The
CHIEF
JuSTICE:—By
sec.
8
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
1917,
as
enacted
in
1920
(10-11
Geo.
V,
c.
49,
sec.
11),
the
duty
is
imposed
upon
any
person
who
has
not
made
a
return,
or
a
complete
return
as
directed
by
that
statute,
of
delivering
to
the
Minister
of
Finance,
upon
demand
by
him,
such
information,
additional
information
or
return
as
he
may
require.
For
default
in
complying
with
the
Minister’s
demand
such
person
by
subsec.
1
of
sec.
9
of
the
statute
(as
amended
by
sec.
7
of
c.
55
of
the
statutes
of
1919,
sec.
13
of
c.
49
of
the
statutes
of
1920,
and
sec.
4
of
c.
33
of
the
statutes
of
1921),
is
made
liable
on
summary
conviction
to
a
penalty
of
$25
for
each
day
during
which
such
default
shall
continue.
Admittedly
in
default
under
sec.
8,
the
respondent
on
conviction
was
fined
$3
per
day,
the
magistrate
taking
the
view
that
sec.
1029
of
the
Criminal
Code
applied
and
gave
him
discretion
to
impose
a
pecuniary
penalty
not
exceeding
$25
a
day.
The
informant
insisting
that
only
the
fine
nominated
in
the
statute
of
$25
a
day
could
be
imposed,
at
his
instance
a
case
was
stated
by
the
magistrate
under
sec.
761
of
the
Criminal
Code
for
the
opinion
of
the
Appellate
Division
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Alberta.
That
court
upheld
the
magistrate’s
decision
and
supported
its
conclusion
by
reference
to
Rex
v.
Thompson
Mfg.
Co.
[1920]
47
Ont.
L.R.
103.
The
contrary
view
was
taken
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Nova
Scotia
in
The
King
v.
Smith
[1923]
56
N.S.
Rep.
72.
This
conflict
might
have
presented
matter
for
an
appeal
by
leave
of
a
judge
of
this
court
under
sec.
1024(a)
of
the
Criminal
Code,
had
the
case
been
otherwise
proper
for
the
application
of
that
provision.
But
the
proposed
appeal
is
not
by
a
provincial
Attorney
General,
or
by
a
person
convicted,
from
a
judgment
of
a
court
of
appeal
setting
aside
or
affiriming
a
conviction.
Sec.
1024(a),
therefore,
does
not
apply.
In
its
present
application
the
Crown
would
treat
the
case
not
as
falling
under
the
sections
of
the
Criminal
Code
providing
for
appeals,
but
rather
as
coming
within
the
civil
jurisdiction
of
this
court,
and,
having
been
refused
leave
to
appeal
by
the
Supreme
Court
of
Alberta,
now
moves
for
leave
under
clause
(b)
of
the
provisions
of
sec.
41
of
the
Supreme
Court
Act.
The
applicability
of
sec.
41
is
expressly
restricted
to
cases
within
sec.
36
and
by
that
section
jurisdiction
to
entertain
appeals
"‘in
criminal
causes”
is
excluded.
We
are
thus
confronted
with
the
question
whether
the
proceeding
under
the
summary
conviction
provisions
of
the
Criminal
Code,
made
applicable
by
sec.
706
of
the
code
and
see.
9
of
The
Income
War
Tax
Act,
to
enforce
the
penalty
imposed
by
sec.
9
for
a
violation
of
sec.
8
of
the
latter
statute
in
which
the
defendant
was
convicted
and
fined,
is
a
“criminal
cause”
within
the
meaning
of
the
exception
in
sec.
36
of
the
Supreme
Court
Act.
A
difference
of
opinion
in
regard
to
the
purview
of
the
word
"criminal’’
in
sec.
36
in
Re
McNutt
[1912]
47
Can.
S.C.R.
259,
was
settled
by
the
judgment
of
the
majority
of
this
court,
as
then
constituted,
in
Mitchell
v.
Tracey
[1919]
58
Can.
S.C.R.
640,
where
it
was
determined
that
"an
application
for
a
writ
of
prohibition
to
restrain
a
magistrate
from
proceeding
on
a
prosecution
for
violating
the
provisions
of
the
Nova
Scotia
Temperance
Act
arose
out
of
a
criminal
charge”?
and
could
not
be
made
the
subject
of
an
appeal
under
the
Supreme
Court
Act.
In
1912
this
court,
following
its
decision
in
the
case
last
mentioned,
unanimously
declined
to
entertain
an
appeal
in
the
case
of
The
King
v.
