AUDETTE,
J.:—This
is
an
information,
exhibited
by
the
Attorney-General
of
Canada,
whereby
it
appears,
inter
alia,
that
the
defendant
is
the
Minister
of
Agriculture
for
the
Province
of
Quebec,
receiving
as
such,
a
salary
(R.S.Q.
1909,
sec.
574),
of
$6,000,
and
an
indemnity
of
$1,500
as
a
member
of
the
Legislature,
and
that
in
computing
the
amount
of
income
tax
for
which
the
defendant
is
claimed
to
be
liable
for
the
year
1917,
the
said
sums
have
been
taken
into
consideration
and
account,
showing
in
the
result
a
liability
to
the
Crown,
for
such
income
tax,
of
the
sum:
of
$210.
By
his
amended
statement
of
defence
the
defendant
denies,
among
other
things,
that
he
is
"a
person
liable
to
taxation
under
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
1917,
ch.
28,
and
amendments
there-
of’’,
alleging
that
the
said
Acts
are
unconstitutional
and
ultra
vires
of
the
powers
of
the
Parliament
of
the
Dominion
of
Canada,
in
so
far
as
they
intend
to
apply
to
the
defendant,
who
is
a
Minister
of
the
Crown
for
the
Province
of
Quebec.
The
defence
rests
upon
paras.
6a
and
7
thereof,
which
respectively
read
as
follows,
viz:
"‘6a.
The
Income
War
Tax
Act,
1917,
and
amendments
thereto,
are
unconstitutional
and
ultra
vires
of
the
powers
of
the
Parliament.
of
Canada.
"
"
7.
The
Income
War
Tax
Act,
1917,
and
amendments
thereof
are
unconstitutional
and
ultra
vires
of
the
Parliament
of
the
Dominion
of
Canada,
in
so
far
as
they
intend
to
apply
to
the
defendant,
who
is
a
Minister
of
the
Crown
for
the
Province
of
Quebec.”
By
sec.
2(1)
of
(1919),
subsec.
1
of
sec.
3
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
1917,
was
amended
by
including
in
the
term
^income”
the
salaries
and
indemnities
or
other
remuneration
of
members
of
provincial
legislative
councils
and
assemblies,
whether
such
salaries
or
indemnities
are
paid
out
of
the
revenues
of
His
Majesty
in
respect
of
any
province.
And
by
sec.
10
of
the
Act
this
amendment
is
deemed
construed
to
have
come
into
operation
on
and
from
the
date
upon
which
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
1917,
came
into
operation.
The
parties
hereto
have
filed
the
following
admission
of
facts,
ViZ.:
"It
is
admitted
for
all
purposes
of
this
action
that
the
Minister
of
Finance
determined
the
amount
payable
for
the
tax
by
the
defendant
herein
pursuant
to
the
requirements
of
the
Income
War
Tax
Act,
1917,
and
amendments
thereto,
as
being
the
sum
of
$210,
and
thereupon,
November
21,
1918,
sent
by
registered
mail
a
notice
of
the
said
assessment
in
the
form
prescribed
by
the
Minister
to
the
defendant,
notifying
him
of
the
aforesaid
amount
as
payable
by
him
for
the
tax;
also
it
is
admitted
that
of
the
income
in
respect
of
which
such
tax
was
determined
$6,000
is
defendant’s
salary
as
Minister
of
Agriculture
of
Quebec,
under
art.
574
of
the
Revised
Statutes,
1909.’’
The
whole
controversy
rests
upon
art.
3
of
sec.
91
of
the
B.N.A.
Act,
1867,
and
art.
2
of
see.
92
thereof,
which
respectively
read
as
follows:
"‘Sec.
91,
art.
3.—The
raising
of
money
by
any
mode
or
system
of
taxation.
"‘Sec.
92,
art.
2.—Direct
taxation
within
the
Province
in
order
to
the
raising
of
a
revenue
for
provincial
purposes.
‘
‘
It
is
a
sound
rule
of
statutory
construction
that
every
word
ought
to
be
construed
in
its
ordinary
or
primary
sense,
unless
a
second
or
more
limited
sense
is
required
by
the
subject-matter
of
the
context.
