Guy
Tremblay:—This
case
was
heard
in
Montreal,
Quebec,
on
May
29,
1980.
1.
Points
at
Issue
1.1
Based
on
the
Notice
of
Appeal
the
points
are:
(a)
Whether
the
amount
of
$16,610
received
by
the
appellant
in
1975
from
Green
Acres
Sod
Farms
Ltd
(hereinafter
called
the
company)
is
a
bonus
(as
the
respondent
contends),
or
a
part
of
the
purchase
price
of
the
appellant’s
shares
in
the
company
(as
the
appellant
contends);
(b)
whether
the
sum
of
$4,591.15
paid
by
the
said
company
to
the
Department
of
National
Revenue
to
pay
the
tax
of
the
appellant
is
income
for
the
appellant.
1.2
From
the
application
filed
by
the
respondent
in
virtue
of
subsection
174(3)
of
the
Act:
At
the
presentation
of
the
application
in
March
1980
made
by
the
respondent
to
join
Green
Acres
Sod
Farms
Ltd
and
Orlando
Foglietta
(hereinafter
called
the
third
parties),
concerning
the
year
1975,
the
Board
allowed
the
consent
of
the
third
parties.
The
application,
however,
included
a
common
question
to
be
debated
among
the
parties
including
the
third
parties.
This
common
question
reads
as
follows:
Whether
the
amount
of
$16,610
paid
by
Green
Acres
Sod
Farms
Limited
to
the
appellant,
on
the
30th
of
January,
1975,
was
in
consideration
of
the
shares
transferred
to
Mr
Orlando
Foglietta
with
the
consequence
that:
(i)
this
amount
would
constitute
a
capital
payment
in
the
appellant’s
hands
and
would
therefore
be
taxable
as
a
capital
gain
pursuant
to
sections
3,
38
and
39
of
the
Act;
(ii)
this
amount
would
have
been
paid
by
the
company
for
the
benefit
of
a
shareholder,
namely
Mr
Orlando
Foglietta,
the
deduction
of
which
would
be
prohibited
since
this
expense
would
not
have
been
incurred
by
the
company
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
and
the
deduction
of
this
amount
would
therefore
be
prohibited
pursuant
to
section
18(1)(a)
of
the
Act;
(iii)
the
amount
would
constitute
a
benefit
or
advantage
conferred
on
Mr
Orlando
Foglietta
shareholder
of
the
said
company
and
purchaser
of
the
appellant’s
shares,
pursuant
to
sections
15(1)(c)
and/or
56(2)
of
the
Act;
Or
whether
this
amour:
of
$16,610
paid
by
the
company
Green
Acres
Sod
Farms
Limited
to
the
appellant,
on
January
30,
1975,
was
paid
on
account
of
salary
or
as
a
bonus
with
respect
to
the
appellant’s
employment
with
the
said
company
with
the
consequence
that:
(i)
this
amount
would
constitute
taxable
income
from
employment
received
during
the
1975
taxation
year
by
the
appellant
as
salary
or
other
remuneration
pursuant
to
section
5
of
the
Act;
(ii)
this
amount
would
be
properly
deductible
by
the
company
as
an
expense
incurred
by
it
during
its
1974
and
1975
taxation
year
for
the
purpose
of
gaining
or
producing
income
pursuant
to
section
18(1)(a)
of
the
Act.
1.3
However,
the
point
concerning
the
$4,591.15
is
not
part
of
the
above
common
question.
This
was
also
heard
before
the
Board.
2.
Burden
of
Proof
On
the
common
question,
the
appellant
and
the
third
parties
have
the
burden
of
proof
to
contradict
the
issued
reassessment
in
the
case
of
the
appellant,
and
the
deemed
reassessment
in
the
case
of
the
third
parties.
On
the
point
of
the
$4,591.15,
the
appellant
has
the
burden
of
proof
and
must
contradict
the
assessment.
3.
The
Facts
A.
