Roland
St-Onge
(orally
April
27,
1978)
[TRANSLATION]:—The
appeal
of
Mr
Roland
Vaillancourt
came
before
me
on
April
27,
1978
in
Montreal,
Quebec.
It
is
a
question
of
alimony
paid
by
the
appellant
to
his
wife
during
the
1974
taxation
year.
For
this
taxation
year,
the
appellant
sought
to
deduct
the
sum
of
$9,957
from
his
income
as
alimony
paid
to
his
wife
during
the
said
year.
The
respondent
disallowed
the
deduction
of
$5,967
which
the
appellant
had
paid
to
his
wife
during
the
period
from
January
1,
1974
to
August
22
of
the
same
year
because,
apparently,
there
was
no
written
agreement
or
court
judgment
for
this
period.
In
fact,
the
evidence
revealed
that
a
judgment
had
been
rendered
on
August
22,
1974,
ordering
the
appellant
to
pay
alimony
of
$210
per
week
to
his
wife
to
provide
for
her
needs
and
those
of
their
children,
in
her
custody,
and
that
no
written
agreement
had
been
made
between
the
appellant
and
his
wife
concerning
the
payment
of
$5,967.
The
appellant
testified
that
he
had
paid
$177
per
week
to
his
wife
from
the
beginning
of
the
year
to
the
date
of
the
judgment,
and
that
before
the
judgment,
a
draft
agreement
had
been
prepared
by
his
wife’s
lawyer
after
he
had
met
with
her
in
the
lawyer’s
office.
The
appellant
explained
that
he
had
not
signed
the
written
agreement,
and
I
quote
his
words:
I
wanted
to
determine
whether
the
agreement
was
reasonable.
It
is
therefore
quite
evident
that
at
this
time
no
written
agreement
had
been
made.
The
appellant
argued,
basing
himself
on
Art.
1472
of
the
Civil
Code
of
the
province
of
Quebec,
that
only
the
consent
of
the
two
parties
is
required
in
order
to
constitute
an
agreement
or
a
contract.
Unfortunately,
the
Board
cannot
take
this
section
of
the
Civil
Code
into
account
because
paragraph
60(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act
must
be
interpreted
restrictively,
and
the
said
section
reads
as
follows:
Alimony
payments.—an
amount
paid
by
the
taxpayer
in
the
year,
pursuant
to
a
decree,
order
or
judgment
of
a
competent
tribunal
or
pursuant
to
a
written
agreement,
as
alimony
or
other
allowance
payable
on
a
periodic
basis
for
the
maintenance
of
the
recipient
thereof,
children
of
the
marriage,
or
both
the
recipient
and
children
of
the
marriage,
if
he
was
living
apart
from,
and
was
separated
pursuant
to
a
divorce,
judicial
separation
or
written
separation
agreement
from,
his
spouse
or
former
spouse
to
whom
he
was
required
to
make
the
payment
at
the
time
the
payment
was
made
and
throughout
the
remainder
of
the
year.
According
to
this
section,
it
is
clear
that
the
amounts
paid
as
alimony
should
be
paid
pursuant
to
a
judgment
of
a
competent
tribunal
or
to
a
written
agreement,
and
that
according
to
the
numerous
precedents
cited
by
counsel
for
the
respondent,
the
meeting
and
the
interview
on
December
13,
1973
at
the
office
of
Mrs
Vaillancourt’s
lawyer,
the
sending
of
a
letter
and
draft
agreement
by
the
wife’s
lawyer
to
the
appellant,
and
the
twenty
cheques
totalling
$5,657
[sic]
all
signed
by
the
appellant
and
endorsed
by
Mrs
Vaillancourt,
cannot
in
any
way
constitute
a
valid
written
agreement
within
the
meaning
of
paragraph
60(b)
of
the
Income
Tax
Act.
For
all
these
reasons,
I
must
dismiss
the
appeal.
The
appeal
is
dismissed.
Appeal
dismissed.
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