There
is
no
conflict
between
these
two
sections,
and
taking
them
in
their
plain
and
ordinary
meaning
it
is
beyond
cavil
that
the
plenary
power
of
‘‘raising
money
by
any
mode
or
system
of
taxation”—either
direct
or
indirect—is
vested
in
the
Dominion;
and
it
is
equally
true
that
the
Province
has
plenary
power
to
raise
money
by
"‘direct
taxation”,
but
for
provincial
purposes
exclusively.
This
is
the
proper
meaning
that
judicial
interpretation
arising
out
of
decided
cases
attaches
to
these
two
sections.
"
"
Each
class
is
allowed
full
scope
to
which
upon
the
natural
import
of
language
used
it
is
entitled,
the
jurisdictions
must
inevitably
overlap,
or
to
use
Lord
Watson’s
expression,
‘interlace’.
.
.
.
The
federal
classes
are
to
be
viewed
as
confined
to
matters
of
common
Canadian
concern
and
the
provincial
as
covering
matters
of
local
provincial
concern,
and
after
applying
further
the
great
cardinal
rule
of
interpretation
laid
down
by
the
Privy
Council
in
the
Parsons’
case
(1881)
7
App.
Cas.
96,
51
L.J.
(P.C.)
26,
that
the
two
secs.
91
and
92
must
be
read
together
and
the
language
of
the
one
interpreted
and
where
necessary,
modified
by
that
of
the
other,
it
will
appear
that
there
are
domains
in
which
intra
vires
federal
legislation
will
meet
intra
vires
provincial
legislation.”
Clement’s
Canadian
Constitution,
464.
See
also
Lefroy
9
s
Canada’s
Federal
System,
166,
265,
279
and
281.
But
there
is
more.
The
powers
of
the
Dominion,
given
by
the
opening
enactment
of
sec.
91,
makes
it
lawful
to
make
laws
for
the
peace,
order
and
good
Government
of
Canada,
in
relation
to
all
matters
not
coming
within
the
classes
of
subjects
assigned
to
the
provinces.
And
it
adds
:
‘
And
for
greater
certainty,
but
not
so
as
to
restrict
the
generality
of
the
foregoing
terms
of
this
section—as
above
mentioned—it
is
hereby
declared
that
(notwithstanding
anything
in
the
Act)
the
exclusive
legislative
authority
of
the
Parliament
of
Canada
extends
to
all
matters
coming
within
the
classes
of
subjects
next
hereinafter
enumerated.”
And
there
follows
the
several
articles,
among
which
art.
3
is
found
which
gives
the
Dominion
the
right
to
raise
a
revenue
by
direct
taxation,
notwithstanding
anything
in
the
Act.
Intra
vires
federal
legislation
must
override,
if
necessary,
inconsistent
intra
vires
provincial
legislation
;
because
when
such
authority
is
so
given
to
the
Dominion,
it
has
paramount
authority,
and
the
plenary
operation
assured
by
the
non
obstante
clause
with
which
the
class
enumerated
opens.
Tenant’s
case
[1894]
A.C,
31,
63
L.J.
(P.C.)
25;
The
Fisheries
case
[1898]
A.C.
700,
67
L.J.
(P.C.)
90.
By
the
very
language
of
the
opening
clause
of
sec.
91
the
rule
of
federal
paramountcy
must
obtain.
However;
is
there
in
this
case
actual
conflict
?
There
is
nothing
repugnant
in
either
enactment
in
finding
that
the
Dominion
has
full
authority,
etc.,
and
that
it
is
acting
within
the
full
scope
of
its
powers
and
with
respect
to
matters
of
common
Canadian
concern
or
of
the
body
politic
of
the
Dominion,
in
enacting
the
Ineome
Tax
Act
and
that
the
Province
has
the
power,
in
raising
revenues
for
provincial
purposes,
to
raise
revenue
by
direct
taxation.
The
Dominion
has
a
right,
under
sec.
91,
to
raise
revenue,
for
matters
of
common
Canadian
concern—and
for
peace,
order
and
good
government—by
direct
and
indirect
taxation,
whilst
the
province,
for
provincial
purposes
can
only
raise
by
direct
taxation.
There
is
no
repugnancy
or
conflict
between
these
respective
powers.
The
exercise
by
the
Dominion
of
the
authority
to
raise
revenue
by
direct
and
indirect
taxation
for
federal
purposes
does
not
trench
upon
the
authority
of
the
Province
to
raise
revenue
for
provincial
purpose
by
direct
taxation.