Concerning
the
common
question:
$16,610
3.01
The
appellant
and
the
third
party
Orlando
Foglietta
(hereinafter
called
Orlando)
were,
until
January
1975,
the
two
shareholders
(50%
each)
of
the
company
incorporated
in
1957.
3.02
The
main
object
of
the
company
is:
to
purchase,
cultivate
and
improve
grasses
of
all
kinds
for
re-sale
to
landscapers,
municipalities
and
others.
as
it
appears
from
the
letters
patent
(Exhibit
A-4).
3.03
In
January
1974,
a
certain
event
occurred
which
provoked
a
conflict
of
personality,
disagreement
in
management,
and
consequently
the
decision
of
the
appellant
to
sell
his
shares
or
to
liquidate
the
company.
3.04
According
to
Orlando,
some
time
in
August
or
September,
the
appellant
offered
his
shares
to
him
for
$90,000,
giving
him
10
days
to
accept.
Orlando,
however,
was
in
no
financial
position
to
accept.
After
many
discussions,
lasting
until
the
end
of
January,
after
meetings
with
a
lawyer,
the
appellant
finally
accepted
the
offer
of
Orlando.
The
offer
dated
January
31,
1975
(Exhibit
A-1)
reads
as
follows:
Dear
Mr
Maioni:
On
behalf
of
myself
and
an
associate,
I
hereby
offer
to
purchase
the
1,999
common
shares
of
the
above
Company
registered
in
your
name
and
the
one
common
share
of
your
company
registered
in
the
name
of
Nicholas
Maioni
for
a
price
of
$175,000
to
be
paid
cash
on
acceptance
of
this
offer
and
upon
the
further
terms
and
conditions
contained
in
this
letter,
namely:
1.
The
seller
shall
be
entitled
to
withdraw
from
the
Company
his
share
of
the
“Bonus
Payable”
on
this
date
the
amount
of
$16,610.
2.
The
seller
shall
be
liable
for
50%
of
reassessment
only
of
corporation
tax
payable
on
income
for
1974
and
any
preceding
years.
Any
tax
reassessment
levied
that
will
appreciate
the
assets
shall
not
be
shared
by
the
seller.
Apart
from
said
reassessment
liability,
the
seller
will
not
be
responsible
for
any
further
obligations
with
respect
to
buyer
or
the
Company.
3.
The
seller
will
not
directly
or
indirectly
enter
into
the
sod
or
sod
farm
business
for
a
period
of
5
years
in
the
Province
of
Quebec
nor
assist
any
producer
located
elsewhere
to
compete
with
the
Company
within
the
Province
of
Quebec.
4.
You,
the
seller,
represent
to
the
best
of
your
knowledge
that
the
balance
sheet,
statement
of
source
and
application
of
funds
and
statement
of
earnings
prepared
as
at
December
31,
1974
and
certified
by
Messrs
Mallette
&
Cie,
the
auditors
of
the
Company
and
attached
hereto,
present
fairly
the
financial
position
of
the
Com-
pany
as
at
that
date
and
in
a
manner
consistent
with
preceding
years
and
that
such
statement
represents
a
true
statement
of
all
receivables
arising
from
the
business
and
that
the
liabilities
represent
a
true
statement
of
all
liabilities
arising
from
the
business
and
further
that
since
the
date
of
said
statements
there
has
been
no
liabilities
incurred
on
behalf
of
the
Company
other
than
normal
operating
expense.
5.
For
purposes
of
information
Mr
Dominic
Girolamo
has
associated
himself
with
me
for
this
purchase
herein
proposed.
If
the
foregoing
meets
with
your
approval,
please
sign
the
enclosed
copy
in
the
space
provided
whereupon
it
shall
be
deemed
to
constitute
an
Agreement
of
Sale
of
your
interest
in
the
Company
above-mentioned.
Yours
truly,
(Signed)
Orlando
Foglietta
Accepted:
(signed)
Gabriel
Maioni
3.05
This
offer
was
received
and
accepted
by
the
appellant
in
Orlando’s
lawyer’s
office
on
January
31,
1975.
