated,
and
with
costs.
Appeal
allowed.
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