Finding
otherwise
would,
without
justification,
interfere
with
the
revenues
of
the
Dominion
when
there
is
no
text
in
the
Act,
or
possible
construction
thereof,
to
justify
such
course.
In
the
interpretation
of
a
self-governing
constitution
founded
upon
a
written
organic
instrument,
such
as
the
B.N.A.
Act,
if
the
text
is
explicit,
the
text
is
conclusive.
But,
when
the
words
establish
two
mutually
exclusive
jurisdictions,
recourse
must
be
had
to
the
general
context
of
the
Act.
Reference
case,
3
D.L.R.
509,
[1912]
A.C.
571.
Dealing
with
the
proviso
at
the
end
of
sec.
91,
the
case
of
the
Att
f
y.-GenT.
of
Ontario
v.
Att’y.-Gen’l.
for
Dominion
[1896]
A.C,
348,
65
L.J.
(P.C.)
26,
settles
and
correctly
describes
all
the
classes
enumerated
in
sec.
92
as
being
from
a
provincial
point
of
view
of
a
local
or
private
nature.
It
is
to
be
read,
therefore,
as
a
limiting
proviso
to
sec.
92.
In
other
words,
as
put
by
Clement,
J.’s
Canadian
Constitution:
"Provincial
jurisdiction
extends
to
all
matters
in
a
provincial
sense,
local
or
private
within
the
province;
subject,
however,
to
this
proviso,
that
any
matter
really
falling
within
any
of
the
class
enumerations
of
sec.
91,
is
to
be
deemed
of
common
Canadian
concern
and
not
in
any
sense
a
matter
local
or
private
within
any
province.”
And
at
p.
366
he
adds:
4
It
has
been
frequently
recognized
by
this
Board,
and
it
may
be
regarded
as
settled
law,
that
according
to
the
scheme
of
the
B.N.A.
Act,
the
enactments
of
the
Parliament
of
Canada,
in
so
far
as
they
are
within
its
competency
must
override
provincial
legislation.’’
In
Citizens
Insurance
Co.
v.
Parsons,
7
App.
Cas.
96,
51
Lid.
(P.C.)
26,
cited
by
plaintiff’s
counsel
at
Bar,
Sir
Montague
Smith,
L.J.,
referring
to
the
apparent
conflict
of
powers
between
secs.
91
and
92,
by
way
of
illustration
of
the
principle
that
the
powers
exclusively
assigned
to
the
Provincial
Ligeslatures
were
not
to
be
absorbed
in
those
given
the
Dominion
Government,
said
at
pp.
108,
109:
‘‘So
‘the
raising
of
money
by
any
mode
or
system
of
taxation’
is
enumerated
among
the
classes
of
subjects
in
sec.
91
;
but,
though
the
description
is
sufficiently
large
and
general
to
include
‘direct
taxation
within
the
province
in
order
to
the
raising
of
a
revenue
for
provincial
purposes,’
assigned
to
the
provincial
legislatures
by
sec.
92,
it
obviously
could
not
have
been
intended
that
in
this
instance
also
the
general
power
should
override
the
particular
one.’’
Continuing,
Sir
Montague
Smith
says:
With
regard
to
certain
classes
of
subjects,
therefore,
generally
described
in
sec.
91,
legislative
power
may
reside
as
to
some
matters
falling
within
the
general
description
of
these
subjects
in
the
Igeislatures
of
the
provinces.
In
these
cases
it
is
the
duty
of
the
Courts,
however
difficult
it
may
be,
to
ascertain
in
what
degree,
and
to
what
extent,
authority
to
deal
with
matters
falling
within
these
classes
of
subjects
exists
in
each
legislature
and
to
define
in
the
particular
case
before
them
the
limits
of
their
respective
powers.
It
could
not
have
been
the
intention
that
a
conflict
should
exist,
and
in
order
to
prevent
such
a
result,
the
two
sections
must
be
read
together,
and
the
language
of
one
interpreted,
and
where
necessary,
modified
by
that
of
the
other.’’
And
that
is
the
principle
of
construction
which
I
have
sought
to
apply
to
this
case.
Part
of
the
passage
last
cited
has
been
referred
to
by
Lord
Hobhouse
in
the
Lambe
case
(1887)
12
App.
Cas.
575,
56
L.J.