Nat
Bell
Liquors
Ltd.
[1921]
62
Can.
S.C.R.
118;
and,
on
appeal
by
special
leave,
their
Lordships
of
the
Judicial
Committee,
[1922]
2
A.C.
128,
at
p.
167,
affirmed
our
lack
of
jurisdiction.
The
importance
of
this
decision
is
that
it
fiinally
determined
that
the
word
"‘criminal’’
in
sec.
36
of
the
Supreme
Court
Act
is
employed
in
the
broad
sense
ascribed
to
it
in
Mitchell
v.
Tracey
[1912]
47
Can.
S.C.R.
259.
Compare
Ex
parte
Wood-Hall
[1888]
20
Q.B.D.
832;
Ex
parte
Schofield
[1891]
2
Q.B.D.
428,
and
Provincial
Cinemota-
graph
Theatre
v.
Newcastle
Profiteering
Committee
[1921]
125
L.T.
651.
Lord
Sumner,
quoting
the
language
of
one
of
the
judgments
delivered
in
Re
McNutt
[1912]
47
Can.
S.C.R.
259,
said,
at
page
186
([1922]
2
A.C.
128,
at
p.
167)
:—
"Their
lordships
are
of
opinion
that
the
word
‘criminal’
in
the
section
and
in
the
context
in
question
is
used
in
contradistinction
to
"civil’
and
‘connotes
a
proceeding
which
is
not
civil
in
its
character’.”
His
Lordship
added:
"After
all,
the
Supreme
Court
Act
is
concerned
not
with
the
authority
which
is
the
source
of
the
‘
criminal
’
law
under
which
the
proceedings
are
taken,
but
with
the
proceedings
themselves.
’
We
have,
therefore,
to
inquire
whether
the
proceeding
against
the
respondent
was
in
its
character
civil
or
was
criminal
in
the
sense
indicated.
There
has
been
some
difference
of
opinion
in
England
as
to
whether
a
proceeding
to
enforce
by
summary
conviction
penalties
imposed
for
contraventions
of
statutory
law
not
ordinarily
regarded
as
criminal
should
be
deemed
criminal
in
determining
the
admissibility
of
the
evidence
of
the
accused,
the
right
of
appeal
to
the
court
of
criminal
appeal
and
similar
questions.
Reference
may
be
made
to
Attorney
General
v.
Radolff
[1854]
10
Ex.
84;
Osborne
v.
Milman
[1887]
18
Q.B.D.
471;
Attorney
General
v.
Bladlaugh
[1885]
14
Q.B.D.
667;
Re
Douglas
[1842]
3
Q.B.
825;
Cattell
v.
Ireson
[1858]
27
L.J.M.C.
167;
The
King
v.
Hausmann
et
al
[1909]
W.N.
198.
But
none
of
these
cases
appears
to
be
at
all
so
closely
in
point
as
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
(Bowen
and
Kay,
L.JJ.)
in
The
Queen
v.
Tyler
&
The
International
Commercial
Coy.,
Ltd.
[1891]
2
Q.B.
588.
See.
47
of
the
English
Judicature
Act
(1873)
excludes
from
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
an
appeal
from
a
judgment
of
the
High
Court
in
any
criminal
cause
or
matter.
By
see.
26
of
the
Companies’
Act,
1862,
every
company
under
the
Act
having
a
capital
divided
into
shares
was
required
at
least
once
a
year
to
make
within
a
prescribed
period
a
list
of
shareholders
with
certain
particulars
and
to
forward
a
copy
thereof
to
the
registrar
of
joint
stock
companies.
By
sec.
17
it
was
provided
that
for
default
the
company
should
incur
a
penalty
not
exceeding
£5
for
every
day
during
which
such
default
continued
and
that
every
director
and
manager
knowingly
and
wilfully
authorizing
such
default
should
incur
a
like
penalty.
On
information
laid
before
him
charging
the
co-defendant
company
with
default
under
see.
26,
Alderman
Tyler,
a
city
magistrate,
refused
a
summons.
The
appellant
obtained
a
rule
nisi
for
a
mandamus.
The
Queen’s
Bench
Division
discharged
the
rule.’
The
applicant
appealed
to
the
Court
of
Appeal
and
its
jurisdiction
was
challenged
under
sec.
47.
The
court
held
that
the
judgment
of
the
Queen’s
Bench
Division
was
a
judgment
in
a
criminal
cause
or
matter
and
rejected
the
appeal.
