Décary,
J.A.:—This
is
an
appeal
from
an
order
by
Collier,
J.
by
which
he
allowed
a
motion
by
the
respondent/plaintiff
to
compel
the
appellant/
defendant
to
produce
certain
documents,
which
she
refused
to
disclose
pursuant
to
subsection
241(1)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
R.S.C.
1952,
c.
148
(am.
S.C.
1970-71-72,
c.
63)
(the
"Act")
.
The
facts,
briefly
stated,
are
as
follows.
The
respondent
became
the
mortgagee
of
certain
property
in
the
Victoria,
B.C.
area.
The
mortgagor
was
a
company
known
as
International
Electronics
Corporation
(I.E.C.).
Pursuant
to
a
certificate
issued
against
I.E.C.
by
Revenue
Canada,
the
Victoria
Sheriff's
Department
entered
the
building
occupied
by
I.E.C.
and
seized
and
removed
various
items
from
the
building
pursuant
to
said
certificate.
The
respondent
alleges
that
Revenue
Canada
caused
sheriff's
officers
to
wrongfully
seize
and
remove
some
of
the
items,
including
fixtures,
and
alleges
also
that
extensive
damage
was
done
to
the
building
in
the
course
of
the
seizure;
the
seizure
of
a
generator,
it
is
said,
resulted
in
flooding
of
the
building.
In
a
statement
of
claim
filed
against
the
appellant
in
the
Trial
Division
of
the
Federal
Court
the
respondent
claimed
damages
on
the
basis,
inter
alia,
that
the
sheriff's
officers
were
acting
"at
the
direction
of,
and
as
agent
of,
Revenue
Canada”.
Pursuant
to
Rule
448
and
to
an
order
of
Collier,
J.,
the
appellant
filed
a
“Supplementary
List
of
Documents”
which,
however,
she
considered
to
be
protected
under
subsection
241(1)
of
the
Act.
The
documents
in
question
are
a
number
of
docket
notations
made
by
four
collection
investigation
officers
of
the
Department
of
National
Revenue.
As
found
by
Collier,
J.,
who
was
supplied
with
copies
of
the
documents
in
issue,
“it
is
obvious
a
good
deal
of
the
materials
in
the
dockets
have
to
do
with
Revenue
Canada's
claim
against
I.E.C.
and
the
seizure
by
sheriffs
on
the
instructions
of
Revenue
Canada".
The
respondent
then
moved
under
Rules
456
and
457
for
an
order
compelling
the
appellant
to
produce
those
documents
listed
as
privileged
documents.
That
application
was
resisted
by
the
appellant
on
the
grounds
that
these
documents
were
records,
writings,
or
other
documents
"obtained
by
or
on
behalf
of
the
Minister
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act",
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
241(1)
and
that
they
were
not,
therefore,
subject
to
disclosure
to
others,
including
the
respondent.
Collier,
J.
granted
the
application,
basically,
for
the
following
reasons:
In
this
present
litigation,
the
plaintiff
is
not
seeking
to
get
confidential
information
and
material
gathered
by
the
Minister
in
the
course
of
general
income
tax
informa-
Subsections
241(1),
(2)
and
(3)
read
as
follows:
241.
(1)
Except
as
authorized
by
this
section,
no
official
or
authorized
person
shall
(a)
knowingly
communicate
or
knowingly
allow
to
be
communicated
to
any
person
any
information
obtained
by
or
on
behalf
of
the
Minister
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act,
or
(b)
knowingly
allow
any
person
to
inspect
or
to
have
access
to
any
book,
record,
writing,
return
or
other
document
obtained
by
or
on
behalf
of
the
Minister
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act.
(2)
Notwithstanding
any
other
Act
or
law,
no
official
or
authorized
person
shall
be
required,
in
connection
with
any
legal
proceedings,
(a)
to
give
evidence
relating
to
any
information
obtained
by
or
on
behalf
of
the
Minister
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act,
or
(b)
to
produce
any
book,
record,
writing,
return
or
other
document
obtained
by
or
on
behalf
of
the
Minister
for
the
purposes
of
this
Act.
(3)
Subsections
(1)
and
(2)
do
not
apply
in
respect
of
criminal
proceedings,
either
by
indictment
or
on
summary
conviction,
under
an
Act
of
the
Parliament
of
Canada,
or
in
respect
of
proceedings
relating
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
this
Act.
tion,
procedures,
investigations
and
matters
of
that
kind.
The
documents,
for
which
the
so-called
privilege
is
claimed,
relate
to
the
actions
taken
by
and
on
behalf
of
Revenue
Canada
which
give
rise
to
the
present
litigation
against,
for
practical
purposes,
Revenue
Canada
itself.
These
dockets
were
not,
and
are
not,
as
I
see
it,
"
given
to
the
Minister
for
the
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act”.
They
came
into
existence
as
a
result
of
collection
proceedings
started
against
I.E.C.
(the
mortgagor)
which
allegedly
caused
the
damage
asserted
by
the
plaintiff
mortgagee.
In
that
sense,
there
is
no
breach
of
confidentiality,
or
of
the
statute.