(P.C.)
87,
and
relied
upon
by
defendant’s
counsel
at
Bar,
but
in
my
opinion
nothing
can
be
gathered
from
it
which
would
justify
the
contention
that
the
Dominion
could
in
any
way
be
deprived
of
its
powers
of
direct
taaxtion.
Then
we
have
a
recent
expression
of
opinion
touching
the
respective
powers
of
the
legislation
granted
by
sees.
91
and
92,
by
their
Lordships
of
the
Judicial
Committee
in
the
John
Deere
Plow
Co
9
s.
case
(annotated)
18
D.L.R.
353
at
857-8,
[1915]
A.C.
330,
84
L.J.
(P.C.)
64,
to
the
following
effect
:
"‘The
language
of
these
sections
and
of
the
various
heads
which
they
contain
obviously
cannot
be
construed
as
having
been
intended
to
embody
the
exact
disjunctions
of
a
perfect
logical
scheme.
The
draftsman
had
to
work
on
the
terms
of
a
political
agreement,
terms
which
were
mainly
to
be
sought
for
in
the
resolutions
passed
at
Quebec.
.
..
To
these
resolutions
and
the
sections
on
them,
the
remark
applies
which
was
made
by
this
Board
about
the
Australian
Commonwealth
Act
in
a
recent
case
Att
9
y.’Gen
9
l.
for
Australia
Commonwealth
v.
Colonist
Sugar
Refining
Co.
[1914]
A.C.
287,
83
L.J.
(P.C.)
154,
that
if
there
is
at
points
obscurity
in
language,
this
may
be
taken
to
be
due,
not
to
uncertainty
about
general
principle,
but
to
that
difficulty
in
obtaining
ready
agreement
about
phrases
which
attends
the
drafting
of
legislative
measures
by
large
assemblages.
It
may
be
added
that
the
form
in
which
provisions
in
terms
overlapping
each
other
have
been
placed
side
by
side,
shews
that
those
who
passed
the
Confederation
Act,
intended
to
leave
the
working
out
and
interpretation
of
these
provisions
to
practice
and
to
judicial
decision/
’
There
is
an
early
case
which
deserves
mention
if
only
for
the
clarity
of
its
language
touching
the
matter
in
controversy
between
the
parties
in
the
case
now
before
the
Court.
I
refer
to
Dow
v.
Black
(1875)
L.R.
6
P.C.
272,
44
L.J.
(P.C.)
52,
23
W.R.
657,
where
Lord
Colvile
says
as
p.
282:
"They
(their
Lordships)
conceive
that
the
third
article
of
sec.
91
is
to
be
reconciled
with
the
second
article
of
sec.
92
by
treating
the
former
as
empowering
the
supreme
legislature
to
raise
revenue
by
any
mode
of
taxation,
whether
direct
or
indirect;
and
the
latter
as
confining
the
provincial
legislature
to
direct
taxation
within
the
province
for
provincial
purposes.
‘
‘
Now,
passing
to
the
other
contention
of
the
defence
respecting
property
and
civil
rights,
counsel
asserts,
inter
alia,
that
an
outside
authority
over
which
the
Provincial
Legislature
has
no
control
cannot
deprive
its
members
of
part
of
the
monies
voted
actually
to
them
as
members,
compensating
them
in
the
discharge
of
their
duties
as
representatives
of
the
people
of
the
Province,
or
voted
as
salaries
to
members
of
the
Provincial
Government.
And
he
asks
that
if
this
tax
is
lawfully
imposed
what
is
then
to
prevent
the
Parliament
of
Canada
imposing
a
direct
tax
and
to
any
amount
expressly
on
members
of
the
Provincial
Legislature
?
And
he
adds
that
the
revenues,
and
duties,
under
sec.
126,
raised
by
the
Legislature
form
a
consolidated
revenue
fund.
The
reply
to
this
purely
suppositious
case
is
that
the
proper
time
to
deal
with
it
will
be
when
it
arises.
The
Courts
do
not
concern
themselves
with
or
forestall
difficulties
that
may
be
imagined
but
which
do
not
exist
in
the
facts
before
them;
nor
are
they
disposed
to
answer
hypothetical
questions.
See
per
Lord
Mansfield
in
The
Kng
v.
Inhabitants
of
West
Riding
of
Yorkshire
(1773)
Lofft
238,
and
Dyson
v.