The
same
day,
the
appellant
received
a
cheque
(Exhibit
TP-1)
in
the
amount
of
$16,610
on
the
back
of
which,
one
can
read
“Bonus
payable”.
This
refers
to
the
1st
numbered
paragraph
of
the
offer
in
Exhibit
A-1.
3.06
The
offer
(Exhibit
A-1)
refers,
in
the
fourth
numbered
paragraph,
to
financial
statements
of
the
company
prepared
as
at
December
31,1974
and
certified
by
the
accounting
firm
Mallette
&
Cie.
They
were
filed
as
Exhibit
A-2,
and
dated
January
14,
1975.
In
the
balance
sheet
one
can
read
in
the
currrent
liabilities
“Bonus
payable
$33,220”.
3.07
In
the
minutes
of
a
meeting
of
directors
of
the
company
on
February
25,
1975
(Exhibit
A-5)
it
can
be
read:
Considering
that
Mr
Orlando
Foglietta
offers
to
reimburse
$35,000
of
his
salary
for
the
year
1974.
Be
it
resolved
that
an
amended
financial
statement
for
the
year
ended
December
31,
1974
be
prepared
and
the
necessary
fiscal
returns
be
amended
(T-2,
C-16,
T-4
and
TP-4)
accordingly.
A
request
will
be
made
that
an
amended
financial
statement
be
audited.
3.08
The
said
amended
financial
statement
filed
as
Exhibit
A-3,
shows
in
the
balance
sheet
that
there
is
no
more
“bonus
payable”
in
the
current
liabilities.
In
the
current
assets,
however,
one
can
read
“advance
to
a
director
$1,780”.
In
the
expense
of
the
statement
of
earning
there
is
$35,000
less
than
in
the
former
statement
(Exhibit
A-2).
The
“earning
before
income
tax”
shows
$35,000
rather
than
nothing
in
the
former
statement.
3.09
Orlando
explained
that
this
decision
to
reimburse
$35,000
of
salary
to
the
company
was
to
give
more
liquidity
to
the
company.
3.10
According
to
William
Abdalla,
CA,
who
testified
as
an
expert,
the
balance
sheet
in
the
amended
financial
statement
shows
that
the
“bonus
payable”
has
been
cancelled,
and
that
Orlando
has
taken
on
his
personal
responsibility
the
total
amount
of
$33,220.
This
amount
indeed
seems
to
have
been
debited
(or
credited)
against
the
$35,000
and
the
remaining
$1,780
as
“advance
to
a
director”
in
the
current
assets.
3.11
This
interpretation
seemed
to
support
the
appellant’s
version
to
the
effect
that
the
amount
of
$16,610
was
not
given
as
“bonus
payable”,
but
as
part
of
the
sale
of
the
shares.
The
fair
market
value
of
the
sold
shares
indeed
was
not
$175,000,
according
to
him
but
$197,735.
The
third
parties’
counsel
objected
to
any
evidence
contradicting
the
accepted
offer
(Exhibit
A-1)
on
the
basis
of
article
1234
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
Province
of
Quebec.
The
evidence
was
permitted
under
the
reserve
of
the
later
decision
concerning
the
objection.
3.12
On
one
hand
the
appellant
said
that
the
amount
of
$197,735
was
the
result
of
the
verbal
agreement
preceding
the
written
agreement
$175,000,
plus
half
of
the
working
capital
on
December
31,
1974,
$22,735
($45,470
+
2).
The
appellant
said
that
on
January
30,
1975,
Orlando
phoned
him:
“take
it
or
leave
it”.
On
the
other
hand,
Orlando
said
that
the
offer
(Exhibit
A-1)
was
drafted
by
the
appellant.
Orlando
said
that
the
“bonus
payable”
was
also
decided
by
the
appellant.
In
the
“Journal”
the
entry
of
the
“bonus
payable”
was
in
the
appellant’s
handwriting.