Bowen
L.J.
said
that
sec.
26
created
a
duty
breach
of
which
would
be
disobedience
of
the
law,
and,
therefore,
an
offence,
which,
unless
the
statute
otherwise
provided,
would
be
indictable.
The
company
might
not
escape
the
duty
by
paying
the
penalty
;
the
duty
imposed
was
positive,
and
the
penalty
provided
was
punishment
for
the
offence
committed
by
a
breach
of
it.
Kay
L.J.
regarded
the
duty
imposed
under
see.
26
as
very
important
in
the
interest
of
the
public
as
well
as
of
the
shareholders;
the
penalty
was
not
intended
to
be
an
equivalent
for
the
omission
to
perform
the
duty
since
it
was
"£5
a
day
during
which
the
default
continues’’;
the
penalty
was
of
such
a
character
that
it
clearly
was
intended
as
a
punishment
such
as
would
compel
the
company
to
fulfil
the
duty.
It
was
inflicted
by
way
of
punishment
and
not
as
a
compensation
for
the
breach.
The
appeal
was
rejected
on
the
ground
‘‘that
the
Court
of
Appeal
has
no
jurisdiction
to
hear
matters
which
belong
to
the
criminal
jurisdiction
of
the
courts
of
the
country,
the
intention
of
the
Judicature
Act
being
to
keep
that
class
of
case
beyond
the
scope
and
reach
of
the
Court
of
Appeal.’’
Almost
equally
in
point
is
The
Mayor
etc.
of
Southport
v.
The
Birkdale
Urban
District
Council
[1897]
76
L.T.
318,
heard
by
Lord
Usher
M.R.,
and
Lopes
and
Chitty,
L.JJ.
A
local
Act
provided
"that
if
it
shall
at
any
time
be
proved
to
the
satisfaction
of
any
two
justices
.
.
.
that
the
illuminating
power
of
the
gas
supplied
by
the
corporation
did
not
when
tested
.
.
.
equal
the
illuminating
power
by
this
Act
prescribed”
the
corporation
shall
forfeit
such
sum,
not
exceeding
£20,
as
such
justices
shall
determine,
to
be
paid
to
the
local
board.
Upon
information,
and
after
hearing,
the
justices
convicted
the
corporation
and
fined
it
£10,
and
then
stated
a
case
for
the
opinion
of
the
High
Court
which
reversed
the
decision
of
the
justices
and
set
aside
the
conviction.
The
informant
appealed
and
a
preliminary
question
was
as
to
the
jurisdiction
of
the
Court
of
Appeal
under
sec.
47
of
the
Judicature
Act.
The
court
unanimously
held
that
the
judgment
appealed
against
was
a
judgment
in
a
criminal
cause
or
matter
and
as
such
non-
appealable.
Lord
Esher
said
:
‘There
were
an
information,
a
summons,
and
a
conviction.
It
is
contended
that
what
was
asked
for
was
the
payment
of
a
debt.
It
is
impossible
to
maintain
that
contention.
Nothing
was
due
to
any
one
from
the
corporation
for
which
an
action
could
be
brought
.
.
.
.
It
is
impossible
to
say
that
they
did
not
determine
that
the
corporation
must
pay
£10
by
way
of
penalty
for
disobedience
to
the
Act
of
Parliament.”
Lopes
L.J.
said:
"There
is
every
element
and
incident
of
a
criminal
matter.
The
proceedings
were
commenced
by
information
;
a
summons
was
issued;
there
was
an
appearance
before
justices
who
would
adjudicate
under
the
provisions
of
Jervis’s
Act
(11-12
Vict.,
c.
43)
;
and
the
proceedings
end
in
a
conviction
and
the
imposition
of
a
penalty
under
s.
40
of
the
local
Act.
Can
anything
be
more
like
a
criminal
matter
than
that?
The
proceedings
were
before
a
criminal
tribunal,
and
commenced
and
ended
in
the
same
way
as
ordinary
criminal
proceedings.
.
.
.
Putting
aside
the
procedure,
and
looking
only
at
the
provisions
of
s.
40
of
the
local
Act,
by
which
a
duty
is
imposed
on
the
corporation,
disobedience
to
that
duty
by
the
corporation
is
a
misdemeanour
at
common
law
and
is
indictable.
Looking
at
the
case
from
that
point
of
view,
it
is
impossible
to
say
that
disobedience
to
the
provisions
of
s.
40
is
not
a
criminal
offence.
It
has
been
argued
that
imprisonment
could
not
follow,
and
that
therefore
this
is
not
a
criminal
matter.
