John
B
Goetz:—
This
is
an
appeal
by
the
taxpayer
with
respect
to
his
1978
taxation
year
wherein
as
a
geologist
he
sought
to
deduct
the
following
fees:
Association
of
Professional
Engineers
of
British
Columbia
|
$70.00
|
Association
of
Professional
Engineers,
Geologists
&
|
|
Geophysicists
of
Alberta
|
70.00
|
Canadian
Institute
of
Mining
&
Metallurgy
|
35.00
|
The
Cordilleran
Section
of
the
Geological
Association
of
|
|
of
Canada
|
36.25
|
|
$211.25
|
The
sum
of
$430
as
an
education
deduction
in
attending
the
Canadian
Outward
Bound
Mountain
School
and
the
sum
of
$25
paid
to
the
British
Columbia
Institute
of
Technology
were
also
claimed.
At
the
outset
of
the
hearing
it
was
agreed
that
the
appeal
with
respect
to
the
deductions
of
$70
for
membership
in
the
Association
of
Professional
Engineers
of
British
Columbia
and
the
deduction
of
$70
as
dues
to
the
Association
of
Professional
Engineers,
Geologists
and
Geophysicists
of
Alberta
be
allowed.
It
was
further
agreed
that
the
appeal
for
deduction
of
fees
for
The
Cordilleran
Section
of
the
Geological
Association
of
Canada
in
the
sum
of
$36.25
be
dismissed
and
further
that
the
payments
of
$430
to
the
Canadian
Outward
Bound
Mountain
School
and
$25
paid
to
the
British
Columbia
Institute
of
Technology
were
properly
disallowed
by
the
Minister.
The
issue
then
resolves
upon
whether
fees
for
membership
in
the
Canadian
Institute
of
Mining
&
Metallurgy
in
the
sum
of
$35
are
properly
deductible
from
the
appellant’s
income.
Facts
The
appellant
is
registered
in
the
Association
of
Professional
Engineers
of
British
Columbia
and
obtained
a
Bachelor
of
Science
Degree
from
Mount
Allison
University
in
1958,
and
a
Bachelor
of
Science
Degree
from
Washington
State
University
in
1968,
both
degrees
requiring
three
years
of
study.
The
latter
degree
related
to
the
study
of
economic
geology.
The
ap-
pellant
apparently
has
recognized
expertise
in
the
mineral
and
geological
fields,
having
dealt
with
Cominco
on
what
was
known
as
“Kimberley
Fault
Problem’’
and
he
was
retained
to
find
the
north
section
of
the
ore
body
and
give
advice
as
to
the
net
slip
of
the
Fault.
He
also
was
retained
to
ascertain
the
extension
of
an
ore
body
at
the
Reeves
MacDonald
Mine,
which
he
did
in
fact
locate
on
the
west
side
of
the
Ponderosa
River,
which
mine
is
now
called
the
Annex
Mine.
From
1970
to
1972
he
was
an
employee
of
J
C
Sproule
&
Associates
who
were
engineers
specializing
in
geology
and
who
were
also
geophysicists.
Their
function
was
to
find
domes
in
the
Ellasmere
mining
area.
In
1972
he
opened
his
own
consulting
firm,
Addie
Consultant
Ltd,
in
British
Columbia
and
in
1974
he
joined
the
Department
of
Mineral
Resources
where
he
is
now
employed
as
District
Geologist.
Findings
The
appellant
testified
that
his
education
increased
through
his
association
and
membership
in
the
Canadian
Institute
of
Mining
and
Metallurgy
where
he
would
attend
a
convention
once
a
year
and
meet
with
associates
and
learn
of
new
techniques.
Periodic
district
meetings
of
this
group
were
held
and
the
appellant,
through
his
membership
in
the
Canadian
Institute
of
Mining
and
Metallurgy,
received
a
monthly
bulletin
which
was
filed
and
appears
to
be
extremely
informative
for
any
one
in
the
mining
and
metallurgical
field.