In
order
to
succeed,
the
appellant
had
to
demonstrate
that
the
documents
in
question
were
of
a
confidential
nature
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
241(1),
i.e.,
that
they
were:
(i)
"
obtained
by
or
on
behalf
of
the
Minister”,
(ii)
“for
the
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act”.
Section
241
cannot
be
interpreted
in
a
vacuum.
The
legislative
intent,
admittedly,
is
the
protection
of
the
confidentiality
of
information
given
to
the
Minister
for
the
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
The
privilege
is
not
established
in
favour
of
Revenue
Canada
but
in
favour
of
those,
particularly
the
taxpayer,
who
give
information
to
the
Minister
on
the
understanding
that
such
information
will
remain
confidential.
The
most
usual
and
natural
meaning
of
the
word
"
obtained"
and
of
its
French
equivalent
"obtenir",
whether
read
in
the
context
of
"any
information"
as
in
paragraph
241(1)(a)
or
in
the
context
of
"other
document”
as
in
paragraph
241(1)(b),
is
that
of
information
or
document
not
in
the
possession
of
the
person
seeking
either
and
being
"given"
to
that
person.
In
my
view,
in
order
to
be
obtained”
within
the
meaning
of
subsection
241(1),
a
document
must
be
either
a
document
in
the
possession
of
someone
else
than
the
Minister
or
his
officers,
or
a
document
prepared
by
the
Minister
or
his
officers
but
on
the
basis
of
information
given
to
them
that
has
remained
confidential.
For
example,
internal
self-generated
documents,
as
they
were
described
by
the
appellant,
could
well
be
subject
to
the
statutory
prohibition
against
disclosure
if
they
are
based
on
information
given
to
the
authors
of
the
documents
under
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
not
released
to
the
public
through
court
proceedings.
In
the
instant
case,
the
documents
are
part
of
a
process,
the
collection
proceedings,
which
is
in
itself
in
the
public
domain
and
which
involves
by
its
very
nature
the
publication
of
information
that
would
otherwise
have
remained
confidential.
One
cannot
seize
a
property
pursuant
to
a
certificate
which
has
the
force
and
effect
of
a
judgment
(see
subsection
223(2)
of
the
Act)
without
revealing
to
some
extent
information
given
to
the
Minister.
Furthermore,
the
documents
only
relate,
to
use
the
words
of
Collier,
J.,
"to
the
actions
taken
by
and
on
behalf
of
Revenue
Canada
which
give
rise
to
the
present
litigation
against,
for
practical
purposes,
Revenue
Canada
itself".
Section
241
was
not
enacted
for
the
purpose
of
helping
the
Minister
out
of
a
negligence
claim
that
has
been
brought
against
him.
Should
there
be
anything
remaining
confidential
in
the
documents
in
question,
the
taxpayer
himself
or
any
concerned
person
could
object
to
their
production.
In
the
present
case,
not
only
was
there
no
prejudice
to
the
taxpayer
or
anyone
other
than
the
Minister
alleged,
but
Collier,
J.,
who
examined
the
documents,
found
as
a
fact
that
there
was
"no
breach
of
confidentiality”.
This
is
not
a
ruling
with
which
I
would,
even
if
I
could,
interfere.
In
Glover
v.
M.N.R.,
[1981]
2
S.C.R.
561;
[1982]
C.T.C.
29;
82
D.T.C.
6035;
affg
(sub
nom.
Re
Glover
and
Glover)
(1980)
29
O.R.
(2d)
392
(Ont.
C.A.),
the
information
sought
to
be
disclosed
in
a
custody
case
was
the
address
of
a
taxpayer
who
had
abducted
his
two
children
and
whose
whereabouts
were
unknown.
That
information
was
most
certainly
an
information
obtained
by
the
Minister
for
the
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
and
there
would
have
been
an
obvious
prejudice,
however
unsympathetic,
to
the
taxpayer
had
the
information
been
disclosed.
The
Glover
case
is,
therefore,
of
no
help
to
the
appellant.
In
view
of
the
conclusion
I
have
reached
that
the
documents
in
question
were
not
“obtained
by
or
on
behalf
of
the
Minister",
I
need
not
decide
whether
they
were
obtained
"for
the
purposes
of
the
Income
Tax
Act”.
Suffice
it
to
say
that
the
appellant,
in
order
to
qualify
under
subsection
1,
must
contend
that
the
documents
were
indeed
obtained
for
the
purposes
of
the
Act,
and
yet,
in
order
to
avoid
the
exception
of
disclosure
established
under
subsection
3
the
appellant
must
submit,
as
she
did
before
us,
that
the
proceedings
in
question
were
collection
proceedings
that
were
independent
from
and
not
related
to
the
administration
and
enforcement
of
the
Act.
The
appellant
would,
therefore,
need
to
demonstrate
that
documents
obtained
with
respect
to
the
collection
proceedings
were
obtained
"for
the
purposes
of
the
Act"
but
that
the
collection
proceedings
themselves
were
not”
relating
to
the
administration
or
enforcement
of
the
Act".
In
view
of
the
very
wide
words
used
in
subsection
241(3),
it
is
far
from
being
evident
that
the
appellant
can
have
it
both
ways.
I
would
dismiss
the
appeal
with
costs.
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