Teskey
J.T.C.C.:
—
The
appellant
elected
to
proceed
under
the
informal
procedure
in
her
Notice
of
Appeal
wherein
she
appealed
her
assessment
of
income
tax
for
the
years
1988
through
to
1993.
The
appellant
withdrew
her
appeals
for
the
1988,
1989,
1990
and
1991
years.
The
only
issue
before
me
is
the
appellant’s
disability
to
walk
without
a
cane
sufficient
to
place
her
within
the
wording
of
subsection
118.3(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
(the
“Act”)
and
to
entitle
her
to
the
non-refundable
disability
tax
credit.
The
evidence
given
by
the
appellant
is
not
in
dispute.
She
lives
by
herself
in
her
own
home.
Her
only
disability
is
that
of
walking.
She
cannot
walk
unaided.
She
must
lean
on
furniture
in
her
home
or
use
a
cane
or
a
shopping
cart
while
out
of
the
house.
Although
the
appellant
appears
to
take
a
slightly
longer
time
to
move
around
the
house
and
dress
herself,
it
certainly
is
not
an
inordinately
long
time.
From
observing
her
move
around
the
courtroom,
she
manages
quite
well
using
her
cane
or
touching
furniture.
Her
capacity
to
travel
around
the
courtroom
was
virtually
the
same
as
a
normal
person.
There
is
no
doubt
she
is
a
very
determined
person
and
her
perseverance
is
to
be
admired.
The
appellant
drives
her
own
car,
does
her
own
shopping,
but
requires
help
to
get
her
parcels
into
the
house.
She
also
uses
Handi-Transit
and
taxi.
She
attends
the
symphony
on
a
monthly
basis.
At
the
conclusion
of
the
hearing
on
Monday,
October
23rd,
I
adjourned
the
hearing
to
Wednesday,
October
25
at
2:30
p.m.
to
give
the
appellant
the
opportunity
to
call
her
chiropractor
as
a
witness.
When
the
case
was
called
at
2:30
p.m.,
Ronald
Schnalcel,
a
solicitor,
appeared
to
represent
her.
No
medical
evidence
was
called
and
both
parties
submitted
their
closing
arguments.
The
respondent
referred
me
to
a
decision
of
my
colleague
Bowman
in
Craven
v.
R.
(sub
nom.
Craven
v.
Canada),
[1995]
1
C.T.C.
2883
(T.C.C.).
I
concur
in
the
conclusion
he
came
to
therein.
Section
118.4
reads
as
follows:
118.4(1)
For
the
purposes
of
subsection
6(16),
sections
118.2
and
118.3
and
this
subsection,
(a)
an
impairment
is
prolonged
where
it
has
lasted,
or
can
reasonably
be
expected
to
last,
for
a
continuous
period
of
at
least
12
months;
(b)
an
individual’s
ability
to
perform
a
basic
activity
of
daily
living
is
markedly
restricted
only
where
all
or
substantially
all
of
the
time,
even
with
therapy
and
the
use
of
appropriate
devices
and
medication,
the
individual
is
blind
or
is
unable
(or
requires
an
inordinate
amount
of
time)
to
perform
a
basic
activity
of
daily
living;
(c)
a
basic
activity
of
daily
living
in
relation
to
an
individual
means
(i)
perceiving,
thinking
and
remembering,
(ii)
feeding
and
dressing
oneself,
(iii)
speaking
so
as
to
be
understood,
in
a
quiet
setting,
by
another
person
familiar
with
the
individual,
(iv)
hearing
so
as
to
understand,
in
a
quiet
setting,
another
person
familiar
with
the
individual,
(v)
eliminating
(bowel
or
bladder
functions),
or
(vi)
walking;
and
(d)
for
greater
certainty,
no
other
activity,
including
working,
housekeeping
or
a
social
or
recreational
activity,
shall
be
considered
as
a
basic
activity
of
daily
living.
Under
this
very
strict
inflexible
test,
I
cannot
say
that
the
appellant’s
ability
to
perform
her
basic
activity
of
daily
living
as
defined
is
markedly
restricted.
The
appeals
are
dismissed.
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