As
a
result
of
his
membership
he
also
receives
an
annual
news
report
after
the
annual
convention
and
articles
are
submitted
to
the
monthly
bulletin
by
learned
members
by
the
metallurgical
and
mining
association
whereby
scientific
papers
are
published,
one
of
which
was
submitted
by
the
appellant
to
the
bulletin
and
was
published
and
related
to
“angle
of
intersection’’.
He
stated
in
cross-examination
that
this
article
had
been
received
with
great
enthusiasm
by
members
of
the
Association.
He
admitted
that
the
Canadian
Institute
of
Mining
and
Metallurgy
was
not
established
by
any
statute
in
any
province,
and
his
prime
reasons
for
joining
were
the
maintaining
and
upgrading
of
his
expertise
in
this
particular
field
of
geology
which
assisted
him
in
finding
employment
throughout
the
years
and
the
increase
of
the
use
of
his
services
by
word
of
mouth
as
his
expertise
grew.
Filed
at
the
hearing
by
the
appellant
and
the
respondent,
was
the
Engineering
Profession
Act,
Revised
Statutes
of
British
Columbia,
c
128,
wherein
in
section
2
the
“practice
of
professional
engineering’’
is
described
as
follows:
2.
In
this
Act,
unless
the
context
otherwise
requires,
“practice
of
professional
engineering”
means
the
carrying-on
of
any
branch
of
chemical,
civil,
electrical,
forest,
geological,
mechanical,
metallurgical,
mining
or
structural
engineering,
including
the
reporting
on,
designing,
or
directing
the
construction
of
any
works
which
require
for
their
design,
or
the
supervision
of
their
construction,
or
the
supervision
of
their
maintenance
such
experience
and
technical
knowledge
as
are
required
by
or
under
this
Act
for
the
admission
by
examination
to
membership
in
the
Association,
and,
without
restricting
the
generality
of
the
foregoing,
shall
be
deemed
to
include
reporting
on,
designing,
or
directing
the
construction
of
public
utilities,
industrial
works,
railways,
bridges,
highways,
canals,
harbour-works,
river
improvements,
lighthouses,
wet
docks,
dry
docks,
floating
docks,
launch-ways,
marine-ways,
steam-engines,
turbines,
pumps,
internal-combustion
engines,
airships
and
aeroplanes,
electrical
machinery
and
apparatus,
chemical
operations,
machinery
and
works
for
the
development,
transmission,
or
application
of
power,
light,
and
heat,
grainelevators,
municipal
works,
irrigation-works,
sewage-disposal
works,
drainage-
works,
incinerators,
hydraulic
works,
and
all
other
engineering-works,
and
all
buildings
necessary
to
the
proper
housing,
installation,
and
operation
of
the
engineering-works
embraced
in
this
clause;
but
the
execution
as
a
contractor
of
work
designed
by
a
professional
engineer,
the
supervision
of
construction
of
work
as
foreman
or
superintendent
or
as
an
inspector,
or
as
a
roadmaster,
trackmaster,
bridge
or
building
master,
or
superintendent
of
maintenance,
shall
not
be
deemed
to
be
the
practice
of
professional
engineering
within
the
meaning
of
this
Act;
(Italics
mine).
“professional
engineer”
means
a
person
who
is
registered
or
duly
licensed
as
such
under
the
provisions
of
this
Act.
(Italics
mine).
The
appellant
was
duly
licensed
under
this
Statute,
having
met
all
the
requirements
thereof,
including
subsection
11(1).
The
following
cases
were
cited
by
counsel:
MNR
v
Robert
A
F
Montgomery,
[1970]
CTC
115;
70
DTC
6080;
Her
Majesty
the
Queen
v
Robert
B
Swingle,
[1977]
CTC
448;
77
DTC
5301.
Both
of
these
cases
were
decisions
of
the
Federal
Court,
Trial
Division.