Orlando
also
said
that
the
appellant
who
was
the
president
of
the
company
decided
by
himself
to
give
a
bonus
when
he
thought
it
was
time
to
have
a
bonus.
3.13
Concerning
Orlando’s
decision
to
reimburse
$35,000
of
salary,
Mr
Mallette
said
that
the
amended
balance
sheet
gives
the
same
final
accounting
result
as
if
the
“bonus
payable
of
$33,220”
had
been
maintained
in
the
current
liabilities
and
that
an
“advance
to
a
director”
of
$35,000
had
been
included
in
the
current
assets.
3.14
Mr
Mallette,
confirming
Orlando’s
testimony,
said
half
of
the
bonus
payable
of
$16,610
was
not
cashed
by
Orlando
in
1975,
but
applied
against
the
debt
of
$35,000.
The
balance
due
less
$1,780
was
paid
on
October
17,
1975
to
the
company
by
Orlando.
3.15
Both
the
appellant
and
Orlando
had
received
an
amount
of
$1,780
in
January
1975.
3.16
In
filing
his
1974
income
tax
return,
the
appellant
calculated
his
capital
gain
on
the
sale
of
the
shares
on
the
basis
of
a
total
consideration
of
$191,610
($175,000
+
$16,610)
rather
than
the
stipulated
consideration
of
$175,000.
The
amount
of
$16,610
was
not
included
as
income,
but
as
“bonus”.
The
respondent
by
reassessment
on
August
24,
1978
calculated
the
capital
gain
on
$175,000,
and
included
the
amount
of
$16,610
as
income.
B.
Concerning
the
amount
of
$4,591.15
3.17
No
taxes
(Federal
or
Quebec)
were
withheld
by
the
company
on
the
amount
of
$16,610,
nor
on
the
amount
of
$1,780
paid
in
January
1975.
3.18
In
June,
the
company
through
its
lawyer
asked
the
appellant
to
pay
the
amount
of
$4,591.15
(Exhibits
R-5
and
R-6).
The
appellant
said
he
ignored
the
letters.
3.19
The
company
in
November
1975
paid
to
both
departments
of
Revenue
(Federal
and
Quebec)
the
total
amount
of
$4,591.15
and
the
company
sued
the
appellant
to
recuperate
the
money.
The
case
is
not
yet
settled
in
civil
court.
3.20
The
respondent
by
reassessment
on
August
24,
1978
included
the
amount
of
$4,591.15
in
the
income
of
the
appellant.
C.
Notice
of
Appeal
3.21
In
November
1978
the
appellant
filed
his
Notice
of
Appeal
before
the
Tax
Review
Board.
4.
Law—
Precedent
Cases—Comments
4.1
Law
The
main
sections
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
referred
by
the
parties
are
3,
5,
6,153(1)
and
(3)
and
56(2).
They
will
be
quoted
if
necessary
in
the
comments.
4.2
Precedent
Cases
The
following
precedent
cases
were
referred
to
by
the
parties:
A.
Concerning
the
point
of
common
question
1.
Hugh
Knox
Limited
v
MNR,
[1973]
CTC
2053;
73
DTC
50;
2.
MNR
v
Estate
of
Donat
Beaupré,
[1973]
CTC
316;
73
DTC
5255;
3.
William
Richard
Kay
v
MNR,
[1971]
Tax
ABC
363;
71
DTC
285;
4.
Harry
Pike
v
MNR,
26
Tax
ABC
195;
61
DTC
202;
5.
Gunter
Gahrns
v
The
Queen,
[1978]
CTC
651;
78
DTC
6436.
B.
Concerning
the
tax
withheld
and
paid
6.
The
Queen
v
Fred
E
Poynton,
[1972]
CTC
411;
72
DTC
6329.
4.3
Comments
A.
Concerning
the
common
question
4.3.1
One
of
the
main
points
during
the
trial
was
the
continuous
objections
of
the
third
parties’
counsel
to
the
appellant’s
evidence
against
the
accepted
offer
(Exhibit
A-1).
