Pinard,
J.
[Translation]:—The
Court
must
decide
here
on
the
merits
of
an
objection
by
a
third
party
to
the
seizure
in
execution
made
herein.
The
objector
in
fact
claims
to
be
owner
of
the
two
vehicles
seized
on
December
15,1988
in
execution
of
a
writ
of
fieri
facias
issued
by
this
Court
on
October
24,
1988
on
the
basis
of
a
registered
certificate,
having
the
same
force
and
effect
as
a
judgment
of
the
Court,
for
a
debt
of
the
seized
corporation
to
the
seizing
Department
totalling
$14,098.33,
plus
interest
and
costs.
The
two
vehicles
seized
are
a
1984
Chevrolet
S-10
and
a
1987
Dodge
Colt.
First,
the
objector
objected
to
the
seizure
because
it
claims
that
it
is
the
sole
owner
of
the
vehicles
in
question,
alleging
that
it
had
purchased
them
from
the
seized
corporation
by
contracts
of
purchase
dated
October
29,
1984
and
September
15,
1986.
Second,
the
judgment
creditor
disputed
the
objection
on
the
ground
that
at
the
time
of
the
execution
the
judgment
debtor
was
owner
of
the
vehicles,
as
they
were
then
registered
in
his
name
with
the
Régie
de
l'assurance-automobile
of
Quebec.
The
evidence
clearly
showed
that
each
of
the
vehicles
seized
was
bought
by
the
objector
Plomberie
Chauffage
Alma
(1980)
Inc.
In
the
case
of
the
1984
Chevrolet,
the
sales
contract
of
October
29,
1984
showed
that
it
was
bought
from
the
dealer
Talbot
Chevrolet
Oldsmobile
Ltée.
In
the
case
of
the
1987
Dodge
Colt,
the
sales
contract
of
September
15,
1986
showed
that
it
was
bought
from
the
dealer
Dupont
Autos
Enr.
In
each
of
these
two
cases,
the
information
obtained
from
the
Régie
de
l'assurance-automobile
of
Quebec
showed
that
the
vehicle
was
bought
by
Plomberie
Chauffage
Alma
(1980)
Inc.
and
that
it
was
initially
registered
in
the
latter's
name.
The
fact
that
the
vehicles
were
subsequently
registered
in
the
name
of
the
seized
corporation
Plomberie
Chauffage
Alma
inc.
may,
as
was
actually
admitted
by
the
witness
John
Belley,
an
administrative
technician
with
the
Régie
de
l'assurance-automobile
of
Quebec,
result
simply
from
administrative
error;
in
the
case
of
the
1987
Dodge
Colt,
Mr.
Belley
even
said
that
the
administrative
error
was
virtually
a
certainty.
In
the
circumstances,
in
view
of
the
fact
that
the
objecting
corporation
and
seized
corporation
are
separate
entities,
I
consider
that
the
objector
has
established
that
it
is
the
sole
owner
of
the
two
vehicles
seized
in
the
case
at
the
bar
and
that
it
accordingly
is
entitled
to
the
requested
release
of
the
seizure
in
execution
concerned.
The
fact
that
these
companies
actually
have
the
same
corporate
name,
to
which
the
objector
only
added
in
one
case
the
figures
for
the
year
1980,
does
not
lead
this
Court
to
lift
the
corporate
veil
in
the
exercise
of
its
discretion
so
as
to
make
the
objector
subject
to
the
obligations
of
the
seized
corporation
towards
the
judgment
creditor.
An
exception
should
only
be
made
to
the
principle
that
a
company
is
legally
independent,
and
its
artificial
personality
disregarded,
when
this
is
necessary
to
prevent
fraud,
which
is
not
the
case
here.
Plomberie
Chauffage
Alma
Inc.
decided
on
February
28,
1980
to
divide
its
operations
and
sell
to
Plomberie
Chauffage
Alma
(1980)
Inc.
all
its
plumbing,
heating
and
heating
oil
distribution
business,
that
is
the
part
of
its
assets
connected
with
the
building
industry.
Plomberie
Chauffage
Alma
Inc.
then
allowed
its
building
employees
to
become
shareholders
in
Plomberie
Chauffage
Alma
(1980)
Inc.
and
so
participate
in
a
business
in
their
field.
As
Plomberie
Chauffage
Alma
Inc.
was
thus
no
longer
working
in
the
building
industry
and
it
was
now
only
concerned
with
an
apartment
building,
a
building
which
incidentally
it
had
to
make
over
to
its
mortgage
creditor
in
1985
due
to
financial
problems,
it
was
quite
understandable
that
the
purchasers
of
its
plumbing,
heating
and
heating
oil
distribution
business
should
want
to
take
advantage
of
the
goodwill
attached
to
its
corporate
name.
Additionally,
the
sale
of
the
vehicles
to
the
objector
was
in
each
case
made
before
the
seizure
and
the
weight
of
the
evidence
is
that
the
vehicles
concerned
were
used
by
the
objector
in
connection
with
its
commercial
activities.
Bearing
all
this
in
mind,
it
is
not
a
matter
of
great
importance
that
in
the
first
year
following
the
purchase
of
the
1984
Chevrolet,
that
is
immediately
before
Plomberie
Chauffage
Alma
Inc.
became
inoperative,
this
vehicle
was
also
used
for
personal
reasons
by
Alfred
Guay,
the
president
of
the
defendant
company,
who
at
the
time
was
also
a
shareholder
of
the
objector
company.
As
regards
the
objector's
delay
in
having
the
registration
certificates
corrected
(they
were
not
corrected
at
its
request
until
March
3,
1990),
this
could
only
have
an
effect
on
the
costs
of
the
case
at
bar,
which
the
confusion
thus
created
in
some
measure
encouraged.
This
delay
by
the
objector
and
the
resulting
confusion
certainly
could
not
be
taken
to
mean
a
wish
to
place
the
vehicles
beyond
the
reach
of
the
instant
seizure,
as
the
tax
debt
was
not
that
of
the
objector
but
that
of
Plomberie
Chauffage
Alma
Inc.
For
all
these
reasons,
the
rule
that
the
judgment
debtor
and
the
objector
are
separate
entities
must
be
observed,
judgment
is
accordingly
rendered
upholding
the
latter's
objection,
finding
that
it
is
the
sole
owner
of
the
two
vehicles
seized
in
this
proceeding
and
granting
the
requested
release
from
the
execution;
the
whole
without
costs,
despite
the
objector's
success,
in
view
of
its
delay
in
having
the
registration
certificates
corrected.