The
Montgomery
case
(supra),
I
feel,
really
has
no
application
in
the
case
before
me
in
that
it
related
merely
to
a
naval
officer
who
sought
to
deduct,
as
professional
membership,
fees
that
he
paid
as
“wardroom
dues’’
which
really
relate
only
to
the
social
aspect
of
being
a
naval
officer.
On
the
other
hand,
the
Swingle
decision
(supra)
is
very
pertinent
to
my
consideration
of
the
facts
in
this
case.
In
that
case,
heard
before
Collier,
J,
a
professional
analyst
had
sought
to
deduct
dues
from
various
societies
relating
to
the
continuing
and
upgrading
of
his
profession
as
a
forensic
chemist.
His
appeal
was
allowed
by
the
Tax
Review
Board,
that
is
to
say,
he
was
allowed
the
deductions
claimed
by
him.
The
Minister
of
National
Revenue
appealed
to
the
Federal
Court,
Trial
Division,
wherein
Mr
Justice
Collier
disallowed
the
appeal.
The
defendant
in
that
case
was
a
chemist
holding
a
Doctor’s
Degree
in
Applied
Sciences
and
also
held
a
post-doctorate
Degree.
He
had
to
keep
up
with
modern
techniques
and
technical
developments
in
chemistry
and
indicated
that
in
the
Public
Service,
so-called
professional
societies
are
considered
desirable
qualifications.
The
organizations
to
which
he
subscribed,
published
learned
journals
and
provided
him
with
technical
information
and
knowledge.
The
whole
issue
in
this
case
turns
on
my
interpretation
of
the
provisions
of
subparagraph
8(1)(i)(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act,
SC
1970-71-72,
c
63,
as
amended,
which
reads
as
follows:
(1)
In
computing
a
taxpayer’s
income
for
a
taxation
year
from
an
office
or
employment,
there
may
be
deducted
such
of
the
following
amounts
as
are
wholly
applicable
to
that
source
or
such
part
of
the
following
amounts
as
may
reasonably
be
regarded
as
applicable
thereto:
(i)
amounts
paid
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year
as
(i)
annual
professional
membership
dues
the
payment
of
which
was
necessary
to
maintain
a
professional
status
recognized
by
statute,
(Emphasis
mine).
While
Mr
Justice
Collier
dismissed
the
appeal
in
Swingle
(supra)
on
the
grounds
that
the
defendant
in
that
case
had
not
established
that
there
was
any
statute
setting
up
or
defining
an
“analyst”,
at
457
and
5307
respectively,
he
stated:
If
the
defendant
is
viewed
merely
as
an
analyst,
I
have
difficulty
in
holding,
on
the
evidence
before
me,
that
an
analyst
has
a
“professional
status
recognized
by
statute”.
I
assume
there
are
many
kinds
of
analysts.
The
legislation
earlier
referred
to
(the
Canada
Shipping
Act,
the
Northern
Inland
Waters
Act,
the
Arctic
Waters
Pollution
Prevention
Act
and
the
Clean
Air
Act)
do
not
define
an
“analyst”.
Nor
do
they
describe
that
occupation
in
any
manner
from
which
a
“professional
status”
can
be
inferred.
The
statutes
merely
provide
that
“any
person”,
or
sometimes
a
“qualified
person”
may
be
designated
as
an
analyst.
Subsection
731(1)
of
the
Canada
Shipping
Act
(to
use
it
as
an
example)
reads:
731.(1)
The
Minister
may
designate
any
person
as
a
pollution
prevention
officer
or
an
analyst
for
the
purposes
of
this
Part.
But
when
one
turns
to
subparagraph
8(1
)(i)(i)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
the
use
of
the
term
“professional”
seems
to
infer
special
skills,
abilities,
or
qualifications.
The
statutes
relied
on
by
the
defendant
are
silent
as
to
those
matters.
The
defendant
has
not
brought
his
claim
for
the
deductions
clearly
within
the
terms
of
this
subparagraph
conferring
the
right.*
Sheaffer
Pen
Co
of
Canada
Ltd
v
MNR
(53
DTC
1223)
(1953)
CTC
345
at
349.