In
fact,
the
Board
did
not
maintain
the
objections
during
the
trial
and
took
it
under
advisement
mainly
because
of
the
image
given
by
the
amended
balance
sheet
(para
3.10
and
3.11)
as
confirming
the
appellant’s
contention
to
the
effect
that
the
amount
of
$16,610
was
given
as
part
of
the
consideration
of
the
sale
of
the
shares
rather
than
as
a
bonus.
This
could
be
considered
as
a
commencement
of
proof
in
writing.
4.3.2
In
studying
the
evidence
concerning
the
decision
to
reimburse
the
$35,000
of
salary
for
1974
(para
3.07),
Orlando’s
reasons
in
making
that
decision
(para
3.09),
the
testimony
of
Mr
Mallette
(para
3.14),
that
Orlando
had
not
cashed
the
bonus,
but
had
applied
it
against
the
debt
of
$35,000,
and
the
payment
of
the
balance
in
October
1975
to
the
company,
the
Board
must
conclude
that
the
preponderance
of
the
evidence
is
to
the
effect
that
the
bonus
has
not
been
cancelled
by
the
company,
that
in
fact
both
the
appellant
and
Orlando
had
received
it.
(Even
if
Orlando
has
not
cashed
it,
he
has
used
it
in
deducting
the
debt
of
$35,000.)
The
Board
understands
the
appellant
to
have
believed
that
the
amended
financial
statement
confirmed
his
thesis.
However,
the
greater
part
and
the
substance
of
the
evidence
is
to
the
contrary.
4.3.3
Without
any
other
commencement
of
proof
in
writing,
how
may
the
appellant
contradict
the
accepted
offer
(Exhibit
A-1)?
A
gratuitous
verbal
denial
cannot
reverse
the
burden
of
proof
especially
when
the
main
evidence
is
a
written
contract.
A
court
cannot
decide
that
such
evidence
is
reversed
only
on
the
credibility
of
a
witness.
MacKay,
J
of
the
Federal
Court
of
Appeal
in
Decker
Contracting
Ltd,
[1978]
CTC
838;
79
DTC
5001,
said
at
pages
848
and
5007:
The
trial
Judge’s
conclusions
are
based
on
the
inference
which
he
drew
from
the
uncontested
facts
and
his
view
as
to
the
credibility
of
the
witnesses
and
should
not
be
lightly
interfered
with
by
an
appellate
Court.
In
doing
so
in
this
case
I
rely
on
the
statement
of
Lord
Wright
in
Powell
and
Wife
v
Streatham
Manor
Nursing
Home,
[1935]
AC
243
at
267
where
he
said:
‘“
.
many,
perhaps
most
cases,
turn
on
inferences
from
facts
which
are
not
in
doubt,
or
on
documents:
in
all
such
cases
the
appellate
Court
is
in
as
good
a
position
to
decide
as
the
trial
judge.”
and
the
observations
of
O’Halloran,
JA,
in
the
case
of
Faryna
v
Chorney,
[1952]
DLR
354
at
357
and
358,
he
said:
“If
a
trial
Judge’s
finding
of
credibility
is
to
depend
solely
on
which
person
he
thinks
made
the
better
appearance
of
sincerity
in
the
witness
box,
we
are
left
with
a
purely
arbitrary
finding
and
justice
would
then
depend
upon
the
best
actors
in
the
witness
box.
On
reflection
it
becomes
almost
axiomatic
that
the
appearance
of
telling
the
truth
is
but
one
of
the
elements
that
enter
into
the
credibility
of
the
evidence
of
a
witness
.
..
.
.
.
A
witness
by
his
manner
may
create
a
very
unfavourable
impression
of
his
truthfulness
upon
the
trial
Judge,
and
yet
the
surrounding
circumstances
in
the
case
may
point
decisively
to
the
conclusion
that
he
is
actually
telling
the
truth
.
..
The
credibility
of
interested
witnesses,
particularly
in
cases
of
conflict
of
evidence,
cannot
be
gauged
solely
by
the
test
of
whether
the
personal
demeanour
of
the
particular
witness
carried
conviction
of
the
truth.