Att’y-Gen’l
[1911]
1
K.B.
410,
80
L.J.
(K.B.)
531.
The
Dominion
in
raising
this
tax
does
not
in
any
manner
attempt
to
interfere
with
the
exercise
of
provincial
powers,
but
merely
asserts
that
when
the
power
is
exercised
the
recipient
of
the
indemnity
and
the
salary
shall
be
answerable
to
federal
legislation
in
the
same
manner
as
other
persons
or
residents,
irrespective
of
the
source
from
which
the
individual’s
income
is
derived.
In
the
Larnbe
case,
12
App.
Cas.
575
at
587,
their
Lordships
make
the
following
observation
in
respect
of
oppression
or
ad
convenienti
argument
:
"‘If
they
find
that
on
the
due
construction
of
the
Act
a
legislative
power
falls
within
sec.
92,
it
would
be
quite
wrong
of
them
to
deny
its
existence
because
by
some
possibility
it
may
be
aboused,
or
may
limit
the
range
which
otherwise
would
be
open
to
the
Dominion
parlaiment.''
And
per
Lord
Loreburn
L.C.
in
Att’y-Gen’l
of
Ontario
v.
Att
9
y-
Gen’l
for
Canada,
3
D.L.R.
509
at
513,
"‘It
certainly
would
not
be
sufficient
to
say
that
the
exercise
of
a
power
might
be
oppressive,
because
that
result
might
ensue
from
the
abuse
of
a
great
number
of
powers
indispensable
to
self-government,
and
obviously
bestowed
by
the
British
North
America
Act.
Indeed
it
might
ensue
from
the
breach
of
almost
any
power.’’
And,
as
said,
inter
alia,
in
Clement’s
Canadian
Constitution,
ord
ed.,
p.
482:
"In
the
case
from
which
this
finding
is
taken,
the
right
of
the
province
to
tax
objects
and
institutions
over
which
the
federal
parliament
has
legislative
jurisdiction
was
affirmed
in
the
Lambe
case
(ubr
supra)
.
.
.
Dominion
excise
laws
may
be
rendered
nugatory
by
provincial
prohibition.
A
province
may
sell
its
timber
on
terms
prohibiting
exports
.
.
.
As
has
been
said,
lawful
legislation
does
not
become
unlawful
because
it
cannot
be
separated
from
its
inevitable
consequences.”
As
a
further
answer
to
the
defence
‘s
contention
in
this
respect,
the
observations
of
Lord
Hobhouse
in
the
same
case
are
very
apposite.
He
said
at
p.
586
:
‘Their
Lordships
cannot
conceive
that
when
the
Imperial
Parliament
conferred
wide
powers
of
local
self-government
on
great
countries,
such
as
Quebec,
it
intended
to
limit
them
on
the
speculation
that
they
would
be
used
in
an
injurious
manner.
People
who
are
trusted
with
the
great
power
of
making
laws
for
property
and
civil
rights
may
well
be
trusted
to
levy
taxes.”
The
well-known
cases
of
Webb
v.
Outrim
[1907]
A.C.
81,
76
L.J.
(P.C.)
25,
and
Abbott
v.
City
of
St.
John
(1908)
40
Can.
S.C.R.
597,
were
much
discussed
at
the
argument.
In
the
case
of
Railroad
Co.
v.
Paniston
(1873)
18
Wall.
(85
U.S.)
5,
Strong,
J.,
is
reported
as
saying,
at
p.
36:
“It
is
therefore
manifest
that
exemption
of
Federal
agencies
from
State
taxation
is
dependent
not
upon
the
nature
of
the
agents
or
upon
the
mode
of
their
constitution,
or
upon
the
fact
that
they
are
agents,
but
upon
the
effect
of
the
tax,
that
is
upon
the
question
whether
the
tax
does
in
truth
deprive
them
of
power
to
serve
the
Government
as
they
were
intended
to
serve
it,
or
does
hinder
the
efficient
exercise
of
their
power.
A
tax
upon
their
property
has
no
such
necessary
effect;
it
leaves
them
free
to
discharge
the
duties
they
have
undertaken
to
perform.
A
tax
upon
their
operations
is
a
direct
obstruction
to
the
exercise
of
Federal
powers.
‘
‘
The
stock
argument
of
interference
with
property
and
civil
rights
in
the
province
needs
only
a
passing
observation.