I
concur
with
the
observations
made
by
the
learned
Trial
Judge
wherein
he
states
at
456
and
5307
respectively:
I
can
visualize
situations
where
a
profession
is
recognized
by
statute,
but
where
no
annual
dues
are
required
to
be
paid
in
order
to
carry
on
that
profession;
yet
at
the
same
time
it
may
be
“necessary”
to
belong
to
organizations
in
order
to
remain
qualified,
in
the
practical
and
business
sense;
to
be
able
effectively
to
perform,
and
earn
income,
in
a
particular
profession.
I
am
advised
by
counsel
for
the
appellant
that
the
portion
of
the
Swingle
judgment
relating
to
non-qualifications,
by
merely
being
a
chemist,
for
the
deductions
of
dues
from
various
institutes
and
chemical
societies,
is
being
appealed.
Nevertheless,
I
am
bound
by
the
findings
of
the
learned
Justice
Collier
but
I
feel
it
open
to
me
at
this
point
in
time,
to
express
my
view
with
respect
to
the
deductibility
of
the
dues
to
the
Canadian
Institute
of
Mining
and
Metallurgy
(or
any
like
professional
association),
and
here
I
refer
back
to
paragraph
2
of
the
Engineering
Profession
Act
of
the
Province
of
British
Columbia,
and
in
particular
to
the
words
in
italics.
The
appellant
is
a
fully
qualified
geologist
and
specializing
in
the
metallurgical
and
mining
fields,
which
terms
are
used
in
the
Engineering
Profession
Act
and
to
be
qualified
as
a
professional
engineer,
he
must
have
one
of
these
qualifications
or
others
relating
to
other
branches
of
engineering
to
be
registered
and
licensed
under
the
provisions
of
the
Engineering
Profession
Act.
The
membership
in
the
Canadian
Institute
of
Mining
and
Metallurgy
is,
in
my
view,
an
off-shoot
of
the
definition
of
“practice
of
professional
engineering”
in
a
specialized
field
and
in
order
to
specialize
in
that
field,
the
appellant
maintains
and
derives
great
benefits
from
his
membership
in
the
Canadian
Institute
of
Mining
and
Metallurgy.
I
take
the
position
that
the
definition
of
“practice
of
professional
engineering”
as
a
mining
specialist
in
mining
and
metallurgy
is
included
in
the
words
of
subparagraph
8(1
)(i)(i).
Certainly
this
would
seem
logical
in
light
of
the
constant
attempts
by
various
professional
societies
to
upgrade
the
qualifications
of
their
membership.
Some
lawyers,
for
instance,
belong
to
the
Canadian
Tax
Foundation
and,
specializing
in
the
taxation
field,
find
that
this
is
vital
to
their
practice.
Most
lawyers
in
Canada
are
members
of
the
Canadian
Bar
Association
which
issues
various
publications
and
has
annual
conventions
and
sectional
meetings
for
the
on-going
education
of
its
members.
The
membership
dues
in
the
Canadian
Bar
Association
are
deducted
by
all
practising
lawyers,
whether
they
be
partners
or
employees
of
a
legal
law
firm.
I
feel
that
the
only
logical
and
reasonable
interpretation
of
subparagraph
8(1)(i)(i)
is
that
it
recognizes
all
branches
of
practice
of
professional
engineering
and
would
therefore
permit
the
inclusion
of
fees
and
dues
paid
by
a
professional
engineer
specializing
in
a
particular
field
of
engineering
to
maintain
and
upgrade
his
qualifications
in
that
specialized
field.
Perhaps
Parliament,
through
the
Department
of
National
Revenue,
should
and
could
give
this
question
some
consideration.
In
that
the
appellant
does
not
bring
himself
squarely
within
the
provisions
of
subparagraph
8(1)(i)(i),
and
in
being
bound
by
the
decision
in
the
Swingle
case
(supra),
I
must
dismiss
the
appeal.
Appeal
dismissed.