The
test
must
reasonably
subject
his
story
to
an
examination
of
its
consistency
with
the
probabilities
that
surround
the
currently
existing
conditions.
In
short,
the
real
test
of
the
truth
of
the
story
of
a
witness
in
such
a
case
must
be
its
harmony
with
the
preponderance
of
the
probabilities
which
a
practical
and
informed
person
would
readily
recognize
as
reasonable
in
that
place
and
in
those
conditions
.
.
.
There
is
high
authority
to
support
the
foregoing,
namely,
a
case
in
the
House
of
Lords
in
1935
to
which
Lord
Greene,
MR
referred
in
Yuill
v
Yuill,
[1945]
P
15,
and
described
it
as
inadequately
reported.
The
case
was
Hvalfangerselskapet
Polaris
A/S
v
Unilever
Ltd
(1933),
46
L1
L
Rep
29.
In
that
case
the
trial
Judge
had
disbelieved
material
witnesses
and
found
that
their
evidence
was
invented
on
the
spur
of
the
moment.
In
the
Court
of
Appeal
Scrutton,
LJ,
giving
the
leading
judgment
said
the
trial
Judge
had
seen
the
witnesses
and
heard
the
conflicting
testimony
and
because
of
that
it
was
impossible
for
the
Court
of
Appeal
to
interfere
with
the
trial
Judge’s
finding
on
credibility.
But
the
House
of
Lords
did
interfere.
It
said
that
the
strictures
cast
by
the
trial
Judge
on
the
two
witnesses
were
unjustified
and
that
the
evidence
of
these
two
witnesses
ought
to
have
been
received.
The
House,
Lord
Atkin
presiding,
came
to
that
conclusion
because
it
was
satisfied
that
the
evidence
of
the
witnesses
disbelieved
by
the
trial
Judge
was
entirely
consistent
with
the
probabilities
and
the
business
conditions
proved
to
be
in
existence
at
the
time.
Commenting
on
the
Unilever
case
in
Yuill
v
Yuill,
Lord
Greene
said
that
it
showed
how
important
it
is
that
a
trial
Judge’s
impressions
on
the
subject
of
demeanour
should
be
carefully
checked
by
a
critical
examination
of
the
whole
of
the
evidence,
and
added
that,
if
the
trial
Judge
in
the
Unilever
case
had
done
so,
as
was
done
in
the
House
of
Lords,
then
he
could
not
have
disbelieved
the
witnesses
as
he
did.”
4.3.4
In
general,
the
evidence
at
the
trial
(not
all
described
in
the
Facts)
shows
that
on
many
points
Orlando
and
the
appellant
contradict
their
mutual
testimony.
However,
one
aspect
of
Orlando’s
testimony
was
not
contradicted
by
the
appellant.
It
is
the
affirmation
concerning
the
offer
of
the
appellant
of
the
amount
of
$90,000
in
August.
Less
than
six
months
later
he
accepted
a
$175,000
tender
by
written
agreement.
It
is
difficult
to
believe
his
verbal
contention
that
the
amount
was
$191,610.
4.3.5
Considering
the
greater
part
of
the
evidence,
the
Board
must
answer
in
the
negative
to
the
first
part
of
the
question
and
in
the
affirmative
to
the
second
part
of
the
question:
the
amount
of
$16,610
paid
by
the
company
is
taxable
income
from
employment
in
the
hands
of
the
appellant.
The
same
amount
is
deductible
by
the
company
as
an
expense.
4.3.6
Concerning
the
question,
the
Board,
on
an
application
made
by
the
respondent
at
the
beginning
of
the
trial,
accepted
in
the
judgment
rendered
by
the
Board
March
10,
1980,
joining
the
third
parties,
to
add:
“1974
and’’
before
the
figure
“1975’’
in
the
6th
line
of
the
5th
paragraph
of
the
said
judgment,
and
add
an
“s’’
after
the
word
“year”
in
the
same
line.