That
is
so
in
this
case,
because
the
proceedings
are
against
a
corporation.
But
if
the
proceedings
had
been
against
an
individual,
it
would
be
impossible
to
say
that
in
this
case
imprisonment
might
not
follow.
That
contention
is
dealt
with
in
The
Queen
v.
Tyler
[1891]
2
Q.B.
588
and
altogether
fails.’’
Chitty
L.J.
added
:
"‘Both
in
form
and
substance
these
proceedings
were
criminal.
They
were
commenced
by
information
and
summons;
there
was
a
conviction,
and
the
imposition
of
a
penalty.
A
case
was
stated
for
the
opinion
of
the
High
Court
and
the
appellants
entered
into
recognizance
to
prosecute
the
appeal.
As
to
the
form,
there
cannot
be
any
doubt.
As
to
the
substance,
the
conclusion
is
the
same.’’
We
think
it
clear
that
see.
8
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
imposed
a
duty
in
the
public
interest;
that
default
in
performing
that
duty
constituted
an
offence
against
the
public
law;
and
that
Parliament
provided
for
the
infliction
of
a
prescribed
punishment
by
a
tribunal
which
ordinarily
exercises
criminal
jurisdiction
and
by
procedure
enacted
by
the
Criminal
Code.
Clifford
v.
O’Sullivan
[1921]
2
App.
Cas.
570,
at
p.
580.
But,
although
a
civil
liability
might
be
imposed,
if
Parliament
provides
for
its
enforcement
by
a
proceeding
in
its
nature
criminal,
that
that
proceeding
would
be
a
criminal
cause
within
the
purview
of
sec.
36
of
the
Supreme
Court
Act.
would
seem
to
follow
from
the
judgment
of
the
English
Court
of
Appeal
in
Seaman
v.
Burley
[1896]
2
Q.B.
244.
Lord
Esher,
in
holding
that
a
judgment
on
a
case
stated
by
justices
on
an
application
to
enforce
payment
of
a
poor-rate
by
warrant
of
distress
was
a
judgment
in
a
criminal
cause
or
matter
within
sec.
47
of
the
Judicature
Act,
said,
at
page
346
:
"
"
It
seems
to
me
that
the
question
is
really
one
of
procedure.
The
question
is
whether
the
proceeding
which
was
going
on
was
a
criminal
cause.
That
it
is
a
question
of
procedure
may
be
easily
seen
by
taking
the
case
of
an
assault.
An
assault
may
be
made
the
subject
of
a
civil
procedure
by
action,
in
which
case
there
may
be
an
appeal
to
this
court;
or
it
may
be
made
the
subject
of
criminal
procedure
by
indictment,
in
which
case
there
cannot
be
such
an
appeal.
This
seems
to
me
to
be
contrary
to
the
argument
employed
by
the
counsel
for
the
appellant
to
the
effect
that
the
question
depends
upon
whether
the
origin
of
the
proceeding,
i.e.,
the
matter
complained
of,
is
in
its
nature
criminal
or
not.
In
each
case
the
thing
complained
of
is
the
same,
namely,
the
assault;
but
there
is
or
is
not
an
appeal
to
this
court
according
as
the
procedure
to
which
recourse
is
had
is
civil
or
criminal.
Therefore,
assuming
the
contention
that
the
rate
is
a
debt
to
be
well
founded,
which
I
do
not
admit,
nevertheless,
if
the
legislature
have
enacted
that
it
may
be
recovered
or
enforced
by
criminal
procedure,
there
can
be
no
appeal
to
this
court.
‘
Lord
Justice
Kay
said,
at
page
349
:
‘If
I
followed
the
argument
correctly,
it
was
that,
where
non-fulfilment
of
a
liability
is
a
criminal
act,
the
proceeding
to
enforce
it
may
be
treated
as
criminal,
but
that
where
it
is
not
a
criminal
act,
the
proceeding
cannot
be
so
treated.
It
appears
to
me
that,
if
there
be
a
provision
in
a
statute
that
that
which
is
merely
a
civil
liability
may
be
enforced
by
a
proceeding
in
its
nature
criminal,
that
proceeding
is
none
the
less
criminal
for
the
purpose
of
s.
47
of
the
Judicature
Act,
1873,
because
it
is
applied
to
a
civil
liability.
If
the
proceedings
intended
by
a
statute
to
enforce
a
civil
obligation
are
in
the
nature
of
criminal
proceedings,
then
there
cannot
I
think,
under
s.