In
the
case
of
Cushing
v.
Dupuy
(1880)
5
App.
Cas.
409,
49
L.J.
(P.C.)
63,
their
Lordships
offered,
inter
alia,
the
following
observations
:
‘‘It
is
therefore
to
be
presumed,
indeed
it
is
a
necessary
implication,
that
the
Imperial
Statute,
in
assigning
to
the
Dominion
Parliament
the
subjects
of
bankruptcy
and
insolvency
intended
to
confer
on
it
legislative
power
to
interfere
with
property,
civil
rights
and
procedure
within
the
provinces,
so
far
as
a
general
law
relating
to
those
subjects
might
affect
them.’’
Thereby
reserving
to
the
sovereign
legislature
its
plenary
power
in
relation
to
all
matters
coming
within
the
classes
of
subjects
mentioned
in
sec.
91,
as
the
Act
expressly
states.
See
also
Tenant
v.
Union
Bank,
supra;
Att’y-Gen’l
v.
Queen
Insurance
Co.
(1887)
3
App.
Cas.
1090;
Bourgoin
v.
Montreal,
Ottawa
and
Occidental
R.
Co.
(1880)
5
App.
Cas.
381,
49
L.J.
(P.C.)
68.
Again
in
the
Russell’s
case
(1882)
7
App.
Cas.
829,
at
pp.
839-
840,
51
L.J.
(P.C.)
77,
is
found
the
following
language:
“Few,
if
any,
laws
could
be
made
by
Parliament
for
the
peace,
order,
and
good
government
of
Canada,
which
did
not
in
some
incidental
way
affect
property
and
civil
rights
;
and
it
could
not
have
been
intended
when
assuring
to
the
provinces
exclusive
legislative
authority
on
the
subjects
of
property
and
civil
rights,
to
exclude
the
parlaiment
from
the
exercise
of
this
general
power
whenever
any
such
incidental
interference
would
result
from
it.
The
true
nature
and
character
of
the
legislation
in
the
particular
instances
under
discussion
must
always
be
determined
in
order
to
ascertain
the
class
of
subject
to
which
it
really
belongs.
‘
‘
And
again
per
Anglin,
J.,
in
Re
Insurance
Act
(1910)
(1913)
15
D.L.R.
251,
48
Can.
8.C.R.
260
at
p.
310:
‘‘when
a
matter
primarily
of
civil
rights
has
attained
such
dimensions
that
it
‘affects
the
body
politic
of
the
Dominion’
and
has
become
‘fo
national
concern,’
it
has,
in
that
aspect
of
it,
not
only
ceased
to
be
‘local
and
provincial,’
but
has
also
lost
its
character
as
a
matter
of
‘civil
rights
in
the
province’
and
has
thus
so
far
ceased
to
be
subject
to
provincial
jurisdiction
that
Dominion
Legislation
upon
it
under
the
‘peace,
order
and
good
government,’
provisions
does
not
trench
upon
the
exclusive
provincial
field
and
is,
therefore,
valid
and
paramount.
’
On
the
whole
I
fail
to
see
any
ground
upon
which
the
defendant
should
be
treated
with
discrimination
as
regards
the
other
citizens
or
public
of
Canada
in
relation
to
liability
for
a
tax
of
the
nature
here
in
question.
See
Hollinshead
v.
Hazelton
[1916]
1
A.C.
428,
85
L.J.
(P.C.)
60.
I
have
come
to
the
conclusion
that
the
Dominion
has,
under
the
several
provisions
of
sec.
91
of
the
B.N.A.
Act,
1867,
independent
plenary
power
within
its
own
proper
legislative
domain,
and
disparate
from
and
unrelated
to
any
provincial
right
of
taxation,
to
raise
revenue
by
direct
taxation
upon
the
income
of
persons
residing
within
its
territorial
jurisdiction,
and
that
the
immunity
or
exemption
claimed
by
the
defendant
cannot
avail.
There
will
be
judgment
against
the
defendant,
as
prayed,
for
the
sum
of
$210,
with
interest
thereon
at
the
rate
of
seven
per
centum
per
annum
(as
provided
by
1917,
sec.
10
of
ch.
28)
from
November
31,
1918,
to
the
date
hereof
and
with
costs.
Judgment
accordingly.
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