Teitelbaum,
J.:—There
are
three
motions
to
be
dealt
with
pursuant
to
Rule
324
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules.
The
two
motions
by
the
plaintiff
are
for:
(1)
an
Order
granting
leave
under
Rule
300(2)
for
the
Plaintiff
I*AM
Institute
of
Applied
Methodology
to
be
represented
by
a
Director
of
the
Corporation;
(2)
an
Order
granting
summary
judgment
on
the
documents
to
the
Plaintiff
l*AM
Institute
Of
Applied
Methodology
pursuant
to
Rule
341(b),
Federal
Court
Rules;
including:
(a)
An
order
in
the
nature
of
certiorari,
directing
Revenue
Canada
Taxation
to
reinstate
the
registration
of
Plaintiff
l*AM
Institute
Of
Applied
Methodology
as
a
registered
Canadian
charitable
organization.
(b)
An
interlocutory
and
permanent
injunction
enjoining
Revenue
Canada
Taxation
from
undertaking
any
act
in
furtherance
of
the
fraudulent
revocation
of
the
registration
of
Plaintiff
l*AM
Institute
Of
Applied
Methodology
as
a
registered
Canadian
charitable
organization,
including
but
not
limited
to
the
imposition
of
any
revocation
tax
under
s.
188
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
(c)
An
order
awarding
Plaintiff
l*AM
Institute
Of
Applied
Methodology
the
costs
incurred
as
a
result
of
the
fraudulent
revocation
of
the
registration
of
Plaintiff
l*AM
Institute
Of
Applied
Methodology
as
a
registered
Canadian
charitable
organization,
including
the
costs
of
this
action.
and
the
one
by
the
defendant
is
for:
(1)
An
Order
pursuant
to
subrules
419(1)(a),
(b)
and
(f)
striking
out
the
Statement
of
Claim
without
leave
to
amend
and
dismissing
this
action,
with
costs.
(A)
Order
granting
leave
under
Rule
300(2)
The
plaintiff
filed
into
the
office
of
the
Federal
Court
a
statement
of
claim
dated
July
4,1990
signed
by
Alfred
Lambremont
Webre
"Director
and
Legal
Agent
for
Plaintiff”.
Mr.
Lambremont
Webre
is
not
an
attorney
or
solicitor.
The
plaintiff,
according
to
paragraph
1
of
the
statement
of
claim
"is
a
not-for-profit
corporation,
incorporated
December
7,
1967
pursuant
to
the
laws
of
Canada,
with
a
registered
address
at
P.O.
Box
2860,
Station
‘’B”,
Ottawa,
Ontario
KIP
5W8".
Pursuant
to
Rule
300(2)
of
the
Federal
Court
Rules,
"except
as
expressly
provided
by
or
under
any
enactment,
a
body
corporate
may
not
begin
or
carry
on
such
a
proceeding
otherwise
than
by
an
attorney
or
solicitor”.
The
plaintiff
is
not
represented
by
an
attorney
or
solicitor,
it
is
being
represented,
according
to
the
statement
of
claim,
by
Mr.
Lambremont
Webre,
a
director
and
legal
agent
or
by
Ms.
Rhonda
Brown
who
signed
the
notice
of
motion
on
August
21,
1990
as
"Director
And
Legal
Agent
For
Plaintiff
l*AM
Institute
Of
Applied
Methodology”.
In
plaintiffs
notice
of
motion,
it
seeks
an
order
permitting
plaintiff
"a
Canadian
charitable
organization,
to
be
represented
by
a
Director
of
the
Corporation".
Plaintiff
lists
the
following
grounds
in
its
notice
of
motion:
6.
Summary
judgment
under
Rule
341(b)
is
proper
as
the
Plaintiff
I*AM
Institute
Of
Applied
Methodology
is
entitled
to
judgment
on
the
documents
submitted,
and
no
fairly
arguable
question
of
law
as
to
the
right
to
judgment
can
be
advanced.
7.
The
right
to
summary
judgment
by
the
Plaintiff
I*AM
Institute
Of
Applied
Methodology
flows
as
a
matter
of
law
from
the
effect
of
the
documents
submitted.
8.
Such
further
and
other
grounds
as
may
be
advised
and
this
Honourable
Court
may
consider.
Some
of
the
documentary
evidence
submitted
by
plaintiff
is
an
affidavit
of
Rhonda
Brown,
the
director
and
legal
agent
of
plaintiff
who
is
representing
plaintiff
on
the
present
motion,
a
resolution
of
plaintiff's
Board
of
Directors
"authorizing
representation
of
the
Corporation
by
Rhonda
Brown”,
and
the
case
of
Guccio
Gucci
S.p.A.
v.
Cebuchier
(1988),
23
C.P.R.
(3d)
427
(F.C.T.D.).
I
believe
that
plaintiff
submits
the
case
of
Gucci
S.p.A.
to
show
that
if
the
evidence
went
to
show
that
the
plaintiff
is
impecunious,
that
the
individual
is
a
member
of
the
corporation
or
that
she
was
authorized
by
the
corporation
to
represent
it,
I
would
have
jurisdiction
to
allow
plaintiff
to
represent
it.
I
am
satisfied
that
the
uncontradicted
evidence,
the
affidavit
of
Rhonda
Brown
and
the
resolution,
indicate
that
Rhonda
Brown
is
a
director
of
plaintiff
and
was
authorized
to
represent
plaintiff
in
Court
File
T-1838-90
and
that
the
plaintiff
corporation
is
impecunious.
Is
this
sufficient
to
allow
the
present
application?
I
think
not.
At
the
present
time,
a
corporation
must
be
represented
by
an
attorney
or
a
solicitor
unless
the
corporation
can
fit
into
the
exception
found
in
Rule
300(2).
That
exception
is
that
there
must
be
an
express
provision
or
an
enactment.
In
the
case
of
Walt
Disney
Productions
v.
Just
Kiddies
Marketing
Inc.
(1985),
1
C.P.R.
(3d)
250
(F.C.T.D.)
Mr.
Justice
McNair
allowed
a
director
or
member
duly
authorized
to
defend
an
action
but
he
did
so
only
because
he
found
"an
enactment”
subsection
225(2)
of
the
British
Columbia
Company
Act,
R.S.B.C.
1979,
c.
59
which
allowed
a
member
or
director
of
a
corporation,
after
being
authorized
by
the
corporation,
to
represent
it
in
Court
legal
proceedings.
I
am
not
aware
of
any
Ontario
statute
that
allows
a
member
or
director
of
a
corporation,
after
being
duly
authorized,
to
represent
it
in
legal
proceedings
before
the
Court,
assuming
the
corporation
to
be
impecunious.
The
application
allowing
plaintiff
to
be
represented
by
a
director
of
the
corporation
is
denied.
The
plaintiff
shall
have
a
period
of
15
days
from
today's
date
to
retain
the
services
of
an
attorney,
failing
which
the
present
action
shall
be
dismissed
with
costs.
The
notice
of
motion
by
plaintiff
for
summary
judgment,
for
an
order
in
the
nature
of
certiorari
and
for
an
interlocutory
injunction
is
continued
sine
die
and
may
be
brought
back
before
the
Court
upon
two
clear
days'
notice
to
the
defendant
but
only
in
the
event
that
plaintiff
retains
the
services
of
an
attorney
within
the
15-day
delay
above
mentioned.
The
defendant's
application
to
strike
is
continued
sine
die
and
may
be
brought
back
before
the
Court
upon
two
clear
days’
notice
to
the
plaintiff
in
the
event
that
plaintiff
has
retained
the
services
of
an
attorney
within
the
delay
above
stipulated.
Email this Content