47,
be
an
appeal
to
this
court.
I
think
that
this
distinction
is
admirably
dealt
with
by
Cotton
L.J.
in
The
Queen
v.
Barnardo
[1889]
23
Q.B.D.
305
at
p.
408.
He
there
said:
‘Section
47
does
not
mean
that
no
appeal
shall
lie
when
the
act
which
originates
the
proceedings
in
which
the
order
was
made
is
a
crime,
but
it
means
that
no
appeal
shall
lie
when
the
cause
or
matter
in
which
the
order
was
made
is
in
the
nature
of
a
criminal
proceeding.
In
Ex
parte
Bell
Cox
[1887]
20
Q.B.D.
1,
it
was
held
that
an
appeal
lay
from
the
granting
of
a
habeas
corpus,
because
the
proceeding
in
which
it
was
granted
was
a
civil
proceeding.
In
Ex
parte
Alice
Woodhall
20
Q.B.D.
832,
it
was
held
that
the
refusal
of
a
habeas
corpus
could
not
be
appealed
from,
because
the
refusal
was
in
a
criminal
proceeding.
This
shews
the
distinction.
In
my
opinion
the
question
is,
not
whether
the
act
which
is
said
to
have
been
done
by
Dr.
Barnardo
is
one
for
which
he
was
liable
to
be
indicted,
but
whether
the
proceeding
in
which
the
order
was
made
was
a
criminal
cause
or
matter.’
I
take
that
to
be
the
true
distinction.
Therefore
it
does
not
matter
whether
the
non-payment
of
the
rate
is
a
criminal
act
or
not.
If
the
proceeding
against
the
person
who
does
not
pay
the
rate
is
in
its
nature
criminal,
there
cannot
be
an
appeal
to
this
court
in
it.
I
think
the
result
of
the
decisions
that
the
question
whether
there
is
such
an
appeal
does
not
depend
an
the
nature
of
the
obligation,
but
on
the
nature
of
the
proceedings.’’
Lord
Justice
Smith
delivered
judgment
to
the
same
effect.
In
The
Queen
v.
Whitchurch
[1881]
7
Q.B.D.
534,
Brett
L.J.
said,
at
p.
537:
"
I
am
of
the
opinion
that
we
have
no
jurisdiction
to
entertain
this
appeal,
because
the
legislature
has
treated
the
matter
as
criminal.
By
the
Public
Health
Act,
1875,
certain
things
are
prohibited,
and
certain
other
things
are
directed
to
be
done
by
the
owners
or
occupiers;
and
it
has
been
enacted
that
if
a
default
occurs,
the
person
in
default
shall
be
subject
to
a
penalty
recoverable
before
justices
by
Jervis
f
s
Acts.
The
legislature
has
decreed
that
a
penalty
shall
be
imposed
on
a'
person
offending
against
the
provisions
of
the
Public
Health
Act,
1875;
and
it
has
been
decided
in
Mellor
v.
Denham
[1880}
5
@.B.D.
467
that
to
treat
the
matter
in
that
manner
is
to
treat
it
as
a
criminal
matter.
‘
‘
The
observation
of
Lord
Sumner
in
the
Nat
Bell
Liquors
ease,
[1922]
2
A.C.
128,
at
p.
168,
that:
“the
Supreme
Court
Act
is
concerned
.
.
.
with
the
proceedings
themselves,
‘
‘
indicates
that
the
words
“criminal
cause’’
in
sec.
36
of
that
Act
have
the
same
purview
and
effect
as
was
given
to
the
words
“criminal
cause
or
matter”
in
see.
47
of
the
English
Judicature
Act
in
the
two
cases
last
cited.
But
see
Rex
v.
Governor
of
%rirrfon
Prison
[1910]
2
K.B.
1056,
at
pp.
1064-5.
Whenever
a
statute
imposes
a
penalty
by
way
of
pnishment
for
non-observance
of
a
behest
which
it
enacts
in
the
public
interest
and
the
prescribed
penalty
is
made
enforceable
by
criminal
procedure,
these
proceedings
fulfil
the
two
conditions
connoted
by
the
word
“criminal”
as
used
in
sec.
36
of
the
Supreme
Court
Act.
Clifford,
v.
O'Sullivan
[1921]
2
A.C.
570,
at
p.
580.
A
decision
by
a
judicial
tribunal
of
any
question
raised
in
or
with
regard
to
them,
at
whatever
stage
it
arises,
18
a
decision
in
a
criminal
cause;
Ex
parte
Woodhall
20
Q.B.D.