This
amendment
was
made
in
the
case
where
the
company
would
have
incurred
the
expense
in
1974.
This
amendment
changes
also
the
second
part
of
the
question
which
must
be
read
(as
it
is
corrected)
in
subparagraph
(ii)
“1974
and
1975
taxation
years”.
B.
Concerning
the
amount
of
$4,591.15
(para
3.17
to
3.20)
4.3.7
The
facts
are
not
in
dispute
Subsection
56(2)
referred
by
the
appellant
must
be
quoted:
(2)
A
payment
or
transfer
of
property
made
pursuant
to
the
direction
of,
or
with
the
concurrence
of,
a
taxpayer
to
some
other
person
for
the
benefit
of
the
taxpayer
or
as
a
benefit
that
the
taxpayer
desired
to
have
conferred
on
the
other
person
shall
be
included
in
computing
the
taxpayer’s
income
to
the
extent
that
it
would
be
if
the
payment
or
transfer
had
been
made
to
him.
The
appellant
said
he
did
not
give
his
consent
to
the
payment.
In
the
Board’s
opinion,
this
section
cannot
apply
in
the
present
case.
The
company
did
not
need
the
appellant’s
consent.
It
had
the
obligation
to
obey
the
Act
as
provided
in
subsections
153(1)
and
(3):
153(1)
Every
person
paying
(a)
salary
or
wages
or
other
remuneration
to
an
officer
or
employee,
(b)
a
superannuation
or
pension
benefit,
(c)
a
retiring
allowance,
(d)
an
amount
upon
or
after
the
death
of
an
officer
or
employee,
in
recognition
of
his
service,
to
his
legal
representative
or
widow
or
to
any
other
person
whatsoever,
(d.1)
an
amount
as
a
benefit
under
the
Unemployment
Insurance
Act,
1971,
(e)
an
amount
as
a
benefit
under
a
supplementary
unemployment
benefit
plan,
(f)
an
annuity
payment,
(g)
fees,
commission
or
other
amounts
for
services,
(h)
a
payment
under
a
deferred
profit
sharing
plan
or
a
plan
referred
to
in
section
147
as
a
revoked
plan,
(i)
an
adult
training
allowance
under
the
Adult
Occupational
Training
Act,
(j)
a
payment
out
of
or
under
a
registered
retirement
savings
plan
or
a
plan
referred
to
in
subsection
146(12)
as
an
“amended
plan”,
or
(k)
an
amount
as,
on
account
or
in
lieu
of
payment
of,
or
in
satisfation
of,
proceeds
of
the
surrender,
cancellation
or
redemption
of
an
income-averaging
annuity
contract,
at
any
time
in
a
taxation
year
shall
deduct
or
withhold
therefrom
such
amount
as
may
be
prescribed
and
shall,
at
such
time
as
may
be
prescribed,
remit
that
amount
to
the
Receiver
General
of
Canada
on
account
of
the
payee’s
tax
for
the
year
under
this
Part.
(3)
When
an
amount
has
been
deducted
or
withheld
under
subsection
(1),
it
shall,
for
all
the
purposes
of
this
Act,
be
deemed
to
have
been
received
at
that
time
by
the
person
to
whom
the
remuneration,
benefit
payment,
fees,
commissions
or
other
amounts
were
paid.
In
the
Board’s
opinion
it
is
obvious
that
the
said
amount
of
$4,591.15
is
“deemed
to
have
been
received
at
that
time”
in
1975
by
the
appellant
who
was
a
former
employee
of
the
company
which
paid
the
amount
of
tax
concerning
salary
and
bonus
paid
at
the
beginning
of
the
said
year.
5.
Conclusion
The
appeal
of
Gabriel
Maioni
is
dismissed
and
no
reassessment
must
be
issued
in
regard
to
the
third
parties
concerning
the
amount
of
$16,610
involved
in
the
present
case
in
accordance
with
the
above
Reasons
for
Judgment.
Appeal
dismissed.
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