832,
at
p.
838;
and,
as
such,
is
within
the
exception
in
sec.
36
;
and
the
existence
of
an
alternative
remedy
of
a
civil
nature
would
not
affect
that
conclusion.
Queen
v.
Whitchurch
[1881]
7
Q.B.D.
534.
Leave
to
appeal
must,
therefore,
be
refused
with
costs.
IDINGTON
J.
coneurred
in
the
result.
Duff,
J.:—It
is
rather
important
to
notice
that
the
sole
point
for
consideration
is
whether
or
not
the
proceeding
out
of
which
this
appeal
arises
falls
within
the
description
‘"criminal
cause’’
in
the
sense
in
which
those
words
are
used
in
sec.
36
of
the
Supreme
Court
Act.
Happily,
in
my
view,
it
is
unnecessary
to
discuss
the
scope
of
such
words
as
‘
‘
crime
‘
‘
and
‘
i
criminal
cause
‘
‘
in
the
abstract;
an
enticing
subject,
perhaps,
for
lozomachy,
but,
in
my
view
of
the
effect
of
sec.
36,
of
little
importance
here.
Nor,
according
to
the
opinion
I
have
formed,
is
it
necessary
to
consider
whether
default
in
making
a
return
or
supplying
information
pursuant
to
sees.
7
and
8
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
is
for
all
purposes
a
criminal
offence.
The
penalty
imposed
by
sec.
9
is
recoverable
in
the
Exchequer
Court;
and
besides
the
consideration
that
proceedings
on
the
Revenue
Side
of
the
Exchequer
Court,
now
on
the
Revenue
Sile
of
the
King’s
Bench,
for
the
recovery
of
penalties
for
smuggling
have
been
definitely
held
not
to
fall
within
the
category
of
criminal
proceedings,
In
re
Hausmann
[1909]
3
Cr.
App.
Cas.
3,
there
is
the
circumstance
that
the
Exchequer
Court
of
Canada
is
not
and
probably
cannot
be
a
court
of
criminal
jurisdiction.
These
considerations
suggest,
perhaps,
that
proceedings
under
the
Income
War
Tax
Act
for
the
recovery
of
penalties
for
such
defaults
as
are
here
in
question,
if
considered
from
the
point
of
view
of
that
Act
alone,
lie
in
very
debatable
ground
;
on
"‘the
boundary
line
which
divides
civil
from
criminal
matters”
to
use
the
phrase
of
Lindley
L.J.,
in
Attorney
General
v.
Bradlaugh
14
Q.B.D.
667
at
p.
714.
We
are
here,
however,
concerned
only
with
the
proper
application
of
a
particular
phrase
in
a
particular
statute;
and
that
question
is
capable,
in
my
view,
of
being
decided
upon
a
ground
that
can
be
stated
very
briefly.
For
the
purpose
of
determining
the
scope
of
the
proviso
to
sec.
36
of
the
Supreme
Court
Act,
under
which
appeals
in
criminal
causes
are
limited
to
the
appeals
provided
for
by
the
Criminal
Code,
it
is
necessary,
I
think,
to
read
that
section
in
light
of
the
enactments
of
the
Criminal
Code.
The
subject
of
appeals,
as
affecting
summary
convictions
under
Part
14,
as
well
as
other
convictions,
where
the
proceeding
lead-
ing
to
the
conviction
is
in
form
a
criminal
proceeding,
and
the
judgment
is
not
a
mere
order
for
the
payment
of
money
(including
appeals
to
the
Supreme
Court
of
Canada,
as
well
as
to
the
Privy
Council),
is
a
subject
dealt
with
in
the
Criminal
Code
as
a
branch
of
Criminal
Law
and
Procedure;
and
there,
I
think.
the
Supreme
Court
Act
leaves
that
subject.
Consequently,
the
right
to
appeal
to
this
court,
if
any,
in
this
and
in
similar
cases,
must
be
found
in
the
provisions
of
the
Criminal
Code.
I
am
dealing,
of
course,
it
is
perhaps
advisable
to
say,
solely
with
cases
in
which
the
proceeding
is
a
proceeding
authorized
by
a
statute
of
the
Parliament
of
Canada.
What
L
have
said
is
in
no
way
inconsistent
with
either
the
decision
or
the
judgment
in
The
King
v.
Nat
Bell
[1922]
2
A.C.
128.
Leave
to
appeal
should
be
refused.
Motion
dismissed
with
costs.
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